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Abstract 
In the last thirty years, the discipline of International Relations has witnessed a 
shift of analytical scope from the conventional world of states towards population- 
and social forces-related concerns. According to major scholarship, this occurs as a 
result of interrelated processes of economic globalisation, United States hegemony 
and emergence of the human security paradigm among Western policy circles. 
However, this assumption has entailed problems to the research of human agency in 
the actual practice of international affairs, since Western hegemony is arguably 
entrenched in the international system to the point of “hijacking” sovereign states, as 
suggested by Oliver Richmond, particularly in the developing world.  
Focusing its analysis on states, this dissertation sets out to argue that, rather 
than essentialised in the hegemonic structure, postcolonial states, notably in Africa, 
hold agency. When interacting with the leading international powers, and even if 
highly constrained by external policies and actions, they act with autonomy by 
identifying their own policy problems, defining strategies and seeking political goals. 
States’ agency is influenced by three independent variables: the broader realm of 
foreign policy relations maintained with international actors (public and private), 
namely leading states; the encompassing arena of domestic policies of the state at 
stake; and the actual practices of the state, particularly with its local constituents. The 
employed theoretical framework builds on Kenneth Waltz’s concepts of state as unit 
with agency in an international system that, nevertheless, is asymmetric. Moreover, 
the state is taken as a social relation, as suggested by Justin Rosenberg, in which 
internal and external spheres of state action are interconnected historically and 
sociologically. 
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The case study consists of the process of implementation of the United States 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in Botswana, Ethiopia and 
South Africa. Since 2003, PEPFAR has been a major tool of United States foreign 
policy, especially in Eastern and Southern Africa, serving security, economic and 
humanitarian purposes. It is a very large public-private partnership that includes 
United States government agencies and United States-based nongovernmental 
organisations, governmental and nongovernmental entities from the countries under 
intervention, as well as international multilateral organisations. Through PEPFAR, 
the United States of America exerts significant power, at various levels (individual, 
community and national), in the countries that accept it, despite principles of ‘shared 
responsibility’ and country ownership. More broadly, PEPFAR displays the 
problems that arguably feature global health governance, namely as far as utter 
asymmetric relations between donor and recipient states are concerned, in which the 
latter are rendered the role of facilitator or ‘rogue’ with regard to the former’s 
policies. Accordingly, the three states have acted as facilitators, with the exception of 
South Africa under President Thabo Mbeki.  
This dissertation’s argument is illustrated by the analysis of agency held by the 
three states in light of PEPFAR’s implementation and overall relations with the 
United States of America. The Botswana state behaves towards the survival of the 
national population, since close to one quarter of the adult population lives with 
HIV/AIDS in a context of shrinking developmental prospects. In the case of 
Ethiopia, self-help is also the main concern, yet centralised in the current political 
regime, in which human development, including improvement of health care, is 
considered fundamental in that effort. Finally, in the case of South Africa, the 
xiii 
 
transmission of values domestically and internationally on the dignity of Africans has 
driven the way in which the governments have addressed the HIV/AIDS issue.          
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Resumo 
Nos últimos trinta anos, a disciplina de Relações Internacionais tem assistido 
a uma transferência de enfoque analítico do mundo convencional dos Estados em 
direção a questões ligadas às populações e às forças sociais. De acordo com 
importantes autores, tal deve-se a processos interrelacionados ligados à globalização 
económica, hegemonia dos Estados Unidos da América e emergência do paradigma 
da segurança humana nos ciclos de decisão política ocidentais. Contudo, esta 
premissa tem levado a problemas referentes à investigação da agency humana na 
prática dos assuntos internacionais, uma vez que a hegemonia ocidental encontra-se, 
alegadamente, tão enraizada no sistema internacional ao ponto de “sequestrar” 
Estados soberanos, como sugere Oliver Richmond, em particular no mundo em vias 
de desenvolvimento.       
Concentrando a sua análise nos Estados, esta dissertação argumenta que, em 
vez de se constituírem parte essencial da estrutura hegemónica, os Estados pós-
coloniais, nomeadamente em África, retêm agency. Na sua interação com as 
principais potências internacionais, e mesmo quando altamente condicionados por 
políticas e ações externas, esses Estados atuam com autonomia através da 
identificação, por si próprios, dos seus problemas políticos, definindo estratégias e 
visando objetivos políticos. A agency dos Estados é influenciada por três variáveis 
independentes: o âmbito alargado das suas políticas relativamente a atores 
internacionais (públicos e privados), nomeadamente os Estados mais importantes; o 
setor mais amplo de políticas domésticas do Estado em causa; e as práticas efetivas 
desse Estado, nomeadamente com a sua população. O enquadramento teórico 
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utilizado assenta nos conceitos de Kenneth Waltz sobre Estado enquanto unidade 
com agency num sistema internacional que, não obstante, é assimétrico. Além disso, 
o Estado é tomado como uma relação social, como sugerido por Justin Rosenberg, 
em que as esferas interna e externa de ação do Estado estão interconectadas 
histórico-sociologicamente.       
O estudo de caso consiste no processo de implementação do Plano de 
Emergência do Presidente dos Estados Unidos da América para a SIDA (PEPFAR, 
na sigla inglesa) em Botsuana, Etiópia e África do Sul. Desde 2003, o PEPFAR tem 
constituído um instrumento principal na política externa norte-americana, 
especialmente na África Oriental e Austral, servindo objetivos securitários, 
económicos e humanitários. Apresenta-se como uma extensa parceria público-
privada que inclui agências do governo norte-americano, organizações não-
governamentais norte-americanas, entidades governamentais e não-governamentais 
dos países sob intervenção, bem como organizações multilaterais internacionais. 
Através do PEPFAR, os Estados Unidos da América exercem um poder significativo, 
a vários níveis (individual, comunitário e nacional), nos países que o aceitam, apesar 
dos princípios de ‘responsabilidade partilhada’ e propriedade do país (country 
ownership). De modo geral, o PEPFAR ostenta os problemas que caracterizam a 
governação global da saúde, em especial as assimetrias profundas que separam 
doadores de recetores, em que os últimos cumprem funções de facilitadores ou de 
‘rogue’ face às políticas dos primeiros. Os três Estados em análise têm atuado como 
facilitadores, com a exceção da África do Sul sob presidência de Thabo Mbeki.      
Esta dissertação conclui que os três Estados detêm agency à luz da 
implementação do PEPFAR e relações em geral com os Estados Unidos da América. 
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O Estado do Botsuana age em prol da sobrevivência da sua população nacional, 
sendo que perto de um quarto da população adulta vive com o VIH/SIDA num 
contexto de perspetivas negativas de desenvolvimento. No caso da Etiópia, a 
autoajuda é também a principal preocupação, embora centralizada no regime político 
vigente, em que o desenvolvimento humano, que inclui melhoria dos cuidados de 
saúde, é fundamental nesse esforço. Finalmente, no que respeita à África do Sul, a 
transmissão de valores, no plano doméstico e internacional, sobre a dignidade dos 
africanos está na base do modo como os sucessivos governos têm lidado com o tema 
do VIH/SIDA.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
1.1. States, Populations and Social Forces 
The last thirty years have witnessed a growing debate on what should 
ultimately constitute the subject matter of study by scholars of International Politics. 
Should the analysis primarily focus on states, populations or social forces? 
Traditionally, states, and the conflicts eminently associated with them in terms of 
military, economic and ideological expansion, have been the major topic of study in 
the discipline, as the classical literature by Edward H. Carr (1939), Hans Morgenthau 
(1948) or Kenneth Waltz (1979) shows. However, the emergence of agendas 
diverging from strict focus on states started to gain particular currency since the 
1980s onwards (although, in some cases, proceeding from well before then), and 
challenged prominent state-centred conceptions of international affairs.   
One agenda that started to shift the conventional scope of analysis towards an 
enlarged range of actors was introduced by the sub-discipline of Security Studies. By 
concentrating on the experience of humans living within states, or in-between states 
(for example, migrants), or natural phenomena (e.g. catastrophes), and the way they 
impact on societies, they examined those social and natural phenomena’s 
implications for the stability of countries and regions. In this regard, social 
constructivism (Wendt, 1992), and its multi-theoretical variations, such as “post-
structuralist realism” (Wæver, 1989: 38) – also known as the Copenhagen School –, 
has played a part in the exercise of identifying causalities that link human-related 
phenomena to security concerns.  
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To some extent, this agenda likened the one of Peace Studies, which had 
started years before with Johan Galtung (1969), and looked, often in a 
transdisciplinary fashion, at typologies of violence and peace, in which the 
conventional inter-state relationship was one of several realms of analysis. A 
thorough study of peace and violence implied looking inside countries, and social 
groups (defined by gender, ethnicity, among other criteria).    
A prominent scholarly and policy consequence of the shift operated by those 
groups of scholars was the rise of the human security paradigm among the foreign 
policy agendas of a number of governments in the late 1990s, particularly among 
Western Europe and so-called ‘Middle Powers’ (Canada, Japan) (Behringer, 2005; 
Debiel and Werthes, 2006). However, the major proponent was the United Nations 
system, whose Human Development Report (1994) defined human security as 
‘freedom from need’ and ‘freedom from want.’ Human security points to a whole 
range of phenomena that pose direct and indirect threats to the integrity of the human 
being and human conglomerates, such as hunger, disease, social disruption, and 
violence. 
Another body of scholarship pertinent to this overview originated among 
scholars of globalisation and international organisations (Keohane, 2002; Ruggie, 
2004). Although far from recent, globalisation as a process of integration of markets, 
territories and populations at a worldwide scale was exacerbated from the 1980s 
onwards thanks to increasingly sophisticated means of communication and 
information. From the early 1990s, with the demise of the Union of the Soviet 
Socialist Republics (henceforth Soviet Union), it was further pushed by perceived 
hegemony of the United States of America (Keohane, 1984). The relevance of non-
19 
 
state actors in that process, namely private companies and nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs), conglomerated around an idea of ‘retreat of the state’ and 
supremacy of ‘social and economic forces’ in terms of core objects of study.  
The centrality of social forces, or structures, has been particularly evident in 
the domain of International Political Economy (Cox, 1981), but also in International 
Relations (Gilpin, 1987), in which ideological bodies such as liberalism, or neo-
liberalism, became increasingly at the heart of analysis rather than individual states. 
Certainly, states remained very important actors, yet not as sovereign policy-making 
entities as they used to be (Jessop, 2003). In a context of expanding mechanisms of 
social, political and economic organisation based on public-private partnerships 
states are rendered the role of facilitators and mediators of an assemblage of public 
and private actors (Ibid.). This dissertation’s case study, the United States President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), constitutes a striking example of such 
partnerships.   
It should be added that the main geographical location of these bodies of 
authors and policy-makers is Northern America and Western Europe. As a result, 
even if unintendedly, their methods of constructing social reality may reflect the 
epistemological centrality of the West in world affairs. In this regard, not only ethno-
centrism may permeate the study of International Relations but also a gender-biased 
approach. Critical Feminist scholars have stressed the leading universalising morality 
in the discipline who “turn out to characterize only certain, specific individuals (e.g., 
male, white, middle-class property owners)” (Hutchings, 1999: 20).    
The constructivist character of the post-Cold War international world is 
exemplified by the realm of global health, in which one’s case study is situated. 
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Global health constitutes the space where manifold actors (states, international 
organisations, nongovernmental organisations, private companies, populations) and 
phenomena (e.g. epidemics) interact according to their different conflicting agendas, 
which are supposed to be governed. As Chapter 3 suggests, global health governance 
has been a failure, because there is no central government enforcing order upon it. 
Global health governance is driven by asymmetric relations between powerful and 
weak actors, notably states. Often the powerful actors correspond to funders of 
global health initiatives of different sorts, whereas the weak are, generally, the 
recipient of such initiatives. Still, the idea of population, its needs, duties and rights, 
lies at the core of global health debates, often hindering the issue of inter-state 
asymmetry.     
As a result, the focus on human security and global social forces has resulted 
on the growing primacy of the population over states in terms of major actors of 
analysis. Eminently, population-related topics such as international development, 
migrations, epidemics, or human rights, became absolutely central in the day-to-day 
policy and analysis of international affairs. This prominence is visible in the recent 
readings, mostly by critical authors in the discipline, of the practice of development 
or human rights, based on the frameworks of biopower and biopolitics (Foucault, 
1978; 1984), which reflect precisely on the issue of the population, and the 
management that it is subjected by global social forces (Douzinas, 2007; Duffield, 
2007; Jabri, 2007). These social forces have macro and micro dimensions that, 
altogether, demonstrate a transfused sovereign power among diverse units, as several 
works in Anthropology have been suggesting in the area of development, health and 
HIV/AIDS (Escobar, 1984/1985; Ferguson, 1994; Nguyen, 2010). Sovereignty is not 
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solely characteristic of state institutions, but of different actors, whose power “to 
give life or impede it to the point of death” (Foucault, 1984) is absolutely crucial.   
However, such “radical” (Chandler, 2009a) reading of the post-Cold War 
liberal order is found wanting for the fact that it does not allow for a perspective of 
human agency in it, as suggested by David Chandler (Ibid.). In one’s reading, human 
agency is formulated in terms of a deliberative power of states as political 
communities, no matter how complex they might be domestically, to institute its own 
policy vis-à-vis the constraints that affect their action. Eventually, this invites a 
reassessment of current population-centred approaches and shift analytical focus 
back to states, although, as discussed in Chapter 4, taking into consideration the 
complementarity of internal and external spheres of the state and their social forces. 
As such, the proposed refocus on the state does not entail the adoption of Waltzian 
theory as developed by the original author.     
As Chapter 4 discusses, some critical scholars of postcolonial theory 
inspiration (Richmond, 2010; Ginty, 2010; De Goede, 2010) have researched agency 
inside states, at the population level, as expressions of local resistance against a 
hegemonic liberal structure. Nevertheless, one finds this assertion troublesome, since 
it often suggests that states, including so-called ‘weak states,’ typically from the 
developing world, are already embedded in that hegemonic structure. In fact, this 
dissertation’s purpose is to demonstrate that, despite highly constrained by the 
external structure, states are characterised by agency when behaving with other 
states, including highly stronger ones. Even if in a context of international 
asymmetry, states retain their ability to take decisions of their own and pursue 
strategies and policies autonomously, with a view to the accomplishment of national 
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interests. As it is shown throughout the empirical part (Chapters 6, 7 and 8), they do 
not necessarily bandwagon (Waltz, 1979: 126) with, or are “hijacked” (Richmond, 
2010) by, the structural hegemonic powers in terms of policies and practices. 
The process of state agency vis-à-vis powerful international structures, 
particularly the United States of America, consists of the dissertation’s dependent 
variable, and will be explained by three independent variables. Considering the 
character of the case study, discussed in the following section, the first independent 
variable corresponds to the nature of foreign relations between the beneficiary 
countries – Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa – and the donor countries – in this 
case, the United States of America, within and beyond PEPFAR. The second 
independent variable refers to the nature of domestic policies of each individual 
country, and their interaction within and beyond the donor countries’ – United States 
of America – foreign policies. Finally, the third independent variable concerns local 
dynamics of policy implementation by the beneficiary countries’ governments/states 
and its connection with the donor country’s – United States of America – policy 
influence. The autonomous action of individual states is constrained by their broader 
intervention in the exterior (region, continent and even world) and inside their own 
borders, in relation with their national communities. States’ actions demonstrate their 
need for survival as a nation (Botswana) and as a political regime (Ethiopia), but also 
their will to transmit ideas and values across the region and the continent (South 
Africa).          
Concepts of agency and structure in International Relations were originally 
theorised by Kenneth Waltz (1979) in Theory of International Relations. States are 
the units in the international structure, and they hold agency when acting with other 
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units. In that regard, they are sovereign; however, no matter how powerful the state, 
such sovereignty is constrained by the structure. Later authors in the same theoretical 
tradition as Waltz, i.e. structural neorealism (Keohane, 1984; Mearsheimer, 2001), as 
well as in other traditions (Bickerton, 2007), have argued that from the 1980s 
onwards the structure has become the hegemony of the United States of America, 
allies in Western Europe, and Japan. However, just like there is no absolute 
sovereignty, there is no absolute hegemony either. This means that a country, no 
matter how weak it can be in economic and military terms, still enjoys a degree of 
agency, especially when behaving with powerful states. Indeed, this dissertation’s 
argument goes along those lines. However, this understanding of agency needs to 
bear in mind the context of asymmetry between powerful, hegemonic states and 
weaker states. One needs to recognise weaker states’ “subalternity” (Ayoob, 2022). 
This asymmetry is primarily understood in function of the disparities of wealth and 
human development between regions, but also the origin of influential 
epistemologies and policies that consubstantiates the actual relationship. In the 
particular case of postcolonial Sub-Saharan African states, which are at stake in this 
dissertation, the question of context is very crucial.  
Moreover, one ought to connect both external and internal dimensions of 
states in order to understand their behaviour with powerful states, reversing the 
neorealist postulate that both spheres should remain detached (Rosenberg, 1990, 
1994). States’ actions need to be informed by their historical and sociological 
experience. Furthermore, despite their specificities associated with the European 
colonial project, states in Sub-Saharan Africa are certainly part of the international 
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system, and should be subject of analysis in the discipline like states anywhere else 
(Brown, 2006).    
 
1.2. Case Study 
 
1.2.1. United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) 
PEPFAR is the product of different interrelated security and humanitarian 
concerns that emerged among the William “Bill” Clinton Administration (1993-
2001), crystallized around the political elite led by George W. Bush (2001-2009), 
and continued under the current Barack Obama presidency (since 2009). It 
constitutes a striking example of United States foreign policy in the area of global 
health/development and diplomacy, in which asymmetric relations between the 
United States of America and countries under implementation stand out. Moreover, 
given its all-encompassing character in terms of types and quantity of organisations 
involved and sectors of activity approached, PEPFAR holds a crosscutting impact on 
recipient countries’ external, internal and local dimensions of governance.       
Launched in 2003, PEPFAR was inserted in the context of the United States 
War on Terror (Lyman and Morrison, 2006; d’Aoust, 2006), and more broadly 
within the emerging nexus linking epidemics to security that came to the fore 
through several intelligence and think tank reports (National Intelligence Council, 
2000; Gordon, 2002; Schneider and Moodie, 2002). The fear of an expanding global 
jihad exploiting social vulnerabilities provoked by AIDS in the worst-affected 
territories of Muslim majority or of Muslim ‘large minorities,’ such as Nigeria, South 
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Africa and Ethiopia (Lyman and Morrison, 2006), constitutes a serious motivation 
for action and scaling-up the response. Yet, linkages to security precede, not only 
September 11 2001 terrorist attacks, but also the very Bush Administration (Pereira, 
2009).  
Nevertheless, preventing global jihads and local instability through 
HIV/AIDS implementation does not represent, as such, the sole justification for 
PEPFAR which has allocated for its first phase (2004-2008) close to 15 billion US 
dollars. Other reasons were important too. First, there were domestic dynamics, i.e. 
arguably the need faced by the Bush Administration to respond to its pressuring 
Christian conservative constituency (the so-called Christian Right) vastly engaged in 
HIV/AIDS politics, and broadly in development in the Third World (Dietrich, 2007). 
Second, in the latest period of his mandate, President Bush has arguably 
‘necessitated’ to deposit a positive policy-making legacy vis-à-vis very low 
popularity levels at home and abroad (Feffer, 2008). Nevertheless, as former United 
States Global AIDS Coordinator Mark Dybul (2009) aptly highlighted during the 
latest presidency’s transitional period, United States reputation was very high across 
PEPFAR’s focus countries and should be maintained.  
Finally, philanthropy – often expressed as ‘compassion’ – has guided both 
fund allocation and implementation by a wide range of nongovernmental 
organizations across the fifteen focus countries and a number of others where the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) carries out activities 
in the field too. Various respondents with United States government implementing 
agencies have emphasised this aspect.  
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PEPFAR constitutes the largest financial bilateral initiative to fight a single 
disease ever. Building on the experience of the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS 
Resources Emergency Act of 1990, whose scope was the growing domestic AIDS 
epidemic (Bowen et al., 1992), PEPFAR was established by the United States 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003. Five years 
later it was continued by the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 
2008. PEPFAR is managed by the Office of the United States Global AIDS 
Coordinator and gathers several implementing United States government agencies: 
USAID, Peace Corps, and Departments of State, Defence, Trade, Labour, and Health 
and Human Resources. 
Channelled through United States government’s agencies (primarily USAID) 
and diplomatic missions, PEPFAR has virtually reached the vast majority of 
countries where USAID is present. However, since the beginning, it has focused on 
fifteen countries which accounted for half of the global number of infections by HIV, 
according to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), most of 
them in Southern and Eastern Africa.1 Irrespective of the particularities associated 
with the individual countries, all were generally presented by Dybul (2009) as the 
“future” of United States-led global order.       
According to the Government Accountability Office (2008: 10), budgetary 
allocations for the 2004-2008 five-year period were mostly oriented towards 
antiretroviral (ARV)-based treatment (55%), the rest being dedicated to palliative 
care (15%), prevention (20%) and orphans and vulnerable children (10%). The 
                                                 
1 The fifteen focus countries are Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, French Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia. 
27 
 
problem with PEPFAR treatment funding is that, rather than being used for 
contracting preferably less expensive, generic ARVs (and thus expanding scale-up 
efforts), was oriented for the purchase of United States ‘Big Pharma’ branded ARVs, 
comparatively more expensive (Thompson, 2007). As such, PEPFAR has worked as 
a governmental protectionist scheme for United States pharmaceutical companies to 
enter African markets. In this area changes have reportedly been taking place through 
the inclusion overtime of generic drugs. 
It is important to affirm that, as a public-private partnership, host countries’ 
institutions are equally very relevant. As any annual report to the United States 
Congress demonstrates, ‘partnership’ has been a buzzword in the process of 
PEPFAR (2009a; 2009b; 2011a). PEPFAR policy documents have always been very 
keen in terms of ‘horizontalising’ relations, showing that, in these difficult times of 
AIDS, the United States government and proud nongovernmental organisations stand 
together with the world’s least advantaged populations. Illustratively, photographs 
line side by side President Bush or a United States ambassador with their 
counterparts or ‘civil society members,’ especially children and young people. In 
turn, the flag of the United States of America stands side by side with the host 
country’s flag. However, despite this rhetoric of horizontal relations, it becomes 
clear, as the coming pages show, that the United States government maintains the 
material hegemony over the partnership, the host governments, and nongovernmental 
organisations, remaining the weakest link in it.  
Over the years PEPFAR has advanced different models of partnership. The 
latest incarnation has received the title of “partnership framework”2 (PEPFAR, 
                                                 
2 For the partnership frameworks signed with Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa see Annexes 5, 6 
and 7. 
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2009a) in March 2009, which replaces the previous, called “partnership compact” 
(PEPFAR, 2009b). Alleged differences between one and the other merely regard 
juridical definitions, as the newest denomination is not legally binding. Nevertheless, 
one can argue that, at the content level, one is essentially talking about the same, and 
thus it is pertinent to insert this quotation about “partnership compact” extracted 
from the 2009 annual report to the United States Congress: 
To build on the success the American people’s partnerships have 
achieved to date and reflect the paradigm shift to an ethic of mutual 
partnership, the USG is working with host countries to develop 
Partnership Compacts: agreements that engage governments, civil 
society, and the private sector to address the issues of HIV/AIDS. The 
goal of Compacts is to advance the progress and leadership of host 
nations in the fight against HIV/AIDS, with a view toward enhancing 
country ownership of their programs. (…) PEPFAR will continue to be 
part of this new era of development that champions friendship and 
respect, mutual understanding and accountability — and trusts in the 
people on the ground to do the work. (PEPFAR, 2009e: 58) 
In its March 2009 draft version, the Partnership framework’s guidance text 
states “an optional two-step process of developing a broad initial Partnership 
Framework and a subsequent more detailed Partnership Framework Implementation 
Plan” (PEPFAR, 2009a: 3). Moreover, the five-year co-joint strategic partnership 
framework is to fulfil principles of transparency, accountability, and the active 
participation of other key partners from civil society, the private sector, other 
bilateral and multilateral partners, and international organizations, and should 
support and strengthen national HIV/AIDS strategies” (Ibid.).3 Out of the different 
principles “country ownership” and flexibility are the most emphatic. 
PEPFAR is articulated with the African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000. 
Its latest report, of 2008, affirms that it “has helped African firms become more 
                                                 
3 It should be mentioned that PEPFAR’s budget includes the United States’ participation in the Global 
Fund. The other multilateral institution in which the United States is engaged is UNAIDS. 
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competitive internationally, thereby bolstering sub-Saharan African economic 
growth and helping to alleviate poverty in one of the poorest regions of the world” 
(Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2008: 7). However, such 
economic growth has not been large enough in order to reduce the large trade deficit 
Africa as a whole maintains with the United States of America (United States 
Department of Commerce, 2009: 41). As such, it is necessary to foster economic 
growth in order to enlarge a consuming market for United States products. 
With the Obama Administration, the major novelty has been the Global 
Health Initiative, which aims at harmonising the different global health programs, 
such as PEPFAR and the President’s Malaria Initiative, and incorporating other 
epidemics with a focus on health systems and gender in eight focus countries (Office 
of the Spokesman, 2010).4 In a context of budgetary constraints, the Administration 
has decreased the pace of funding to the global health programs, including PEPFAR. 
Moreover, this is a phase of shifting the emergency mode towards sustainability and 
country ownership (Pereira, 2011a). 
 
1.2.2. PEPFAR in Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa 
Apart from being PEPFAR focus countries,5 Botswana, Ethiopia and South 
Africa were chosen for being representative of different strategic rationales regarding 
security, development and overall political and economic reform. 
                                                 
4 Countries are Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, and Rwanda. 
5 As discussed in Chapter 5, the category of focus country has disappeared from PEPFAR’s official 
policy literature after the first phase of implementation of the Plan (2004-2008). However, at the time 
of elaborating the doctoral project (2008), it was still featuring, and therefore it is employed 
throughout the dissertation.   
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On the one hand, Botswana’s relevance is explained by a constructivist 
element of United States foreign policy. In the latest decades, Botswana’s 
governments are considered exemplary for their commitment to economic growth, 
good governance, stability, and liberal institutions. Eventually, the country is put 
forward as a ‘model’ that the rest of the continent should emulate. In a context of 
persistent conflict and underdevelopment across the continent, Botswana is presented 
as the country everyone should aspire to be. Consensually, available literature 
presents this country as a major case of successful and peaceful postcolonial national 
development under a liberal framework based on partnership between the state and 
private interests (Mbabazi et al., 2002: 38-39; Mogae, 2006). Such success is much 
enhanced when this country is compared with other Sub-Saharan countries, mostly 
those whose economies rely on mineral resources. The example of HIV/AIDS further 
centralises that aspect, the national government being generally commended for its 
committed and “country-owned” (Whitfield and Maipose, 2008) response to advice 
on the social and economic impact of the epidemic (Osei-Hwedie, 2001; Bar-On, 
2002; Noorbaksh, 2008; Gossett, 2010). In fact, the country has been severely 
affected by the epidemic, as close to one quarter of the adult population lives with 
the disease (WHO, 2010: 32). 
On the other hand, Ethiopia and South Africa were chosen for their status as 
‘anchors’ of strategic policy of the United States of America, in their corresponding 
regions, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, and the African continent as a whole 
(Jefferson, 2006; Schraeder, 2006). As the United States Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) is launched with the aim of stabilizing the continent in more diplomatic 
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and humanitarian forms (Esquire, 2008), they reflect a harder version of power 
politics embedded in United States foreign policy. 
As far as Ethiopia goes, its regional location has been featured by manifold 
threats such as state failure, epidemics, Islamic extremism, refugee movements and 
armed conflicts. In a context of complex relations between the United States of 
America and the countries in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia emerges as the main 
United States local ally in the effort of stabilization inside Ethiopia and around the 
region (Somalia, Northern Kenya, Eritrea and South Sudan) (Lyons, 2006). 45 to 
50% of the Ethiopian population is Muslim (Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the 
United Nations, 2007), and therefore it is deemed worrisome. Concerning 
HIV/AIDS, although the prevalence rate among adults is relatively small (2.1% 
[WHO, 2010: 32], it affects close to one million people.  
With regard to South Africa, the large size of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (18.1% 
of prevalence among adults [Ibid.]) poses itself security concerns from a United 
States foreign policy perspective. Most studies relating AIDS and security in South 
Africa (and Southern Africa in general) reflect upon impact in the military structures 
(Heinecken, 2003; Rupiya, 2006), war (Cheek, 2001), urban juvenile criminality 
(Schönteich, 1999) and recruitment of youths for extremist activity against Western 
interests (Lyman and Morrison, 2006: 56-57).6 Even though deeply integrated in the 
global capitalist economy and characterised by the rule of liberal political institutions 
and a vibrant civil society sector, the specificity of domestic dynamics on urban 
insecurity, violence, social exclusion, and increasing inequalities, often mirrored by 
the experience of HIV/AIDS, demands careful attention from a security perspective. 
                                                 
6 The Muslim population accounts for 1.5% of the total population of the country (South African 
Government, 2008). 
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1.3. Methodology 
This is a qualitative study that involves analysis of policies and practices of 
different actors, with a focus on the government of the United States of America, 
Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa. This study incorporates disparate types of data 
and techniques of data collection: revision of academic literature (theories of 
International Relations and International Political Economy, Global Health 
Governance, Security Studies, African Studies, United States Foreign Policy, 
Development Studies) and policy documents (primarily PEPFAR and United States 
government as a whole, and South African, Ethiopian and Botswana government); 
media reporting (on PEPFAR and the governments of all countries involved); semi-
structured interviews with representatives of PEPFAR implementing organisations 
and other relevant actors; and, finally, observations of daily social and political life in 
Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa.   
Regarding the interviews, two sets of questions were defined. One set 
targeted prime implementers of PEPFAR, although, occasionally, sub-partners were 
also interviewed under the same set (Annex 1).7 The other set was applied to a range 
of stakeholders in the area of HIV/AIDS, health, development and governance, yet 
without being funded under PEPFAR (Annex 2). The purpose was to obtain outsider 
views on PEPFAR-funded projects and their effects. 
Considering the vast number of implementers and time limitations, one opted 
out for prime implementers only. The identification of implementers was carried out 
                                                 
7 There are two types of implementing partners: prime and sub. The hierarchy is explained by the 
process of funding application, in which the prime secures the funding in the first place, and then 
channels it down to the sub-partner level. 
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through access to the country operational plans, downloadable on PEPFAR’s website 
(www.pepfar.gov), to websites of the United States’ Embassies in the three countries. 
This was done before and during the individual field enquiry periods. One contacted 
as many prime implementers as possible in order to obtain the largest possible 
number of interviews. Time limitations also posed constraints on the examination of 
the fullest scope of the dependent variable (the process of state agency).  
Questions to PEPFAR implementers’ representatives were conceived to be as 
broad and flexible as possible in order to accommodate the maximum amount of 
information on the implementing organization’s mission and activities, and relations 
with the United States and national governments under PEPFAR. Questions also 
looked for opinions and perceptions about various relevant issues, such as the 
HIV/AIDS response, developmental achievements in the country, and, occasionally, 
security. Being a qualitative study, the manifold claims made by interviewees are 
merely informative with regard to one’s broader discussions in this dissertation. They 
are taken as such and never as scientifically conclusive arguments. It is not one’s 
concern to question the validity of such claims, but solely to build on the social, 
political and professional experiences that come attached to those claims, and the 
way they are put forward. 
In terms of the relationship maintained between researcher and interviewees, 
a Waiver Consent/Authorization for Minimal Risk Research was issued by the PhD 
Program Coordinator at the School of Economics, University of Coimbra for this 
doctoral project, and submitted to each potential interviewee.8 The submission of this 
                                                 
8 Interviewees were assured orally that both their names and their organizations would remain 
anonymous in the dissertation. However, as expressed in the rules of the doctoral program, a list of 
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document was part of a larger introductory file with the researcher’s biography, 
doctoral project’s abstract, list of questions and institutional letters issued by home 
and host institutions in the three countries.9 In Ethiopia, the United States embassy in 
Addis Ababa also issued a letter of support. 
In the case of South Africa, where field research took place between early 
September and late November 2009, the primary source of contacts was the lists of 
partners by South African province in 2009 obtained through access to the United 
States’ embassy in South Africa’s website. These lists included: name of institution, 
short presentation of mission and activities, type of PEPFAR-funded program area, 
physical location, and contact information (name, position, telephone number and e-
mail address). This public display of contact information proved, compared to the 
other two countries, highly facilitating with regard to establishing contacts and 
requesting an interview. With the exception of Durban-based implementers, most 
interviews were carried out by telephone and some by e-mail. This had to do with the 
countrywide distribution of implementers’ headquarters, whose personal visit would 
require a far longer field research period in the country. One interviewed 43 prime 
PEPFAR implementers and 4 entities not under PEPFAR funding, mostly 
nongovernmental entities based in the country or in the United States of America.  
In Ethiopia, field research took place in two periods: from early February to 
mid-May 2010, and from early October to late November 2010. The reason for this 
                                                                                                                                          
interviewees was made and delivered to the thesis’ supervisor. The interviews were always carried out 
in English, which generally did not constitute a setback in the relationship between researcher and 
interviewee. 
9 This project was hosted in South Africa by the Health Economics and AIDS Research Division 
(HEARD), University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban; in Ethiopia by the Organization for Social Science 
Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA), Addis Ababa; and in Botswana by the Centre for 
Study of HIV and AIDS (CSHA), University of Botswana, Gaborone. 
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exceptionally extended field research in Ethiopia had to do with the unsatisfying low 
number of interviews done after the first period when compared to the achievements 
in Botswana and South Africa, which had the potential to skew the comparative 
findings of the dissertation. This situation, thus, called for an extended effort in 
Ethiopia. The main source of PEPFAR prime implementers’ contact persons was the 
2009 Country Operational Plan for Ethiopia, which includes no contact details of 
implementers. Unlike in South Africa, the United States’ Embassy in Addis Ababa 
did not make contacts available, either through online search or direct request. As 
such, one had to resort to browsing for contacts on the implementers’ website when 
available and searching for their office and contact person around Addis Ababa and 
the country. In Ethiopia one sought to interview 15 PEPFAR implementers, mostly 
United States governmental and nongovernmental implementers. Although no 
Ethiopian governmental agency made itself available, one had encounters with 
members of the governmental party on an informal basis during the campaigning 
period of May 2010. All interviews were done at the interviewees’ offices and other 
locations of their choice. 
In Botswana, field research occurred from early June until late August 2010. 
Although working with the same kind of source of information as in Ethiopia (the 
2009 Country Operational Plan, which does not display contact details of 
implementers), and therefore having to resort to online browse and physical search of 
offices and contact persons, this operation proved more effective than in Ethiopia. 23 
PEPFAR implementers were interviewed, and from all types: United States and 
Botswana governmental and nongovernmental organisations. With one exception 
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(over the telephone), all interviews were done at the respondents’ offices or other 
locations of their choice. 
In face of the impossibility of arranging personal meetings with higher level 
members of national governments (e.g. Prime Ministers, Presidents of the Republic, 
Ministers of Health, diplomats), one resorted to sources such as media interviews 
with them and public speeches. 
The information collected was treated qualitatively to frame and inform the 
analysis, as well as to illustrate, when deemed appropriate, certain dynamics and 
perceptions from different type of actors involved.   
   
1.4. Field Contribution 
This dissertation aims to make a number of contributions to Peace and 
Conflict Studies in general, although with a specific focus on Global Health 
Governance, Development Studies, African Studies and United States Foreign 
Policy. These contributions are both theoretical and empirical.  
This dissertation engages in two central, ongoing discussions in Peace and 
Conflict Studies: security rationales and policies underneath international 
community’s initiatives in the realm of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, and 
the interrelated question of external structural domination and national state 
sovereignty. On the one hand, one’s case study is emblematic of a major initiative of 
the United States of America, whose scope stretches far beyond its primary goal of 
containing and treating the HIV/AIDS epidemic and interconnected social, economic 
and political dimensions. Together with other policy tools, PEPFAR maintains a 
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lasting influence in recipient countries, at the external, domestic and local levels, 
with a view of accomplishing a security-driven agenda, among other elements. As 
such, this PEPFAR’s discussion offers a nuanced perspective over the prominence of 
security discourses and practices in the larger landscape of peacebuilding and 
development debates. On the other hand, by inquiring the fundamental concepts of 
agency and structure, unit and international system, and corresponding characteristics 
of hierarchy and anarchy, the dissertation addresses the question of whether or not 
policy initiatives advanced by the international community, and more specifically 
those of the United States of America through PEPFAR, reduce drastically or even 
terminate the sovereignty of countries under intervention. The exploration of agency 
in this context requires, however, the redefinition of the object of study centred on 
the state and not the population per se. Although useful in terms of rendering 
operational the concepts of agency and structure, one finds the Waltzian proposal 
limited, and therefore proposed a conceptualization that accounts for issues of 
asymmetry between states as well as the historical and sociological experience of the 
state. 
A topic within International Relations that this dissertation directly 
contributes to is Global Health Governance. Being an area completely contemporary 
to the major research agendas that revolve around globalisation, human security and, 
thus, population-centred research and policy, this dissertation offers insightful 
theoretical and empirical inputs. The theoretical input concerns the role of states, 
their policies, and practices. From an empirical point of view, it deals with one of the 
most important case studies of ‘global health’ as a whole, i.e. the largest bilateral 
program on a major epidemic, and concomitant areas (medical, political, social, 
38 
 
economic). In a larger sense, this dissertation also contributes to Development 
Studies, addressing issues of dependency and agency crucial for studies of 
development aid. 
With regard to African Studies, the dissertation contributes to 
interdisciplinary discussions on statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa and its presumed 
peculiarities within the international system. Additionally, this work focuses on three 
individual African countries, and corresponding implications for their surrounding 
regions and the African continent. It proposes a three-layered presentation of their 
foreign and domestic policies, and practices, in view of their major strategic choices 
and challenges. South Africa has received large attention by scholars in the field over 
the years, and sections dealing with it largely build on that scholarship. However, 
literature outputs specifically on Ethiopia, and most especially on Botswana, are not 
as available. Furthermore, the impact of one single program in these very different 
African states also enriches Comparative Politics literature. This dissertation may 
also appeal to scholars working on policy analysis, and how policy translates into 
practice. In this regard, and considering the case study, United States Foreign Policy 
was particularly central throughout the dissertation.               
Finally, as a piece in the Social Sciences, it collaborates with the inter-
disciplinary and inter-scientific effort of improving the knowledge about the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Together with other epidemics and their determinants, it poses 
a severe constrain on the quality of life of millions of people around the world, and 
therefore demands a permanent reflection that ultimately allows for better individual, 
local, national and international responses.   
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1.5. Chapters’ Roadmap 
This dissertation is divided into nine chapters. After this Introduction 
(Chapter 1), Chapter 2 makes a historical incursion into the experience of 
postcolonial Sub-Saharan states. However, it focuses on the last three decades (1980-
2010), particularly with regard to relations with the Western world. This exercise is 
done with the purpose of contextualising the dependent variable of this dissertation: 
the process of agency, i.e. autonomous, yet constrained, action, of postcolonial Sub-
Saharan states in face of the international structure of Western hegemony. Although 
one’s case study points to three individual states (Botswana, Ethiopia and South 
Africa), this chapter revolves around a generalised idea of the postcolonial African 
state, and underlines the tension of governmentalities that feature the postcolonial 
relationship with regard to development, survival and negotiation of aid and loans. 
Chapter 3 focuses the discussion initiated in the previous chapter in the field 
of Global Health Governance. It reflects on the epistemological foundations of this 
field by emphasising their liberal and constructivist elements. It is argued that global 
health emerges as a Western construction contemporary to globalisation and the post-
Cold War era, in order to make sense of new and old epidemics and their perceived 
effects around the world. Initiatives in the area of health with a global scope appear 
as policies that consolidate Western countries as primary donors, and countries with 
large disease burdens, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, as recipients, and 
rendered the role of either facilitators or ‘rogues’ in the implementation of those 
policies. 
Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework of this dissertation. Proposing 
the dialectics of agency and structure for the study of West-Africa relations, it 
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departs from a reading of Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) conceptualisation of system, 
structure, unit and agency for the world of states, found basically useful for the 
empirical analysis that ensues. After reviewing several hegemony-based approaches 
to international relations, the chapter challenges them by questioning the 
essentialisation to the international structure that the postcolonial state in Sub-
Saharan Africa is subject to by that body of claims, and concomitantly the lack of 
agency that comes associated. Finally, one proposes an analytical framework based 
on the dialectics of agency and structure, however, acknowledging the existent 
asymmetry between the West and Africa and the need to connect external and 
internal spheres of the state, informing them with historical and sociological 
experience. 
Chapters 5 scrutinises the dissertation’s case study: PEPFAR. It presents and 
discusses its origins, political rationales, policies and organisational design. The links 
to security and humanitarianism, as well as its sophisticated division of labour, are 
particularly examined, in order to understand not only the broader United States 
foreign policy, but also how this instrument engages with the host countries, 
especially state institutions. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are the empirical chapters. Each one corresponds to a 
separate independent variable that explains the process of agency of the three states 
(dependent variable). Chapter 6 addresses the nature of foreign policy of the three 
countries. Chapter 7 refers to the domain of domestic policy. Finally, Chapter 8 
considers the actual practices of states/governments in face of the pressures posed by 
the international structure and domestic societies too. It shows the instances through 
which PEPFAR, as well as United States foreign policy at large, is incorporated or 
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rejected vis-à-vis strategic concerns of Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa. It 
demonstrates the coherence across the three levels of analysis that consolidate 
distinguishable behaviours. In the case of Botswana, one identifies a concern for 
survival of the population, in a context of a very large HIV/AIDS burden. Ethiopia 
reveals a survival approach as well, yet driven by the political regime’s self-help. 
Finally, South Africa’s behaviour is characterised by a will to transmit specific ideas 
and values inside and outside the countries’ borders, especially around Africa. 
At last, Chapter 9 presents the conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 – African Postcolonial State in Last Three Decades (1980-
2010) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter looks historically at political developments from the first wave 
of independences throughout the 1960s until the first decade of the 21st century. The 
period under analysis covers the last three decades, and is divided into two periods: 
the 1980s-1990s and the 2000s. Despite the continuities that characterise both 
periods, the differentiation is based on a fundamental policy change towards the 
region among Western organizations and states, and the reactions such change has 
provoked. As such, this chapter introduces the historical basis that inform the 
dependent variable of this dissertation, that is, the process of agency of postcolonial 
national states in Sub-Saharan Africa vis-à-vis the international system featured by 
Western hegemonic interventions in the region, particularly, but not exclusively, 
through development assistance. 
Even though this dissertation analyses three specific countries (Botswana, 
Ethiopia and South Africa), this chapter focuses on a generalised idea of the ‘African 
state.’ It serves the purpose of setting the terms of the debate the empirical chapters 
engage with on the individual countries’ experience with PEPFAR. The relevance of 
framing the background debate based on a generalization has to do with a usual 
methodological approach to the study of African politics, which departs from 
generalisations moving then toward specific countries or issue areas. According to 
leading Africa scholar Jean-François Bayart, this should not imperil the research 
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“since geographical proximity has none the less brought about a relative 
commonality of historical destiny, of which the colonial interlude is only of 
secondary importance” (Bayart, 2009: 34). As Bayart further claims, “[this] allows 
us to construct a scientific object, to circumscribe a political area in a comparative 
perspective, even to talk of an ‘African’ civilization in the sense intended by Braudel 
as a reality of ‘great, inexhaustible length’” (Ibid.).   
However, this choice is also explained by the regional character of the 
broader foreign policy that informs this dissertation’s case study – the launch and 
implementation of PEPFAR since 2003 in Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa. 
Although it is part of a policy with a worldwide scope, PEPFAR has particularly 
been implicated in the broader United States foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan 
Africa. As one discusses in Chapter 5, PEPFAR’s rationale departs from a 
generalising approach to issues around security and stability, irrespective of the 
country at stake. The synthesis of these two drivers of analysis – the methodological 
‘tradition’ in the political study of African affairs and the character of policy-making 
in the United States of America – leads to an approach to general Sub-Saharan 
African relations with the United States of America, and the Western world at large. 
To be more precise, one discusses the role of international aid and loan-giving 
overtime in such relationship.    
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the 
character of the postcolonial settlement between the newly African state and the 
former colonising powers. The second section focuses on the 1980s-1990s, in which, 
despite the powerful influence of the neo-liberalising structural adjustment programs 
of the time, the African national state sought to p
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survivalist modes in very adverse circumstances. In turn, the third section covers the 
first decade of the 21st century, characterised by the securitization of external 
development programs and a policy centred on the imperative of strengthening the 
African state through policies of statebuilding. One witnesses the renewal of a 
purportedly active state setting out to attain different agendas, according to 
individual country’s choices and old and new issues that they face, including 
social/human development and health-related ones. However, the current context is 
also one of diversification of donors and lenders, in which China, for instance, is 
playing a very important role. Indeed, the beginning of the 21st century has witnessed 
in the African scene an emergence of new and powerful actors, apart from Western 
governments and organisations. The final section connects the individual cases of 
South Africa, Ethiopia and Botswana to the contemporary debate paved by the 
previous sections.                   
 
2.2. Postcolonial Settlement 
Although framed by a nationalist rhetoric, strong ties with the former colonial 
powers were generally maintained by the leaders of the former colonies. With a 
relatively small number of exceptions (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, 
Algeria, Zimbabwe and Namibia), transition towards formal independence occurred 
in a fairly smooth manner, in which power was formally delegated from the colonial 
administrators to the leadership of the nationalist parties that had reclaimed 
sovereignty. Regarding the major colonial powers in Africa, the United Kingdom of 
Britain and Northern Ireland (henceforth United Kingdom) and France, there 
generally were no incentives to contend by force those demands of independence, 
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arguably because resources allocated to the colonies were small and therefore did not 
justify military interventions. However, they sought a close relationship with the 
post-independence political regimes.  
The most sensible solution (…) was to leave with every appearance of 
willingness, while establishing as good a relationship as circumstances 
allowed with the successor regimes – many of which were in any event 
led by politicians who were closely associated with the colonial power. 
(Clapham, 1996: 37)    
The postcolonial elites essentially inherited the bureaucratic apparatus 
established during the colonial period, and thus reproduced the rational logic of a 
nation-state as the Weberian tradition puts it. Additionally, the porous character of 
state institutions, namely in technical areas such as education or health – largely 
realms of Western knowledge inculcation –, is explicable by the continual 
connections to the formal administrative and political power (Swidler, 2007). The 
character of the relationship between the newly independent Sub-Saharan African 
states and their former colonial powers was as intense as asymmetric. It “carried with 
it a constant remainder of the colonial past, and could never be entirely divorced 
from a sense of subordination” (Clapham, 1996: 77). In this regard, it is interesting to 
observe the role of the development apparatus in the postcolonial age.  
Expatriate workers from the former metropolis frequently increased in 
number after the independence, especially in the francophone states, and 
provided a strong inducement for their home governments to help 
guarantee peaceful conditions and friendly relations with the African 
state. (Ibid.: 78) 
In fact, the former colonial elites maintained an interest in keeping good relations 
with what they saw as “their Africa” (Ibid.: 79).  
Although the key relationship tended to be with the former coloniser, close 
links were maintained by the postcolonial elites with the superpowers, usually one of 
the two world rivals (United States of America and Soviet Union). Nonetheless, even 
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though the average African postcolonial state is indeed porous, subaltern and to an 
extern subordinated, it does not mean that it does not have the capacity of taking 
independent actions, and as such does not necessarily conform permanently to the 
system’s structural constraints and guidance. Here one looks particularly to the three 
last decades (1980-2010). 
 
2.3. 1980s-1990s: Structural Adjustment Programs and Survivalism 
The immediate post-independence period of the 1960s was heralded with 
optimism. Many African countries sought to attain levels of economic growth as part 
of a nascent developmental strategy driven by the state. This strategy aimed at 
building industries that would facilitate transition from a primary sector-based 
economic stage, contribute for the consolidation of sovereignty, and concomitantly 
reduce dependency from the former colonial rulers. At the same time, social welfare 
concerns were also incorporated in the development strategy. According to Africa 
historian J. D. Fage,   
[with] independence (…) the new leaders of these countries almost 
without exception embarked on development strategies which involved 
increasing production for export of primary agricultural and mineral 
products, and taxing, and borrowing against, the resultant income from 
the world markets to provide funds for the development and 
diversification of the economy and the improvement of society. In 
particular they planned to improve education, health, housing and other 
amenities, so that more people could live in towns and work in new 
industries. The output of these industries should mean that less of the 
national income would need to be expended on imported manufactures, 
so that more funds would be available to pay interest on foreign 
borrowings and ultimately to reduce them. (Fage, 1988: 499)  
However, those early achievements proved to be not lasting, as it became 
increasingly visible in the 1970s. Progressively larger import deficits at the average 
African country started to coexist with a spiral of negative economic growth and 
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depreciation of living conditions among the population (Ibid.). Both external and 
internal factors were pointed out. Externally, the lack of, or insufficient, integration 
by national economies in the global market place, despite the post-independence 
efforts was signalled (Ibid.: 499). Also, the great increases in oil prices in the 1970s 
certainly affected for the most part the number (at the time) of non-oil-producing 
countries, which required energy to fuel the nascent industries (Ibid.: 501). 
Furthermore, the increase in the burden of interest rates on the national economy was 
another obstacle.  
Payments of the interest due on the foreign loans they had acquired to 
help finance their development programmes – let alone any repayments 
of the capital that had been borrowed – were becoming a very high 
proportion of their GNPs [gross national products], and were eating up 
more and more of their diminishing foreign earnings. (Ibid.: 505-506) 
At the internal level, factors such as urbanisation and population growth were 
identified as explanatory of an increasingly difficult situation (Ibid.: 501-505). As put 
by the same historian,  
From 1973 onwards, the problem of growing enough food in Africa to 
feed its growing and increasingly urbanized population was made much 
worse because there were a series of successions of years in which the 
amounts of rain received, particularly in the arid and semi-arid zones 
between 10º and 30º either side of the equator, were markedly less than 
the average. (Ibid.: 504)            
But a second explanation lies on the character of the African state. The 
African state has been described as eminently neopatrimonial and clientelist, 
characterised by a system of “giving and granting of favours, in an endless series of 
dyadic exchanges that go from the village level to the highest reaches of the central 
state” (van de Walle, 2001: 51). This system functions in a hybrid manner, in which 
that practice of favour exchange takes place behind the façade of a modern state 
structure. The nature of the state in Africa has been thoroughly studied in the last 
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couple of decades (Bayart, 2009; Chabal and Deloz, 1999), but for the purposes of 
this chapter, one will refer to Nicolas van de Walle’s description. 
Outwardly, the state has all the trappings of a Weberian rational-legal 
system, with a clear distinction between the public and the private realm, 
with written laws and a constitutional order. However, this official order 
is constantly subverted by a patrimonial logic, in which officeholders 
almost systematically appropriate public resources for their own uses and 
political authority is largely based on clientelist practices, including 
patronage, various forms of rent-seeking, and prebendalism. (Ibid.: 51-
52)    
One critical feature of this neopatrimonial system is that “it results in a 
systematic fiscal crisis” (Ibid.). The same author argues that this crisis – fundamental 
to understand the relation maintained for so long with the international lenders – has 
not to do with a “big state,” as believed by the leaders of the financial institutions, 
but with the revenue side.  
Despite extensive state intervention in the economy [after the 
independence], cronyism and rent-seeking have siphoned off potential 
state revenues. Taxes are not collected, exemptions granted, tariffs 
averted, licenses bribed away, parking fines pocketed. As a result, 
revenues always lag behind expenditures. (Ibid.: 53)  
In a context of external difficulties and given the domestic political 
characteristics, countries turned to the international financial institutions and Western 
Europe to provide them with funding. However, funding through Structural 
Adjustment Programs under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and national donors came with a set of conditionalities that has 
enlarged overtime. 
Aid conditionality means that the granting of aid is tied to whether 
recipient countries adopt, or promise to adopt, certain recommended 
policies. At first only the granting of new short-term balance-of-
payments aid was linked to policy conditionality, but over time most new 
programme and project aid became so linked. The policy conditions to 
which the granting of aid was linked initially concerned only 
macroeconomic matters but were soon extended into attempts to 
restructure the state-market relation. (Engberg-Petersen et al., 1996: 15) 
49 
 
The leading school of thought backing conditionality policies was eminently 
neoliberalism, which was re-emerging in Western Europe and North America in the 
late 1970s, early 1980s, and advocated drastic reductions of state bureaucracy and 
state interventionism in the economy. This school made thrives in several 
governments of the time, whose main concern was to control inflation in their 
countries. The purpose was to release societies from the constraints imposed by the 
state through liberalization of public-owned enterprises, so countries could respond 
more effectively to global market signals (Ibid.: 401). 
It is not one’s purpose to comprehend how neo-colonial, or neo-imperial, this 
process has per se been. Since the independence, the broader relationship between 
the postcolonial state and its former colonial master has been based on asymmetry, 
on dominance of the latter over the former, and therefore van de Walle’s conclusion 
resonates with that premise: “The discourse and ideology of economic liberalization 
was clearly donor driven, with remarkably little local support.” (van de Walle, 2001: 
275) It is rather one’s purpose to analyse the agency, i.e. the autonomous action, 
enjoyed by the national governments under that hegemony. Despite the narrower 
political manoeuvre room imposed by the design of the international interventions, 
national political elites have remained largely untouched, as they sought to navigate 
these conditionalities. As van de Walle shows in his discussion of the structural 
reforms, “measures have been partially undertaken, reserved, diverted, compensated 
for, and manipulated so they do not threaten leaders’ control over discretionary state 
resources” (Ibid.: 274). Moreover, according to the same author, given the 
neopatrimonial character of the African state,  
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overall government consumption does not appear to have declined 
significantly over two decades of reform and, once aid resources to states 
are included, the total amount of resources controlled by governments 
has probably risen by several percentage points of GDP in the last twenty 
years. (Ibid.)   
This behaviour constitutes what Christopher Clapham has coined the “politics 
of state survival” (Clapham, 1996). Accordingly, survivalism has taken many shapes 
and forms from appealing to foreign funding aimed at resolving issues of poverty and 
underdevelopment to facilitating foreign direct investment, in a context in which 
state institutions and government elites generally coincide. As part of the growing 
privatisation of international relations throughout the 1990s, those appeals are 
targeted both at foreign governments and, most prominently perhaps, NGOs, which 
exploded in their visibility and influence, and private companies (Ibid.: 244). The 
governmentality of the liberalizing structural adjustment programs was confronted 
with another governmentality: the governmentality of neopatrimonialism (Bayart, 
2009: 268).              
Aid has arguably helped to assure the elites the status quo. However, it did so 
at a very high cost in terms of reduction of human development. It is not one’s 
purpose to assess the results of these programs in their various dimensions, as, for 
instance, Poul Engberg-Pedersen and colleagues (1996) have done with regard to a 
group of countries in the areas of agriculture, industry, poverty reduction or the 
environment. However, even liberal reformist observers such as van de Walle 
recognise that the reduction of the state functions resulted in “a progressive 
withdrawal of governments from key developmental functions they had espoused in 
an earlier era” (van de Walle, 2001: 276). In other words, states lost capacity to 
address conveniently the critical issues of social welfare and improvement that 
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heighten development. Conversely, the provision of social services started to be 
provided by donors and NGOs who occupy those areas. At that level, the dependency 
of countries have augmented, and while it is fair to emphasise the neopatrimonial 
character of governments, it has to be stressed the extent to which those adjustment 
programs are responsible for such outcomes too.            
By the end of the 1990s, early 2000s, the international establishment altered 
its perspective by shifting policy focus away from a reduced state to a ‘capable’ one. 
Rather than reducing the African state, the purpose became to rebuild it, empower it, 
and make it act ‘responsibly’ towards the international community.                        
 
2.4. The 2000s: Development Securitization, Statebuilding and the 
Developmental State 
Both the international financial establishment and its body of critics 
acknowledged that the structural adjustment interventions across Africa did not bear 
the ultimately intended results. However, they evidently put forward different 
reasons to explain the situation. The former generally refers to a conditionality which 
was not hard enough in terms of enhancing private investment and liberalizing public 
and parastatal10 companies (Engberg-Petersen et al., 1996: 8). In turn, critics focus 
on problems of translating neo-liberalism into practice. For some, the problem of 
neo-liberalism is that it is too “simplistic and misleading” (Ibid.). For others, who do 
not share the same radical stance, the neo-liberal paradigm is “basically correct,” but 
it ought to be adapted to local realities (Ibid.). But perhaps the greatest divide in 
                                                 
10 Parastatals are organisations that belong to the state apparatus, and whose budgets come, fully or 
partially, from external sources. 
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opinion between the former and the latter group has to do with how poor societies 
were before and after the programs. For the critics, the average people became much 
poorer, while the supporters claim the very opposite. The supporters also allude to a 
lack of a counterfactual in the critics’ discourse; they claim one just would not know 
“what would have happened without structural adjustment” (Ibid.).  
In any case, the statistical fact is that in terms of human development, the 
continent has remained in the lowest ranks of the Human Development Index. In 
2000, the United Nations Millennium Summit established eight targets to be ideally 
achieved by 2015. The goals of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals 
are: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; to achieve universal education; to 
promote gender equality and to empower women; to reduce child mortality rates; to 
improve maternal health; to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; to ensure 
environmental sustainability; and to develop a global partnership for development. 
The Millennium Development Goals have constituted the basis of action for 
multilateral initiatives such as the 2001-established Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (henceforth Global Fund). However, major bilateral 
initiatives have been launched, such as the United States Millennium Challenge 
Account and theme-specific programs such as PEPFAR or the President’s Malaria 
Initiative. Another type of initiatives consisted, for instance, on the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries, with an aim of reducing and restructuring the debt towards a fresh 
start for development. 
But these initiatives occurred in a fairly different policy context compared to 
the late 1970s and 1980s described above. Since the end of the Cold War 
commentators and policy-makers have referred to a need of linking developmental 
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efforts to what they perceives as new threats to international security (Krasner and 
Pascual, 2005; Klingebiel, 2006; Adelman and Eberstadt, 2008; Patrick, 2008). 
Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has alluded to them in this brief manner: 
“today the threat is chaos” (Rasmussen, 2002: 333). By this he meant the 
amalgamated phenomena that jeopardise the unprecedented wave of liberal power 
after the demise of the Soviet Union and throughout the 1990s, and that expanded 
across the world through trade and travel. It included the easier proliferation of 
migrations, and concomitantly epidemics; trafficking in drugs and weapons of mass 
destruction; and sophisticated transnational networks of terrorists. The purpose of 
external intervention, preferably through soft power means (Armitage and Nye, 
2007), i.e. aid and business opportunities, but also through military solutions, ought 
to consist in containing phenomena like those.  
The idea of linking security to development of populations is far from new, as 
has been shown in the case of epidemic interventions in colonial settings (Pereira, 
2008).  
The genealogy of securitization of infectious disease can be considered 
as old as the rise of liberal political regime in Europe since the 17th 
century, and whose global expansion and consolidation were favoured by 
international public hygienist surveillance as of the 1830s. (Ibid.: 8) 
However, this time around, the novelty had to do with the observation that 
development had become a strategically-defined question of security as classically it 
used to be with regard to enemy states. This framework has been radically described 
as a governmentality in which the neo-liberal economics embedded in the Structural 
Adjustment Programs of the 1980s and 1990s was complemented by issues of 
denying life opportunities for the populations (Duffield, 2002; 2005; Dillon and 
Lobo-Guerrero, 2008).  
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Rather than serving purposes of progress and emancipation, for Duffield 
(2007), development has become a tool of contention of “surplus” postcolonial 
populations, and the pressures they put on global capitalism since the wave of 
decolonisation in the aftermath of the Second World War. This pressure has become 
more intense from the 1990s onwards, particularly after the attacks in New York and 
Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001, as contention is required for more specific 
goals rooted on security challenges, such as international terrorism and other 
perceived threats to the Western world. Development interventions are constructed in 
rhetorical and policy terms as preventing such threats, and managed by sophisticated 
mechanisms of “governance at a distance” (Duffield, 2005: 208-210). These tools 
build on a presumption of neutrality of developmental work, driven by professional 
experts, and aimed at overcoming stringencies that political struggle generates, as 
anthropologists Arturo Escobar and James Ferguson have shown (Dar and Cooke, 
2008). This body of radical critics of development often constructs analyses through 
the employment of frameworks of biopower and biopolitics developed in the 1970s 
by Michel Foucault, as Chapter 4 discusses into more detail.         
A burgeoning literature with strong impact on Western foreign policy circles 
has placed the problems of ‘new threats’ to security and development, not only but 
particularly in Africa, to the nature of the state in the developing world (Krasner and 
Pascual, 2005; Zartman, 1995; Reno, 1995; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). Those states 
are described as eminently weak or even failed, and thus rendered dangerous. Robert 
Rotberg has defined two very academically and policy influential working 
definitions of weak and failed states. 
55 
 
Weak states (broadly, states in crisis) include a broad continuum of 
states: they may be inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or 
fundamental economic constraints; or they may be basically strong, but 
temporarily or situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, 
management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks. (Rotberg, 2004: 
4)     
In turn, 
Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested 
bitterly by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops 
battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Occasionally, the official 
authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of 
civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of 
dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state. (Ibid.: 5)  
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and 
Washington, DC, United States Policy Advisor Stephen Krasner and United States 
Ambassador Carlos Pascual argued that 
[in] today’s increasingly interconnected world, weak and failed states 
pose an acute risk to the United States of America and global security. 
Indeed, they present one of the most important foreign policy challenges 
of the contemporary era. States are most vulnerable to collapse in the 
time immediately before, during, and after conflict. When chaos prevails, 
terrorism, narcotics trade, weapons proliferation, and other forms of 
organized crime can flourish. Left in dire straits, subject to depredation, 
and denied access to basic services, people become susceptible to the 
exhortations of demagogues and hatemongers. It was in such 
circumstances that in 2001 one of the poorest countries in the world, 
Afghanistan, became the base for the deadliest attack ever on the United 
States homeland, graphically and tragically illustrating that the problems 
of other countries often do not affect them alone. (Krasner and Pascual, 
2005: 153) 
As incongruent and possibly ironic as it might be, the reduction of the state 
advanced by the Structural Adjustment Programs of the previous decades have 
diminished the capacity of states to assure its territorial authority, let alone the 
provision of social goods and services, as noted above. It has long been asserted that 
many African postcolonial states, which inherited the administrative divisions of the 
colonial period, face an endogenous weakness regarding its identity and therefore its 
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predisposition to internal and cross-boundary conflicts (Clapham, 1996). Yet, the 
reduction of the state – and consequently its neopatrimonial character – has arguably 
enhanced the tendency towards fragmentation, as the struggle for resources became 
more intense. Rather than prescribing the reduction of the state as during the 1980s 
and 1990s, Western policy-makers emphasised the role of a strong state in the 
developing world as facilitator of a successful comprehensive foreign policy. Krasner 
and Pascual thus conclude 
Today, stability requires more than maintaining a balance of power 
among strong states. Safety both here and abroad now depends on the 
ability of the United States and the international community to make 
sovereignty work—to establish democracies that improve the lives of 
ordinary individuals rather than of the ruling elite. The first step in this 
process must be to prevent conflict if possible, or to ensure a meaningful 
peace when conflict does occur. The world can do more to help those 
countries at risk of unrest or recovering from war. If successful, then over 
the longer term the United States will have enabled more people to enjoy 
the benefits of peace, democracy, and market economies. That can only 
be in everyone’s best interest. (Ibid.: 163) 
As for the practice of this foreign policy of statebuilding, this has been based 
on an ever-more intense tenet of partnership between governments and international 
organizations, constructed around ‘mutual understandings’ and ‘mutual goals.’ 
Countries in the developing world are encouraged to pursue ‘good governance’ and 
‘accountability,’ thus remaining more responsive to the international community. 
The purpose is to raise a sense of responsibility within a liberal logic of respect for 
civil society, markets and human rights, and eventually ‘own’ the donor-induced 
policies and the donor-driven programs. Establishing a successful, effective 
indigenous state is a precondition for international security and prosperity. 
David Chandler has argued that this foreign policy, in which large-scale 
development-related interventions promoted by Western countries are part of a 
57 
 
general politics of statebuilding in non-Western regions, is one of an “Empire in 
denial” (2006). This process is characterized by a marked depoliticization of 
relations, both between the international community and the countries under 
intervention, and between these latter and their societies. Whereas the national elites, 
given their dependence on the international community, work toward the fulfilment 
of international community’s requirements, the latter, rather than connected to the 
state institutions for public goods, increase their dependence on the system of 
international NGOs, private companies, and often criminal activity too. Relations are 
operated according to “a narrow and functionalist framework” (Ibid.: 5-6). This 
depoliticization is a symptom of the Western empire’s “denialism” of its power 
behaviour and accountability vis-à-vis their societies and, of course, the regions 
where it intervenes (Ibid.: 8-22). For Chandler, as far as relations with Africa are 
concerned, imperial denialism is visible in the establishment of partnerships (a key 
element in PEPFAR, as one will show) in opposition to the 19th century-type overt 
discourse and practice of government. 
The new administrators of empire talk about developing relations of 
‘partnership’ with subordinate states, or even of African ‘leadership,’ at 
the same time as instituting new mechanisms of domination and control. 
Gone is the language of Western dominance and superiority; replaced by 
the discourses of ‘capacity-building’ and ‘empowerment’ in the cause of 
the non-Western Other. (…) They are eager to deny that they have any 
interests or deciding influence at the same time as instituting new 
mechanisms of regulation which artificially seek to play up to the 
authority, rights and interests of those subordinate to them. (Ibid.: 9)      
Indeed, this renewed form of empire is an ethical one in opposition to the 
traditional interest-based approach. Driven by liberalism, this is an empire concerned 
with implementing values such as those mentioned above, and not with conquering 
territories and founding colonies as it used to be. The ethics refer to a concern for the 
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survival, development and security of the populations under intervention framed in 
terms of ‘their (i.e. non-Western) needs,’ and not ‘our (i.e. Western) needs.’ “The 
needs of non-Western states and societies have assumed centre stage.” (Ibid.: 71) 
Unlike in the past, the post-Cold War era of Western dominance seems to have 
cleared “the context of ‘friend/enemy:’ the Other – the object of foreign policy – is 
more likely to be defined on the basis of needs” (Ibid.: 73). In this context, “Western 
states and international institutions appear less as external or coercive forces and 
more as facilitators, empowerers and capacity-builders” (Ibid.: 77). This has been 
very visible in the case of PEPFAR as a bilateral program of the United States 
government to provide primarily HIV/AIDS relief in a number of countries, but also 
in other overarching policy initiatives in and for Africa, such as the United States 
Millennium Challenge Account or the United Kingdom’s Commission for Africa 
(Ibid.: 83-86).     
Parallel to these policy developments in the West, a discourse on African 
Renaissance emerges in South Africa with resonance across the continent. It 
stretches back to the immediate post-apartheid foreign policy of South Africa 
through Deputy President Thabo Mbeki.  
Mbeki formally introduced the idea of a renaissance in an address to an 
American audience in April 1997. Also in 1997, a document entitled The 
African Renaissance: A Workable Dream was released by the Office of 
South Africa’s then-Deputy President. (Taylor, 2005: 33)   
Having generated a flourishing literature of debate and critique,11 African 
Renaissance essentially alludes to a “third moment” of Africa’s postcolonial 
existence, after decolonization (1960s), followed by democratization (1990s), and 
featured by “social, political democratization, economic regeneration and the 
                                                 
11 For a very comprehensive list of publications see http://userpage.fu-
berlin.de/afrosi/documents_pdf/AfricanRenaissanceBibliography.pdf (accessed 14 December 2011). 
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improvement of Africa’s geopolitical standing in world affairs” (Maloka, 2001). 
Although it was alluding to Africa as a whole, it became questionable to what extent 
this was a strategy of regional hegemony by the far most powerful economy in 
Africa to engage profitably with the rest of the continent in a new (post-apartheid) 
context (Cheru, 2002: xii; Lesufi, 2004; Owusu, 2006). Still, it backed the latest pan-
African plan for development in the continent, the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD), set up as a result of collaborative efforts by a group of 
African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa), supported by the 
Organisation of African Unity and endorsed by the group of the eight most 
industrialised countries in the world (G8) (Maloka, 2001). Established in 2001, it 
promised a break away from the ineffective neoliberal policies imposed on African 
countries by structural adjustment policies and serious improvements in national 
governance through further democratization, openness to civil society, transparency 
and accountability (Ibid.). 
This intellectual and policy event was further complemented by the 
reintroduction of the theory and practice of the developmental state in policy 
discussions about Africa (Stein, 2000). As mentioned, the link between the state and 
development was relatively vivid in the immediate post-independence phase, reduced 
drastically by the end of the 1970s when African states turned to the neo-liberally-
driven financial institutions for funding. The idea of a dirigiste state that drives the 
economy towards growth, yet respecting the marketplace, found inspiration in the 
fairly recent success stories of the so-called East Asian Tigers (Malaysia, South 
Korea, Singapore) as well as in the more distant European cases of post-Second 
World War Germany and the Scandinavian countries, who sought to grow 
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economically at a quite fast pace. In Africa, only Botswana (White, 2006) and 
Mauritius (Meisenhelder, 1997) served as examples in this regard. It can be argued 
that this resurgence happened in reaction to three policy trends. First of all, as 
already discussed, critics of the Structural Adjustment Programmes galvanized the 
argument that giving the primacy to the market at the expense of a minimal state led 
to disastrous results. Secondly, as also referred, according to leading Western foreign 
policy strategists, the postcolonial experience has made evident that many African 
states have limited capacity; they are weak or even failed, to the point of generating 
threats to international stability, and therefore require measures that rebuild them and 
make them capable. Therefore, rebuilding them and making them agents of 
development is an important prospect (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). Finally, 
several economic perspectives, converging on something one could call “Afro-
pessimism,” argued that not only development in Africa was impossible but also its 
elites were inherently rent seekers and corrupt. Yet, Thandika Mkandawire counter-
claimed that there is firm historical evidence of developmentalist experiences that 
delivered positive results.  
Most arguments on the impossibility of developmental states in Africa 
are not firmly founded either on African historical experience or in the 
trajectories of the more successful ‘developmental states’ elsewhere. 
Africa has had examples of countries whose ideological inclination was 
clearly ‘developmentalist’ and that pursued policies that produced fairly 
high rates of growth and significant social gains and accumulation of 
capital in the postcolonial era. (Mkandawire, 2001: 309-310) 
As Ian Taylor  has convincingly argued in his comprehensive critique of 
NEPAD, not only this partnership has been a continuation of the previous hegemonic 
neoliberal framework (the ‘Washington Consensus’)  – this time around initiated by 
Africans rather than by Washington, DC-based institutions – but also a renewal of 
61 
 
the neopatrimonial and clientelist paradigm of the postcolonial era. Generally, 
NEPAD has been run by the same old elites, and did not lead to the fresh start it 
alleges.  By 2005 Taylor’s commentary was put in these terms:  
In this light, grand pronouncements regarding the importance of good 
governance and democracy or of economic liberalization are made 
redundant by the behaviour and actions of the very same people 
responsible for drawing up and/or committing themselves to such aims. 
Again, the divorce between rhetoric and reality is stark and more and 
more palatable. (Taylor, 2005: 275) 
From a political-economic perspective, Ishmael Lesufi (2004) and Francis 
Owusu (2006) have corroborated Taylor’s idea that African Renaissance-driven 
NEPAD was a tool of South African foreign policy toward expansion across the 
continent, thus following Mbeki’s domestic policy of liberalization in exchange for 
foreign direct investment. Yet, while acknowledging Taylor, Lesufi and Owusu’s 
critiques, it is important to highlight that the 2000s era cannot be described in the 
same vein as the one before. Even though survivalism is still an arguable feature 
among many African countries today, the current period offers new, or renewed, 
intellectual but also policy choices. Thandika Mkandawire leaves a note of caution in 
that regard, as he appeals to a non-static view of the African polity.  
Having presented key actors as irredeemably greedy, corrupt and 
captured by rent seekers and economies of affection and African states as 
preternaturally disposed to predation, the misreading denies us the 
opportunity to think creatively of modes of social organization at both 
macro and micro-level that can extricate African countries from the 
crises they confront” (Mkandawire, 2001: 310) 
The 2000s has indeed been witnessing interesting changes in the ‘traditional’ 
commentary about Africa. Impressive economic growth has spawned across some 
countries with spill-over effects in terms of improvements in human development. 
Among United States development analysis circles this has been seen with large 
interest. Whereas for Steven Radelet with the Centre for Global Development argues 
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that some countries are already enjoying some “emerging” status in the regional 
economy given their recent high rates of economic growth (Radelet, 2010), Daniel 
Kaufmann with The Brookings Institution gives it a “tempered optimism:”  
Many African countries are now recording positive (and sometimes 
substantial) growth, reducing poverty rates and attracting more foreign 
investment. However, it may be premature to declare success across the 
African region. (…) Yet, most of the remaining SSA [Sub-Saharan 
African] countries still face substantial governance and economic 
constraints to growth. It is important to recognize that performance is 
very varied across the African region and that many countries, like 
Gabon, still face daunting governance challenges. (Kaufmann, 2011) 
Other analyses have pointed to the enlargement of the middle class as very important 
indicator (Ncube et al., 2011).  
There has also been a diversification of donors and lenders to look at. In fact, 
the first decade of the 21st century has been one where, first and foremost, China is 
holding an undisputed influence across the continent through direct investment and 
provision of loans for development projects (Garner, 2007; Lancaster, 2007; 
Kragelund, 2011). Intellectually too, it is observable the renewed interest in several 
Asian models of growth, especially China, as many African students of development 
economics and other fields obtain opportunities to study in that country. Thirdly, 
Africa-focused international organizations, such as the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa and the African Union (2011), advocate an increasing 
dirigiste role for the state in order to achieve higher economic growth and 
development in a context of renewed optimism about the domestic state-based 
capabilities to deliver. 
While there certainly are continuities from the previous decades, the first 
decade of the 21st century has undergone policy changes at the structural level of 
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relations between the West and Sub-Saharan Africa, especially as far as the role of 
the state in the latter region is concerned. As Western policy-makers call for a 
merging between security and development and statebuilding as policies for African 
states in order to consolidate their goals of stability and peace, or “Empire in denial” 
as suggested by Chandler, the latter in turn adopt, or readopt, policies of 
developmentalism based on the state. At the same time, as new donors and lenders, 
particularly China, come forth, some African states are achieving remarkable 
economic results.         
 
2.5. South Africa, Ethiopia and Botswana and the African Postcolonial 
State Experience 
The previous sections delineated two periods of political-economic relations 
between African states and the international financial and development community, 
following a debate built on a generalized idea of the ‘African state’ that one aims at 
linking to the individual cases under scrutiny in this dissertation. South Africa, 
Ethiopia and Botswana offer distinct experiences not just between themselves but 
also regarding the characterisation given above. Yet, they certainly remain ‘African’ 
not only for their obvious geographical location in the continent, but also for the 
important part they play, in their different ways, within the debate of the postcolonial 
state in Africa.  
Botswana is one of the two countries (the other is Mauritius) that 
developmental state proponents in the beginning of the 2000s were presenting as a 
democratic governmental state. It is still part of the very small number of countries 
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that are presented as ‘models’ of good governance, economic growth and 
improvement in human development by the international community. Yet, lasting 
repercussions of the state’s commitment to development only started to trickle as a 
public-private partnership for the exploration of diamonds in the country, Debswana, 
was established between the state and the mineral giant company De Beers 
(Froitzheim, 2009). Ethiopia is assigned to the opposing majority of countries. 
Ethiopia is a historically very poor country, with low levels of development, and 
ridden by long violent political conflicts. As such, Ethiopia corresponds to the 
leading descriptions made above about the African state, whereas Botswana does not. 
Interestingly, one of the promoters of Botswana as a model inside the continent has 
been the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in his 2006 unpublished academic 
thesis “African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings” (Zenawi, 2006), 
which includes a chapter dealing specifically with Botswana. Here Zenawi discusses 
Botswana as a successful case in the context of what he conceives as the failures of 
the liberal, or neo-liberal, reforms in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s.  
The basic issue that the Ethiopian leadership holds in hand in terms of a long, 
sustainable dynamic of development is the very low stage in which the country still 
finds itself in. Despite recent propelled double digit growth annually, Ethiopia is still 
struggling with very strong dependence on subsistence agriculture, let alone 
limitations in infra-structure, human resources, etc. In addition to that, problems of 
internal insurgencies undermine the prospects of development. Nevertheless, 
Ethiopia is part of the small group of African countries (together with South Africa 
and Liberia) with an “idea of the state” (Clapham, 1996) outside the usual colonial 
structure. With the exception of the Italian occupation period and brief British 
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administration that followed, at the turn of the mid-20th century, Ethiopia was never 
part of a European empire. Despite European influences for centuries, the modern 
state apparatus was initiated indigenously, even if according to a logic of internal 
colonial-like processes of domination, in which the Amhara ethnicity has 
predominated (Gilchrist, 2003). In turn, Botswana as a sovereign nation is not only 
recent, established in 1966, but also inherited the apparatus of the British 
Protectorate era.  
The case of South Africa is very peculiar in the broader African context. It is 
so because it has been the far most economically advanced country in the continent, 
and therefore being in opposition to the average, poor, less developed African 
country. However, the persistence of a white minority regime of separate 
development (apartheid) during much of the postcolonial age rendered it problems of 
international recognition and acceptance, namely among African countries. Although 
South Africa did not share a pariah state status, i.e. non-recognition, with the similar-
minded regime of the former Republic of Rhodesia (today’s Zimbabwe), this dual 
situation – being economically very advanced and influential yet in a context of 
exclusion of large sectors of its population – was observed by the end of the 1980s “a 
major threat hanging over the future of the continent, constituting a problem Africans 
had to continue to face and for which there seemed to very little hope of finding any 
quick or peaceful solution” (Fage, 1988: 498). After the 1994 governmental elections 
and dismantlement of the apartheid, South Africa, with a multiracial government led 
by the African National Congress, has emerged as a vibrant influence across the 
continent, especially in Southern Africa. Remaining a “regional hegemon” 
(Shillinger, 2006), South Africa has arguably reverted its negative reputation and is 
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increasingly observed – not just in Africa but around the world – as a benign power 
both economically and militarily through engagement in the already mentioned 
NEPAD as well as in peacekeeping missions. It has become a liberal-idealist power, 
even if with flaws (Geldenhuys, 2008).                      
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a background discussion on policy trends focusing 
on the role of state in Sub-Saharan Africa before the analysis of the national 
government’s autonomous action under PEPFAR’s process of implementation. It 
discussed the dissertation’s dependent variable: the historical process of agency by 
postcolonial African national states and governments in relation to the West-led 
international community, notably formal colonial powers. This agency is particularly 
analysed in two contexts of Western structural hegemony. The first are the 1980s and 
1990s, in which donors and lenders, primarily Western countries and international 
organizations, inculcated neoliberal structural adjustment policies with the aim of 
reducing budget deficits and enhancing private investment. The second corresponds 
to the first decade of the 21st century, characterised by policies linking security to 
development, and aimed at building, or reforming, state institutions in the developing 
world (statebuilding).  
A major case of agency by Sub-Saharan African states is found in the politics 
of development that featured the immediate post-independence period in much of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Developmental concerns, centred in raising education, health, 
and living conditions in general, were indeed part of a nation-building political 
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agenda in many countries in the region with the aim of attaining economic 
independence after legal recognition was already obtained. Although it delivered 
fairly positive results during the first couple of decades of independence, by the late 
1970s, many governments ended up running very large deficits that demanded 
negotiation for external support. As remarked previously, such high deficit has been 
explained by external and internal reasons, an internal one being the neopatrimonial 
character of the state. However, such funding was granted in exchange for the 
commitment to the compliance of conditionalities that reduced drastically the state’s 
initial agenda of provision of social services, and moreover, arguably, exacerbated 
tendencies toward disaggregation and conflict. Despite the governmentality of those 
organisations, and the difficult circumstances that came about in terms of pursuing 
the national developmental agenda, African states, and their elites, sought to survive, 
even if through their own governmentality of neopatrimonialism. The optimism of 
development as a means towards further national independence as conceived by the 
independence governmental elite retreated to the hardship of having to survive as 
elite and, at the same time, as a state, since more than often both coincide. Such 
difficult survival was not only contemporary to manifold armed conflicts but also to 
a significant decrease in the living conditions of many African countries’ 
populations. 
However, by the early 2000s, the ideology of the developmental state re-
emerges intellectually and politically in Africa. This is partly justified by the 
international community’s reversal of its policy: from promoting state reduction to 
supporting statebuilding and renewing a development agenda under the auspices of 
the Millennium Development Goals. The return of the politics of state-driven 
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development in Africa occurs as a response to the “decay” (Clapham, 1996) 
experienced by Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but 
also in the context of a rhetoric of African Renaissance animated by the continent’s 
major power, South Africa, which had just established a multiracial democracy. 
Together with the endorsement of the role of the state by important pan-African 
institutions, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the 
African Union, this change took place at a time of exciting economic growth by 
several countries and diversification of international funders (first and foremost, 
China). 
The next chapter frames the discussion developed throughout these last pages 
within the context of global health governance. It reviews the main narratives in that 
domain – both theoretical and policy-related. Then it draws attention to the condition 
of the postcolonial African state as receptor of external funding and policies within 
the study area, and moreover the predominant patterns of behaviour within that 
sector of global governance.                    
69 
 
Chapter 3 – Global Health Governance  
 
3.1. Introduction  
 The previous chapter introduced the post-independence experience of African 
states vis-à-vis the international system dominated by the Western powers and the 
major international financial institutions. Departing from a generalised approach to 
African statehood and Western power, it pointed to a pattern of mutually struggling 
relations by both sides, yet under a background of asymmetry in this relationship.  
Before proceeding to the dissertation’s theoretical chapter, and considering 
the specificities of the case study, it is important to discuss the specific realm of 
relations within which PEPFAR is implemented and the role of the postcolonial 
African state in it. This realm consists in what has come to be named as ‘global 
health governance.’ The engagement to be pursued throughout this chapter departs 
from an exercise of reflexion on the leading narratives on this topic in the field of 
Political Science and International Relations by scholars, activists and policy-makers. 
It does not seek to test the empirical consistency (or the lack of it) that ground the 
causalities that construct those narratives. The relevance of looking at the narratives 
that frame the analysis of global health and discussing them has to do with the fact 
that they impact on the terms of analysis of broader relations between, in the case of 
this dissertation, the United States government through PEPFAR and the national 
governments of the countries where PEPFAR has been implemented. By looking at 
and discussing these narratives one aims at a more critical understanding of the role 
the postcolonial African state as recipient state is meant to play. 
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This chapter is divided into five sections. The first four discuss the leading 
narratives on global health governance in the discipline. The first introduces the 
context in which global health was elaborated through social constructivist and 
liberal-institutional tools in parallel with the emergence of human security as a 
paradigm of Western foreign policy for the post-Cold War, and its consequences in 
terms of the ‘securitization’ of health-related issues. The second looks more 
specifically at the dimension of social change inside the West in the last three 
decades under the influence of the Sociology of Risk. The third departs from David 
Fidler’s liberal-institutional approach to global health governance based on the 
centrality of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) International Health 
Regulations’ (IHR) revision of 2005 towards a radical, post-Foucauldian explanation 
of liberal power transmitted by medical intervention inside and outside the West. The 
fourth section considers the argument around contestation, incoherence and, 
eventually, failure of any governance of health at a global scale. The idea that there is 
no government in this domain invites the appraisal of the traditional actors – states – 
in the domain. The fifth, and last, section focuses on the case of the postcolonial 
African state in a context of international asymmetry, in which it is rendered the 
primary role of recipient of the major Western states. It finally idealises two types of 
behaviour: the state as facilitator, and the state as ‘rogue.’             
  
3.2. Human Security and the Construction of Global Health 
 The realm of health affairs outside the domain of individual states is 
traditionally denominated as international health. Since 1948, with the establishment 
of WHO, it remained mostly confined to its interstate framework and its IHR created 
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in 1969. Another landmark was the signature in 1989 of the WHO’s “Health for All 
Declaration,” also known as the Alma-Ata Declaration, in which member states 
committed to the attainment of the best health conditions to their populations. 
However, it also featured in development aid to the Third World and military 
agendas during the Cold War. Nevertheless, in retrospect, David Fidler (2005: 180) 
argues this was a field of “low politics” compared to the supreme politics of war and 
peace under United States-Soviet bipolarism that neorealist theories of International 
Relations prominently explained and reinforced.    
 The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, early 1990s brought about foreign 
and security policy consequences that started to be conceptualized in another way, 
including in the domain of international health. One consequence was the rise of an 
understanding of security based on individuals and population groups rather than on 
states. Human security (UNDP, 1994) is the ‘paradigm’ that growingly started to be 
laid down onto the nascent European defence and foreign security policies and the 
Middle Powers Initiative (Behringer, 2005; Debiel and Werthes, 2006; Martin, 
2007), for instance. It derived from the intellectual labour of an amalgamation of 
liberal-cosmopolitan, social constructivist and critical-theoretical authors in the 
discipline, who urged for attention to forms of violence and insecurity beyond the 
formal inter-state warfare. It was also very influential among the United Nations 
system in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction 
missions. It was so defined by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP):  
Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, 
safety from such chronic diseases as hunger, disease and repression. And 
second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the 
patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. 
(UNDP, 1994: 23) 
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As a result, human-related phenomena such as epidemics, migration, 
trafficking in drugs or environmental damage began to be conceptualized as threats 
to stability inside countries, regions and even the world, in a context in which state 
confrontation was growingly understood as obsolete. So-called ‘new threats’ like 
those are far more disruptive and killing than wars between armies, and hold indirect 
consequences for the Western world. As far as epidemics go, they deteriorate many 
populations’ living standards in developing countries, particularly in Africa, and thus 
contribute to the damage caused by phenomena such as civil wars (Kaldor, 1999) and 
“failed states” (Zartman, 1995), that is, states “unable or unwilling” to offer the 
residents basic public goods such as food, access to health or public security. Human 
security appeared together with familiar agendas for the post-Cold War such as 
human rights, democratization, the rule of law, and the market that, once 
implemented, could reduce instability and conflict in general. In addition to that, 
viruses emerge as threatening in terms of the globalization of trade and travel at a 
larger geographical scale, particularly in the context of outbreaks. 
As a result, while traditionally states attracted analytical focus, in the last ten 
years, entities such as viruses, and the diseases and epidemics that they provoke, 
were growingly elaborated as threats to security. Indeed, pathogenic agents only 
constitute threats to humans when they, first, infiltrate human ecology and afterwards 
penetrate and develop themselves within the human body. Viruses as such do not 
pose any threat. What is actually convertible to a threat status are peoples, societies 
and, in the last analysis, states, as part of a complex social and political impact that 
the multiplication of infected people feeds and arguably provokes in a context of fast 
global relations (Schneider and Moodie, 2002; Elbe,
73 
 
Saker et al., 2004; Owen and Roberts, 2005; McInnes and Lee, 2006). If one 
perceives detection, prevention, care and eventual cure of populations as the major 
measures against disease, one defines as security objective the contention of the 
multiplication of the number of people carrying the agent, despite the ethical 
problems it may entail (Elbe, 2006). The linking of viruses to security is 
consummated in the depiction of ‘securitized people” as those “at risk,” 
“vulnerable,” and making up “dangerous classes” (Hardt and Negri, 2004). In other 
words, they are a reflection of the epidemiological estimates on the several diseases, 
yet, particularly, the major epidemics. In the case of HIV/AIDS, in Southern and 
Eastern Africa they are the general population, while in China, India, Russia, and the 
West, they are drug injectors, migrants, homosexuals and the general mass of the 
marginalized ones. Eventually, they led to the almost blurring of traditionally 
separate fields such as International Relations and Public Health.  
Together with an exercise of social constructivism, liberal-institutionalist 
approaches gained prominence in the analysis and policy recommendation of 
international/global mechanisms of response to the manifold viral and epidemic 
manifestations. The ‘securitization’ of health and disease was embedded 
institutionally under the revised International Health Regulations of 2005, and is 
found in the rhetoric and rationale of multilateral and bilateral initiatives, such as the 
Global Fund, established in 2001, or PEPFAR, launched in 2003.  
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3.3. The Western Risk Society and the Politics of Technicalization 
Global health is eminently a Western invention with the aim of making sense 
of globalization and a new paradigm of human security-based foreign policy. As 
remarked, the problems of health and disease were already subject to international 
discussion. However, the West-led hegemony of globalization in terms of worldwide 
socio-economic relations fuelled by technological advances in information and 
communication created a landscape in which those problems, among other 
human/population-related ones (migrations, environmental degradation, scarcity of 
energy resources, urban insecurity), were bound to have direct and indirect security 
consequences for the Western world and its lifestyle. In other words, ‘threats’ like 
those were undermining of what Anthony Giddens has called “ontological security” 
(Giddens, 1995), building on the notion of “risk society” (Beck, 1992) as a latest 
stage of Western modernity, in which, after wealth and power, risk and impotence 
emerge (Beck, 1995). Although in the industrial age there was already a notion of 
risk, it was considered a price to pay for the material progress of societies through 
social protection systems and other compensatory mechanisms. Accordingly, 
Western societies do not aim at maximizing risks, yet minimizing them through the 
implementation of emergency measures against increasingly incontrollable risks, 
such as nuclear proliferation, global warming or even large-scale pandemics. For 
Beck (2006), the best response is “precaution through prevention.” 
This sociological reading has proved to be very influential in the way 
responses to epidemics and viral outbreaks started to be conceptualized by political 
analysts and policy-makers of global health. Along with human security policies, the 
inevitability of the occurrence of direct and indirect effects at a global scale has led 
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to a very large epistemological consensus around the definition of preventive and 
curative measures aimed at the sources of those risks. As a result, global health 
governance has become, in the words of James Ferguson (1994), an “anti-politics 
machine.” Global health governance became an eminent ‘technical’ field, in which 
what largely is at stake is the formulation and implementation of ‘good’ policies, 
informed by ‘good practices,’ and accompanied with disbursement and allocation of 
resources to projects serving those in need. In the case of the major epidemics 
(HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria), this is observed in the manner biomedical 
responses attained supremacy, although preventive measures were also clearly 
emphasised. Rather than an implication of the political communities, as it used to 
happen during the Cold War, global health governance bypasses political 
contingencies and aims at ‘fixing’ the ‘issues.’  
 
3.4. Global Health Governance’s Constitutionalism 
A major feature of the post-Cold War international environment, namely in 
the area of health and disease, is the dissemination of governmental alongside 
nongovernmental actors. Apart from states and WHO, international organisations 
such as the United Nations constellation and the World Bank joined in, followed by 
many old and new large developmental and humanitarian NGOs, philanthropic 
organisations and initiatives and private companies, such as pharmaceutical 
companies. Often many of these entities have sat together under the aegis of public-
private partnerships (PPP), a model of governance that got boosted in the context of 
post-Cold War acceleration of neoliberal reforms led by the major Western states, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as described in the previous 
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chapter. In the domain of global health two major examples of PPP are the 
multilateral Global Fund and the bilateral PEPFAR. After a previous phase of being 
rendered to “low politics,” influential David Fidler observes this change of 
landscape, in which health and disease concerns attain centrality in the foreign policy 
of major states and generates many actors and agendas, as a “revolution” (Fidler, 
2008).     
However, for Fidler (2004), it was not until September 11, 2001 attacks in the 
United States of America, the so-called case of “Amerithrax” soon after September 
11, and the 2003 outbreaks of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) that 
global health governance’s “constitutionalism” was reconfigured. Eventually, the 
WHO’s IHR were revised and incorporated an element of security in it. From a 
juridical-institutional point of view (Pereira, 2008), Fidler understands the role of 
WHO and its IHR as the key contents of international health’s constitutionalism, 
whose historiography, obviously, stretches way back in time. It kicked off in the 
1830s as the first international hygienist conference takes place to search for a 
response to a cholera epidemic affecting Europe at the time. Afterwards, other 
international conferences alike occurred throughout the 19th and early 20th century. 
Finally they paved the way for the League of Nations’ Office of Health Affairs and 
WHO. Founded in 1948, WHO has gained reputation for inculcating an international 
cooperation regime based on the 1969 IHRs, consolidating what Fidler (1999) has 
called Microbialpolitik, that is, an international agenda fundamentally guided by 
allied fight against disease. In Fidler’s view, the 2001-2003 events above and their 
corresponding structuring responses of contingency constitute a turning point in the 
understanding of epidemics as object of national and international security. This 
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period inaugurates ‘the new world order in public health,’ in which global health 
governance likens the United States federal model in the context of crisis in health at 
the global scale. The functions of that model are: provision of national security; 
regulation of international trade; preparedness support and response to epidemic 
crisis; and protection of human rights (Fidler, 2004). Broadly, such ‘new order’ 
reiterates the post-September 11 counterterrorist response, in which all areas of 
governance in the United States of America were merged towards a more efficient 
and engaged reaction. However, this shift is still troublesome. The 2005 revision of 
the IHR diverted WHO away from its mandate, since it may be specifically serving 
national and international policies.  
Less clear is whether the new IHR might embroil WHO in the politics of 
national and international security to the detriment of its core public 
health functions. Although it makes some experts uncomfortable, the 
potential for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction connects 
public health to security concerns. (Fidler and Gostin, 2006: 92)                    
The 2005 IHR revision calls for the necessity to establish partnerships with other 
“interested” sectors, notably the armed forces. At the same time, the new IHR allows 
the possibility of “containment at the source,” beyond the typical border controls for 
people and goods (WHO, 2007). Such situation allows foreign interventions to be 
triggered regardless of state sovereignty, namely with military means, for the sake of 
epidemic contention. In sum, these novelties reflect a real change in the purposes of 
the IHR. 
Fidler’s juridical-institutional explanation has been complemented by a more 
radical approach in terms of whom and what constitutes the governance of global 
health. This approach implies that a plethora of other defining actors, such as  private 
companies, non-governmental organizations, networks and partnerships and even 
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Hollywood “celebrities” (Drezner, 2007) needs to be inserted together with the 
traditional actors. Like major states and WHO, those agents maintain intense power 
agendas and regulating capacities, particularly under a framework which jeopardises 
national sovereignty given the possibility of “containment at the source,” as 
presupposed in the 2005 IHR. Moreover, since Fidler’s constitutionalism seems to 
overestimate the role of epidemic crisis and response as contextual facts, i.e. the 
outbreak event and the demanded quarantine measure, a complementing approach 
that embodies structural elements in the machinery of public health, such as 
surveillance and hygiene mechanisms administered by national and international 
agents, is required.  
An historical analysis of disease surveillance stretches back to the 17th 
century, as epidemic surveillance departs nationally in metropolitan Europe, and 
increasingly expands onto the colonies. This regime is consolidated with the 
international hygienist arrangements of the 1830s (Bashford, 2006). As a result, it 
has helped to consolidate a system of security that one recognizes today. Michel 
Foucault’s (1984) work on the analytics of liberal political power from the 17th 
century onwards has been found highly helpful in this regard. Rather than simply 
deposited on domestic and international institutions of statehood, power permeates 
an insidious, comprehensive web of institutions and practices, governmental and 
non-governmental, local and international, yet commonly affiliated to ideals of 
liberalism and free trade. Unlike in earlier Absolutist regimes, power is conceived to 
both foster life and impede it to the point of death. The object of such power consists 
on human beings at the aggregate level, as well as life in general. Designated as 
“biopower,” it expresses the 18th century scientific effort of measuring and regulating 
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all dimensions of life, such as birth, mortality, schooling, employment, criminality, 
etc. This change has implied thinking the human being as an être biologique, a 
natural species, yet with political life and power. Biopower is therefore ‘totalitarian’ 
in the way that it is aimed at the totality of the population. Issues of health and 
disease become particularly pertinent in this framework of analysis of power.  
Contrarily to previous Absolutist regimes, biopower, or biopolitics as it was 
later reformulated, necessitates to be rationalized, justified (Foucault, 1984: 258), 
and Foucault’s later concept of governmentality embodies that necessity. It accounts 
for a discursive-material device (dispositif) of security embodying rationalities and 
technologies of government. They comprise “discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions” (Foucault, 1980: 184). These 
technologies do not necessarily use violence to force people to do what the sovereign 
likes (Lemke, 2001). A major manifestation of the sovereign power’s 
governmentality is found in the figure of the “medical police” (Carroll, 2002). In 
fact, governmentality as rationalities and technologies of government largely 
corresponds to a general idea of police activity: “practices of inspection and 
surveillance, information and intelligence gathering, and direct intervention (to the 
point of deadly force) in private, familial and commercial matters” (Ibid.: 465). The 
medical police did not resort to deadly force; yet it pursued a variety of sanitary 
techniques in order to guarantee “health and safety” among the population from now 
onwards (Ibid.). 
A number of historical examples from the British Empire demonstrate the 
century-old political importance of medical intervention at a global scale. Alison 
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Bashford (1999) has looked at the 1881 smallpox epidemic in Sydney, Australia, as 
an illustration of the more administrative facet of such medical policing through the 
establishment of the local health authority, i.e. the Board of Health in the British 
Colony of New South Wales. Although smallpox epidemics were not “uncommon” 
in the 19th century, that one precipitated key bureaucratic changes. Policing was 
primarily about carrying out activities animated by socio-political concerns rather 
than exhibiting state presence. Thus, one should mention the police role that charities 
pursued, as Carroll (2002) shows in the case of colonial Dublin, Ireland, hygienic 
activities in the 18th century. The ultimate function of health policing was to 
potentiate the general health status of the populations, not just for the sake of 
political economy, but also to prevent scarring contagions and epidemics that could 
undermine the body politic. Bashford (2006) reports that, in function of the 
establishment of border epidemical check-ups and quarantine systems, surveillance 
mechanisms were installed at the global scale uniting metropolises and colonies. 
National surveillance and hygienist measures moved beyond from the national 
sphere on to the rest of the world, cementing Western power territorially and 
biologically, as the 1881 smallpox epidemic in Sydney above illustrated. As 
mentioned, a cholera epidemic affecting the European powers in the 1830s paved the 
way for the several international hygienist conferences during the 1800s that led to 
the establishment of the international sanitary institutions in the two world wars’ 
interval.  
Yet, in that period, health issues were essentially taken as technical matters 
by the League of Nations’ Health Office, a predecessor of WHO. According to 
Bashford, its mission was to collect information from the national administrations, in 
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order to control diseases such as malaria, smallpox and sleeping sickness, in close 
collaboration with the Economics Office of the organization. General population-
related dossiers tended to be studied in its migratory and trade dimensions, excluding 
issues such as birth control, and sexual and reproductive health. The author provides 
several examples on how, despite direct enquiry, those latter matters were untouched 
by the League of Nations under the basis of not being part of the organisation’s 
mandate.  
An important role in the systems of information on populations between 
colonies and metropolises was played by the educational transnational institutions of 
tropical medicine of the British Empire. Founded in the late 19th century, the schools 
of Tropical Medicine in London and Liverpool were instrumental in the research and 
dissemination of epidemiological facts and practices at the field level. Supported by 
organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Red Cross, the business 
community of Liverpool (with vested interests in the Caribbean, West Africa and 
Latin America), the schools’ agendas ranged “from the medical concerns of a fading 
Empire to a national and international school of public health, moving towards 
integration of domestic and global health concerns” (Wilkinson and Power, 1998: 
288). Tropical medicine as a distinctive discipline in the curricula of medical studies 
was born with the objective of facilitating the settlement of Britons and other 
Europeans in threatening environments characterized by pests such as smallpox, 
malaria or yellow fever (Arnold, 1997). But it also held the mission of improving the 
lives of natives engaged in the colonial businesses, therefore pursuing the 
‘benevolent’ task assigned to imperialism. Nevertheless, Cameron-Smith identifies 
tropical medicine across the British Empire “as a discourse that constructed the space 
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of the tropics as Other and thus as racially pathological” (Cameron-Smith, 2007: 16). 
In turn, Jama Mohamed (1999) shows how colonial rule on medicine in Somaliland 
during the first half of the 20th century benefited from health interventions, 
vaccination namely, as it improved public health. The medical mission was therefore 
to “[popularize] the Government, and [to identify] the administration with the 
people’s welfare” (Ibid.).  
The integration of tropical medicine’s culture and history when linked to the 
rise of “medical police” is particularly illustrative of both the character of this early 
securitization of infectious diseases and the apparatus of biopolitical 
instrumentalization at the global level. Beyond international and national political 
institutions, culture, science and medical practice informatively contribute to the 
historical power regime. In more recent times, hygienism remained notably 
instrumental with regard to the implementation of powerful white-supremacist 
regimes such as the one South African experienced during the apartheid period 
(Youde, 2005a). According to Youde, the legacy of public health intervention as 
historically anti-black population transpires from the 2000 conflict between South 
African government, notably President Thabo Mbeki, and the international AIDS 
community. Mbeki claimed that the international community’s AIDS discourse was a 
Western neo-colonialist discourse expressing Africans’ inferiority as a race to tackle 
their own problems (Ibid.). This episode was particularly dramatic since South Africa 
was holding, as it still does, the highest rate of HIV infections in the world. 
The conceptualisation started by Foucault on liberal power as driven by 
political-economic ideology and not institutions leads to an image of an assemblage 
of various entities. “Nébuleuse” is an apt alternative word to assemblage that one 
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borrows from Robert W. Cox (2005) to model the “constitutionalism” in global 
(health) governance, contrasting with Fidler’s adoption of the United States federal 
model. The end of the Cold War and the rise of global neo-liberal agendas performed 
by an enlarged quantity of institutions in many different sectors of activity (trade, 
development, humanitarian, etc.) and at different scales (local, national, regional, 
global) confirmed the reformulation of the state as sovereign political unit and 
accelerated the networking of biopolitical-like modes of power. This “nébuleuse” 
builds on strong political density, where many networks of governmental and non-
governmental agents interact formal and informally at a global level. Global public 
health constitutes a quite solid domain for the analysis of those phenomena and the 
power relations they embody. They feature grand public-private, bilateral and 
multilateral funding, managing and implementing programs, initiatives and entities: 
WHO, PEPFAR, Global Fund, World Bank, UNAIDS, Clinton Initiative, Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, and a vast range of international NGOs in the field. Once 
inserted in the broader global governance, the health system as a regime of global 
surveillance consolidates the supremacy of an international arena dominated, not by 
anarchical relations of individual units of sovereignty in the form of states, as put by 
the neorealist tradition of International Relations (Waltz, 1979), but by a hegemonic 
world system of liberal sovereignty (Bickerton, 2007). In the field of ‘global health’ 
ultimate examples of such endeavour stretches as far as the project of medicalization 
of populations, as explored by Stefan Elbe (2010). If it is true that this explanation is 
not fully applicable to the whole world, namely in terms of the “modern world” of 
powerful states of regional prominence, such as India, China and Russia (Cooper, 
2004), this is particularly compelling with regard to the postcolonial world.       
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3.5. The Failure of Global Health Governance? 
 While the narratives around post-Cold War Western foreign policies rooted 
on human security and globalization have arguably dominated the global health 
governance literature, another narrative, focusing on the contradictions that the 
international political economy of health has exposed, has gained its own currency.  
Adrian Kay and Owain Williams (2008) have drawn attention to the fact that 
global health governance is highly part of the larger processes of global governance, 
based on liberalisation and commodification. The results of global liberalisation and 
commodification are particularly noticeable in a number of instances. Since the 
market of health professionals has opened itself up to ‘globalisation,’ it has allowed 
an easier transfer of human resources from lower-paying countries to better-
remunerating ones. As a result, countries and regions already with very low scores in 
terms of health care find themselves struggling even more with the loss of medical 
and nursing personnel. In turn, as far as the manufacture and distribution of drugs go, 
particularly antiretroviral ones, the protection of patents pursued by, mostly, West-
based pharmaceutical companies and their states, in order to maintain high levels of 
profit, constitutes another front undermining access to better health in poorer 
countries. For Kay and Williams, the leading global health governance literature fails 
to take contradictions like those into account.   
The current literature on GHG [global health governance] constructs a 
concept of global health that implicitly naturalises the neoliberalisation 
process and pushes analysts to seek technocratic and political solutions to 
adverse trends in population health across the globe. (Ibid.: 21)  
 Another set of incongruences have been put forward by authors that aggregate 
around the ethics of human rights and social justice, concerned with the social 
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determinants of health, i.e. by having a structural perspective of health condition’s 
political economy (Williams and Rushton, 2009: 11-12). Mainly disseminated by the 
activist nongovernmental community and some academics (MSF, 2008; Schrecker, 
2009), mostly from North America and Western Europe, this discourse is eminently 
targeted at Western countries as donors and leaders of globalization. This ethics 
appeals to further international regulation of negative practices (such as contracting 
health staff from the Global South or protecting resolutely pharmaceutical patents) 
and further financial commitment to global health programs. This stance fails to have 
a lasting influence in terms of actual political change. Yet, even if they could have it, 
their terms of the debate are located under a population-centred framework, in which 
affected political communities, particularly poorer, developing states, are supposed 
to have little or no autonomy in face of larger states and private companies. 
As a result, global health governance started to be regarded as a domain of 
failure, since the alluded contradictions and disputes do not suggest coherence of 
policies (Ibid.). The idea of governance of the ‘global’ does not mean that there is an 
actual governmental form for that ‘global,’ although the social constructivism that 
permeates much of the analysis suggests it. Here, Fidler’s (2004) post-Westphalian, 
liberal-institutional ‘constitutionalism’ is found wanting, since the international 
system is still primarily driven by a more traditional set of actors, namely states. In 
turn, the radical, post-Foucauldian readings are also flawed, since they leave limited 
or no room for human agency by introducing a rejoinder that points at neoliberal 
totalitarianism (Chandler, 2009a).  
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3.6. Global Health Governance and African Postcolonial State 
The failure of global health governance as a domain of coherence among the 
many actors that struggle inside it invites a reassessment of the character of such 
domain, by looking precisely at the most stable and consistent in the international 
arena: states. In an article, James Ricci (2009) criticises an overemphasis by global 
health governance authors on the propelled reduced relevance of the state in the field. 
He cautions against the overreliance on the pulverization of non-state actors of 
different types as redefining the post-international juridical feature of governance. He 
argues that, despite the prominence of such organizations as the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, states are still main funders of global health initiatives, PEPFAR 
being a case in point (Ibid.: 7). However, Ricci’s state-centred perspective does not 
account for the problem of asymmetry as crucial feature of the international system, 
particularly between the Western and African states, instrumental for any meaningful 
discussion in global health governance. Ricci does not explore the particular case of 
the postcolonial African state within that arena of relations.  
However, the same applies to the discussion on African states’ participation 
in global health security talks by Lenias Hwenda and colleagues (2011). 
Accordingly, even when considering African states as honourable diplomatic players 
in the international realm, the issue of structural asymmetry is left underdeveloped. 
Lenias Hwenda and colleagues (2011) affirm that African countries’ health-related 
interests have been overwhelmed by the positions of developed countries. They point 
at debates on health security initiated by Europe and North America under WHO to 
demonstrate the need for serious political African engagement in such discussion. 
However, their recommendation does not consider the issue of asymmetry either, 
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finding themselves stranded in the idealism of institutional equality. It thus becomes 
necessary to explore the character of the intervened state, namely in the context of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, bearing in mind the asymmetric state structure of relations in 
global health governance.  
Certainly, the problem of inequity in health has received significant attention 
by ethics-based authors and organisations. As mentioned above, they have constantly 
emphasised the manner through which richer countries easily drain health 
professionals from the Global South and constrain access to drugs at affordable 
prices. However, their principal focus on the population dimension does not consider 
the particular and, arguably, prominent contingency of state relations in global health 
governance.  
This dissertation proposes two different antagonistic types of state that 
emerge out of the literature and policy debates in global health governance. One is 
the facilitator state, in which the recipient state behaves according to what is 
expected by the community of funders and policy-makers. Another type is the 
‘rogue’ state, in which states deviate from compliance in several regards, from 
adoption of the ‘right’ policies to tackle health issues to management and 
employment of received funds according to pre-established purposes. Certainly, the 
proposed types are idealised categories within the framework, and therefore subject 
to debate over the addition of further categories and gradations. Nevertheless, they 
are applicable to the postcolonial African state in particular as opposed to donor 
countries. This ought to be clearly remarked since suggestions about playing roles as 
facilitators and/or ‘rogues’ have also been suggested for donor countries and their 
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policy choices and stances. Moreover, these ideal types do not exclude their 
coexistence within a single country, i.e. the same country can incorporate both types.  
The leading narratives on global health governance largely reduce the African 
state to the status of recipient of external funding in exchange for compliance with 
the policies recommended by the funder, multilateral or bilateral. However, it should 
be remarked that there are differences between multilateral and bilateral 
arrangements in terms of participation.  
Multilateral structures such as the Global Fund and the broader United 
Nations system tend to favour the inclusion of representatives and citizens of 
recipient countries in technical and even leadership positions. For instance, at time of 
writing Michel Sibidé of Mali is the head of the UNAIDS, and Tedros Adhanom of 
Ethiopia was the chair of the Global Fund until September 2011. In turn, bilateral 
programs are majorly led by the donor country, as it happens in the case of PEPFAR. 
Although recipient countries are made part of a ‘partnership,’ it is clear, as it will be 
discussed in the case of PEPFAR in Chapter 5, that the relationship is vertical, rather 
than horizontal. In either case, national governments of recipient countries in Africa 
are urged by major governments and NGOs from donor countries and international 
organizations to behave with ‘responsibility’ and ‘leadership’ in the adoption of 
recommended institutions and policies. As a result, several governments in Africa, 
namely those of the countries under analysis in this dissertation, with the exception 
of South Africa for a certain period, have responded positively to the external 
pressures toward observance of international community’s policies, and engaged in a 
relationship with those institutions, even if in asymmetric terms. In this framework, 
the state is assigned the role of mediator and facilitator in the process of providing 
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goods and services for the populations in need. In turn, this role as mediator or 
facilitator is enhanced and ameliorated through policies of direct assistance to state 
agencies and their representations (e.g. clinics, hospitals and health-extension 
programmes) and ‘capacity-building’ in several organizational areas. However, 
sovereignty is not conceived as a characteristic of this type of state. In this regard, 
Bob Jessop suggests: 
[The] state is no longer the sovereign authority. It becomes but one 
participant among others in the pluralistic guidance system and 
contributes its own distinctive resources to the negotiation process. As 
the range of networks, partnerships, and other models of economic and 
political governance expand, official apparatuses remain at best primus 
inter pares. (...) The state's involvement would become less hierarchical, 
less centralized, and less dirigiste in character. (Jessop, 2003: 8) 
However, as it was pointed out in the previous chapter with regard to 
NEPAD, African states have been organising themselves around regional 
arrangements towards collaboration with the international community’s major 
policies. A major example has to do with the so-called Abuja Declaration of 2001, 
according to which the cosignatory governments pledged to allot at least 5% of their 
annual budget to health expenditure in order to complement international funding.       
The assumption of a highly obedient state to the international community 
opens up the possibility of an inverse case. By not being (entirely) compliant with 
good policies and behaviours (if not opponent to them), the state is attributed features 
of ‘rogueness’ by the international community. As far as global health governance in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, the most striking case of ‘rogueness’ concerns the 
reduction and suspension of antiretroviral treatment programs in South Africa by the 
African National Congress-led (ANC) government of former President Thabo Mbeki 
and his Minister of Health Manto Tshabalala-Msimang. Due to his self-proclaimed 
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dissidence in unequivocally buying into the drug-based response to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in his country and around Africa, he was considered denialist by many 
home and international activists and his country’s regime a “rogue democracy” 
(Baker and Lyman, 2008).12 Headed by HIV-positive, former male prostitute and 
ANC member Zachie Achmat, South Africa-based (with large international support) 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) initiated a series of civil disobedience actions 
with the aim of reverting government’s position. Achmat himself decided to stop his 
therapy until everyone in South Africa who would need it would resume or initiate 
their therapies. In 2002 and 2003 the TAC has won a court cases against the state that 
allowed provision of antiretrovirals (ARV) to infected pregnant women and to people 
with advanced AIDS.  
However, when in 2008 Mbeki was removed from his position following an 
African National Congress’ (ANC) congress, the transitional President Kgalema 
Motlanthe dismissed Tshabalala-Msimang (Associated Press, 2008), and 
antiretroviral programs were reactivated. Currently not only “denialism” has been 
publicly dismissed, but the opposite direction is actually pursued. In 2010 President 
Jacob Zuma announced mass voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) campaigns, 
after he had himself taken an HIV test, which was observed as the burial of denialism 
by the South African government  (Mail & Guardian, 2010). At the 2010 
International AIDS Conference, Minister of Health Aaron Motsoaledi reiterated 
policy change, expressed commitment and requested assistance from foreign donors 
                                                 
12 Outside Africa a striking case of ‘rogueness’ in global health governance corresponds to the 
invocation of sovereign rights by the Indonesian government over the decision of not sharing A/H5N1 
flu virus samples with the World Health Organization. (Reuters, 2007) This position was adopted 
under the belief that, once disbursed for research and development of a vaccine, Indonesia would 
hardly benefit from it, since it would too costly to be purchased with the major Western 
pharmaceutical companies.  
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(Motsoaledi, 2010).13 The South African case clearly reveals a shift between 
‘rogueness’ and facilitation. 
In a broader sense, the major example of ‘rogue’ recipient state behaviour is 
the real or perceived deviation of funds disbursed for policy implementation for what 
is considered illegitimate ends. In other words, this type of behaviour corresponds to 
the discussion carried out in the previous chapter on the neopatrimonial character of 
many polities across Sub-Saharan Africa. Often framed in Western circles as 
“corruption,” this practice sits along other troubling practices associated with the 
functioning of the social and political fabric, namely electoral misconduct, abuse of 
state violence and disrespect for the rule of law. As a result, donor countries are often 
uncomfortable with assisting governmental structures directly (although they still do 
it) and prefer NGOs, even if, in some cases, the locally-based ones, in some way or 
another, belong to the state/governmental division of labour, as it happens in the case 
of Ethiopia. As Chapter 5 on PEPFAR’s political origins and political rationales 
discusses, one major reason for opting out for bilateral mechanisms at the expense of 
multilateral ones (even though also participating in them) concerns precisely the will 
to augment surveillance over the expenditure of the recipient state by assigning an 
exclusive auditing mechanism (Interviewee 33, 2010).       
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 Global health governance as a specific realm of relations in the international 
arena appears in the discipline of International Relations in function with broader 
                                                 
13 Chapters 6, 7 and 8 offer a comprehensive discussion of the South African case. 
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post-Cold War developments associated with human security-based foreign policies 
in Western powers, globalisation-provoked ‘new threats’ to international security, 
neoliberalism, and human rights agendas. Given the diversity of interests and 
agendas by the manifold actors that compose this field, analysts so far have been 
concurring in arguing about the failure of achieving coherent ‘governance’ of 
phenomena as disparate as viral outbreaks and epidemics, with different incidences 
across the globe. Addressing a gap in the global health governance literature, this 
chapter explored the role of recipient states and their governments in this realm. 
Bearing in mind the particular case of the postcolonial African state discussed in the 
previous chapter, it proposed two types of recipient state behaviour: facilitator and 
‘rogue.’ While the first alludes to the idea of a state compliant with international 
structures and policies, in which it mediates and facilitates the implementation of 
those policies, the second looks at the ‘darker’ side of the state from a global health 
governance perspective. Apart from the well-documented case of South Africa under 
the Mbeki Administration, which will be further scrutinized ahead in this 
dissertation, the problem of ‘corruption’ across state structures is regarded as a 
negative factor that ought to be suppressed.     
From a reflexive point of view, one could argue that the intellectual 
constitution and development of ‘global health governance’ as a distinguishable 
realm of relations within the discipline of International Relations offers an example 
of how liberal and social constructivist theories came to dominate the analysis of the 
international arena. Global health governance is certainly influenced by the explosive 
proliferation of governmental and nongovernmental, national and transnational, not-
for-profit and for-profit actors in the field, which are seductive for liberal-
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institutionalist, cosmopolitan approaches to international relations in the post-Cold 
War era. In turn, social constructivism is strikingly visible in the construction of 
causalities (for instance, the link between epidemics and security) that give sense to 
the enhancement of the international-political study of health programs, the same 
applying to the post-Foucauldian use of it, mentioned previously.  
When framed in the broader theoretical discussion of the discipline, the 
preponderance of liberal-institutional, social constructivist and critical approaches, in 
which disparate health-related phenomena with global implications require global 
responses, have led to the inversion of the terms of analysis of the international arena 
altogether. The following chapter discusses how these leading approaches elaborate 
the international system as hierarchical and the agents within as anarchical, rather 
than the other way around, as taught by classical authors such as Kenneth Waltz. Yet, 
the next chapter evolves toward the re-inversion back to the traditional structure-
agency relationship, although adapted to the reality of the postcolonial African state. 
Departing from this chapter’s exercise of exploration of the recipient state’s 
behaviour’s types, the next chapter will also propose a conceptual framework of 
analysing the postcolonial African state’s agency within the structure based on the 
Waltzian assumption, yet complemented with a sociological approach that accounts 
for the contingencies affecting the African state that derive from its asymmetric 
position vis-à-vis the West.  Departing from the issues of structure-agency and 
hierarchy-anarchy within International Relations theory, it seeks to conceptualize the 
individual behaviour of African states in function of their governments’ larger 
political and strategic agendas. Building on neorealist and sociological accounts of 
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state and structure, it conceptualises agency as ability of the African colonial state to 
act autonomously, even if in subalternity to the international structure.                   
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Chapter 4 – Asymmetric Relations in Global Health Governance   
 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 showed that postcolonial relations between the West and Sub-
Saharan Africa have been characterised by a tension of governmentalities (Bayart, 
2009), in which both sides try to condition and resist policy choices and practices in 
a context of asymmetry between them. After the failure to live up to the expectation 
of achieving domestic development and achieving integration in the world economy 
after the first two decades of independence (1960s and 1970s), many African 
governments often found no alternative but to negotiate development assistance from 
the West, whose conditionalities aimed at altering the domestic and foreign 
behaviour of these developing countries. The underlying policy tendencies pursued 
by the key Western capitals in the last three decades stretched from the preconisation 
of a neo-liberal political philosophy (1980s and 1990s) to a merge of security and 
development and statebuilding (2000s) in the developing world, namely in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The following chapter inserted the broader discussion in the specific 
field of health program relations, and emphasises the asymmetric character between 
(Western) donors and (African) recipients, the latter rendered facilitators and 
‘rogues’ in the implementation of policies and programs. Nonetheless, postcolonial 
African states, and their elites, who have generally coincided, have sought to exert a 
capacity to survive under very difficult circumstances, particularly in the 1980s and 
1990s, and to restore, during the early 2000s, the developmentalist agenda that had 
characterised the immediate post-independence period. This chapter frames the 
tension between the West and the postcolonial African state in light of the dialectics 
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of agency and structure in the context of West-Africa relations. This exercise is 
divided into four sections.  
First of all, drawing on Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) Theory of International 
Relations, one revisits the concepts of agency, international system, anarchy and 
hierarchy. Although finding Waltz’s contributions limited, as the third section shows, 
this dissertation acknowledges their basic utility in the clarification of the terms of 
analysis. Agency is defined as the ability to act autonomously, even if under 
constraints exerted by the structure. Conversely, agency is a characteristic of states, 
which are the units in the international system. These units are featured by domestic 
hierarchical political relations, while the international system is eminently anarchical, 
i.e. characterised by no central authority.  
Secondly, one reviews the multi-theoretical body of literature (neorealist, 
neoliberal and critical-theoretical) on relations between the West and the developing 
world that point at an unabated hegemonic character of the West. It discusses the 
consensus within International Relations and International Political Economy on the 
idea of a structural hegemony led by the Western world. Especially, critical-
theoretical authors argue that Western hegemony has gone so far to the point of 
having forced an inversion of the international systems’ structural and unitary 
characteristics. Rather than a structure featured by anarchy and units by hierarchy, 
the Western foreign policy space constitutes the sphere of hierarchy that seeks to 
tame the anarchy taking place inside developing states through more or less coercive 
measures based on military presence and development assistance. Eventually, this 
has led to an analytical shift in terms of what constitutes structure and unit.  
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The third section challenges the body of claims made in the previous section 
by highlighting the low degree of agency granted to the postcolonial African state 
within the West-led international system. Often, the state in Africa is presented as 
part of the leasing West-led international structure itself. Regarding the particular 
case of West-Africa relations, the article “Africa and international relations: a 
comment on IR theory, anarchy and statehood” by William Brown (2006) is very 
instructive. However, it also builds on David Chandler’s (2009a; 2009b; 2010) 
propositions on the problem of human agency and the use of ‘radical’ frameworks of 
analysis.  
Finally, building on the previous sections, one proposes the analytical lens for 
the dissertation. On the one hand, one acknowledges Waltz’s contribution, however, 
adapted to the asymmetric character of West-Africa relations. Given Waltz’s elitist 
approach to the structure, which virtually excludes large parts of the world, his 
neorealist conceptualization of agency and structure is informed by the idea of 
“subalternity” (Ayoob, 2002) of developing world’s states vis-à-vis the West. On the 
other hand, the dialectics of agency and structure developed by Waltz is 
complemented with a historical-sociological approach that conceives the state as a 
social relation (Rosenberg, 1990; 1994). This means that inter-state relations are to 
be assessed beyond the conventional detachment of the external sphere, as 
‘international sphere,’ from the internal one, by assuming inclusiveness among both. 
As such, one lays the framework for the five remaining chapters.               
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4.2. State Agency and International System 
Kenneth Waltz was the first author in International Relations to propose a 
scientific depiction of the international system,14 divided between structure and units. 
In his Theory of International Relations, Waltz explains  
A system is composed of a structure and of interacting unities. The 
structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of 
the system as a whole. (...) A structure is defined by the arrangement of 
its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes. A system 
is composed of a structure and of interacting parts. Both the structure and 
the parts are concepts, related to, but not identical with, agents and 
agencies. (Waltz, 1979: 79-80)       
 The international system is composed of units – states – and likens a free 
market led by the principle of self-help. “International-political systems, like 
economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units. (...) 
International politics is structurally similar to a market economy insofar as the self-
help principle is allowed to operate in the latter.” (Ibid.: 91) States’ self-help is 
driven by a basic goal of survival in the international system, since that is the basis 
for any other pursuit “from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to 
be left alone” (Ibid.).  
Though not the only actors in the international system, for Waltz, states are 
the most important ones, as they “nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse, 
whether by passively permitting informal rules to develop or by actively intervening 
to change rules that no longer suit them” (Ibid.: 94). A remark made by the same 
author is particularly relevant for one’s discussion of the African state. Positing that 
the states’ predominance will be long-ranging, Waltz famously wrote:  
                                                 
14 Initiated by Waltz, the agenda in International Relations on system, structure and agency was later 
enhanced by Alexander Wendt (1999) and Collin Wight (2006), among others. However, for the 
purpose of this dissertation one is confined to Waltz’s propositions.     
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The death rate among states is remarkably low. Few states die; many 
firms do. Who is likely to be around 100 years from now – the United 
States, the Soviet Union, France, Egypt, Thailand and Uganda? Or Ford, 
IBM, Shell, Unilever, and Massey-Ferguson? I bet on the states, perhaps 
even on Uganda. (Ibid.: 95)       
Certainly that today the Soviet Union – chief part of Waltz’ thesis on the balance of 
power among major state units as condition for world peace – is no longer around. 
However, the resilience Waltz attributed to an African state should be emphasized, 
particularly considering the elitism that cuts across his work, i.e. the primary 
attention he gives to the world’s more powerful states.  
Another aspect to be highlighted on Waltz’ work is his understanding of state 
sovereignty, which is not synonym to absolute independence from others’ 
constraints. In this important passage, Waltz frames the terms of how state agency 
sets out: 
Sovereign states may be hardpressed all around, constrained to act in 
ways they would like to avoid, and able to do hardly anything just as they 
would like to. The sovereignty of states has never entailed their 
insulation from the effects of other states’ actions. To be sovereign and to 
be dependent are not contradictory conditions. (Ibid.: 96)      
Ability to act with choice occurs in a relational manner, in which sovereignty is 
never an absolute property of states and requires conducts of interdependence. This 
means that, even though states have different capabilities (Ibid.: 105), in principle, all 
of them – United States of America or Ethiopia – enjoy agency, that is, an ability of 
act autonomously, within different gradations of constraint in the structure.   
Considering the discussion on hegemony and what it means for West-Africa 
relations, which ensues in the next section, the distinction between hierarchy and 
anarchy should be discussed too. For Waltz, whereas the state-units are featured by 
hierarchy (Ibid.: 81-88), the international system is characterised by anarchy, i.e. 
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absence of central authority (Ibid: 102-116). In a clear separation between internal 
and external, Waltz argues that states have domestic levels of leadership enforcing 
the country’s law, while outside them there is virtually no entity with that ability.  
A government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself 
the right to use force – that is, to apply a variety of sanctions to control 
the use of force by its subjects. If some use private force, others may 
appeal to the government. A government has no monopoly on the use of 
force, as is all too evident. An effective government, however, has a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and legitimate here means that 
public agents are organized to prevent and to counter the private use of 
force. Citizens need not prepare to defend themselves. Public agencies do 
that. A national system is not one of self-help. The international system 
is. (Ibid.: 103-104) 
However, Waltz’s claim has been questioned in the last thirty years, 
especially since the end of the Cold War, and what that event meant in terms of the 
expansion of United States power worldwide. Hegemony-based approaches to 
international politics, including neorealist ones, have stressed the particular powerful 
feature of the United States of America and major allies (Western Europe and Japan) 
in the leadership of the international system and its consequences for the external 
anarchy-internal hierarchy debate.           
 
 4.3. Reverting Traditional International Relations Postulate     
The concept of hegemony has been thoroughly used by International 
Relations scholars within the different mainstream theoretical strands (neorealism 
and neoliberalism) since the 1980s. Neorealist authors such as Robert Gilpin (1987) 
or John Mearsheimer (2001) have explored hegemony in terms of a stabilizing power 
of the United States of America in a broader context of anarchy in the international 
system, i.e. a system characterised by the absence of central authority, in opposition 
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to hierarchy within the domestic realm of the units of that structure, the nation-states, 
as described by Waltz above. Neorealist authors, such as Mearsheimer, tend to be 
pessimistic about this character, since they might motivate ‘adventurist’ foreign 
policies by the hegemonic power. This interventionist feature of great powers has 
become particularly acute since the end of the Cold War, and perhaps constitutes the 
major point of contention between neorealists and their neoliberal colleagues, who, 
like Robert Keohane (1984), have regarded United States hegemony as an 
opportunity for leading international cooperation. Much political analysis of United 
States-driven global health and development initiatives derives from Keohane’s 
inputs on international cooperation. Concepts such as “soft power,” or “smart power” 
(Armitage and Nye, 2007), i.e. power transmitted through international development 
assistance and international trade, appear as an alternative to military coercion in 
order to establish and consolidate an advantageous position for the United States of 
America. Unlike neorealist authors, who are generally amoral with regard to states’ 
international relations, neoliberal authors are rather idealistic about foreign policy. 
Although recognizing the anarchic international system, they animate the belief that 
the implementation of Western domestic liberal values worldwide – liberal 
representative democracy, market capitalism, civil society, limited government, 
human rights – will ameliorate the prospects of international security, stability and 
peace (Ibid.). The taming of anarchy is not envisaged merely for the external sphere 
of relations between nation-states but also for the domestic sphere. This has 
happened both in practice and, increasingly, in theory, especially after the Cold War, 
as narratives about ‘new threats to security’ appeared throughout the 1990s. 
International security is not merely a function of great powers’ balance of power, as 
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put by Waltzian theory, but also of the impact of marginal, impoverished countries in 
the developing world. Issues around state failure, which one alluded to in Chapter 2 
as featuring relations between the West and Sub-Saharan Africa in the last couple of 
decades, illustrate the concern mainstream theorists of International Relations have 
started to show about the domestic sphere of sovereign states and the need to contain 
the threats emanating from inside them (Bickerton, 2007).  
The actual practice of this soft power-based policy – in which PEPFAR is a 
clear example of in many countries – conjugated with the maintenance of “hard 
power,” i.e. military power in such contexts as Iraq and Afghanistan – has had 
relevant theoretical consequences. The broader policy of prevention of state failure 
and promotion of statebuilding led to a renewed understanding of the international 
system as one characterized, not by anarchy or interdependence, but by hierarchy as 
central government (Ibid.). Conversely, the domestic sphere of postcolonial states is 
featured by anarchy, i.e. absence of central government (Ibid.). Christopher 
Bickerton has summarised it in these terms:   
The highly influential theory of state failure led to a reworking, perhaps 
even an inversion, of the basic categories of International Relations (IR). 
Traditional IR theory was built on the assumption that state sovereignty 
was the precondition for social and political order within domestic 
society. In the absence of any ultimate political authority, the 
international realm, by contrast was seen as a domain of strife, where all 
political and legal order was undermined by the ever-present possibility 
of conflict. Thus one of the traditional problems for liberal theories of 
international politics in the last century was how to ‘domesticate 
anarchy’: that is, how to make the world order more like the domestic 
order. (Ibid.: 94) 
In the case of inter-state West-Africa relations, this claim has been animated by 
authors such as Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw (2001) encompassing a body 
that William Brown (2006) calls “the Africanist critique of International Relations.” 
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 The discussion of the ‘intrusiveness’ of the international liberal order in 
domestic realms has been expanded by the application throughout the last 10 years of 
Michel Foucault’s concepts of biopower, biopolitics and governmentality, originally 
developed to explain the historical rise of liberal power in France and Germany. In 
his 1975-76 Collège de France lecture Society Must Be Defended!, Foucault (2006) 
contradicts Claus von Clausewitz, claiming that “politics is the continuation of war 
by other means,” and not the other way around, as the celebrated war strategist put it. 
This remark has been found instructive in terms of the shifts of conceptualizing 
power – liberal rather than absolute – from the 18th century onwards, with the end of 
the religious wars and the rise of what later became known as capitalism and liberal 
democracy. This sense of politics is less territorial and juridical and increasingly 
more deterritorialized and intensively political (Ibid.). Accordingly, the nature of 
liberal power lies less on the utmost capacity and willingness of the sovereign of 
taking life as such but on the possibility of “either fostering life or impede it to the 
point of death” (Foucault, 1984).  
This characterization of sovereign power – biopower – builds on the idea 
presented prior to that lecture in the first volume of The History of Sexuality that a 
new type of power centred in human beings at the aggregate level and in life in 
general was emerging (Ibid.). This power emanates from the parallel expansion of 
scientific thought and shrinking of the religious influence, as a result of the 
Nietzschean “death of God.” Foucault dedicated an entire volume – The Birth of 
Clinic (Foucault, 1994) – to the particular role of medicine and its branches in this 
revolution in human knowledge about human beings and others and nature around 
him, particularly in Europe. Biopower was exercised through the effort of measuring 
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and regulating all dimensions of both biological and social life through Biology, 
Medicine, Sociology: birth, mortality, criminality, education, employment. Biopower 
is pungently ‘totalitarian,’ since it is targeted at the totality of the population and life 
manifestations. Liberal power is particularly complex in comparison with its former 
form, Absolutism. It requires rationalization and justification so it can be accepted, 
although, sometimes – as the very case of medicine, for instance, demonstrates – it is 
applied by force. Thus, power described by Foucault is presented as 
“power/knowledge” in order to explain the striking influence, namely moral one, of 
epistemic communities, i.e. groups of scientists and others legitimated by the 
scientific “truth” and agreeing on the measures to be taken to tackle with a specific 
issue (Haas, 1992), as the case of the politics of HIV/AIDS (Youde, 2007) 
exemplify. Basically meaning the agent of biopower, the later concept of biopolitics 
(Lemke, 2001) was introduced, to which one shall add up the concept of 
governmentality. Described as “conduct of the conduct,” it is a discursive-material 
apparatus of security embodying rationalities and technologies of government, which 
account for “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions” (Foucault, 1980: 184). These technologies are indeed 
designed to avoid the employment of violence to compel (Lemke, 2001). In a liberal, 
or liberalizing, context that would be very complicated to achieve from the 
perspective of the management of the system’s own sustainability. As such, 
frequently, control is exerted through “ideological manipulation or rational 
argumentation, moral advice or economic exploitation” (Lemke, 2000: 5). 
105 
 
These elaborations have been consistently used to explain the voracity of 
Western powers to intervene in non-Western settings, and enforce security (Jabri, 
2007), human rights regimes (Douzinas, 2007), and development (Duffield, 2007; 
2002; 2005). In a recent publication, Mark Duffield has reiterated the virtue of post-
Foucauldian concepts to achieve a radical view of the security-development nexus 
discussed in the previous chapter, looking at the case of humanitarian/development 
organizations.  
Following the lead of Foucault and the international political sociology 
of the Paris School (...), the development–security nexus can be 
understood as a dispositif or ‘constellation of institutions, practices, and 
beliefs that create conditions of possibility within a particular field’ (...). 
The nexus constitutes a field of development and security actors, aid 
agencies and professional networks, complete with their own forms of 
subjectivity, that call forth the conditions of need and insecurity to which 
collectively, and in competition, they seek to provide solutions. In this 
process, however, not only is risk normalized, but the origins and causes 
of the absences and instabilities these actors hope to rectify are also 
obscured and occluded. (Duffield, 2010: 56; italics in the original) 
Authors such as Mark Duffield continue an avenue of research which, in the 
last analysis, was initiated at the Frankfurt School in its post-Auschwitz phase. 
Holding Modernity and its perverse developmentalist creed arguably on the basis of 
the Nazi horrors as object of critique, it founded Post-Development as a field of 
social critique, namely with regard to the Third World and development aid and 
rationales pushed by the international establishment (International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank, major governmental donors and large North-based NGOs). Initiated in 
the early to mid-1980s by Colombian anthropologist Arturo Escobar (1984/1985), it 
has influenced a number of authors in several fields seeking to demonstrate that 
development, rather than a process, is both means and end, heading to no other 
tangible outcomes than violence and subjection (DuBois, 1991; Brigg, 2002).  
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International development is subject to “governance at a distance” (Duffield, 
2005: 208-210) through technologies of management such as the logical framework. 
These tools build on a presumption of neutrality of developmental and anti-poverty 
work, taking the shape of professional-technical intervention impinged to overcome 
political rigidities, as influential anthropological works of the mid-1990s by Arturo 
Escobar and James Ferguson (Dar and Cooke, 2008). Partnerships, notably 
transnational ones, integrate elements of reciprocity, mutuality and pluralism 
(Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2004: 255; Kettl, 2008: 10). However, that does not 
mean they are more democratic (Roelofs, 2009), both in terms of inter-partner 
relations and between the partnership framework and a whole public lying at the 
margins: from taxpayers, who fund the partnership, to clients, who are subject to 
their activities’ ambitions and interventions. Flexibility does not mean more 
simplicity of relations, rather on the contrary: large partnerships tend to generate 
grand complexity, and are admittedly difficult to take hold from a theoretical 
perspective (Kettl, 2008; Roelofs, 2009; Milward and Provan, 2000). Similarly, goals 
based on empowerment and country ownership – subjectivities connected to hope, 
responsibility and self-reliance – are advanced too.  
Country ownership is what recipient countries obtain when “urged to take 
ownership of development policies and aid activities in their country, to establish 
their own systems of coordinating donors, and only to accept aid that suits their 
needs” (Renzio et al., 2008: 1). According to Bill Cooke (2003), this system of 
ownership provision, promoted, for instance, by the World Bank and repeated by 
other donors, discloses close vicinity with colonial forms of administration, namely 
“indirect rule,” in which colonial administration was tentatively more profitable 
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when transmitted to native elites in order to prevent contestation. However, it is also 
important, as Katharina Welle (2001) has demonstrated, to bear in mind that 
partnership as an organizing model of transnational collaboration has had different 
meanings in contemporary development discourse and practice. In her examination 
of a collaborative project of water management in Ghana, Welle made the distinction 
between partnership as “discourse of solidarity” and as “discourse of efficiency” 
(Ibid.: 4). Whereas initially (i.e. early 1970s) partnership would stand for a 
commitment of solidarity as a mode of alternative development (Ibid.: 7) involving, 
primarily, nongovernmental partners in the North and South, later, from the mid-
1980s until today, as large financial institutions started to implicate NGOs in their 
development financing (Ibid.: 9), partnerships started to be understood as means of 
achieving “good government” (Ibid.: 10) – or ‘good governance,’ as the current 
jargon put it – from an efficiency point of view. 
The shift of level of analysis from the external to the internal obviously had 
an impact in terms of the scrutiny of agency within the structure of hegemony and 
empire. According to Oliver Richmond (2010), the national states and democratic 
institutions that receive the neoliberal policies of the great powers were “hijacked 
and captured” (Ibid.: 3), and therefore agency is left to be searched within the modes 
of local resistance to external neoliberal policies.  
In these struggles [generated by the hegemonic liberal project], a 
possibility of a post-liberal peace emerges, in which everyday local 
agencies, rights, needs, custom and kinship are recognised as discursive 
‘webs of meaning’. This might herald a more realistic recognition of the 
possibilities of, and dynamics of, contextual and local peacebuilding 
agencies within international peacebuilding, development and 
institutional architecture and policies. This move away from ‘imperious 
IR’ and a willingness to emphasise local context and contingency lays 
bare those paradoxes and tensions derived from territorial sovereignty, 
the overbearing state, cold institutionalism, a focus on rights over needs, 
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distant trustee-style governance and a hierarchical international system in 
which material power matters more than everyday life. (Ibid.: 4-5)  
Informed by postcolonial-theoretical perspectives and by focusing on sectors 
of postcolonial populations, this agency/resistance has increasingly constituted a 
research agenda aimed at identifying forms of power hybridity (Richmond, 2010; 
Ginty, 2010). This agency/resistance to the liberal project of statebuilding and 
peacebuilding is presented as a local phenomenon of subversion and appropriation, 
capturing some nuances mentioned throughout Chapter 2, namely neopatrimonialism 
and the way it exemplifies a form of hybrid power (De Goede, 2010). 
 
 4.4. Hegemony-based Approaches and Problem of Agency  
 This thesis argues that African national governments hold agency in the 
international system. This means it assumes that African states/governments act on 
their own under those auspices, i.e. they hold the capacity of taking decisions 
independently, even if constrained and pressured by other states/governments and the 
structural social forces. This agency is a consequence of the postcolonial sovereign 
status achieved since the wave of independences. However, in order to properly 
analyse state action, one needs a more traditional approach to conceptualise agency 
and structure, as the first section suggested. In other words, the analysis should 
depart from the premise that the international arena is driven by anarchy and the 
unitary parts (states) are organized in a hierarchical way. As such, this dissertation 
contends with the hegemony-based claims made in the previous part. One concedes 
that hegemony-based approaches are very appealing, as they are unambiguous about 
the asymmetries that characterise the world of states, in which the United States 
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government’s hegemony often leads to intervention within the domestic realms of 
less powerful states. However, those arguments are problematic for two reasons. On 
the one hand, they assume that the mere intellectual construction of the state in the 
African context is per se a colonial act by the Western world, i.e. an external 
imposition to regulate postcolonial relations. On the other, they essentialise the 
membership of weak African states to the structure of United States hegemony, and 
thus negate their agency.  
In the first case, one follows Brown (2006) in his critique of the authors he 
calls “the Africanist critique of mainstream International Relations:”  
Implicit in the Africanist critique is an idea that ‘western IR’ helps to 
reinforce Western dominance in the international system through, for 
example, aid donors’ insistence on the adoption of particular reforms in 
Africa, centred on Western conceptions of the nation state. (Brown, 
2006: 126)     
For Brown, the understanding of the African state as under absolute domination 
displays an essentialisation, at the knowledge level: the comparative history of 
Europe, where state-centric theory was born, and Africa. Underneath the Africanist 
critique’s positions lies “the notion of a one-way process of imposition of the 
Western ideal-state onto Africa as if Africans themselves had little to do with it” 
(Ibid.: 128). Brown further adds that, unlike the “Africanist critique” often suggests, 
“not only was the course of colonisation shaped by the interaction between Africans 
and Europeans but decolonisation and the foundation of independent states was a 
process in which Africans were actors, not simply acted upon” (Ibid.). This is 
consistent with Christopher Clapham’s (1996) account of the post-independence 
arrangement under the Organization for African Unity, in which the tenets of 
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Westphalia (respect for state sovereignty; non-violation of state integrity; and state 
independence) were clearly remarked. 
In the second case, the question of state agency, or the lack of it, is visible in 
the way authors such as Oliver Richmond (2010) conceptualize human agency, in 
which the state is deliberately bypassed. Accordingly, the state is an entity that is 
observed either as an external machination of potential oppression, often deriving 
from the colonial era, or as a plain superficiality. As such, these authors move 
straight away into the internal realm of the state. The search for agency within the 
domestic sphere of states in the developing world is symptomatic of an 
understanding of the national state as being not only unresponsive to citizens, and 
equivalently more attached to the prescriptions and guidance of the international 
community, but also violent and oppressive of those populations on behalf of the 
external project.  
However, it is questionable to what extent the critique is directed at external 
policies and their consequences, namely at the level of national state violence or at 
liberalism itself. David Chandler has alluded to liberalism within the critique of 
international intervention as a ‘field of adversity.’              
It would seem that at the core of the policy and radical critiques of the 
liberal peace is a critique of liberal aspirations rather than a critique of 
international interventionist policies and practices. The critique reflects 
the ease with which liberalism has become a ‘field of adversity’, through 
which both policy reform and critical claims for theoretical advance can 
both be made. The construction of a liberal ‘field of adversity’ seems to 
have little relation to policy realities. This is reflected in the fact that, 
while there is a consensus on the view that Western policies are 
problematic in that they are too liberal, there is much less attention to 
how the problems of the post-colonial world might be alternatively 
addressed. (Chandler, 2010: 16) 
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Chandler’s remark follows from his critique of post-Foucauldian authors, 
particularly Mark Duffield, who arguably do not theorise, or even exclude, human 
agency that emanates from neoliberal policies. For Chandler, Duffield’s approach  
in effect, essentializes or naturalizes the concept of biopower to argue 
that ‘liberal’ discourses of progress are essentially new forms of 
governing and controlling population (and moreover) appears to throw 
the baby of human agency out with the bathwater of development, 
rejecting modernizing aspirations towards democracy and development 
for recreating oppressive neoliberal biopolitical frameworks of control 
and regulation (Chandler, 2009a: 99)       
As Chapters 6, 7 and, especially, 8 show, those “liberal aspirations” are also shared 
across the three polities under consideration in this dissertation. Furthermore, Jan 
Selby (2007) and David Chandler (2009a; 2009b) have contested the search for the 
existence of an alternative political solution to liberalism within Foucauldian 
accounts.15 In this excerpt, Chandler compares the contemporary post-Foucauldian 
approach, which he calls the “poststructuralist critique” to the “liberal 
cosmopolitans” of the 1990s (authors such as Daniele Archibuggi or Mary Kaldor), 
who arguably set up the Western interventionist framework of today. He concludes 
there is no difference between them. 
The radical discourse of poststructuralist post-territorial political 
community sought to critique this international order as a product of 
global liberalism, but the nature of the critique was in content and form 
little different from that of 1990s cosmopolitanism. There is little 
difference between the frameworks of the poststructuralist critics and the 
                                                 
15 Though not explicitly Marxist, Foucault shared an agenda deriving from Marxian analysis of 
society and economy borne out of the Frankfurt School. Hence, Marxism lays the foundations for 
Foucauldian application to International Relations, which, according to Jan Selby (2007), has not been 
properly acknowledged by the scholarly community. Explaining liberal practices, Foucault sheds 
precious light on how power works, or is meant to work, within capitalist societies, but, according to 
Selby (2007: 340-341), not why it works the way it does. For him, it is explained by Marxism: “the 
ceaseless accumulation of capital, and attendant conflicts amongst capitalists, classes and states” 
(Ibid.: 340). Hence, both traditions – Foucauldian and Marxist – are “mutually enriching” (Ibid.) and, 
moreover, reiterate the conclusion Foucault himself had come to when he stated that “for many of us 
[them] as young intellectuals, an interest in Nietzsche of Bataille didn't represent a way of distancing 
oneself from Marxism or communism. Rather, it was almost the only path leading to what we, of 
course, thought could be expected of communism” (Macdonald, 2002). 
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liberal cosmopolitans because the groundwork of the critique was already 
laid by the crisis within liberal thinking. (…)The radical critique of the 
cosmopolitan discourse of global rights offers a critique of sovereign 
power, representational politics and its grounding liberal ontology, but 
one that merely echoes, to the point of parody, that of its ostensible 
subject of critique. (Ibid, 2009: 68)   
 The dismissal of the state, and its agency, in the developing world, or its 
rendering to a rather passive part of a hierarchical international system, is 
problematic not because the study of emancipation in international politics from an 
anti-colonial perspective is unimportant but because, by radicalizing the argument 
about states as violent and therefore oppressive, it cuts off the prospect of reducing 
inequalities vis-à-vis powerful states. Despite the multitude of social forces in the 
international realm, states are still the centres of political power in that realm, and, as 
such, the attenuation or even change of hegemonic political power is a process that 
necessarily implicates states. However, it is relevant, first of all, to acknowledge the 
character of the African postcolonial state, in particular the relationship with the 
former colonizing powers. As mentioned in Chapter 2, as postcolonial states are 
created, often ties with the former colonial powers were not disrupted. Actually, they 
were retained, and, in the case of social policy (education, health), were intensified 
through mechanisms of development aid and cooperation. Despite the rhetoric of 
independence and sovereignty, often it was in the national elites’ best interest to 
nurture these ties, which indeed constituted relevant means in light of the politics of 
neopatrimonialism. This aspect should be strongly emphasised, as it may be easily 
perceived as postcolonial ‘politics of neo-colonialism.’ 
 However, it should be added that the issues surrounding the state, and its 
agency, in Sub-Saharan Africa are not solely exclusive to that region of the world. 
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David Williams suggests that “the ambiguities about state agency that emerge are not 
at all unique to Africa. African states help to provide some of what we might call the 
‘limit cases’ but the broad issues that emerge are ones that can be applied to thinking 
about state agency in general” (Williams, 2011: 3). Accordingly, “political and 
normative elements” (Ibid.) entrenched in the state render it special qualities, such as 
agency in the international system.             
  
 4.5. Agency, Asymmetry and “State as Social Relation”   
Whereas Waltz’s conceptualization of agency and structure is useful for the 
analysis of postcolonial African relations, one does not advocate a complete return to 
Waltzian neorealist theory. Despite serving well as a “problem-solving theory” (Cox, 
1981) for the objectivity of its definitions, a full engagement with neorealist theory is 
empirically limited (Ayoob, 2002).       
Although a confessed neorealist, Mohammed Ayoob underlines the elitism of 
Waltz’s proposals, as they draw on the experience of major world powers (United 
States of America and Soviet Union), and their impact on the post-Second World 
War settlement in Europe. For Waltz, weaker states are almost inevitably inclined 
towards bandwagoning with the stronger powers, and there they remain: “As soon as 
someone looks like the winner, nearly all jump on the bandwagon rather than 
continuing to build coalitions intended to prevent anyone from winning the prize of 
power” (Waltz, 1979: 126). However, Ayoob has made the same criticism for 
neoliberal authors alike, whose “thesis on cooperation under anarchy skews the data 
in favour of affluent, industrialized democracies of the global North that form a small 
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minority of the total membership of the international system” (Ayoob, 2002: 36). 
Concentration on North America, Western Europe, Japan and a few more 
countries/regions excludes, or inhibits, the vast majority of states, which are 
generally much poorer and less developed and industrialized. This problem of 
exclusion is found in the specific field of global health governance. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, James Ricci (2009) has called for a rescue of the state in that 
area. After all, states are the major financial contributors and defining policy-makers. 
However, Ricci’s introduction of International Society theory does not take into due 
account the character of asymmetry, and thus invisibility, of the recipient state. As 
such, his theoretical approach is mired in the same elitism that liberal-institutional 
and globalization scholars of global health mentioned above exhibit. This asymmetry 
is primarily understood in function of the disparities of wealth and human 
development between regions, but also the origin of influential epistemologies and 
policies that form the actual relationship. Although Ricci’s call for a renewed 
attention to the state is very pertinent, his International Society-based proposal as a 
fitter analytical framework suffers from the same theoretical problem that affects 
neoliberal and neorealist approaches, and that will be scrutinized into more detail in 
the Chapters 6, 7 and 8. By leaving it in silence, Ricci’s alternative, state-based 
proposal does not conceptualize the issue of asymmetry between states in global 
health governance. His allusion is mainly, if not exclusively, to donor countries, 
mostly Western, and large, powerful states such as China. His mention of the 
Indonesian government’s refusal to share A/H5N1 flu virus samples offers an 
example of how a smaller country conflicts with the major states; however, the 
background question of asymmetry within such (international) society is not 
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addressed. It should be added that the segregation faced by postcolonial African 
states lies at the core of the “Africanist critique of International Relations,” which 
one has discussed in the previous section. Accordingly, this silencing is handed as 
evidence that International Relations theory just does not serve the realities of 
regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. This fact implicates an understanding of the 
contingencies that render those states generally a condition of subalternity and 
asymmetry vis-à-vis the major players in the international scene, who also happen to 
have been former colonial masters.  
As a response, Ayoob proposes a version of neorealism he has called 
“subaltern realism,” which departs from a position in which the state is the central 
figure in the international arena, “despite the proliferation of nonstate actors and their 
increased capacity, in relative terms, to influence international and national 
outcomes” (Ibid.: 39). However, so it can have any significance, the state has to be 
effective and markedly Westphalian in order to achieve any real equality with the far 
more powerful states in the system. “Only by approaching the Westphalian ideal 
more closely can the postcolonial states provide stable political order domestically 
and participate on a more equal footing in writing and rewriting the rules of 
international order.” (Ibid.: 40). Ayoob prescribes these states as “strong states” 
(Ibid.) that can guarantee development and economic growth, even if contrary to the 
international establishment.16 But Ayoob’s proposal is not radical in its rejection of 
the (postcolonial) state as a violent demon. He regards postcolonial violence as a 
                                                 
16 In his article Ayoob (2002) refers to the Washington Consensus, since his earlier developments of 
the “subaltern realism” perspective started in the early 1990s, as the liberal developmental proposal 
based on market dominance and state structure reduction emerged victorious under the name of 
Washington Consensus. One could hypothesise that an example of “strong state” suggested by Ayoob 
corresponds to the revival of the ‘developmental state,’ as it will be discussed in this dissertation, 
particularly with regard to Ethiopia and Botswana. 
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contingency following the proclamation of juridical sovereignty and recognition as 
members of the United Nations. “In many cases, establishing effective statehood, to 
whatever extent this was possible, entailed the exercise of violence and 
counterviolence by the state and its opponents” (Ibid.: 43-44) As Hobbesian as he is 
about the need of central authority to regulate what alternatively would be a ‘brutish 
way of life’ among humans, violence is possibly necessary in order to build a nation 
that can prosper in the future. Ayoob’s rejoinder to neorealist theory is valuable as it 
reiterates the centrality of the state – and therefore its agency – in the international 
system while, at the same time, considering the subalternity most states, including 
those in Sub-Saharan Africa, have been experiencing since their existence as 
sovereign states.  
However, as a committed neorealist theoretical perspective, Ayoob detaches 
external from internal spheres, and that is particularly limitative as a lens that 
captures the fullest possible levels of relations a state can have. Considering the 
porosity of the postcolonial state in terms of areas such as social development or 
health – mostly at stake in this dissertation, after all – it is necessary to establish a 
framework that connects external and domestic dimensions of inter-state action.           
An envisaged framework that deals with the limits of neorealist theory for 
explaining the realities of postcolonial relations, while acknowledging its clarity in 
the definition of structure and agency, is one that is sociologically-informed by the 
work of Justin Rosenberg (1990; 1994). Taking states as social relations, Rosenberg 
argues that such state-specific property as sovereignty, and the very international 
system, is partially the product of inter-state relations. Reflecting on the emergence 
of the nation-state in Europe after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Rosenberg 
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argues that internal and external developments to states combine and consolidate the 
international system of relations.  
We are viewing, in the emergence of sovereign nation-states, the 
consolidation of a structure of political power whose core institution 
(sovereignty) is a point of continuity between the domestic and the 
‘international.’ The mustering of administrative power domestically is 
inescapably bound up with relations between states – and vice-versa. 
(Rosenberg, 1990: 254) 
Although the author reflects on the specific case of Europe, it is worth applying to 
relations with states in Sub-Saharan Africa, which, despite their nuances, discussed 
throughout Chapter 2, are members with agency in the international system. In 
another piece, Rosenberg repeats his appeal for an attention to the social component 
of states and their relations beyond a dogmatic separation between external and 
internal. Yet, here he addresses the problem of the risk of treating any state as a mere 
Western construction, hollowed out of its specificities.  
If one cannot look at those social relations, then one must treat the state 
as an irreducible actor. And to do this is to invest the specifically modern 
Western form of the state with an elemental status which abstracts it from 
its social and historical reality. (Rosenberg, 1994: 94) 
Understanding the state as a social relation implies that the existing hierarchy found 
inside the state/units is the result of relations between political, social and economic 
forces, internal and external to the unit. This sociologically-informed theory of the 
state allows for the comprehension of a sophisticated public-private partnership, 
PEPFAR, under analysis here, and its process of implementation in different national 
settings. And this applies not only to the recipient governments but also to the donor 
one. Likewise, the structure upon which states sit and interact is also historically and 
socially-informed by social forces. 
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 In this dissertation, one organizes those social relations that constitute the 
state along different levels. In the case of recipient countries of international (or 
bilateral, in this case) development programs, one divides the analysis along three 
interconnected levels. One level corresponds to the conventional international realm 
of relations at the higher diplomatic and military level featured by an encompassing 
foreign policy and national strategies. Relations between different states are analysed 
within the international system’s context. A second level corresponds to the domestic 
sphere, in which state policies with a domestic scope engage with the international 
donor’s influences. Accordingly, the focus is on how the international level is 
negotiated internationally in the governmental sphere. And the third level is the local 
and looks at the practices of the interaction of the recipient state and the international 
donor. This level allows the analysis of how the policies under scrutiny are rendered 
operational in the field. At each of these levels, despite the asymmetry of relations 
with the donor, the recipient state holds agency, i.e. it acts independently in the 
pursuit of its policy goals.  
Indeed, it should be remarked that, apart from state policies, this sociological 
approach requires the full inclusion of all actors involved in the partnership, i.e. 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations, United States-based and 
established in the host countries, as well as international organizations (e.g. those 
belonging to the United Nations system). Yet, other stakeholders are also taken into 
consideration.   
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4.6. Conclusion 
 This chapter puts forward the conceptual proposal for the study of the agency 
of Sub-Saharan African national governments under the implementation of 
development aid programs. It started with a discussion of the concepts of agency, 
structure, anarchy and hierarchy in light of Kenneth Waltz’ (1979) Theories of 
International Relations. His proposals are found basically useful to describe the 
autonomous behaviour of postcolonial African states, despite their structural 
constraints. One asserted Waltz’s idea that all unit-states have agency and 
constraints, independent of their capacity. States are the key units of the international 
system, and are characterised by internal hierarchy, with the primacy of central 
government. In turn, the international system is featured by anarchy, i.e. the absence 
of central government who enforces law in the international realm.  
The second section looked at the hegemony-based arguments that have 
emerged since the 1980s to describe the role of the United States of America in the 
international system. In order to understand the ambition, scope and intensity of 
West-led statebuilding and development policies and initiatives, particularly critical-
theoretical perspectives have suggested an inversion of the ‘classical’ structure-
agency relationship. Accordingly, the structure appears hierarchical rather than 
anarchical, and the state-unit is anarchical rather than hierarchical. However, the 
third section has challenged this view in two instances. First, one contested the idea 
held by what Brown (2006) has called “the Africanist critique of International 
Relations” that the modern Westphalian state is an intellectual and policy act of 
colonialism by the West in Africa. Following Brown (Ibid.), one reinforces that 
Africans were also part of the process of colonisation and postcolonisation, and thus 
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the integration of Africa in the world of states is also their responsibility. Second, 
building on Chandler (2009a, 2009b, 2010) one finds problematic the jeopardy, or 
even negation, of agency among postcolonial African states by critical theorists, 
namely when employing Foucauldian frameworks.    
Finally, the fourth section proposes the analytical framework for the empirical 
chapters. Although basically useful for explaining states’ ability to act autonomously, 
i.e. with agency, in the world system, Waltzian theory of International Relations is 
limited insofar as it was primarily elaborated to explain major states’ behaviour. As 
such, it appears as an elitist proposition that hardly captures the realities of weaker 
and poorer states such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the same applies to 
other mainstream theories in the field, namely neoliberalism. An approach that looks 
at asymmetries is thus required, and Ayoob (2002) develops an approach that 
underlines the subalternity of smaller states. Although the idea of subalternity is 
correct, Ayoob’s neorealism still detaches external and internal spheres of the state, 
and that is limited too as it does not help to grasp the interchange between the 
external and the internal dynamics. Building on Rosenberg (1990, 1994), it is argued 
that a sociologically-informed understanding of the state as a social relation allows 
for a more inclusive grasping of the postcolonial state’s behaviour vis-à-vis the 
structure. However, this sociological approach implies the incorporation of actors 
that go beyond the ‘mere’ state institutions on both sides. It requires the full 
incorporation of the array of governmental and nongovernmental entities, based in 
the donor and recipient countries, as well as international organizations, whenever 
they are implicated. Inter-state social relations are divided along three levels – 
international, national, and local – that lay the analytical framework for the empirical 
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Chapters 6, 7 and 8. The next chapter presents and discusses the PEPFAR’s history 
and connections to United States domestic and foreign politics.             
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Chapter 5 – PEPFAR: Evolution and Asymmetric Relations  
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced this dissertation’s analytical framework 
based on the ideas of agency by postcolonial African states, following Waltz’s 
(1979) original proposition in Theory of International Relations, asymmetry of 
relations in the international system (Ayoob, 2002), and, finally, “state as a social 
relation” (Rosenberg, 1990, 1994). A sociological approach to the state is found 
needed in order to connect the traditionally divided internal and external spheres of 
states, and as such enhance the scope of analysis of inter-state relations between the 
West and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This chapter presents and discusses the case study in which the analytical 
framework is employed: the process of designing, establishing and implementing 
PEPFAR in Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa. It looks at the origins, political 
rationales, policies and organisational design of PEPFAR, before proceeding to the 
actual experience of implementation in those three countries (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). It 
is informed by official documents from the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator 
(PEPFAR’s leadership); media articles; opinion pieces by several parties; academic 
articles and theses. But it is also informed by interviews carried out with PEPFAR 
implementers and other stakeholders in Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa. This 
chapter focuses on the origins of the plan and the political rationales behind it. 
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5.2. The Origins of PEPFAR 
The history of the United States government’s international intervention in 
HIV/AIDS started in 1986 with a USAID request to Congress for funding 
specifically for that area (Sheehan, 2008: 126). The main reason for doing it had to 
do with the developmental implications that the rising epidemic could originate 
(Ibid.). This was sensitive in the context of the late Cold War, particularly in Africa, 
where two models of development and modernity were challenging each other for 
influence: one market-based, of United States/Western inspiration, and another state-
led, of Soviet/Warsaw Pact support. This also happened in the context of the first 
international initiatives driven by the World Health Organization (WHO) to establish 
programs for monitoring and control of the epidemic (WHO, 2008). With the end of 
the Cold War in 1989, and despite an overall reduction of international development 
funding in the early 1990s, this intervention became part of a “second phase” of 
United States-Africa relations and the progressive construction of  
concerns about under-development and humanitarian issues such as wars 
and armed conflicts, failed and collapsed states, poverty, HIV/AIDS and 
environmental catastrophes such as drought and famine and their 
collective impact on United States national security. (Francis, 2010: 11)      
Hence, progressively, HIV/AIDS started to be referred to as an issue of development 
with increasingly security implications, as it came to be crystallized with the 
establishment of PEPFAR in 2003.  
PEPFAR builds extensively on the experience of the Ryan White 
Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Act of 1990. It can be argued 
that PEPFAR constitutes a ‘globalisation’ (beyond United States borders) of the early 
experience of a domestic program. The CARE Act aimed at responding with a 
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character of emergency to a disease that had already killed 50 000 people by that 
year in the United States of America (Rankin, 2009: 2). It had four components: 
primary care for those infected in major metropolitan areas; supportive services; 
early intervention and prevention programs; and programs for women, infants, 
children, youth, and their families (Ibid.: 5), and it was reauthorized three times 
(1996, 2000 and 2006). This program was the result of years of activism, including 
by the person who gave name to the program, Ryan White, an infected haemophiliac. 
This activism emerged in face of years of neglect by the federal government, whose 
anti-gay stance had larger consequences to HIV/AIDS intervention in the country. 
Even though HIV can be transmitted in several ways, including blood transfusions, 
for a long time it was primarily associated with male homosexual practices, to the 
point of being called a “gay cancer” in the early moments of discovery of the disease 
(Fee and Parry, 2008: 54).      
The commonality between both programs is visible in the way both have 
evolved. As it is discussed into more detail ahead in this chapter, both have started, 
as their titles make it explicit, as emergency programs for dealing with a crisis. Yet, 
they then pursued a strategy of transferring ‘ownership’ to the communities, which, 
in the case of PEPFAR, means largely the national governments and these countries’ 
civil societies. The comments and examples that Leslie Rankin has put forward are 
informative on that regard.  
This approach is critical for HIV and AIDS services as localities are 
faced with many different issues. For example, an area that does not have 
coordinated public transit may allocate funding for van rides so that 
clients can be compliant with medical appointments, whereas an area 
with efficient public transit may chose to allocate funding for other 
purposes. By allowing localities the ability to prioritize rather than 
providing a standardized federal prioritization, funding can be used 
efficiently to provide effective services. (Rankin, 2009: 44)          
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 Overtime the CARE program came to be confronted with the question of 
generating dependency. Considering that the program’s funding is largely spent on 
the provision of lifelong antiretroviral medications, the enrolment of new patients 
who could not, and cannot, turn to an alternative medical scheme in this program has 
contributed for its increasing overall cost (Ibid.: 45). 
It should also be mentioned that the current head of PEPFAR, Eric Goosby, 
was the first administrator of the CARE Act in 1991. Moreover, his career in the 
1980s was spent in HIV/AIDS medical care (he is a medical doctor by training) 
primarily in the United States of America, and in the 1990s in the leadership of 
several other United States domestic initiatives.          
 
5.3. Political Rationales 
5.3.1. United States Foreign Policy and Security Strategy 
In Chapter 2, one discussed the several linkages established by scholars and 
policy-makers in the West in the realm of infectious disease and other health-related 
issues and foreign policy, security and strategy. In the case of the United States of 
America, the topic of infectious diseases has been framed in the most recent strategic 
concepts.  
New flows of trade, investment, information, and technology are 
transforming national security. Globalization has exposed us to new 
challenges and changed the way old challenges touch our interests and 
values, while also greatly enhancing our capacity to respond. Examples 
include: Public health challenges like pandemics (HIV/AIDS, avian 
influenza) that recognize no borders. The risks to social order are so 
great that traditional public health approaches may be inadequate, 
necessitating new strategies and responses. (The White House, 2006: 47, 
italics in the original) 
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HIV/AIDS’ real or constructed implications, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where the epidemic was found proliferating extensively since the 1980s too, 
have long become a subject of interest to the United States Department of State, 
namely its autonomous agency for international development, USAID. Addressed 
first as an issue of health and development, it increasingly became a topic in security 
discussions, even if asymmetrically, from the late 1980s through the 1990s. As the 
doctoral thesis by Carrie C. Sheehan (2008) on the securitization of HIV/AIDS in 
United States foreign policy shows, congressional hearings and presidential 
documents across the late 1980s through early 1990s demonstrate a security concern 
associated with the epidemic, both in its domestic (inside the United States of 
America) and international dimensions. After a sharp decline during most of the 
1990s, it resurged in the late 1990s, yet with a larger emphasis on the link between 
AIDS and security than ever before (Ibid.: 163-164). 
Richard Holbrooke, United States ambassador to the United Nations at the 
end of the 1990s, was arguably the key element in the United States government to 
elaborate a security discourse about the epidemic that eventually led to the first 
United Nations Security Council meeting on HIV/AIDS on January 10, 2000. His 
discourse pointed at two, yet interconnected, aspects. One had to do with the impact 
on the military when operating overseas, in peacekeeping missions or else, and 
another on potential social disruptions in sites characterized by a hyper-epidemic. In 
an interview in May 2006, Holbrooke commented on both aspects. 
My first personal observation was in Cambodia in 1992 when I went 
there as a private citizen, and I saw the peacekeepers from the United 
Nations in Cambodia, and they were doing a good job. But at night I saw 
them wandering around the street drunk and going into whorehouses and 
so on and so forth, and I was quite upset about this. It was clear that they 
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were spreading AIDS, and they were going to take AIDS back with them. 
(Holbrooke, 2006) 
And after a visit paid to ten African countries in 1999 he observed: 
Watching kids sleep in the gutters in Lusaka [Zambia], knowing that they 
will become either prostitutes or rape victims, either getting or spreading 
the disease, because there's no shelter for them, and that the government 
is doing nothing about it, makes a powerful impression on you. (…) I 
said: "Look at the facts; it's not simply a humanitarian issue. If a country 
loses so many of its resources in fighting a disease which takes down a 
third of its population, it's going to be destabilized, so it is a security 
issue." (…) Anyway, that was years ago. That issue is over. Everyone 
now accepts our definition of AIDS as a security issue -- it's self-evident. 
(Ibid.) 
Also in January 2000 the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
published a report which presented HIV/AIDS as a security threat to the United 
States (National Intelligence Council, 2000), followed by another in 2002 about the 
“second wave” countries whose future experience with the epidemic will lead to 
disruptions with global consequences (Gordon, 2002). Following on these 
developments, Washington, DC-based think tank Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) has also published along these lines. According to CSIS 
analysts Mark Schneider and Michael Moodie (2002), after Southern and Eastern 
Africa, strategically crucial countries such as Russia, India and China, together with 
very populous African countries such as Nigeria and Ethiopia, were emerging as the 
next regions severely affected by the epidemic.  
In International Relations scholarship, a first and very influent narrative 
highlighted scenarios of socioeconomic disruption, loss of state capability, violent 
conflictuality and terrorism within worst-affected societies in Southern and Eastern 
Africa (Elbe, 2003; Price-Smith, 2002; Altman, 2003). United States army official 
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Charlene Jefferson summarizes this complexity, where orphans and vulnerable 
children attract major attention:  
Simply put, a disturbing new formula may be emerging; AIDS creates 
economic devastation. Economic devastation creates an atmosphere 
where stable governments cannot function. When stable governments 
cannot effectively function, terrorism thrives by exploiting the underlying 
conditions that promote the despair and the destructive visions of 
political change. (…) …AIDS has created a steady stream of orphans 
who can be exploited and used for terrorist activities. (Jefferson, 2006: 6-
7) 
Princeton Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison (2006) have suggested that countries like 
Nigeria and South Africa offer safe havens for recruitment of children and youths for 
jihadist, anti-Western activities home and abroad, exploiting on the epidemic effects. 
The question of international peacekeeping forces deployed in the developing world 
and their exposure to the virus through engagement with female sex workers was 
also explored by Stefan Elbe (2003), Matthew L. Lim (2004) and Martin Rupiya 
(2006). In Russia, AIDS proliferation within the army also became a matter of 
national security by the government too, as a result of increasing incidence of the 
virus nationwide (Eberstadt, 2002; Sjösted, 2008). It should also be mentioned that 
AIDS has been likewise linked as a variable to other socially constructed threats, 
namely migrants and refugees (IRIN, 2006) and climate change (Australian 
Associate Press, 2008).  
However, other authors, such as Laurie Garret (2005) and Alex de Waal 
(2006), expressed scepticism about the propelled causality. The nexus is eminently 
speculative (McInnes, 2006) and based more on intuition that on evidence (Barnett 
and Prins, 2006). AIDS is a long-wave event, and hence it requires the careful 
analysis of three generations so one can draw peremptory conclusions about its real 
impact.  
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Put briefly, an infected person has children, these are orphaned and may 
grow up to be infected, but not before they have themselves had children 
– who are orphaned in turn. Hence a basic unit of social structure in most 
human societies, the three-generation bond linking grandparents, parents 
and children in a continuously reproduced pattern is rent asunder. 
(Barnett, 2006: 298) 
De Waal has led a research team in recent years whose empirical evidence argues 
against the HIV-security framework (de Waal, 2010). Still, independent of this 
discussion, the linkage was maintained and even adopted by the then-head of the 
United Nations Joint Programme for HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS), Peter Piot, as part of 
a strategic discourse of raising awareness and funding for the epidemic in the years 
that followed.     
However, it is interesting to notice that at time of publication of the two CIA 
reports there was a change in United States Administration (from Clinton to Bush), 
where Bush’s first remarks on Africa were of little engagement with the continent. In 
2000, George W. Bush stated that “[while] Africa may be important, it does not fit 
into the national interests, as far as I can see them” (Francis, 2010: 10), something 
that seems contradictory with the growing presentation of the epidemic as an 
existential threat. Nonetheless, after the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York 
City and Washington, DC, there was a resurgence of that rhetoric under a more 
comprehensive policy framework linking (failed) states, counter-insurgency, 
development, and epidemics too, with Africa broadly constituting an important site 
of analysis and implementation. At the end of his tenure, former United States Global 
AIDS Coordinator Mark Dybul has used these terms: 
Our future is Africa’s future and Africa’s future is our future. So there’s 
very much that long-term vision for a stable world in which we play a 
role and have a role. And it’s in our self-interest. (…) [These programs] 
have changed how people view America. (…) people know what we 
stand for when we stand with them. And eight of ten of the countries in 
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the world with the highest approval rating of the United States, 
sometimes higher than the United States itself, are in Africa. (…) These 
programs touch lives. (Dybul, 2009)   
However, the growing influence of China in Africa has also led to reinforced 
attention to the geopolitical implications (Osikena, 2010: 169-170). An interviewee 
with a United States government agency in Botswana lamented that the United States 
of America does not get the same newspaper credit for the HIV/AIDS effort as 
Chinese building companies operating in the country do (Interviewee 16, 2010). 
But it should be underlined that the foreign policy and security argument is 
not the only PEPFAR’s driver. In broader domestic discussions about PEPFAR this 
general rationale comes together with what one could call ‘conventional benign 
reasons,’ such as humanitarianism and compassion for the sufferer. Recipient 
populations are presented as in utter need of United States compassion and charity 
(Pereira, 2011b: 10-11). However, this argument is still very relevant, especially in 
commentary about the public’s perceived too high expenditure by the government in 
development and relief overseas. 
              
5.3.2. Domestic Constituencies 
The United States of America has a large constituency implicated both in the 
policy-making and practice of development-related issues, which can be seen as a 
product of the eminent rise as a military and economic superpower worldwide, 
particularly after the Second World War. Despite some resistance to allocating aid 
overseas by some advocates of a more inward, isolationist position, the majority of 
political leaders and their constituents, either for idealist or realist purposes (Ruttan, 
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1996: 2), are in favour of actively engaging in, and moreover leading, programs that 
aim at improving human development indicators in the developing world (education, 
health), as well as economic growth, democracy and civil society. This tendency has 
been recently confirmed by a survey published by the Council on Foreign Relations 
that found that  
[there] is a widespread consensus in the United States that developed 
countries have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger and 
severe poverty and that helping poor countries develop serves the long-
term interests of wealthy countries, including by developing trade 
partners and enhancing global stability. (Council on Foreign Relations, 
2009) 
It should be added that this “consensus” is basically shared with other developed 
countries, therefore showing that this cannot be seen as a United States distinctive 
trace, as many policy-makers and activists often seem to suggest in domestic settings 
when alluding to “American values” (Goodwin, 2007: 49; Ziker, 2008: 10; Schaefer, 
2009: 142) The same case is verified when respondents are enquired on whether or 
not they would be eager to pay more taxes in the name of international development, 
and they answer they would not. This response is arguably based on “extremely 
exaggerated estimates” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009) of the government’s 
actual expenditure on foreign aid. 
 As large and comprehensive as it has been, PEPFAR has sought to attract the 
interest (and sometimes the criticism too) of the relevant constituency composed by 
universities and nongovernmental voluntary organizations. In his mid-1990s account 
of the domestic politics of governmental foreign assistance in the United States, 
Vernon W. Ruttan claimed that these two types of organizations were generally 
facing a rather unpredictable future as “clients” of USAID (Ruttan, 1996: 203-251). 
The former’s relationship with USAID was declining since the early 1980s (Ibid.: 
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217) in an overall “long history of frustration (…) due in large part to the differing 
perceptions of administration and staff (…) on the appropriate role of the two 
institutions [university and USAID]” (Ibid.: 220). The latter were generally 
appreciated overtime for “stimulating community development and empowerment 
[in the developing world]” (Ibid.: 235). However, the same author and former 
USAID official concluded in 1996 that they 
[unfortunately] (…) have not been able to convince either the 
development professionals in the assistance agencies or the journalists 
who report on their activities in the field either that they have been very 
effective in providing relief in a manner that does not generate 
dependency or of their capacity to implement and manage development 
projects that achieve sustainability. (Ibid.)                         
With PEPFAR these entities made a dramatic return, insisting publicly on their 
capacity to generate effective results. 
A specific type of nongovernmental organization involved in PEPFAR’s 
division of labour that has been relatively distinctive is the faith-based organization 
(FBO). Even though very significant funding has been allocated to non-faith-based 
organizations (for instance, in the areas of research and community development), 
FBOs were subject to ‘positive discrimination’ by the Bush Administration, as one 
interviewee with a FBO implementing agency admitted:  
As a faith-based organization we benefited from the policy preference of 
the Bush Administration. Now funding will be more dispersed among 
different organizations, secular and faith-based. Secular are more into 
distribution of condoms. We were discriminated positively. (Interviewee 
32, 2009)   
This applied in terms of access to funding and given freedom to adopt their 
privileged policy of action, particularly as far as prevention is concerned, in turn, as 
will be discussed below, already legally trimmed to suit their preferences for 
messages of abstinence and marital fidelity at the expense of condoms and other 
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‘liberal’ approaches. Several authors associate this presence to the ascendancy of the 
Christian Right in the country, and the support it gave to Bush’s consecutive 
elections (Dietrich, 2007; Buss and Herman, 2003; Marsden, 2008). 
 The Christian Right does not constitute, or agglomerate around, a single 
political entity in the United States political system. Therefore, several definitions 
have been advanced over time. For the purpose of this dissertation, one builds on the 
conceptualization by Lee Marsden, according to which  
[the] term ‘Christian Right’ (…) applies to conservative evangelicals and 
right-wing Catholics within the Republican Party whose religious 
persuasion determines their attitudes to political questions. This grouping 
consists of organizations, politicians, activists and supporters who are 
generally Protestant evangelicals, but also includes right-wing Catholics 
supportive of conservative moral and fiscal values on issues such as 
abortion, sexuality and free markets (…) united in their opposition to 
abortion, euthanasia, stem-cell research, homosexuality, same-sex 
marriage, promiscuity, secularism and big government. (Marsden, 2008: 
3-4)               
In addition to that, the Christian Right supports the war in Iraq and other military 
operations, and hence are in principle persuaded by the security rationales underlying 
development interventions, let alone their Christian sympathy for those in need of 
salvation, material and spiritual. As far as HIV/AIDS goes, Marsden refers to opinion 
polls that claim that “between one-third and three-quarters considers AIDS to be a 
punishment from God” (Ibid.: 75).  
It should also be added that Christian Right’s organizations have had their 
direct international relations with partners from all over the world, including Sub-
Saharan Africa, where Christianity has grown exponentially in the last decades, 
“from 144 million in 1970 to 411 million by 2005” (Ibid.: 76). Many African 
Catholics with connections to the United States of America have traditionally been 
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associated with the Christian Right (Buss and Herman, 2003: 94), but the most recent 
“renewalists” (i.e. Pentecostals and Charismatics), 17% of the total Christian 
population in Sub-Saharan Africa, have stronger ties, and also have increased 
dramatically (Marsden, 2008: 76). As a result, they offer an ideological-institutional 
framework where the Christian Right’s influences can be disseminated, although, as 
Doris Buss and Didi Herman (2003: 95) have noted, it is not clear whether there is 
mutual share of worldviews between United States and African congregates. John W. 
Dietrich (2007: 290) points at Evangelical Janet Museveni, wife of Ugandan long-
standing ruler Yoweri Museveni and head of Christian AIDS-funded Uganda Youth 
Forum, as an example of empathy between the United States Christian Right and 
Africa. However, Alex de Waal (2006: 99-100) has observed Janet Museveni’s move 
as a collaborative effort of the ruling couple of maximizing AIDS funding with 
several donors and their ideologies. Whereas the first lady works with abstinence-
backing United States partners, the president was turning to condoms-driven 
European donors. This suggests the tendency for ‘subversion’ of external funding 
and prescriptions discussed in Chapter 2.   
 With the change from Republican to Democrat Administration, Christian 
Right-backed policies in PEPFAR, particularly the Mexico City Policy, that forbids 
any federal funding for family planning activities conducive to abortion, were 
reversed. This has given momentum to organizations on the opposite side of the 
spectrum, i.e. liberal and supportive of sex education, condoms and consented 
abortion. However, that does not mean a retreat of the Christian Right, rather on the 
contrary. In fact, recent Congressional debates on funding have reconsidered the 
reversal of that funding back to restriction.          
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5.3.3. The Presidency and Bipartisanism 
Considering the name of the program, in which the President appears as the 
‘sponsor’ of the program, one ought to scrutinize the role of the presidency in the 
establishment and execution of PEPFAR. The same applies to the bipartisan 
character of this initiative, in which, since the beginning, it has been stressed by 
policy-makers that it has been gathering both Republican and Democrat congressmen 
and senators in its endorsement, despite policy differences. 
The figure of the President is regarded in itself as a cornerstone of foreign 
policy in the United States of America. As Glenn P. Hastedt claims in his in-depth 
study of United States foreign policy-making, “in the eyes of the public, it is the 
president who makes American foreign policy” (Hastedt, 2009: 184). Even though 
his advisors certainly play a role and hold their leverage on the defining decisions, 
examples throughout history demarcate the level of autonomy maintained by 
presidents (Ibid.: 184-186). In the case of PEPFAR, Bush has recognised the early 
advice he received from national security advisor Condoleezza Rice on establishing a 
HIV/AIDS program with a humanitarian as well as security focus (McGreal, 2010). 
According to Hastedt, the nature of the President’s personality has much to do with 
the decisions and initiatives that are pursued. One element of his personality that has 
been associated with PEPFAR concerns to his worldview, i.e. the president’s 
“politically relevant beliefs” (Ibid.: 188). Moreover, in the case of PEPFAR’s 
promoter and leader during most of the program’s history so far, George W. Bush, he 
is regarded, following terminology by James David Barber cited by Hastedt, as an 
example of “active-positive presidents [who] put a great deal of energy into being 
president and derive great satisfaction from doing so” (Ibid.). 
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In the previous section, the important role of the Christian Right in the 
process of election and re-election of George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 was 
highlighted. Some commentators have regarded the adoption of specific policies as 
part of a Christian Right-led political structure (Dietrich, 2007; Rosen, 2006). 
However, another opinion emphasises that Bush’s decisions derive from his own 
(Christian) values. For instance, when asked what drove the establishment of 
PEPFAR, a long-standing official with a United States government PEPFAR 
implementing agency has commented that “in [her] personal opinion, it relied on the 
Bush person, a conservative, charitable individual who believed that this was the best 
thing to do” (Interviewee 14, 2010). Eventually, both elements do match one another. 
Over the years, George W. Bush was constantly implicated by the media and 
commentators with the program, often in a very personalized way, thus confirming 
the above claim of the President’s centrality in (foreign) policy-making. This 
intimate connection to the program has been particularly emphasised in 2008 during 
the process that led to its reauthorization and his personal visits to African countries, 
in which he insisted on the maintenance and reinforcement of the program (Wolf and 
Page, 2008; Mail & Guardian, 2008; Medical News Today, 2008; Kaiser Network, 
2008a; Loven, 2008; Schaefer and Kim, 2008). After his retirement in early 2009, 
George W. Bush has acknowledged that PEPFAR was a major aspect of his foreign 
policy (McGreal, 2010), and his global AIDS coordinator Mark Dybul even 
suggested that a Nobel Peace Prize should be awarded to Bush. 
Dybul did say he believes that Bush deserves a Nobel Peace Prize for his 
work in Africa. “There was literally no global response until President 
Bush came forward and said enough is enough,” he said. Dybul said that 
the global shift in the direction of development also warrants the prize. 
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“If you look at this objectively, no one can say that that is not the ring of 
a Nobel Peace Prize.” (Huseman, 2010)                  
However, other commentators in 2008 have argued that this engagement with 
PEPFAR and other presidential health initiatives, such as the President’s Malaria 
Initiative, was a way to save face vis-à-vis the rising economic recession affecting 
the United States of America and the unresolved problems in the major foreign 
policy and military sites, Iraq and Afghanistan (Feffer, 2008). 
Since its inception, PEPFAR has been characterized by bipartisanism, as both 
leading political forces in the United States congress and senate, Republicans and 
Democrats, have approved the plan in 2003 and reauthorized it in 2008. Despite the 
prominence of the figure of the President and the strong support by his Christian 
Right’s constituency, more clearly visible in a number of policies, the almost 
simultaneous timings of reauthorization and election of the next president proved the 
necessary political flexibility in order to not only continue but even expand the plan. 
Apart from questions of budgeting, which some Republican senators contested for 
some time before the reauthorization (Kaiser Network, 2008b), the major dispute had 
to do with the notorious requirement that one-third of the prevention money had to 
be spent on abstinence-only education (Feller, 2008). Before the voting of the 
reauthorization some Democrat senators were reportedly standing in opposition to 
that abstinence obligation. Yet, even though that provision stayed in the 
Reauthorization Act, the former one-third requirement was erased (Moss, 2008).  
As Barack Obama is elected in 2008 and inaugurates his mandate in early 
2009, the presidential engagement in global health is upgraded towards the launch of 
the Global Health Initiative (GHI), which aims at strengthening health systems in 
countries with United States health and development assistance by building on the 
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experience of previous initiatives, most notably PEPFAR (PEPFAR, 2010). GHI is 
implemented in 73 countries worldwide, 8 of them, including Ethiopia, having “GHI 
plus” status.17 GHI plus countries receive additional technical and management 
assistance from the United States government, and were selected according to 
“criteria that include partner country interest, presence of the major GHI health 
programs, burden of disease, geographic diversity, and potential to leverage bilateral, 
multilateral, and foundation investments” (Kaiser Network, 2011: 7). The same 
applies to another development tool, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which 
remains.  
The importance of bipartisanism in United States politics is also visible in 
another case. When starting his mandate in 2001, Bush maintained the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Schneidman, 2008), a relevant tool in the 
United States-Africa relationship. Established by the Clinton Administration, AGOA 
was later articulated with the Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria Act of 2003 (Annex 3), which established PEPFAR, and has been serving as 
a component of the plan’s implementation since 2003.               
 
 
5.3.4. Global Health Governance and United States Bilateralism 
A remarkable feature of PEPFAR is its tendency to pursue a style of 
implementation mostly based on a bilateral relationship between the United States 
government implementing agencies and their counterparts and/or recipient 
organizations in the host countries. Although important fund allocations to the 
                                                 
17 The other countries are Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Bangladesh, Nepal and Guatemala. 
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Global Fund under PEPFAR have been occurring, the largest chunk of intervention 
has been done in a bilateral way. 
The reason for this tendency has been explained as a need to secure autonomy 
with regard to policy decision, away from multilateral deliberation at the Global 
Fund and the United Nations system at large. A major reason for maintaining this 
bilateral orientation in global HIV/AIDS policy concerns the issues of abstinence-
only and family planning, in which conflictive views between the Bush 
Administration and the Western European and United Nations establishment have 
persisted over the years (Ingram, 2005). For instance, in 2002, funding to the United 
Nations Population Fund, in charge of family planning intervention worldwide, was 
suppressed by the Bush Administration (Ibid.: 391). As a whole, this trend was 
confirmed time and again in other instances, especially in the area of gas emissions 
control and climate change. 
Another reason has to do with United States policy-makers and development 
practitioners’ factual knowledge or only perception about the modus operandi of 
(multilateral) Global Fund staff vis-à-vis theirs in terms of relations with the host 
countries’ governments. An interviewee with a United States government agency 
commented that whereas Europeans (who work mostly through the Global Fund, 
apart from their own bilateral initiatives) have “little problems” with transferring 
funds directly to African ministries, the United States of America is much less 
complacent in that regard (Interviewee 33, 2010). According to this interviewee, the 
chances of having money lost to corruption are higher when the tighter control of the 
United States system is not in place. The need to keep funding under control is so 
relevant that, if necessary, accountants are hired to work at the national ministries 
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just to be sure that money is not stolen, i.e. directed to the minister’s extended 
family, as the interviewee explained. For this respondent, local “theft” is still a 
fatality, yet one that can still be minimized if control is exerted directly by the donor 
country.               
 
5.4. Policies: Prevention and Treatment, Emergency and 
Sustainability 
The analysis of the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
(2008: 10) of the Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 
2003, that provided the guidelines and regulations for PEPFAR in the first phase, 
found that 55% and 10% of the budget were required to be spent in treatment and 
orphans and vulnerable children (OVC), correspondingly, between 2006 and 2008. In 
turn, 15% and 20% were recommended to palliative care and prevention. Out of 
those 20% for prevention 33% had to be spent in abstinence/faithfulness programs, 
while the remaining 66% could be spent in so-called “other prevention activities” 
(Ibid.). In addition to that, soon after his inauguration in 2001 Bush mandated the 
restoration of the Mexico City Policy, originally created by former President Ronald 
Reagan in 1984. This policy obliges USAID-funded  
nongovernmental organizations to agree as a condition of their receipt of 
Federal funds that such organizations would neither perform nor actively 
promote abortion as a method of family planning in other nations. (Office 
of the Press Secretary, 2001) 
The so-called “ABC (abstain, be faithful, condomise) strategy” and policies 
on family planning constitute a contested issue until today. The contestation relates 
to the propelled unscientifically proven ability of abstinence/faithfulness activities 
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really contribute for a decrease of infections (Centre for Health and Gender Equity, 
2004: 10-11) and its suitability to the domestic realities of intervention. In the same 
report quoted above, GAO mentioned that according to its survey, 
although more than half of the 22 experts we interviewed acknowledged 
benefits of PEPFAR’s overall prevention spending directive, the same 
number of experts expressed concern about the AB directive’s effect on 
country-based and evidence-based programming. (…) However, 13 of 22 
experts expressed concern that the AB directive has posed obstacles to 
country-based programming, and 13 experts said it has hindered 
development of integrated prevention programs. (GAO, 2008: 20)  
One major problem with the efficacy of prevention based on 
abstinence/faithfulness is that it does not fit one of the most vulnerable groups to 
AIDS, namely women who engage in sex work or transactional sex. This group 
certainly cannot abstain from sex; therefore prevention for them has to take another 
form. As for the Mexico City Policy, this policy inhibits the right of women to 
voluntarily access pregnancy interruption with United States funding, even if the 
country at stake has a favouring legislation. Answering to the question on the chief 
obstacles to implementation, an interviewee with a United States-based 
implementing NGO in South Africa said that “the major limiting factor is the people 
who take decisions in Washington who do not understand South African reality” 
(Interviewee 22, 2009). Along the same lines, another interviewee, yet with a South 
African NGO, affirmed critically that “we know better about the South African 
epidemic than United States politicians” (Interviewee 34, 2009). 
 Soon after the Obama election in 2008, the Mexico City Policy was reversed. 
This led to consequences, not only on family planning, which could be restored with 
larger choices, but even at the language level. Acknowledging Bush’s role in the 
reauthorization, an interviewee with a South African NGO mentioned that “with the 
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new administration there are changes though. For instance, the GAG policy [i.e. 
Mexico City Policy] has retreated. Now we can call prostitutes and not commercial 
sex workers” (Interviewee 35, 2009). 
But the problem of measuring ‘what works’ has not been merely in terms of 
abstinence/faithfulness and treatment as such but more broadly about how to 
comprehensively best tackle the epidemic. At the celebratory times after the 
reauthorization, Nandini Oomman and Steve Rosenzweig with the Centre for Global 
Development commented: 
Why did Congress ignore the evidence by maintaining an earmark for 
treatment and care? One reason is that some senators, mired as usual in 
the desire to demonstrate short-term results at the expense of longer-term 
progress, wanted to ensure that funding was spent on activities where 
short-term gains are easy to measure and report. As a result, the 
reauthorizing legislation will continue to focus PEPFAR funding more on 
counting pills and patients and less on preventing new infections, despite 
the fact that 5 new people are infected with HIV for every 2 that are put 
on treatment. PEPFAR country teams and host country stakeholders will 
continue to be limited in their ability to fund activities crucial to long-
term, sustainable AIDS responses. (Oomman and Rosenzweig, 2008) 
As mentioned, the slightly over half of PEPFAR’s budget goes to treatment 
activities. As an example, according to GAO (2008: 12), the total allocation for 
treatment for the fiscal year 2007 alone was 1.16 billion USD. However, the 
acquisition of antiretroviral (ARV) drugs under PEPFAR is subject to strict rules. 
According to GAO (2005), all drugs that could be contracted by the recipient 
countries had to be approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and be of United States origin.  
Because the Emergency Plan is largely funded under the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, the purchase of ARVs with these funds is subject 
to a provision of the act that prohibits the purchase of any medication 
manufactured outside the United States if the manufacture of that 
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medication in the United States would be covered by a valid United 
States patent, unless the patent owner gives its permission. (Ibid.: 9-10) 
As a result, in the beginning, and for a certain period, PEPFAR functioned as a 
protection scheme for United States pharmaceutical companies, which not only 
benefited economically from the program, but also sought to penetrate the most 
affected countries by the epidemic (Mann, 2003) 
Nevertheless, the situation started to change overtime, as GAO recommended 
an exploration of not only a larger palette of ARVs but also less expensive solutions 
in harmony with other donors’ policies.  
The original ARVs provided under the plan are generally higher in price 
than the generic ARVs provided under the other initiatives. The 
differences in the prices, quoted to GAO during June and July 2004 by 
13 manufacturers, ranged from $11 less to $328 more per person per year 
for original ARVs than for the lowest-priced corresponding generic 
ARVs provided under the other initiatives. At these prices, three of the 
four first-line regimens recommended by the World Health Organization 
could be built for less—from $40 to $368 less depending on the 
regimen—with the generic ARVs provided under the other initiatives 
than with the original ARVs provided under the plan. Such differences in 
price per person per year could translate into hundreds of millions of 
dollars of additional expense when considered on the scale of the plan’s 
goal of treating 2 million people by the end of 2008. (GAO, 2005)      
Eventually, policy changed, and in October 2009 it was already permitting 
100 drugs, including 71 generics (Medical News Today, 2009). In this regard, a 
nongovernmental implementer in Ethiopia commented  
In principle everything has to be American and licensed by the FDA 
[United States Food and Drug Administration]. However, experience 
showed that was not very feasible. So we turned to Indian companies, 
especially for generics. Some companies in the US resisted (Abbott) but 
others were cooperative. With this move we could decrease the cost per 
patient from 1000 USD to 85 USD. (Interviewee 3, 2010) 
As the very name informs, PEPFAR started with a preoccupation of giving 
emergent relief in terms of making available treatment through ARVs and prevention 
of new infections. According to PEPFAR’s first five-year strategy, the purpose was 
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to “rapidly mobilize resources” for fifteen countries in order to “provide treatment to 
2 million HIV-infected people; prevent 7 million new HIV infections; and provide 
care to 10 million people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, including orphans and 
vulnerable children” (PEPFAR, 2003). In addition to those core programs, the 
program would also develop supply chain management systems, be driven by 
scientific evidence, and build on public-private partnerships integrating both 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations, in which national “bold 
leadership” is mandatory for success. 
Although some specific research on PEPFAR has occasionally raised 
concerns about the quality of evaluation (Over, 2009), the PEPFAR coordination, the 
United States presidency and other higher level leadership has alluded to a great 
success in terms of saving ‘millions of lives.’ This tension was found in several 
interviews conducted, although the tendency is to speak rather positively about the 
impact. A respondent with a United States government agency in Ethiopia 
enthusiastically said “[before] PEPFAR there was just no assistance to HIV-infected 
people. Almost every patient visiting our medical facility was HIV-positive. 
PEPFAR has saved lives” (Interviewee 36, 2010). A respondent with an NGO in 
Botswana simply mentioned “In many countries there was no response to AIDS. (…) 
And without PEPFAR countries would not be able to respond. I give a huge credit to 
PEPFAR” (Interviewee 29, 2010). In turn, a respondent with an international 
organization in Ethiopia receiving PEPFAR funding gave a more balanced view:     
Since 2003 the assistance provided to the government has been 
improving, and the country is under way to reach universal access 
shortly. It was also good for tuberculosis and other opportunistic 
infections. There are more health centres too. The only shortcoming 
though is that it is only rooted on HIV/AIDS. (Interviewee 37, 2010)  
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Another interviewee with an international organization in the same country referred 
“people are now more informed. Although I do not know about the impact on 
infection and prevalence rates, I am aware PEPFAR has improved activities aimed at 
making people know their status” (Interviewee 38, 2010). In fact, the question of 
lack of measurement is found in another declaration, this time by an Ethiopian 
respondent with an Ethiopian NGO: “PEPFAR has had a significant influence, but I 
do not have evidence about its efficiency” (Interviewee 4, 2010). 
The second phase was set up by the second five-year strategy plan that 
followed the Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Annex 4). Published in 2009, this 
document put forward an agenda aiming at achieving sustainability through country 
ownership in a spirit of “shared responsibility” between the United States 
government and its partners in the host countries, especially the governments, and 
enlarging the scope of PEPFAR towards strengthening the health systems (PEPFAR, 
2009c: 5-6). This policy shift from emergency to sustainability was reinforced by the 
proposal of the GHI, an umbrella program for all of United States governmental 
health-related programs, in which PEPFAR maintains a leading role, while new 
dimensions, such as gender, are incorporated. The objective is to refrain from direct 
funding of service providing activities to the populations, but to capacitate host 
countries’ organizations to do it, as human resource capacity has long been identified 
as a major limitation to effective implementation (GAO, 2004). This shift also 
happens at a time when PEPFAR’s leadership has been forced to flatten or reduce the 
funding levels. However, it has also been noticeable the apparent disappearance of 
the “focus country” language in favour of a gradual enlargement of the number of 
countries benefiting directly from PEPFAR.  
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 An early assessment of the health system impact of PEPFAR has not 
grounded its propelled goal. Although focusing on the 2000-2006 period, featured by 
the emergency mode, the comparison of PEPFAR focus and non-focus countries in 
light of WHO indicators “demonstrates no significant difference in improvement in 
PEPFAR focus countries when compared with non-focus countries” (Duber et al., 
2010: 8). At the same time, and from another angle, an interviewee with a PEPFAR 
implementing NGO has made the following observation on the pervasiveness of 
PEPFAR: 
I would distinguish between positive intended consequences and negative 
unintended consequences. The former is that PEPFAR has reduced 
deaths and prolonged lives. In many places there was just no supply 
chain and PEPFAR installed one. This is a benefit for the broad health 
system. The latter is that PEPFAR operates in a rather dysfunctional 
system. PEPFAR has pooled everything to HIV. It shifted resources 
allocated to TB, family planning and safe motherhood toward blood 
safety, ABC prevention, care and treatment and OVCs [orphans and 
vulnerable children]. (Interviewee 11, 2010)     
 As for sustainability through country ownership, it should be mentioned that 
it does not merely represent a development in United States policy, but a rather 
international one. Prior to the Reauthorization Act of 2008 and the latest five-year 
strategy of 2009, the 2004 UNAIDS-sponsored Consultation on Harmonization of 
International AIDS Funding’s “Three ones” principles (one national HIV/AIDS 
strategy; one national AIDS coordinating authority; one national country-level 
monitoring and evaluation system) and the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness were already providing a policy framework in that direction (GAO, 
2010: 4-6), as well as the 2002 United Nations International Conference on 
Financing for Development’s ‘Monterrey Consensus’ (PEPFAR, 2011a). In order to 
materialize that strategic goal, PEPFAR constitutes partnerships with the host partner 
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countries and non-state actors “to ensure that PEPFAR programs reflect country 
ownership, with partner governments at the centre of decision making, leadership, 
and management of their HIV/AIDS programs and national health systems” (Ibid.: 
6). In turn, the Country Operational Plans (COP) provides “the information for 
funding review and approval and serves as the basis for congressional notification, 
allocation, and tracking of budget and targets” (Ibid.: 7). Moreover, COPs result of  
an opportunity to bring the United States country team together with 
partner government authorities, multilateral development partners, and 
civil society as an essential aspect of effective planning, leveraging 
resources, and fostering sustainability of programs. (Ibid.: 8)  
According to the GAO’s (2010) study on the alignment of PEPFAR policies 
with the countries’ strategies in four countries (two African, Uganda and Malawi; 
two Asian, Cambodia and Vietnam), which compared the national strategic and 
programmatic documents with PEPFAR’s and consulted with PEPFAR 
implementers, “PEPFAR activities generally support the goals laid out in partner 
countries’ national HIV/AIDS strategies” (Ibid.: 10). However, problems and 
limitations are also found. While some relate to “differences between PEPFAR 
indicators and national and international indicators” and “gaps in partner countries’ 
access to PEPFAR information” (Ibid.: 18-20), others concern “unwillingness or 
inability to commit resources, public corruption and financial mismanagement, and 
lack of technical expertise” (Ibid.: 20).                   
As referred above, one alleged reason for the unilateral stance of the United 
States of America vis-à-vis the multilateralism of many other donors has to do with 
tighter surveillance of spending by partner recipient governments in order to hamper 
corruption and mismanagement. As such, it is not surprising that, according to the 
latest PEPFAR report to Congress at time of writing, country ownership’s “key areas 
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of focus included surveillance, planning, analysis, management, and budgeting, at 
key national ministries as well as other levels of government” (PEPFAR, 2011b). 
Yet, another major issue has precisely to do with how capable recipient countries, 
namely their governments, are to continue the current, PEPFAR-initiated and -
funded efforts. National governments are embracing the idea and concept of country 
ownership as part of their developmental concerns. However, the levels of disbursing 
resources – the question of “unwillingness or ability” quoted from the GAO’s report 
– vary greatly according to the individual country’s economic/developmental 
position. As far as the countries scrutinised in this dissertation go, while Botswana 
and even South Africa are allocating national resources that account to about 80% of 
the total expenditure in HIV/AIDS, Ethiopia is much lower. 
 To a large extent, the GHI, established soon after the inauguration of the 
Obama Administration in 2009, expands the ambition of the new policies on 
sustainability. This initiative seeks to pool together different ongoing plans – 
PEPFAR, the President’s Malaria Initiative – and include areas such as maternal and 
child health, family planning, reproductive health and neglected tropical diseases, 
avian influenza and other epidemic threats (Kaiser Network, 2010).     
 
5.5. Organizational Design 
PEPFAR is eminently rooted in a concept of partnership in which United 
States governmental and nongovernmental organizations are put together with host 
countries’ counterparts, and possibly international organizations (such as WHO, 
UNAIDS, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Program). 
The leadership of PEPFAR lies with the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator, and 
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the United States government agencies involved are Department of State (namely 
embassies), USAID, Department of Defence (DoD), Department of Commerce, 
Department of Labour, Department of Health and Human Services (namely the 
Centres for Disease Control & Prevention [CDC]) and Peace Corps. There are two 
types of implementing partner: prime and sub-partner. The hierarchy is explained by 
the process of funding application, in which the prime secures the funding in the first 
place, and then channels it down to the sub-partner level. Generally prime partners 
obtain their funding from USAID, CDC or the United States embassies. 
According to PEPFAR’s (2004) 2004-2008 strategic document, 15 billion 
USD were requested to the Congress for funding the plan, most of it directed to 15 
focus countries. Apart from Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa, the list was 
composed of Cote d’Ivoire, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia. In 2009 these countries were 
given that status since they were “home to approximately half of the world's 
estimated 33 million HIV-positive people and to almost 8 million children orphaned 
or made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS” (PEPFAR, 2009d). Still, funding was also 
extended to other countries, generally those where USAID was operating. However, 
in PEPFAR’s second five-year period (2009-2013) strategy (PEPFAR, 2009c), the 
category of focus country virtually disappeared, later re-emerging under the auspices 
of GHI. 
In addition to this division of labour, several PEPFAR-initiated projects have 
sought to include private companies in the host countries, and as such accomplish an 
idea of country ownership described by a joint public and private collaboration. Two 
150 
 
interviewees with different United States government agencies in Botswana gave two 
examples from that country: 
[cell] phone technologies [in Botswana] are good. There is a deal in 
which Maskom [mobile communications provider] offers 100 Pula 
[Botswana currency] to its users when subscribing alert SMS for taking 
medications. This is a case of country ownership of the projects, in fact. 
(Interviewee 10, 2010)  
For us, country ownership is not government ownership, but ownership 
by the government, privates and civil society. This is why you want 
Debswana [Botswana diamonds public-private partnership] to be 
involved in this too. (Interviewee 2, 2010)  
Since the beginning, PEPFAR has attempted to constitute a change – if not a 
revolution – in two ways of organizing and implementing international aid. One way 
had to with augmenting levels of inter-agency collaboration among the various 
United States government agencies. Although two senior officials with USAID and 
DoD (Interviewee 14, 2010; Interviewee 10, 2010) have claimed a prevailing view 
that historically both organisations have gone along very closely, PEPFAR’s 
coordination has found it necessary to appeal for them to “‘leave their uniforms at 
the door’ and come together in the common cause of turning the tide against the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic” (PEPFAR, 2011c). To an extent, this setting constitutes an 
experiment of a larger hypothesis of reformulating United States international 
development from a “whole-of-government” (Herrling, 2009) perspective. For 
instance, the inclusion of AGOA in PEPFAR’s division of labour is an example of 
that, especially in terms of the economic empowerment of people living with AIDS 
(PEPFAR, 2009e). Another way has concerned the character of relations between the 
United States government and their counterparts in the country of implementation. 
According to the 2009 PEPFAR report to congress, which focuses on partnerships, 
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PEPFAR aims to change relations by turning an asymmetric relationship into one 
between equals.             
The United States is changing the paradigm for development, rejecting 
the flawed “donor-recipient” mentality and replacing it with an ethic of 
partnership that emphasizes country ownership, good governance, and 
accountability. Partnership is rooted in hope for and faith in people. 
Partnership means honest relationships between equals based on mutual 
respect, understanding and trust, with obligations and responsibilities for 
each partner. Partnership is the foundation of PEPFAR’s success and of 
what Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has called “transformational 
diplomacy.” (PEPFAR, 2009e: 18-19) 
The constitution of ‘partnership frameworks’ signed between the United 
States of America and host countries’ representatives include the principles of 
country ownership; sustainability; support for country coordination of resources; 
United States government interagency collaboration; engagement and participation; 
strategic framework; flexibility, progress towards policy reform and increased 
financial accountability; integration of HIV/AIDS into strengthened health systems 
and a broader health and development agenda; monitoring and evaluation; 
collaborative but not contractual; transparency; and “do no harm” (PEPFAR, 2011a). 
At time of writing, 21 partnership frameworks had been signed, including with 
Botswana (December 2010), Ethiopia (October 2010), and South Africa (December 
2010) (PEPFAR, 2011d).  
The theoretical discussion in this dissertation has focused on an 
understanding that the international system is characterized by asymmetry. In the 
case of international partnerships such as PEPFAR asymmetry is not just a question 
of one side possessing funds and exerting influence, and the other side possessing 
very little at those levels. Talking about research activities in Botswana, an 
interviewee with a Botswana government ministry has called “scientific imperialism” 
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(Interviewee 39, 2010) the way United States universities land in the country, request 
ethics approval, obtain blood samples, return to the United States of America and 
publish papers based on those samples, without being clear to what extent the ‘blood-
donor country’ benefits from it. This asymmetry is further cemented on the security 
rationale attached to programs like PEPFAR, which views the subjects of 
intervention as threats to United States and international security, but also on 
bringing host countries’ institutions, namely governments, to closer external scrutiny, 
ripping apart the porous border between the postcolonial state and the international 
community.  
However, perhaps the greatest example of the asymmetry between the United 
States of America and recipient societies is the dependency created by the unlimited 
free provision of lifelong drugs by the former to the latter. This dependency 
corresponds to what Mead Over (2008) calls the “ballooning entitlement” by 
recipient countries. This “entitlement” is a result of a continuing public commitment 
to free provision of ARVs by the United States leadership under PEPFAR in a 
context characterised by, on the one hand, growing financial difficulties to live up to 
that commitment, and, on the other, an increasing number of new infections. For 
Over this uneasy system of dependency holds potential negative effects in the long 
run. Over emphasises the problem of “entitlement” that recipient countries start to 
own with regard to receiving assistance from the United States of America, 
particularly in the case of antiretroviral drugs, which shall have to be handed to 
patients over the course of a lifetime so they have the desired lasting effect.  
To the extent that AIDS treatment is viewed as an entitlement by all 
parties to the transaction, the donor governments and their citizens on the 
one hand and the recipient governments and their patients on the other, 
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the recipient governments and individuals might have diminished 
incentives to prevent HIV infection or to use efficiently the externally 
provided resources. Furthermore, it is human nature for people who are 
dependent on others to resent the dependency relationship. 
In the extreme, it is possible that a strong AIDS program in these 15 
countries will create a kind of postmodern colonial relationship between 
the US and these countries – undermining the quality of these bilateral 
relationships. (Ibid.: 19) 
This type of colonialism is negative for United States international reputation, and 
thus it should drive a policy change towards a point of sustainability – a “AIDS 
transition”18 (Ibid.: 24-33) – that will not spark discontent against it. 
If, in the existing fifteen PEPFAR focus countries, the next government 
can effectively manage the current AIDS treatment entitlement, prevent 
the future need for treatment, and help ensure the AIDS transition to the 
point that the disease becomes a manageable chronic condition, then the 
next president will deserve a full measure of credit for the long-run 
benefits of PEPFAR, credit equal to or greater than that due to President 
Bush for launching the program. (Ibid.: 33) 
However, since this dissertation is ultimately concerned with agency by 
national governments, and how it manifests itself, it is interesting to explore how 
interviewed implementers address this question of asymmetry. Here one verifies a 
clear difference of perspective between respondents with a United States government 
agency, and other respondents who, although part of the division of labour, have a 
critical view of the process. For instance, an interviewee with the United States 
government reiterated that imperialism is not a United States foreign policy’s aim 
(Interviewee 16, 2010). Yet, two rather emblematic positions could be found in one’s 
inquiry. An African interviewee with a United States-based implementing NGO gave 
a rather pessimistic comment: 
                                                 
18 “More generally the AIDS Transition must mean a refocusing of the rhetoric, goal-setting 
and results orientation that is gaining force in AIDS treatment to target also AIDS prevention.” 
(Ibid.: 33, bold in the original) 
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Overall, before PEPFAR there were few ARVs available. Now there are 
more, and that means better health and less mortality, and thus less 
orphans. But now PEPFAR is changing priorities and countries in Africa 
are crying because they depend heavily on the ARV program PEPFAR 
initiated. It is sad that we put our fate in the hands of the West. 
(Interviewee 40, 2010) 
Yet, another respondent with the same characteristics put it in rather different 
terms: “PEPFAR originates from early programs for the military overseas and seeks 
to attain objectives of United States security. It is up to the Africans to do the most 
they can from it.” (Interviewee 11, 2010) To an extent, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 respond 
to the latter interviewee’s observation.  
According to a 2009 GAO report, major fund-channelling United States 
government agencies “CDC and USAID [had] developed and implemented practices 
to provide accountability over PEPFAR awards, such as reviewing programmatic 
reports and financial data and providing technical assistance to partners” (GAO, 
2009: 28). These practices included required reports; expenditure data and work 
plans; site visit checklists and reports; direct assistance; umbrella grant managers (for 
sub-partners); sub-awards; and third-party technical assistance providers (Ibid.: 28-
30). Yet, the same report found difficulties in the area of compliance due to lack of 
USAID and CDC staff; overburden; and different reporting timeframes (Ibid.: 32-35)    
One of the main top-down disciplinary transmission belts is observed in the 
weight that bureaucratic compliance holds. While the implementation of surveillance 
practices is generally expectable to be pursued by funders and complied by 
recipients, several questions still arise. Focusing on the experience of non-United 
States government implementers, one such question has to do with how time-
consuming and even difficult it can be to collect the required information, especially 
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when it is done by volunteers and in a context of scarcity of means of 
communication. An interviewee with a South African FBO commented: 
The project relies vastly on lots of church volunteers, who nevertheless 
receive a small payment. It is difficult to get people to report, and thus 
match PEPFAR’s requirements. Reporting is no less than monthly. What 
is required from field workers and volunteers is who has been reached, 
how were public gatherings. (…) Field workers report to their 
supervisors, and they report to the main office in Cape Town. The main 
obstacles are found in the lowest levels. Reporting is a matter of copying 
and faxing, but it takes a lot of time. (Interviewee 24, 2009) 
Another interviewee with a sub-partner FBO, but in Botswana, lamented, while 
pointing at piles of sheets of paper in his small office to be delivered to its prime 
partner: “Funds come with conditions. It is difficult to be flexible. Look, this is the 
bureaucracy we have to go through!” (Interviewee 41, 2010) Another NGO 
respondent, yet in South Africa gave a different nuance: 
Many organizations I have been working with have refused PEPFAR 
funding given the administrative overload and the reporting 
compulsiveness. This tendency has been augmenting. Besides, 
requirements are very stringent. We have to report every single month. 
We have to comply with the United States government. This is all about 
compliance or not. For PEPFAR it is more important to report than work 
in the field. Our office here is just to deal with bureaucracy. (Interviewee 
42, 2009)     
Another South Africa respondent insisted on the stringed need to report. 
How can I put it diplomatically?... Partners have to do lots of reporting, 
to pay a lot of attention to numbers. PEPFAR is very much centred in 
obtaining numbers, and that is difficult to pursue by implementing 
organizations. In fact many implementing people are constantly worried 
about gathering numbers and thus showing service (to PEPFAR 
coordination). (Interviewee 43, 2009) 
Another NGO interviewee in South Africa gave an interesting insight framed in 
terms of West versus non-West, and how apparently opposing institutions (funder 
and funded) ‘ally’ themselves:   
We have deep links with the communities, and it is often difficult for 
them to comply with the reporting because it requires skills that people 
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do not have, for example, deadlines. People in the ground are not like us 
in the Western world; they are not used to deadlines. Another thing has to 
do with the fact that we are preoccupied with quality, but PEPFAR is too 
demanding with numbers. If we do not get them the numbers, we do not 
get any funding or we have to return the money. USAID understands our 
position, but they are with their hands tied. Flexibility is something 
lacking. But this is not a criticism, but a challenge. (Interviewee 44, 
2009) 
Another NGO respondent in South Africa gave yet another insight, pointing at inter-
implementing organization level, which can be featured by competition and rivalry. 
PEPFAR requirements are not in many instances relevant to the realities 
on the ground. For example, the way that PEPFAR demands that we 
count compromises on quality service provision and encourages 
competition among partners. (Interviewee 45, 2009) 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
PEPFAR has been an important tool of United States foreign policy 
worldwide, yet most notably in Sub-Saharan Africa. As the latest budget request by 
the head of the Bureau of African Affairs, Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson 
(2011), shows, PEPFAR sits alongside the various initiatives in the area of conflict 
prevention, good governance, rule of law or economic growth, with whom it 
intersects, particularly the latter. Moreover, PEPFAR constitutes its own presidential 
initiative, and therefore increases its political and symbolic importance. 
 Initially building on the experience of the domestic CARE Act, several 
political rationales have been pointed out to justify PEPFAR’s maintenance and 
expansion since 2003. It should be highlighted that, despite the security-strategic 
dimension attached to United States policy-making, the relevance of domestic 
constituencies is also very defining. The extent of the link between HIV/AIDS, and 
health and human development at large, and security is revealing, not so much for its 
effective power, which is seen in other cases, but for the broader rationale behind 
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United States policy-making and even advocacy. Although non-security reasons, 
coined as humanitarianism or compassion are attributed, and explain why, when and 
by whom PEPFAR was effectively established, as several comments on and by 
former President Bush demonstrate, they only add to the preceding security question. 
The area of prevention and treatment policies gives two prime examples that 
interviewed PEPFAR implementers and a body of analysis have drew attention to. In 
terms of prevention, the making and changing of policy at the Washington, DC 
institutions (Presidency, Congress and Senate) around abstinence/faithfulness or 
family planning, some implementers contend, are inadequate for the realities they are 
meant to intervene and improve. In turn, the core question of treatment – the highest 
recipient share of the budget – has shown, for some time, the protection of United 
States pharmaceutical companies. Much more expensive than, say, generics, their 
ARVs were sometimes the only that recipient countries could contract with the 
allocated funds.  
Further examples are given on PEPFAR’s organizational design. Although 
claiming to be a ‘real’ partnership, in which both sides are equal, an exploration into 
the practice of the partnership shows the very opposite. In addition to the previous 
examples, far more exemplary of United States hegemonic intervention is the 
dependency that has been created over the years between recipient countries, i.e. 
what Mead Over (2009) has called “postmodern colonialism.” For Over, that colonial 
regime is very negative for the United States future relation with recipient countries, 
since it might generate discontent in the case the United States of America cannot 
keep up to its engagement. It is very informative of the regime of asymmetry and 
dependency that PEPFAR represents. Besides, the issue of oversight by the key 
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funders over the implementing partners adds to the criticism made about policy’s 
mismatch with implementation realities. Although reporting to funders should not 
constitute anything particularly exceptional, several implementers have pointed at 
experiences in which time and resources (human, technological), or their absence, 
undermined activities, driving them away from what they perceive as ‘real’ and even 
spur rivalry among implementers. 
After this presentation and discussion of the case study, the next chapter 
analyses the experience of the national governments of Botswana, Ethiopia and 
South Africa with PEPFAR, and the United States of America and the external world 
at large, from region to globe.  
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Chapter 6 – Foreign Policy of Postcolonial African States 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This is the first of a series of three chapters that analyse the agency of the 
states of Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa in the process of PEPFAR’s 
implementation, and relations with the United States of America and the world at 
large. The study of their agency occurs in light of three independent variables: 
foreign policies, domestic policies, and practices of the three individual countries. 
Particular relations maintained between the three states and PEPFAR, the United 
States of America, and the international system, are framed across three separate 
levels, which, nevertheless, are complementary, following the analytical framework 
presented in Chapter 4.   
Thus, this chapter looks specifically at the foreign policy of Botswana, 
Ethiopia and South Africa. However, to begin with, it is relevant to depart from the 
principle that the participation of individual countries in the PEPFAR framework, 
outlined in the previous chapter, is not compulsory, but voluntary. So 
implementation can begin, recipient countries have to formally agree with the 
donors’ plans through the signature of a partnership framework19 by host states’ 
representatives. Moreover, host state institutions are strongly implicated in the 
process of policy-making – emphasized by the growing importance of the principle 
of ‘country ownership’ – and actual implementation, since significant funding is 
directly allocated to host governmental organizations, i.e. ministries and their 
                                                 
19 See Annexes 5, 6 and 7 for Partnership Frameworks between the United States government and the 
governments of Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa, correspondingly.  
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national, regional and local subsidiary organisations. Even though PEPFAR 
embodies a strong ambition by the United States government to control the 
stakeholders, it should always be borne in mind that the host countries are definitely 
key in this process, and as such hold a degree of agency in the areas of policy-
making and implementation, even if largely constrained. This hardly can be 
considered a colonial relationship, as William Brown suggests:  
Indeed, aid is founded on an inter-state relationship, one in which legal 
equality rather than imperial or colonial subordination defines the formal 
relationship between the giver and the receiver. Even with institutions as 
powerful as the World Bank and IMF, or bilateral donors such as the 
USA, the relationship with recipient states is conducted with formally 
equal sovereign entities. While African policy autonomy may indeed be 
severely compromised by the aid relationship, the recognition of the right 
of African states to make their own (limited) policy choices is not 
seriously questioned. Whatever other powers donors have, a socially-
recognised right to rule African societies is not one of them: this is 
fundamentally a non-colonial relationship. (Brown, 2009: 7-8)      
Studying the host states/governments’ agency vis-à-vis the influence of 
PEPFAR in particular, and the United States government at large, means analysing 
those countries’ political strategies and goals in a broader perspective, i.e. beyond the 
mere terms of that partnership. Why do the governments of Botswana, Ethiopia and 
South Africa take the positions they take in terms of engaging (more or less) with, or 
opposing, the United States government via PEPFAR and/or other programs? The 
ability to be active and responsive to the external pressures, and not merely a vacuum 
where those external pressures sit, stands for the idea of possessing autonomy of 
decision and action. 
The presentation of each country not only follows an alphabetical order but 
also is meant to distinguish two theoretical models of state behaviour in terms of 
their broader political and strategic agendas. The cases of Botswana and Ethiopia are 
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explained by an eminent concern for survival. Whereas in Botswana survival is 
directly linked to the HIV/AIDS epidemic per se, in Ethiopia it has to do with a 
broader geopolitical and developmental vision of the national government, in which 
the epidemic plays a role among other pressing issues, to assure the political 
regime’s self-help while tackling the very low ranking of human development in the 
country.  The South African experience displays a rather different case, in which the 
politics of the epidemic, including PEPFAR, have been implicated in the 
transmission of ideas and values domestically and abroad by the governmental 
leadership.            
 
6.2. Survival of the ‘Botswana Miracle’ 
The successful attraction of external sources by the Botswana government, 
particularly from the United States of America, is not explainable by the geopolitical 
situation of the country, as it happens in the case of Ethiopia and South Africa. In 
fact, a rather constructivist element of United States foreign policy-making has to be 
introduced. Botswana has long enjoyed an optimistic status in United States 
diplomacy as a ‘model country’ for Africa, i.e. one where market economic systems 
and liberal democracy have been put into place consistently throughout the whole 
postcolonial age. However, in contrast, Botswana’s foreign policy overtime, since 
1966 until today, has been rather realist in terms of its formulation and execution.  
Transition to national sovereign rule was smooth, and the country never 
underwent internal mass-scale political violence, like in its neighbours (Namibia, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe), which nevertheless affected Botswana at times. The 
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national army itself was only established in 1977 as a consequence of a former 
Rhodesian army’s incursion into Botswana in search for black insurgents. Later, in 
1985 and 1986, bombings by the South African apartheid army took place in 
southern parts of the country (Kelebonye, 2010).  
The reason for such smoothness has been found in the fact that the 
dominating elite ante- and post-independence was the one and the same, one of its 
great representatives consisting precisely on Seretse Khama, ‘native’ leader and the 
country’s first President of the Republic (Varela, 2006: 266-267). Indeed, Tswana 
leaders benefited particularly from the regime of Protectorate administered by the 
United Kingdom. On the one hand, despite conceding to the crossing of the railways 
from the South African Cape colony to former Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), they 
enjoyed military protection from the Boer neighbours, in the South. They could 
hardly retain independence from the Boer republics were they by themselves. On the 
other, since the United Kingdom was not engaged in exploiting Bechuanaland the 
way it did in South Africa and Rhodesia, the system of indirect rule under the 
Protectorate allowed for the increase of the national leaders’ empowerment. One 
such manifestation was through the benefit of colonial capitalistic policies of cattle 
development, together with the White farmers of British descent. 
This transition was led by the same local and colonist elites, and the 
developmentalist framework based on market economy and liberal multiparty 
democracy was clearly aligned with the West. However, it should be stressed that, 
despite this configuration, Botswana’s political leadership maintained a rather realist 
understanding of its political situation and the way the bipolar politics of the Cold 
War was having an impact on its survival as a country, particularly from the late 
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1970s until the end of apartheid, and more broadly the Cold War, in the early 1990s. 
In one of the few political science articles on Botswana’s foreign policy (already 
dating twenty years-old), James J. Zaffiro argues that 
During the 1980s, Botswana was able to capitalize on friendly relations 
with both superpowers thus benefiting from their diplomatic support in 
times of crisis, such as in the aftermath of the 14 June 1985 South 
African Defence Force (SADF) raid in Gaborone. (Zaffiro, 1992: 59)         
Although the domestic politics of the country were West-leaning, the reality of 
standing right in the core of numerous violent conflicts forced the Botswana 
leadership to engage with all parties involved in difficult circumstances.    
Since 1966, year of the independence, Botswana became an Asian-style 
developmental state, whose initial goals consisted on developing basic infrastructure 
(roads, electricity, water) between the main towns.  
Four “broad pillars” of Botswana’s first national development plan 
included: (1) self-help; (2) assistance by other governments in major 
national undertakings beyond the resources of the country, such as the 
Shashi Dam and industrial development; (3) encouragement of private 
investment; and (4) education. (Ibid.: 62)   
The “other governments” consisted mostly on the United Kingdom, provider of most 
of development funding; the United States of America, at a later stage and in a rather 
limited way (for instance, in the areas of education and training by the Peace Corps 
and some universities); the Soviet Union, even if indirectly (the Soviet anti-apartheid 
and pro-black liberation movements stances); and South Africa, the regional 
economic hegemon (Parsons, 1999).   
The planning and execution of economic development took off in 1967-
71 after the discovery of diamonds at Orapa. The essential precondition 
of this was renegotiation of the customs union with South Africa, so that 
state revenue would benefit from rising capital imports and mineral 
exports – rather than remaining a fixed percentage of total customs union 
income. This renegotiation was achieved in 1969. (Ibid.) 
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In fact, relations with South Africa were thorny. On the one hand, South African 
trade cooperation was needed. On the other, being a black-led country, Botswana 
was not racially aligned with the apartheid in South Africa and Namibia, and until 
1980 the white minority-led former Rhodesia. Botswana was subject to air raids in 
1985 and 1986 by South Africa since there was a suspicion that Botswana was 
hosting African National Congress (ANC) insurgents within its borders (Kelebonye, 
2010; Parsons, 1999). The trade-off appeared to rely on both parties’ commitment, if 
not to liberal, non-racial democracy, at least to capitalism. 
International academic interest for Botswana started in the mid-1980s by 
authors such as Louis Picard (1987) driven by the impressive growth rate 
experienced by the country throughout the first two decades of independence. 
Between 1980 and 1989, Botswana achieved a 13% annual growth in GDP (Hillbom, 
2008: 191). Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world at the time of 
independence, and with the discovery and exploration of diamonds, it attained some 
of the highest growth rates in the world. At the same time, Botswana sought to 
maintain regular multiparty elections, presidential and parliamentary, even though 
they were always won by the same party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). But 
that did not seem to be highly problematic for analysts, since post-Second World 
War Sweden and Japan also exhibited the same characteristics. 
Some of the most impressive democratic developmental performers over 
the past half century, notably Sweden and Japan and more recently 
Botswana, have had one-party dominant systems, which, in their cases at 
least, seem to have combined the best of both developmental and 
democratic worlds. The dominant party was subject to regular democratic 
tests at the ballot box and constantly subject to the pressures of a free 
civil society, while at the same time maintaining the coherence, authority 
and capacity for long-term decision-making which is necessary for 
tackling the structural problems of development. (White, 2006: 66) 
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It should be added that this reversal of poverty was being obtained spectacularly and 
with “good governance,” but also in a context of relative impoverishment of African 
postcolonial economies and defection to authoritarianism (Mkandawire, 2001; 
Schraeder, 1994; Acemoglu et al., 2003: 80).    
The conditions that made Botswana so successful and turned it into an upper 
middle-income country after some decades are arguably intrinsic to Botswana’s 
elites and the historical context of continuities from Protectorate’s time. Apart from 
governmental stability and a propelled “native initiator culture” (Acemoglu et al., 
2003; Maundeni, 2001), the marginalization of nationalist, socialist movements and, 
increasingly, ‘traditional’ leadership allowed for the development of institutions and 
policies which facilitated backing from the Western powers, namely the United 
Kingdom (even if in decline), and their mining companies. Debswana, the public-
private partnership for diamond exploration in Botswana, gathers the government 
and the South African mining giant De Beers, founded by Cecil Rhodes, the colonist 
millionaire who had established the British South African Company railways in the 
late 19th century (Froitzheim, 2009: 38). Yet, Botswana’s “right institutions” and 
“good policies” can be replicated once “individual actions” are put into place 
(Acemoglu et al, 2003: 113). The focus on good foundational developmental 
structures is emphasized by Beaulier and Subrick, who added up the inexistence of 
an army in the first decade of independence that could drain resources like in the rest 
of Africa (Beaulier and Subrick, 2006). 
However, Botswana’s worldwide economic success occurred in a very 
specific context. Externally, it took place at a time when the general landscape of 
African countries was one of impoverishment and reversal to armed conflicts of 
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different natures and autocracy. Internally, by the 1990s Botswana was realizing the 
minerals-driven ambition of the pre-independence political-economic elite. These 
were conditions unique to Botswana, as stressed above. As such, despite maintaining 
or even expanding domestic inequalities without major changes in levels of poverty 
and unemployment and features of liberal authoritarianism, as a later bibliography 
has started to suggest (discussed in more detail in Chapter 8), Botswana easily stood 
out in the international arena as the ‘miracle’ of economic growth and stability in 
contemporary Africa.  
Nevertheless, this propelled success has come under jeopardy by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic affecting the country, and as such renewed Botswana political 
leadership’s concern for the country’s survival after the end of the Cold War and the 
apartheid. Considering the very large size of the epidemic, HIV/AIDS intervention 
has constituted a question of survival for the country. Self-help is visible in the way 
the government decided to launch an antiretroviral program – funded up to 80% with 
public resources – and sought to obtain support from external sources, namely the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Global Fund and PEPFAR. Botswana’s 
prevalence rate among adults aged 15 to 49 is 23.9% (WHO, 2010: 32). This 
accounts for the second biggest HIV/AIDS epidemic in the world after the small 
Southern African nation of Swaziland, whose rate is 26.1% (Ibid.). Considering that 
the national population is only of 1 921 000 (Ibid.: 158), one verifies how wide and 
serious is the magnitude of the epidemic. In 2007 an estimate of 300 000 adults and 
children were living with AIDS, which meant an increase of 20 000 cases in 2001 
(UNAIDS, 2008: 214). 
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When the first case was identified at Princess Marina Hospital in Gaborone in 
1985 (AIDS and Human Rights Research Unit, 2007: 3), the government was quick 
to launch one of the first control programmes in the continent. After consulting with 
the international agencies, it established a one-year emergency plan in 1987 (Heald, 
2005: 4-5), and then two medium term plans (1989-1997 and 1997-2002) (AIDS and 
Human Rights Research Unit, 2007: 3) and the national strategic framework for 
2003-2009, which framed HIV/AIDS in the broader question of development. After 
the creation of the National AIDS Council (NAC) in 1995 under the Office of the 
President, the National AIDS Coordinating Agency was set up in 1999 with the aim 
of implementing, coordinating, monitoring, evaluating and fundraising for 
HIV/AIDS, under the aegis of NAC (Ibid.: 9). In the late 1980s the adopted approach 
was based on “education and surveillance,” in which condoms played a central role 
(Heald, 2005: 5). However, there was “widespread disbelief” (Ibid.) among the 
populace, since there was no mortality to demonstrate the severity of the disease. By 
the mid-1990s that started to change, because of the increasing number of deaths. 
Yet, it was still called “the radio disease,” since most of the mass HIV/AIDS 
awareness-raising used to be done through the radio, as it still does today (Ibid.).  
Given the disappointing results of these waves of intervention, governmental 
leadership slowly disengaged from the response (Ibid.: 7). However, the publication 
of a number of reports in the early 2000s (Econsult, 2007: 121-123), especially one 
by the Botswana Institute for Development Analysis (BIDPA, 2000), became a 
game-changer. Those reports presented grim demographic forecasts, whereby 
Botswana would dramatically lose its population in the case of absence of treatment 
programs for those living with AIDS. An interviewed medical expatriate with a 
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United States implementing NGO who first worked in Botswana in the 1990s 
commented that by that time “Botswana was faced with the fact that it had no choice. 
Ten years ago that was the burning issue. Survival was at stake. So, implementation 
had to start. (…) There was a need for new thinking in the country.” (Interviewee 13, 
2010) Eventually, the country’s economy would suffer dramatically with decreasing 
figures of growth, consumption and productivity. A 2007-published study on the 
labour force of Debswana, the diamond public-private partnership, concluded that 
“among the 3 558 participants [of the survey], annual HIV incidence was estimated 
to be 3.4%, and HIV prevalence was 23.8%” (Riviello et al., 2007). It would also 
scare foreign investors away (Interviewee 14, 2010). Eventually, the government 
launched a massive treatment program in 2001 assisted by the African 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP) of the Gates Foundation. In 2004 
PEPFAR joined in, but only with the purpose of “filling the gaps” (Interviewee 11, 
2010; Interviewee 10, 2010; Interviewee 12, 2010), since the biggest chunk, 
reportedly 80% of the expenditure, is taken up by the government (Froitzheim, 2009: 
133). By “filling the gaps” stakeholders mean priority intervention in the areas of 
management and capacity-building of programs and organizations, as it is further 
discussed in the next chapter. It largely corresponds to PEPFAR’s second phase 
(2009-2013) purpose of sustaining ‘country ownership’ of actions carried out so far.  
 
6.3. Security Architecture and Ethiopia’s Strategy 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the last decade has witnessed the emergence of a 
number of large international initiatives with the aim of improving the developmental 
status of many low- and middle-income countries. The Millennium Development 
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Goals constituted a framework upon which programs in several areas (health, 
education, gender, economic development) sit and set out to offer opportunities for 
those countries to ameliorate their records. However, this renewed policy and 
financial focus on development was accompanied by a growing concern about 
linking them to security and stabilization concerns by Western donor countries. For 
them development became a question of containment and management of 
populations, as critical analysts and theorists of International Relations, mentioned 
throughout Chapter 4, have emphasised, at the expense of more liberating approaches 
for those same populations. However, the question of the recipient country’s state is 
left between irrelevance and plain membership to the Western hegemonic structure. 
One’s argument is that not only recipient states are independent actors – they have 
agency – but also they can have an agenda that is not necessarily aligned with those 
Western goals.  In the case of the Ethiopian government, this development-security 
architecture has become a source of opportunities, although some threats have been 
identified too.  
The major opportunity that it is being offered to the Ethiopian government is 
the boost it gives to the current policy framework of state-led development and 
economic growth (‘developmental state’). The following chapter will scrutinise the 
domestic politics of the developmental state in more detail. For now it suffices to 
explain that the very low stage of development Ethiopia still finds itself in requires 
the attraction of as much external funding as possible. Despite improvements in 
recent years, Ethiopia is the 13th worst positioned country in the 2010 edition of the 
United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report (UNDP, 2010: 
145). Lately, apart from traditional Western Europe, Northern America, Japan and 
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Australia, the range of donors and lenders has extended to so-called ‘new partners,’ 
such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, India and China. The current 
diversification of ‘partners’ can be observed in recent statements by the Ethiopian 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. 
We try to get help from every quarter… This is because we need all the 
assistance we can get. It would be stupid for us to say to the Indians for 
example, that we prefer Chinese assistance. It would also be stupid for us 
to say to the Brits now that the Chinese are helping out some 
infrastructure projects, keep your money. It doesn’t make sense. We want 
to get as much assistance as we possibly can because on balance we get 
about half of the average assistance that other African countries get in per 
capita terms. It’s not like we are overflowing with assistance. At this 
stage what we are trying to do is make the best use of every avenue we 
have. (Wallis, 2009) 
It is hard to judge whether this diversification is the product of an intended 
governmental policy or just the result of a changing international environment, yet it 
is quite undeniable that it serves a government’s clear purpose. Diversification of 
‘partners,’ especially non-Western ones, concerns the need to reduce dependency 
from the conditionalities attached to the provided funding. Those conditionalities 
refer to formalities around political and economic reform, as well as other sorts of 
pressure, such as statements by donor governments and embassies and reports by 
nongovernmental organizations with an impact on perceptions about the country and 
its government’s ruling leadership inside the donor countries and around the 
international community.20 Nevertheless, although Zenawi has been claiming that 
Ethiopia is not a great aid per capita recipient, Ethiopia is the biggest African 
recipient of official development assistance (ODA), namely of Western countries, as 
Table 1 shows. 
                                                 
20 However, this is not to suggest that non-Western partners do not impose conditions on the Ethiopian 
government, since they hypothetically do. The focus on Western aid relations with Ethiopia has to do 
with the dissertation’s case study, which is precisely an aid program by the leading Western power. 
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Table 1: Top 10 ODA recipients (USD million, net disbursements in 2008) 
(Chang, 2010: 8)  
Rank Country Net Disbursement Percentage of ODA 
1 Ethiopia 3 327 8 
2 Sudan 2 384 5 
3 Tanzania 2 331 5 
4 Mozambique 1 994 5 
5 Uganda 1 657 4 
6 Congo Dem. Rep. 1 610 4 
7 Kenya 1 360 3 
8 Egypt 1 348 3 
9 Ghana 1 293 3 
10 Nigeria 1 290 3 
11 Other recipients 25 411 58 
 Total 44 005 100 
The question of perceptions nurtured by donor countries and the international 
community at large about the country’s current development efforts and the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) leadership, 
particularly its main figure, Meles Zenawi, is reportedly very important in the 
country’s relations with the West. Ethiopian leaders are aware of the negative 
constructed image of the country, especially since the mid-1980s, due to large public 
events such as 1985 Live Aid, as an eminent site of hunger, poverty, and 
underdevelopment. Therefore, they develop a foreign policy in order to show 
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otherwise, according to longstanding analyst of Ethiopian politics Patrick Gilkes 
(2010).  
Although to a lesser extent than in Botswana, throughout the last decade 
Ethiopian leaders like Zenawi and Minister of Health Tedros Adhanom have enjoyed 
throughout the last decade  a positive reputation as a new generation of African 
leaders who present themselves as unequivocally committed to good governance and 
stability (Zimeta, 2010; Aljazeera, 2010). Zenawi has been representing not just 
Ethiopia but the entire continent in international climate change summits (African 
Renewal, 2010), while Adhanom was the chair of the Global Fund until September 
2011. Thus, while important international organizations and forums offer avenues of 
Ethiopian governmental promotion, it may also have an undermining effect. In 
effect, the Ethiopian government has been accused of manipulating international aid 
to reward supporters and punish opponents, legislating anti-democratic frameworks 
that impeded proper campaigning by the opposition in the latest governmental 
elections of May 2010, and violating the human rights of some ethnic groups. This 
also includes the jamming of the United States-based radio network Voice of 
America and the country expulsion of one journalist in 2010 (Catholic Information 
Service for Africa, 2010). This criticism has augmented after the elections’ results 
were made public, in which the ruling government received 99% of votes under 
allegations of not meeting international standards (Press TV, 2010). In face of United 
States government criticism, the Ethiopian leadership has nonetheless remained 
responsive. Victorious Meles Zenawi was found stating in June 2010 
the United States has every right to use its taxpayers' money as it sees fit 
(…) If they feel that the outcome of the elections is such that they cannot 
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continue our partnership, that's fine. We should be very grateful for the 
assistance they have given us so far, and move on. (Murdoch, 2010)                 
Despite the asymmetry between Western foreign governments and Ethiopia, 
it should be stressed that historically, and unlike many postcolonial African 
countries, whose subordination to former colonial masters is arguably persisting, the 
latter’s consecutive regimes have been driven by a sense of equality among 
sovereigns (Furtado and Smith, 2007). As the host country of the Organization for 
African Unity (now African Union), and according to popular belief, an emblematic 
example concerns the tradition of granting free land to embassies worldwide, 
especially to African and donor countries, in order to attract further presence in the 
country. Addis Ababa has thus become one of the largest conglomerates of 
diplomatic representations in the world. In the case of relations with the United 
States of America, the country’s biggest donor, the Ethiopian government has 
maintained a large ability to receive and manage assistance. This happened even in 
times of strong ideological differences that conduced to suspension of diplomatic 
relations, as it happened during the Soviet Union-backed military regime of the 
Dergue (Committee, in Amharic) between 1974 and 1991, during the famines of the 
1980s (Kissi, 1997). Despite the policy of not assisting regimes created by coups 
d’état, which led to the withdrawal of USAID from the country in those years, 
assistance was still facilitated (Ibid.).  
According to historian Edward Kissi (Ibid.), the United States maintenance of 
support during the Haile Selassie and Dergue periods, even when formally 
suspended, was primarily driven by humanitarian concerns.  
Although geo-politics certainly played a role in United States relations 
with Ethiopia, some of the American proposals for the improvement of 
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the conditions of Ethiopia’s peasants were motivated by a concern for the 
sons and daughters of the soil. (Ibid.: 432)  
However, now the pendulum seems to swing more to the geopolitical side. 
Particularly after the failed military intervention in Somalia in 1994, but certainly 
after September 11, 2001, and the subsequent War on Terror, which highlighted the 
problem of Islamic extremism in the Horn of Africa, United States policy for 
Ethiopia has become increasingly more hard power-driven (Gordon and Mazzetti, 
2007: 14-16; West, 2005). In this context, Ethiopia emerges as the sole actor the 
several post-Cold War United States Administrations can openly rely on (Ibid.). Yet, 
the same argument is applicable to the Ethiopian government. Its rationale for 
interacting, or ‘partnering,’ with the United States government is based on national 
security goals and improving the social welfare of the population. Whereas for the 
United States of America what is at stake is the contention against suspected Al-
Qaeda affiliated groups together with a favourable resolution of Somalia’s state 
failure (both inland and at sea), for the Ethiopian government what concerns chiefly 
is the consolidation of territorial integrity and its control (Gordon and Mazzetti, 
2007). The purposes of the War on Terror in the Horn of Africa coincide quite 
explicitly with the EPRDF’s own national policy of securing the borders and 
containing internal armed groups. As Zenawi has affirmed, “we don’t look at this as 
us joining the United States on the war on terrorism, we see it as the United States 
finally joining us because we’ve been victims for many years” (West, 2005: 4). 
Nonetheless, policy contradictions are identified by experts.  
While Addis Ababa is pursuing its traditional unaccommodationist and at 
times hostile policy towards these groups, Washington is encouraging all 
those Islamist movements that are interested in renouncing violence to 
participate in the political process. (Elmi, 2010)  
175 
 
In the midst of this, broader readings of security in the broader Horn of Africa have 
been emphasizing the overall lack of strategic thought, namely by the United States 
of America, in the resolution of the manifold conflicts taking place (Bah, 2009). 
Unlike the cases of Botswana and South Africa, PEPFAR’s implementation 
in Ethiopia is not justified for the scale of the HIV/AIDS epidemic alone, although in 
absolute terms it is a major health problem, since it affects close to one million 
people (UNAIDS, 2008: 214). Given the size of the population of around 80 million, 
HIV/AIDS sits alongside other pressing health concerns that have to do with all the 
direct and indirect consequences of urban and rural poverty, malnutrition, famine, 
population displacement and armed conflicts that affect the country. In addition to 
that, HIV/AIDS intervention often implicates activities around family planning, 
which moreover serves the goal of hampering population growth, considered a major 
obstacle to social development by policy-makers, academics and general 
commentators (Commission for Africa, 2005: 105-106; Bevan, 2006; Pausewang, 
2009: 72; Dyer, 2009).21  
HIV/AIDS as a distinct field of development/health intervention has 
represented an opportunity for the country to obtain resources from public and 
private donors, and simultaneously raise its international profile as the example of 
the Minister of Health Adhanom shows. Moreover, the history of the HIV/AIDS 
response in Ethiopia demonstrates a large deal of openness to the international 
community, and eagerness to interact with it. After the discovery of the first 
HIV/AIDS case in the country in 1984 (Kloos and Mariam, 2000: 17), a National 
                                                 
21 However, Berhanu Abegaz (2004: 321-322) emphasises that population growth should not be 
regarded as a primary cause of underdevelopment in Ethiopia. 
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Task Force was established in 1985 with the aim of tackling the spread of the virus, 
followed by the first department of AIDS control in Ethiopia at the Ministry of 
Health in 1987 (Kitaw et al., 2006: 210). Together with WHO, the then leading 
international organization in the field, two prevention and control programs were 
launched, for the 1987-1990 and 1992-1996 periods, but with “little impact on the 
growth of the HIV epidemic in the country” (Ibid.). Under another international 
institutional setting, as UNAIDS is launched in 1996, the Ethiopian health authorities 
designed with stakeholders National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plans for 2000-2004 and 
National AIDS Priority Strategies for 2001-2005. Finally, the HIV/AIDS Prevention 
and Control Office (HAPCO) was established in 2000, and has remained the leading 
HIV/AIDS authority for the country, headed by the President. However, according to 
interviews with senior professionals in the country, actual intervention remained very 
low, funded by the World Bank alone, until PEPFAR was established in the country 
in 2004 (Interviewee 37, 2010; Interviewee 2, 2010; Interviewee 7, 2010; 
Interviewee 46, 2010; Interviewee 47, 2010). In 2009, activities funded by PEPFAR 
in the areas of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment and correlated medical and 
developmental activities (other epidemics, family planning, education, 
evangelisation) were upgraded to “Global Health Initiative (GHI) plus” status under 
that initiative. As discussed in the previous chapter, together with seven other 
countries, Ethiopia will receive further capacity and management support to pursue 
the efforts developed in the last seven years.        
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6.4. (South) African Renaissance: Post-Apartheid Politics 
South Africa is generally observed by the international community as a 
continental power in Africa; actually a superpower in its immediate Southern African 
neighbourhood (Shillinger, 2006). Its hegemony is usually assessed in very classical 
terms: very large relative gross domestic product (GDP) (roughly half of Sub-
Saharan Africa’s total) and military capabilities. The recent invitation to join the 
group of emerging world economies with Brazil, Russia, India and China (the so-
called ‘BRICs’) is symptomatic of the country’s significance beyond its own 
neighbourhood and continent (IOL, 2010). While South Africa’s regional hegemony 
has long constituted a solid fact, the country’s foreign policy’s development over the 
last decades has invited several explanatory approaches. The apartheid period is 
generally described by neorealist features, as potent military might was employed 
systematically inside and outside the country’s borders in order to cement the 
regime’s self-help (Geldenhuys, 2008: 2). However, in 1994, with the first 
multiracial elections and dismantlement of Apartheid, a shift was underway, as Deon 
Geldenhuys describes: 
This reorientation flowed from a paradigm shift in South African foreign 
policy. The ‘old’ South Africa’s realist thinking informed by the 
imperatives of survival in a hostile world, was replaced by a liberal 
idealist approach in which democratic South Africa would promote an 
ambitious reformist agenda abroad based on its internal experiences and 
values. (Ibid.) 
According to scholarship, unlike apartheid, the democratic era has been 
characterized by the primacy of liberal idealism, as successive presidents (Nelson 
Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma) have been engaged in a new kind of pan-
Africanism with the aim of promoting representative democracy, good governance 
and economic development around the continent for the new millennium (Ibid.: 7-
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11). Rhetoric of African Renaissance and constitution of the New Partnership for 
African Development (NEPAD), mentioned in Chapter 2, constitute the cornerstones 
of this liberal-idealist agenda for the continent.  
Independent of the domestic regime – of separate development (apartheid) or 
liberal-democracy, with black-majority22 – South Africa’s relative capabilities vis-à-
vis the regional neighbourhood and the rest of the continent render it hegemonic, at 
least unless other ‘rivals’ emerge. To a large extent, domestic regime change implied 
a change in international relations, particularly with Southern Africa, from an utterly 
isolationist position (apartheid) to friendly conviviality with neighbours, who 
moreover helped the leading political force, the ANC, to resist and eventually 
negotiate a regime transition (post-apartheid) (Schoeman, 2007). Indeed, while 
Apartheid South Africa had vivid military incursions in Mozambique, Angola, 
Zimbabwe, and even Botswana, let alone Namibia, which was part of South Africa 
until 1990, the ANC was assisted by the leadership of those countries, or at least 
groups inside them (e.g. Botswana), and also farther-away states, such as Zambia or 
Tanzania, not to mention political regimes and social movements around the world 
(Ibid.). Post-apartheid idealism is rooted on this mosaic of relations established 
during the anti-apartheid struggle, and resulted on the democratic will of sharing 
South Africa’s relative wealth with the rest of the continent through aid, and 
prioritization of the African continent, and the Southern African subcontinent in 
particular, in terms of international trade and foreign investment (Taylor, 2005). 
Eventually, South African companies, or multinationals with earlier strong presence 
                                                 
22 It should be highlighted that the ruling post-apartheid party in South Africa, the African National 
Congress, follows a non-racialist policy, the same applying to the remaining parts of the governmental 
coalition, the South African Communist Party and the Confederation of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU). However, the political regime is commonly referred to as of black majority.  
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in South Africa, increased their presence in key sectors like telecommunications, 
transport and distribution (Mutenheri, 2010).  
This renewed hegemony of South Africa worked in diapason with the 
international framework of the United States of America and financial institutions, 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, whose preponderance 
expanded with the retreat of the Soviet Union (Cox, 2005). Eventually, such 
hegemony proliferated to wider parts of Africa, whereby “many African elites 
contribute to making neo-liberalism accepted as the ‘only’ macro-economic 
framework and development strategy within which they (and by implication, all 
others) can work within” (Taylor, 2002: 21). Though not without some reservations, 
South Africa was accepted by the Southern African Development Community in 
1994, a trade-facilitating organization whose predominance until then rested on 
Zimbabwe, but that soon became under South African dominance (Schoeman, 2007). 
South Africa’s post-apartheid liberal idealism constitutes a refoundation of the 
previous military power, yet with a benign tone. From a military point of view, the 
South African army is predicted to intervene merely in peacekeeping operations in 
the immediate and more distant abroad (Baker and Lyman, 2008: 9; Bond, 2006a: 
152; Cilliers, 2008: 22). Furthermore, it has rolled back its nuclear armament 
program, and participates in international nuclear disarmament initiatives (Burgess 
and Purkitt, 2001).  
The political-philosophical roots of post-apartheid South Africa, based on 
democracy, human rights and good governance, largely fits the United States of 
America’s tenets indeed, although some authors tend to favour an association with 
the ‘Middle Powers,’ such as Canada or the Scandinavian countries, let alone the 
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already mentioned BRICs (Geldenhuys, 2008). South Africa is one of the “anchor 
states” in the United States strategy for Africa, together with Ethiopia, Nigeria and 
Kenya (Chau, 2007: 6-7). Maintaining relations of alliance advances goals structured 
around regional/continental stabilization vis-à-vis perceived armed conflicts, human 
security threats and Islamic terrorism (Ibid.). Expansion of markets and access to 
mineral reserves is of utmost importance too. As far as United States of America-
South Africa relations in particular go, they have shown a consistent pattern of 
proximity since the apartheid thru today.23 In this regard, the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) concurs towards that goal, as it aims at facilitating trade 
relations between South Africa (and Southern Africa as a whole) and the United 
States of America. This whole framework is frequently headed by United States 
leadership discourses around the need for anchor states such as South Africa to hold 
“responsibility” both home and in the region (Clinton, 2009). South Africa is induced 
as a hegemonic leader that should set example towards the achievement of what, in 
the last analysis, are United States strategic goals, and which, after all, coincide with 
South African ones (Underwood, 2008).  
The resilience of liberal democratic institutions and the primacy of the market 
posits South Africa as one of the very few countries in Africa not falling into any of 
the categories of “failed states,” “critically weak states,” “weak states” and “states to 
watch,” according to the United States influential “Index of State Weakness in the 
                                                 
23 In fact, the United States of America backed the apartheid regime for a long time, at different levels 
(Underwood, 2008: 9; Campbell, 2008). The main reason for that concerns the Cold War geopolitical 
game at stake in Southern Africa. Given the military and diplomatic assistance that the Soviet Union 
was providing to the regimes in Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, in turn hosting the 
ANC and other anti-apartheid movements, the United States of America assisted the South African 
regime as it was containing communism (Burgess and Purkitt, 2001: 85; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and 
Ojakorotu, 2010: 95). The CIA was active in the counter-terrorist domain (Hutton, 2010). At the same 
time, protecting South Africa meant protecting the capitalist political economy South Africa was 
grounded upon, namely United States companies working on South African soil (Bond, 2008). 
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Developing World” (Rice and Patrick, 2008). However, although the current military 
and police behaviour is no more aggressive, home and abroad, the levels of violence 
inside South Africa remain very high (Cilliers, 2008). Urban insecurity and 
criminality have amounted to thousands of deaths and injuries over the years, notably 
among the most vulnerable groups (i.e. women and children) in informal settlements, 
townships, cities and countryside (Chopra and Sanders, 2004; Cullinan, 2009).  
It should also be emphasized the contribution of United States-based and 
transnational solidarity groups, often composed of black diasporas, which 
campaigned to change foreign policy in favour of the end of apartheid (Gramby-
Sobukwe, 2005). Some of those groups eventually have been playing eminent roles 
in the post-apartheid period under the auspices of United States-South Africa 
programs of cooperation, namely the large mainstream Christian churches, i.e. 
Catholics, Anglicans and other Christian denominations (Ibid.: 796). One major 
program is certainly PEPFAR, in which implementers in South Africa have been the 
largest recipients (Bradbury and Kleinman, 2010).  
Nevertheless, both countries have disagreed on the issue of United States 
Africa Command (AFRICOM), a consequence of post-September 11, 2001 policy of 
surveillance in Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ojakorotu, 2010). It has been repeatedly 
rejected by South Africa and other countries across the continent, though not by 
neighbouring Botswana (Buchanan, 2008; McFate, 2008; Burgess, 2009). Another 
point of contention between them referred to the politics of HIV/AIDS and, 
consequently, PEPFAR. According to latest data, the prevalence rate among adults is 
of 18.1%, the largest epidemic in the world after neighbours Swaziland, Botswana 
and Lesotho (WHO, 2010: 32).  This issue lasted for most of the Mbeki Presidency 
182 
 
and is, at least partially, explained by the post-apartheid liberal-idealism discussed so 
far.24  
In the early 2000s, building on some unsettled scientific disputes on the 
nature of the HI virus, animated by natural scientists such as Peter Duesberg, Mbeki 
claimed that the biological causes of AIDS were unclear (DeMeo, 1993). For him, 
what was rather clear was a social cause: poverty (Schneider and Fassin, 2002: 49; 
Youde, 2007a: 5). Furthermore, for Mbeki, the AIDS orthodoxy had become the 
West-led international community’s new racist and colonialist mantra for showing to 
the world Africans’ inferiority (Mackintosh, 2009: 33; Sitze, 2004: 770). In addition 
to that, he considered that this orthodoxy was paving the way for greedy 
pharmaceutical companies to sell highly toxic drugs to poor African countries 
(Mackintosh, 2009: 38). This argument was grounded on apartheid-time public 
health emergencies launched by the government which turned out to be particularly 
damaging for blacks. It also reflected cases of blacks’ suspicion of public health 
measures (Youde, 2005: 424-426). However, as his biographer Mark Gevisser 
claimed in 2007, Mbeki did not mean to be “denialist,” yet a “dissident,” 
intellectually and politically (SABC News, 2007). In practice, many treatment 
                                                 
24 This governmental “denialism,” as put by pro-treatment civil society groups, has been alternatively 
explained in terms of an ethnic boundary that cuts across the South African society, which, in turn, 
leads to an absence of “collective shared risk,” if not a collective state of denial between the different 
ethnic groups (Lieberman, 2009). Since government policy-making and implementation in such 
complex area as HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment requires a sense of collective risk among 
different ethnic groups in order to engender “compliance and consent” (Ibid.: 7) by the public, 
Lieberman concludes that the more ethnically stratified the national polity finds itself, the less the 
national community is inclined to accept the underlying idea of a shared collective risk and thus 
support policies of response. The author argues that the ethnic boundaries cutting across South 
African societies – broadly, between whites and blacks – led to a lack of “collective shared risk.” Both 
ethnic groups were in a “state of denial.” While whites would see the epidemic as blacks’ problem, 
and blacks would vision it as whites’ problem, the government did not step in aggressively, in a 
context of post-apartheid fragile national/ethnic relations. The opposite case in Lieberman’s study was 
Brazil, whose efficiency of the government’s response relied on the tenuous ethnic boundary existing 
across Brazilian society. 
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programs were suspended, and arguable “African solutions for African problems” for 
the epidemic were put forward. His Minister of Health, late Manto Tschabalala-
Msimang, introduced a prescription based on garlic, olive oil, lemons and African 
potato (Kahn, 2009).  
The politicization of HIV/AIDS in that period occurred in the context of post-
apartheid race relations but also the advancement, home and across Africa, of the 
developmental rhetoric of African Renaissance. After the dismissal of Mbeki in 2008 
after an ANC congress, Tschabalala-Msimang was also sacked by the transitional 
president, Kgalema Motlanthe. And once President Jacob Zuma was elected party 
leader and later elected country’s president, an absolute reversal of policy took place. 
Before that, in 2002 and 2003, the Treatment Action Campaign won court cases 
against the state that allowed provision of ARVs to infected pregnant women and to 
people with advanced AIDS (Oshry, 2007). The launch of PEPFAR in South Africa 
occurred precisely in the height of those disputes, and its first years of 
implementation (2003, 2004) were affected by the political context, which did not 
mean that the PEPFAR was launched without endorsement of the national authorities 
(Interviewee 25, 2009). It was endorsed, even if under difficult conditions, as a 
former official with a United States government implementing agency admitted: 
“When it was to get the [PEPFAR] memorandum of understanding it was difficult 
for us to find the person [among the South African government] to sign. It was a 
massive job. But now it is changing in terms of getting contacts.” (Ibid.)          
Post-apartheid idealism of South African foreign policy can help to grasp 
Mbeki’s position. Even though it was a mostly domestic event, this position reflects a 
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will, eminently embodied in the figure of President Mbeki, of transmitting a set of 
values and ideas across Africa, and even the world, centred on the dignity of 
Africans and their resistance to prevailing racist and colonial images promoted by the 
West-led international community, as well as their ‘affiliates,’ i.e. activists, inside 
South Africa too. Although this presidential stance was observed as utterly 
unacceptable by the mainstream HIV/AIDS ‘epistemic community’ and irrational by 
the average international community, especially outside Africa, the idealist 
commitment to a set of values and ideas gave it meaning.  It definitely was part of 
the project of African Renaissance – home and around the continent – to fight back 
the historical constructed images around African (read: black) sexuality and even 
humanity.                 
Particularly since the end of 2009, the South African government, both at 
presidential and ministerial levels, have started to engage more seriously with the 
epidemic and its different domestic and foreign activist interlocutors. The launch of 
substantial testing and treatment programs was so exciting that led the head of 
UNAIDS, Michel Sibidé, to address President Zuma as an “architect for AIDS 
strategy” on the 2009 World AIDS Day (SAPA, 2009). Relationship with funders 
like PEPFAR and its recipient organizations and the remaining HIV/AIDS 
community has improved to the point of Minister of Health Aaron Motsoaledi 
appearing as a guest speaker at the latest International AIDS Conference 2010 as a 
firm HIV/AIDS advocate (Motsoaledi, 2010). This was something almost 
unimaginable for a South African higher government official some years before. Yet, 
again, the permeating post-apartheid liberal idealism is found once again in the 
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rhetoric. Minister Motsoaledi promises commitment at home and sensitivity for other 
African nations.  
Motsoaledi, the health minister, said his government wants to keep 
paying 80 per cent of its AIDS bill, an important commitment because it 
means more donor money will be available for countries in even direr 
need. While South Africa has the most HIV-positive people, other, 
poorer countries, including neighbours like Swaziland, are more 
burdened because a higher percentage of their citizens are HIV-positive. 
(Bryson, 2010a) 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 This chapter has focused on the relations between the states/governments of 
Ethiopia, Botswana and South Africa and the United States/PEPFAR, and the 
international community at large. This chapter showed not only that individual 
countries act in their own right as units of the system, i.e. they have agency, but also 
how they have acted throughout the years. Moreover, those countries maintain their 
specific political and strategic agendas that drive their action as they are constrained 
by their national, regional and international circumstances. 
 Despite the peaceful transition from indirect rule under the British 
Protectorate of Bechuanaland to formal independence in 1966, regional pressures 
during much of the post-independence period forced consecutive Botswana 
leaderships to realist strategic thinking. In practice, and although leaning 
domestically towards Western institutionalism and values (for a long time its main 
development funder was the United Kingdom), it demanded negotiation and some 
sort of relationship with all neighbours, independent of their domestic regimes, and 
both superpowers. Even if difficult until 1994, it obliged to a special relationship 
with the regional economic hegemon, South Africa. By the 1990s, due to spectacular 
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economic growth, the country rose to middle-income status, in opposition to the 
collapse of many regimes around the continent throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
However, by then, and despite an improving regional environment with the end of 
apartheid in the southern neighbour, Botswana was challenged by another threat to 
survival: HIV/AIDS. Affecting roughly a quarter of the adult population, the country 
has acted – through allocation of domestic resources and attraction of PEPFAR 
support – to respond to a problem framed in terms of survival of the nation. 
 Whereas the case of Botswana points at a question of national survival, in 
which the country’s population is under a severe threat, the Ethiopian situation is 
rather centred on domestic political regime’s survival, which aims at securing the 
integrity of the current map of the country given the number of internal and external 
threats while enhancing development prospects domestically. The Ethiopian political 
history since Haile Selassie demonstrates that over the years different regimes have 
sought to advance their interests with the external powers, despite outside threats. As 
far as relations with the United States of America, even during the Dergue regime 
period (1974-1991), the government, formally assisted by the Soviet Union and 
therefore at odds with United States foreign policy, negotiated assistance of both 
geopolitical and humanitarian nature. The same applies today to the ruling EPRDF, 
who has been under criticism of Western diplomacy and human rights NGOs, but 
nevertheless secures significant assistance, namely through PEPFAR, from the 
United States of America. This set of goals largely coincides with the United States 
broader agenda for the Horn of Africa.  
Unlike Botswana, HIV/AIDS does not pose a concrete threat to the Ethiopian 
population. Consequences of the epidemic for the political regime are rather indirect 
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and part of a comprehensive dimension, that is, human development. In spite of 
recent improvements, Ethiopia still occupies the 13th lowest position in the Human 
Development Report of the United Nations. However, rather than relying solely on 
the West-led international aid and security architecture as it used to be, now the 
Ethiopian political leadership is able to diversify its sources of assistance, as ‘new 
partners’ emerge, notably China, India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and 
Turkey. As such, dependency from Western aid and attached conditionalities is 
relaxed and allows for a more independent policy for the EPRDF. 
South Africa’s case is rather different from Botswana and Ethiopia. The 
regional hegemony expressed by a relatively very large GDP and military 
capabilities implies an analytical predisposition to a neorealist perspective about 
South Africa, both during and after the apartheid regime. However, the post-1994 
administrations led by the ANC have kept a rhetoric and policy aimed at 
transmitting, through aid and economic influence, values spoken as an African 
Renaissance, characterized by democratic participation, human rights and good 
governance, around the continent. This idealism had consequences at the level of 
HIV/AIDS intervention, particularly at home but also beyond. It consisted on a 
questioning, or self-proclaimed “dissidence,” by then-President Thabo Mbeki of 
West-led international community’s efforts in that area. In his opinion, it reiterated 
former derogatory colonial views of African sexuality that had to be rejected under 
African Renaissance. As a consequence, and even though scientific data pointed at a 
very large epidemic, state-sponsored treatment programs were suspended or reduced.  
It is interesting to observe that this standpoint contradicts quite entirely the 
one taken by the government of neighbouring Botswana in the same period. Whilst 
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the South African government was reducing, or even suspending, treatment 
programs, its neighbour was launching the national mass-scale antiretroviral 
program. The Botswana government was convinced by international advice that 
pharmacological solutions were key to the survival of the population. In turn, 
important members of the South African government were reluctant, or ‘dissident,’ 
over the whole efficacy of such pharmacological intervention, preferring local 
(African) solutions, and shifted the focus to the social determinants of the epidemic 
(poverty) away from arguable treatment regimes. After Mbeki, as epidemic realities 
were recognised and generated an engaged response under President Zuma, South 
African governmental behaviour remained driven by a pan-Africanist concern, as the 
government’s fundraising rhetoric demonstrates, expressed in function of countries 
with lower economic capacity to afford therapies. Although South Africa is heavily 
affected by the epidemic and necessitates foreign assistance, there are other inflicted 
countries, yet poorer than South Africa, that somewhat need to be prioritized.                               
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Chapter 7 – Domestic Policy of Postcolonial African States 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the actions of the governments of Ethiopia, 
Botswana and South Africa in face of the opportunities and constraints that emerged 
in the international system, as well as in terms of continuities and changes 
concerning their foreign policies. Their behaviour, one argues, expresses agency as 
an ability to act with autonomy, even if in asymmetry, to fulfil their political and 
strategic agendas over time. Two distinct theoretical strands explain their behaviour 
with regard to the United States of America, and the larger international community. 
One stresses the concern for self-help, and is applicable to the cases of Ethiopia and 
Botswana. The other is based on the transmission of ideas and values structured 
around African Renaissance, and helps to grasp South Africa’s policy, namely after 
1994, the year the apartheid regime came to an end and full multiethnic democracy 
was inaugurated. 
This chapter looks at the domestic dimension of inter-state behaviour. One’s 
analytical framework departs from the Waltzian (1979) idea of state as an acting unit 
of the system, yet with a spectrum of asymmetric relations that do not confine 
themselves to the traditional international arena. Rosenberg’s (1990, 1994) 
suggestion of “the state as a social relation” induces levels of inter-state relations 
below the mere international sphere, thus conceiving relations with an impact on 
internal politics and policies, as well as on local dimensions, to be reviewed in the 
next chapter. In effect, this chapter builds largely on the previous one, and expands 
the range of opportunities and constraints imposed by the (international) structure, 
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particularly as far as PEPFAR’s policies and implementation is concerned. 
Therefore, it focuses on the behaviour of PEPFAR host countries in face of the 
PEPFAR’s arguably most prominently pervasive policy: country ownership. After 
five years (2003-2008) of implementation under an ‘emergency’ mode, with the 
major aim of quickly putting in place cross-country systems of contracting and 
distribution of antiretroviral drugs, PEPFAR’s second, current phase (2009-2013) is 
much more concerned with a transition towards sustainability through country 
ownership of the previously initiated interventions under United States government 
command. Although regarded as an example of ‘structural’ domination, country 
ownership has been interpreted and managed by the national governments in 
different manners, according to the broader political and strategic agendas of the 
individual countries.    
This chapter follows the same structure of the previous one. It starts with 
Botswana, then proceeding to Ethiopia and finally South Africa. Botswana’s section 
details the national-government-led response, in which PEPFAR fits, aimed at 
safeguarding the survival of the population. The section on Ethiopia focuses on the 
developmental policies of the national government since they are the most involved 
in the process of PEPFAR’s implementation. Even though the national ministry of 
defence is also a PEPFAR implementer, suggesting a direct geopolitical implication 
to the intervention, one considers that the ‘developmental state’ policy offers the 
broadest platform for analysing the program in the country. Finally, as far as South 
Africa goes, it depicts the process of launch and implementation of PEPFAR under 
the domestic tensions and changes that affected the realm of HIV/AIDS intervention 
in that country over the years.           
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7.2. Botswana’s National Struggle against Epidemic 
As a sovereign state Botswana is the direct inheritor of the British 
Protectorate of Bechuanaland. This Protectorate was established in 1885 as a result 
of the necessity to prevent an alliance between the former Boer republic of Transvaal 
(now the Gauteng province of South Africa) and the former German South-West 
colony (now Namibia). Such alliance could undermine British access to former 
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) from the former Cape Colony (Parsons, 1999).  
Although it nominally formed a British domain, it was in the interest of the 
local Tswana rulers to maintain this alliance with the United Kingdom, given the 
record of conflict with Transvaal throughout the 19th century (Ibid.). Five years after 
the constitution of the Protectorate, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) was 
established to proceed with the construction of a railway across Bechuanaland. The 
British government considered the allocation of the Protectorate to that company, 
which generated a worrying reaction by the local rulers. In 1895 the three Tswana 
kings, Bathoen, Khama III and Sebele, travelled to London and requested the British 
government not to proceed with that measure in exchange for the maintenance of 
Protectorate administration. After a lobbying campaign the rulers were successful 
with that mission (Ibid.). Nonetheless, the Tswana monarchs had to concede to the 
BSAC enterprise. But, all in all, it can be argued that the Tswana leaders benefited 
from the regime of Protectorate administered by the British. On the one hand, despite 
conceding to CSAC, they enjoyed a military protection from the Boer republic that 
they could hardly afford. Furthermore, the system of indirect rule allowed for the 
increase of their actual empowerment of their leadership. For instance, the local elite 
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benefited from colonial capitalistic policies of cattle development, together with the 
British white farmers.   
A reason why the United Kingdom was somehow easily persuaded to 
concede to the native rulers’ request had to do with the fact that it always regarded 
Bechuanaland as a “temporary expedient” (Ibid.). Sooner or later, Botswana would 
be integrated either in former Southern Rhodesia or South Africa, since it was “a 
mere appendage of South Africa, for which it provided migrant labour and the rail 
transit route to Rhodesia” (Ibid.). Unlike the other two domains, subject to intense 
colonial rule and economic exploration, Botswana remained largely marginal in that 
process. In fact, no significant development was made in the country until the 
independence in 1966. For example, the construction of the capital city itself, 
Gaborone, only started in 1964. Until then the administrative centre was located in 
Mafikeng, on the South African side.  
Transition to national sovereign rule was peaceful, and never seriously 
contested British principles of political and economic organization. The reason for 
such smoothness has been found in the fact that the dominating elite ante and post-
independence was the one and the same, one of its great representatives consisting 
precisely on Seretse Khama (Varela, 2006: 266-267). A year before formal 
independence, in 1965, the first elections for self-government took place, and the 
moderate, liberal Bechuanaland Democratic Party, under the leadership of Seretse 
Khama, became the first Prime Minister of Botswana, and founding father of the 
modern state. With the independence, the Bechuanaland Democratic Party was 
renamed Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), and Khama became President of the 
Republic of Botswana. The BDP has won all multiparty elections until today, and 
193 
 
Khama governed until his death, in 1980. Ketumile Masire governed from 1980 to 
1998 and Festus Mogae from 1998 to 2008. Ian Seretse Khama, son of the first 
president, is the current President.  
The country never underwent internal mass-scale political violence like in all 
neighbours (Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe), which nevertheless affected 
Botswana, as the previous chapter discussed. The foundation of the Botswana 
Defence Forces in 1977 was a consequence of a Rhodesian army’s incursion in 
Botswana in search for black insurgents. In turn, the South African apartheid army 
bombed parts of Southern Botswana (Kelebonye, 2010).  
In 1966, at the time of independence, Botswana was one of the poorest 
countries in the world, and there was very limited power and communications 
infrastructure by then. The country received large developmental support from the 
United Kingdom, and later from the United States, especially in the area of education 
and health.  But two decades into independence, the country experienced massive 
growth rates. With the discovery and exploration of diamonds, it attained some of the 
highest growth rates in the world, achieving a 13% annual growth in GDP between 
1980 and 1989 (Hillbom, 2008: 191). This achievement was thanks to the discovery, 
exploration and trade of diamonds under the Debswana public-private partnership 
that put together the Botswana state and the mineral giant De Beers, founded by the 
early owner of the South African railway company, Cecil Rhodes. 
Various reasons are advanced to explain why Botswana has been as 
“successful” as it has been. Zibani Maundeni (2001) argues that, comparing to 
neighbouring Zimbabwe, a major factor concerned the indigenous “initiator culture” 
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of developmentalism in Botswana embedded in the hegemony of the BDP over other 
political sensitivities and local chiefs. 
In the case of Botswana, where there was an indigenous initiator state 
culture, new state elites emerged from the indigenous old state, 
revolutionised it from above, maintained discipline and coherence within 
the state, embarked upon state-led capitalist development and enjoyed the 
support of the general population. The Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP) emerged out of the indigenous old state in response to the 
decolonisation and nationalism that were sweeping the African continent 
in the 1950s and 1960s. It opposed and displaced the populist 
nationalists. It displaced the chiefs from the centre of state power. (Ibid.: 
129) 
This “initiator culture” consisted of a consecration of institutions of “private 
property,” which “protect the property rights of actual and potential investors, 
provide political stability, and ensure that the political elites are constrained by the 
political system and the participating of a broad cross-section of society” (Acemoglu 
et al., 2003: 84). It materialized into “policies [that] served the interests of important 
coalition partners, the major cattlemen, and the foreign mineral extracting firms” 
(Froiztheim, 2009: 145). In sum, Acemoglu and colleagues indicate the following 
factors explaining, apart from the availability of unskilled labour, which stopped 
migrating to South Africa for the mining industry, the success of Botswana: 
tribal institutions that encouraged broad-based participation and 
constraints on political leaders during the precolonial period; only limited 
effect of British colonization on these precolonial institutions because of 
the peripheral nature of Botswana to the British Empire; the fact that 
upon independence, the most important rural interests, chiefs, and cattle 
owners, were politically powerful; the income from diamonds, which 
generated enough rents for the main political actors to increase the 
opportunity cost of further rent seeking; and, finally, a number of 
important and farsighted decisions by the post-independence leaders, in 
particular Seretse Khama and Quett Masire. (Acemoglu et al., 2003: 84)  
As Botswana achieved to upper-middle income status, by the mid-1990s, 
foreign agencies left the country, including USAID and the Peace Corps. This is an 
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instance of the post-independence path of agency walked by the national elite, which 
sought to employ strategically available political and material resources in the 
construction of a country that at time of the independence was underdeveloped. From 
a point of colonialism (Protectorate) and neo-colonialism (utter dependency on 
foreign resources for development), Botswana achieved an impressive degree of 
autonomy in the design and implementation of its own development policies that its 
integration in the global market of diamonds facilitated. Botswana emerged as one of 
the two developmental state stories (the other is Mauritius) in Africa in the 1990s.         
However, in the early 2000s foreign assistance resumed in full force due to 
the HIV/AIDS crisis. In the case of United States support, this followed a personal 
request by President Festus Mogae to the United States Administration (Interviewee 
17, 2010). HIV/AIDS emerged as one of the greatest threats to the country and its 
development prospects, together with the decreasing demand for diamonds. 
However, precisely because of the problem’s magnitude, which undermines the 
survival of the nation, the government took an early decision of intervening actively 
in the epidemic. Assisting with the survival of a significant share of the population 
has evident consequences in terms of larger policies of development. Many studies 
about the social aspects of the epidemic have underlined over the years the severe 
impact on the development prospects of a country, since it primarily affects the most 
productive members of society, i.e. young adults (Arndt and Lewis, 2000; Bauer, 
2006; Fourie and Schönteich, 2001; Kim and Farmer, 2006; Santaeulalia-Llopis, 
2008; Whiteside and de Waal, 2004; Whiteside, 2004; 2009). 
HIV/AIDS intervention in Botswana has started in the mid-1980s, but it only 
became a matter of utmost importance for the national government in the beginning 
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of the 2000s. The national antiretroviral program was launched in 2001 primarily 
with domestic funds, complemented by other sources: the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation’s African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP), the Global 
Fund and, finally, PEPFAR. Responding to the epidemic was framed in terms of 
survival of the small national population of less than 1.5 million people, since the 
prevalence rate among adults corresponds to close to one quarter of the total adult 
population (WHO, 2010: 32). Arguably, due to the actual budgetary prioritization of 
HIV/AIDS by the Botswana government, HIV/AIDS became a topic associated with 
very much everything governance-related: a matter of public health, of course, but 
also of development and even national security (Molomo et al., 2007). For example, 
some programs, assisted by the United States government, targeted directly the 
Botswana Defence Forces (Interviewee 14, 2010).  
PEPFAR was made part of a larger process ultimately aiming at the 
consolidation and expansion of an already developmental state in Botswana, while 
the perhaps more basic concern for survival is particularly salient. However, unlike 
the Ethiopian case, as one will show, PEPFAR is not a significant part in quantitative 
terms of the overall response. Often, interviewees referred to PEPFAR’s role as one 
of only “filling the gaps” of the national, government-led response. PEPFAR’s 
funded activities mainly revolve around medical research, prevention, and building 
organizational capacity. An interviewee with a United States government 
implementing agency stressed the ‘invitee’ character of her organization’s presence 
in the country’s effort against the epidemic, after a short period in which the 
Botswana government considered foreign assistance no longer necessary.   
Our organization arrived in the country after the national independence 
and stayed until 1997. (…) However, ten years ago President Mogae 
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asked the US government to return to the country to support the fight 
against AIDS. (Interviewee 17, 2010) 
To a large extent, PEPFAR’s participation in the Botswana effort corresponds 
to the main goal for the second five-year implementation phase (2009-2013): to 
assist national organizations (government and civil society) towards a country-owned 
sustained response. Respondents with United States government implementing 
agencies are generally very glad about the process of PEPFAR’s implementation vis-
à-vis the final established goal. The country is generally regarded as a main leader of 
the overall process of implementation. One interviewee underscored PEPFAR’s 
important role in terms of technical assistance and pointing at new policy directions 
(children and women). Yet, she stressed that the country – both the public and 
private sectors – engage strongly in the response, and thus ‘own’ it.      
In Botswana, PEPFAR had a significant impact in assisting the 
government. But the country was already way ahead comparing with 
other countries. (…) In Botswana there are strong policies. Now the 
challenge is to roll out on gender and children. Our purpose is to fill 
gaps, and facilitate country-ownership. For us, country ownership is not 
government ownership, but ownership by the government, privates and 
civil society. That is why you want Debswana [diamonds company] to be 
involved in this too. (Interviewee 2, 2010) 
Another respondent reiterated the government’s leadership in the process and place 
PEPFAR next to the other private (Gates Foundation) and public (the European 
Union, through the Global Fund) donors. 
Here the government has the lead. ACHAP is also leading. The EU 
[European Union] is also contributing, though more in education. And 
PEPFAR fills remaining gaps. (Interviewee 10, 2010) 
A third respondent with a United States government implementing agency gives the 
example of military aid to show the assimilation foreign aid received by the 
Botswana government is subjected to its strategic goals.  
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My personal view is that mostly everywhere (…) aid is given to the 
recipient militaries, and they just take it without much questioning. But 
that is not the case of Botswana. They only take the projects they want. 
They own the projects. (Interviewee 14, 2010) 
A fourth respondent underlines the national government’s commitment and points at 
persisting difficulties of response. 
The goal of country ownership is working well in Botswana, which 
depends on two things: political will and capacity. In Botswana there is 
good governance and the government shares the same core values with 
the US [United States of America]: caring for social welfare. There have 
not been obstacles, no major health system challenges. The only thing to 
be stressed is that there are very isolated rural populations, which is 
problematic in terms of prevention of transmission. That will require a lot 
of government commitment. (Interviewee 16, 2010) 
Confidence in Botswana’s capability to maintain a steady response to the 
epidemic is also shared by PEPFAR’s nongovernmental sector. Interestingly, one has 
found two professionals originally from two neighbouring countries among the 
supporters of the idea of national leadership and ownership in Botswana. One 
restates the idea of Botswana as an ‘African model,’ this time around in the field of 
HIV/AIDS: “In Botswana the government is very committed. It has really been a 
model in Africa. It is not donor-dependent. Here PEPFAR only fulfilled gaps. The 
Botswana case should be repeated.” (Interviewee 11, 2010) Another interviewee has 
comprehensively addressed a number of crucial implementation issues in which the 
government has been instrumental, from political involvement with public taboo 
matters to prevention to supply-chain.  
Facilitating conditions are the embracing political environment, featured 
by good governance. The health minister’s recent statements on 
HIV/AIDS in prisons are another good example of the political elite’s 
commitment to the struggle against AIDS, namely on the side of 
prevention. This is facilitating prevention work. Accountability is also to 
be mentioned. Concerning infra-structures, this country has good roads 
which help in the supply chain process. (Interviewee 15, 2010) 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, the country’s openness to the 
international community’s recipes from the late 1980s through today has been a very 
important feature. Independent of the actual results of those recipes once 
implemented, which, as mentioned, were assessed very negatively, today’s policies 
are generally embraced by the government and are regarded as a proof of leadership 
in the struggle against AIDS, as interviewees state. An interviewee has commented 
that “[a] facilitating condition is the abundance of clear rules which trickle down 
from the international community to the government. Thanks to government’s will 
many resources have been pooled together” (Interviewee 11, 2010).   
From the national government’s side, its leadership acknowledges the support 
given by external funders, including PEPFAR, in the struggle against the epidemic, 
namely in the social sphere. 
PEPFAR supports OVCs [orphans and vulnerable children], and as such 
it helped to set up a network involving us plus the ministries of local 
government and health as well as civil society organizations. The 
government cannot do everything alone. (…) Without PEPFAR no CSOs 
[civil society organizations] would develop. It is assisting in building 
capacity for them. I worked at the district level, and what was working 
was peer-education by CSOs. They were important in mobilizing people. 
One of them was TCM [Total Community Mobilisation], funded by 
ACHAP.25 People adhered well and chiefs were collaborative. 
(Interviewee 18, 2010) 
Despite the recognizable engaged position of the government, most 
respondents, including one with a national ministry, have acknowledged the current 
worrisome economic situation. Considering the reliance on revenues associated with 
the diamonds trade, the decreasing global demand for that commodity sets out to 
undermine the costly effort. Despite decreases in drug prices, the program will 
                                                 
25 TCM was described in these terms by Allen and Heald (2004: 1147): “One of the (…) strategies to 
complement the ARV programme was called ‘total community mobilization’. This, as with so much 
else in Botswana, was designed as a top down intervention. An army of field-officers were to 
undertake door-to-door visits, and to talk at various community gatherings and hold workshops.” 
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remain very expensive, in part as a result of more people surviving thanks to it. This 
will demand critical options and trade-offs by the government (Econsult, 2007: 118-
120). Indeed, the pandemic in Botswana remains rampant, although consulting 
company Econsult in its report to the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) 
refers to “preliminary evidence of a fall in HIV prevalence rates amongst younger 
age groups suggests that these campaigns are effective, at least to a certain extent” 
(Econsult, Ibid.: 118). As a consequence, the struggling race for preventing the 
epidemic to reach more catastrophic results in Botswana tightens, and puts crucial 
dilemmas for the national leadership.  
In their article of 2004, Allen and Heald (2004) provided an explanation why 
preventive efforts were not improving the situation. They argued that the open 
acceptance of international intervention strategies, based on voluntary testing, 
condoms promotion and general human rights approaches, were facing enormous 
social constraints, and eventually being counterproductive (Ibid.: 1152). As the 
epidemic’s mortality was increasingly becoming visible to the public’s eyes, “more 
coercive measures [were] being advocated and even then in the face of intense 
opposition from outside agencies” (Ibid.). Since 2004, numerous projects – some of 
them funded under the auspices of PEPFAR – have been launched in several fronts, 
but there is a strong lack of certainty among interviewees of ‘what works.’ In other 
words, assuming that there are ongoing programs which prevent transmission, one 
does not know exactly which actually work given the lack of measurement of impact. 
Nonetheless, what is taken for certain is the central role of the state/government in 
this process today and in the coming future. This centrality is expressed not only in 
terms of funding largely interventions, such as the ARV program, but also with 
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regard to formulation and enforcement of policy, including “draconian measures” 
(Ibid.) of surveillance that may undermine logics of human rights associated with 
HIV/AIDS, such as patients’ volunteerism. Despite the external constraints that 
Allen and Heald allude to, the national government is the main institution in charge 
in this realm, thus reproducing the traditional understanding of public health politics 
as a realm of the national state.    
 
7.3. Ethiopia’s Rising Developmental State 
The current ruling party in Ethiopia is the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), an assemblage of regional parties26 that, under the 
leadership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), combated and eventually 
ousted through guerrilla warfare the military regime of the Dergue in 1991.27 
Reasons motivating regime overthrow were the disastrous Soviet reforms, which 
imposed new cycles of famine and immiseration, as well as the so-called “national 
question” (Vaughan, 2003: 40-80). In a historical context of internal colonization led 
by the major Ethiopian ethnicity, the Amharas, over other ethnicities, whose power 
stretched back to the emperorship rule, the Dergue regime was not eager to concede 
in its “monolithic” (Berhe, 2004: 574) understanding of the Ethiopian nation and 
arguably rejected any alternative solution to the complex ethnic reality of the 
country.  
                                                 
26 In the aftermath of the Dergue’s deposition these included, apart from the TPLF, Afar Liberation 
Front, Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement, Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia, Issa & 
Gurgura Liberation Movement, Ogaden Liberation Front (Horiale), Oromo Abo Liberation Front, 
Ogaden Liberation Front, Sidama Liberation Movement, United Oromo People’s Liberation Front, 
and Western Somali Liberation Front (Vaughan, 2003: 28). 
27 The Dergue was a regime established in 1974 in the aftermath of the overthrow of Emperor Haile 
Selassie. The process of overthrow began after civic protests against his absolutist rule, rising 
capitalist exploitation of the land, and incapacity to address several famines affecting the country. 
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As the Dergue’s leader Haile Mariam Mengistu is driven out of power and 
forced into exile (in Zimbabwe, where he still lives at time of writing), the country’s 
liberators proposed two fundamental policy frameworks for a new Ethiopia. The first 
is a political-administrative formula called “ethnic federalism,” in which the country 
is regionally divided along ethnic lines, in order to respond to historical ethnic 
grievances. Nevertheless, the current political era has been considered by many 
analysts not far from a continuation of absolutist modes of rule, and regional 
opposition to the leading post-conflict formula of “ethnic federalism” persists. Often, 
this has involved armed means against the central government in Addis Ababa. The 
second is economic development. The main inheritor of the TPLF, the EPRDF, has 
been in power uninterruptedly since 1991. Its consecutive governments have put 
several five-year development plans over the years. Considering the low base of 
development the country finds itself in, these plans have received large assistance 
from the main international donors and lenders. One of the latest relevant programs 
of assistance was the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Program of 2002/3 
(Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2006).  
The current Growth and Transformation five-year plan was launched on 
December 2, 2010, and strives for the establishment of industry by 2020, building on 
double digit growth rates of recent years (Hassen, 2010). Although the accuracy of 
those rates is highly disputed by the political opposition and even the International 
Monetary Fund (Teklehaimanot and Asfaw, 2010), they animate the government’s 
latest endeavour: the construction of the Millennium Dam on the Nile Basin entirely 
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with national funds.28 In addition to this developmental project, the government has 
been running a process of “cheap” leasing of vast masses of land to foreign 
companies, mostly of Indian, Chinese, Pakistani and Saudi origin (Mariam, 2011). 
The minister of agricultural development has claimed “we [the government] hope 
that big commercial and intensive farms will solve the shortage of food in Ethiopia” 
(Ibid.). This policy indeed happens in a context of continuous need of food 
assistance, which, despite the impressive growth, still affects sectors of the 
population and has led the government to repeatedly call for external assistance 
(IRIN, 2011).               
The principles of social mobilization of the masses of Leninist-Stalinist 
inspiration, acquired and developed by the TPLF during the armed struggle against 
the Dergue, are now being transferred to the developmental purposes of the EPRDF 
(Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). The party’s symbol is a bee, and it serves to illustrate 
how the party wants the Ethiopian peoples to be: united, sovereign and very 
laborious. These ideas have seeped into Ethiopians’ imaginary, shaping the vision 
they have of themselves. This was visible, for instance, when interviewing an 
EPRDF’s youth league member in May 2010, at a campaign booth in Arada, an 
Addis Ababa sub-city,29 during the latest federal elections’ campaign. As she showed 
                                                 
28 The strategic importance of the gigantic Millennium Dam is threefold. First, it responds to the 
demands of power supply that national development plans require. Ethiopia, notably its capital city, is 
often affected by power cuts during day and night that undermine business life, particularly for those 
without electricity generators. Second, it serves as an example of national commitment to a great 
cause, since the Dam is aimed to be primarily funded by domestic resources, despite the fear of a 
dramatic inflationary pressure (Giorgis, 2011). And finally, it challenges a historical geopolitical 
complex of inferiority with regard to Egypt, whose potential forceful intervention in Ethiopia in case 
of modification of the Nile water’s regime has long constituted a source of fear for Addis Ababa’s 
leaderships. 
29 Sub-city is an administrative division within a city in Ethiopia.  
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photographs depicting road improvements in the area and school children and adults 
attending HIV/AIDS awareness raising events, she argued  
Our government believes every Ethiopian is capable of working, no 
matter little skills he might have, as long he is not disabled. We took 
many jobless people away from the roads and put them working. First we 
give them training and then we pay them 200 Birr [cc. 11 euro] per 
working day. The more a worker works the more he will earn. So if he is 
hard-working he can get 2 000 Birr or more a month. These are all 
Ethiopians. We believe everyone is capable of earning their money 
without assistance from anyone. We tell people not to give money to 
beggars. (Interviewee 31, 2010) 
In turn, according to the EPRDF’s leadership, abolishing poverty is the 
ultimate target of the current developmental enterprises. The fight against poverty is 
an argument recurrently used to contend political opposition.  
The EPRDF has been underscoring the fact that poverty is the main 
enemy of the country and there is no worse enemy than poverty. Thus we 
have to beat poverty as quickly as possible and wage relentless battle 
against poverty since there is no lofty war than the war on poverty. 
Ethiopians should also benefit from every growth in proportion to the 
sacrifice they pay for growth and the yield obtained. The growth should 
therefore be rapid, sustainable and fair. By implementing these, we 
should quickly reduce poverty. [This] was the line of argument of the 
EPRDF which was countered by the opposition who could not 
understand the urgency of the call as poverty has been living with us 
since eternity. (Walta Information Centre, 2011)  
The plan accounts for improvements in terms of social development, 
including the health dimension (Hassen, 2010). Although the Ethiopian government 
is highly dependent on external funding in the area of health, the ministry of health’s 
reports emphasise the centrality of a “country-led” approach in policy-making, 
management and implementation while simultaneously acknowledging and 
committing to such external frameworks like the Millennium Development Goals 
(Federal Ministry of Health, 2008). This prospect of “country ownership” is widely 
shared by the Minister of Health Tedros Adhanom, who was also the chair of the 
board of the Global Fund until September 2011 (Center for Global Development, 
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2010). Respondents with two major United States implementing agencies – one 
governmental and another nongovernmental – have recognized the Ethiopian 
government’s ownership at the level of planning but faulty in terms of funding the 
efforts’ consolidation. According to the former,  
The government has good policies and they have discipline to implement, 
something other governments of other countries do not have. (…) They 
have a lot of ownership. They have a plan and know where to go. This is 
my understanding of ownership: having a plan. Other countries do not 
even have that. But they will hardly be able to fund by themselves. They 
cannot even pay salaries. (Interviewee 1, 2010) 
In turn, the latter respondent argued  
[In] terms of ownership, [national] government agencies are keen to lead 
the process and enjoy taking credit for it. "We did this, we did that." 
They rarely give partners credit for achievements. But when problems 
occur they call partners to fix them and do not do it themselves. We are 
often called to fix problems we are not obliged to, and when we refuse to 
do it, they just leave the, say, machine, road, etc., abandoned. They 
always claim they ran out of funds. (Interviewee 3, 2010)   
On the same matter, an Ethiopian interviewee with an Ethiopian NGO gave a 
nuanced reaction, yet concurring with the latter two. 
We still need support from foreign governments because we are poor. 
Most of our activities are donor-dependent. (…) The idea is that Ethiopia 
will be independent from foreign aid in the future, but I do not know… I 
am not a politician, and I do not want to talk about it. (Interviewee 4, 
2010) 
According to the latest Health Sector Strategic Plan for 2005/6-2009/10, the 
ministry of health has ascertained clear policies in several areas: health service 
delivery and quality of care; health facilities construction and rehabilitation; human 
resource development; pharmaceutical services; information, education and 
communication; health management and management information system; 
monitoring and evaluation; and health care financing (Federal Ministry of Health, 
2005). The comprehensiveness of the Ethiopian health plan seems to match what the 
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interviewee with a United States government agency quoted above has called 
PEPFAR’s “wrap-around” character in Ethiopia (Interviewee 1, 2010). PEPFAR has 
been funding activities in a multitude of areas: treatment, support to orphans and 
vulnerable children, family planning, training of health personnel, and even refugees 
and food aid (Ibid.). The launch of the Global Health Initiative (GHI) of the United 
States government has rendered Ethiopia, precisely for this comprehensive nature of 
implementation, a “GHI plus” status together with other seven countries. As two 
interviewees with the United States government affirmed (Interviewee 2, 2010; 
Interviewee 1, 2010), this propensity has had to do with the very low base that 
current efforts build upon. After all, despite recent commendable improvements in 
the African context (Reuters, 2010), Ethiopia is still the 13th least developed country 
in the world, according to the latest Human Development Report (UNDP, 2010), 
with a population of around 80 million people.   
As mentioned in the previous chapter, even during the Dergue, in which the 
politics of the Cold War put the United States of America and the Ethiopian regimes 
in adversarial camps, the Ethiopian government has seized opportunities deriving 
from United States foreign policy agendas (humanitarian or geopolitical or both). 
Apart from the geopolitical situation of the Horn of Africa, it can be argued that the 
latest ‘opportunity’ has been precipitated by HIV/AIDS and its forecasted 
implications notably in terms of the linkage between HIV/AIDS and security. A 
decade ago Ethiopia was considered a country belonging to the “second wave of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic” (Schneider and Moodie, 2002), after the “first wave” of hyper-
endemic Southern Africa. Ethiopia sat together with other countries with large 
populations with regional security status, such as Nigeria, India, China and Russia. 
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However, the epidemic is of relatively small proportions, 2.1% of prevalence rate 
among adults (WHO, 2010: 32). Still, it represents an absolute number of close to 1 
million people.  Nonetheless, the opportunity seizure has to do be understood in a 
context of commitment to developmentalism as state ideology and practice, actual 
allocation of state resources to human development, and articulation with different 
‘new partners’ beyond the traditional Western European and Northern American 
donors. A recent manifestation of such commitment consisted on “a record 117.8 
billion birr (6.98 billion USD) annual budget for next year, aiming to build 
infrastructure, health and education services” (IOL, 2011). 
Apart from the question of financial sustainability, another constraint (an 
eventual consequence of that) concerns the limited presence of the state in the 
provision of services, especially in the rural areas where 82% of the population lives 
(World Bank, 2011). Despite the investment in health extension programs by the 
state, those who still have more influence in questions of health and disease are 
religious institutions, particularly the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and Islam, 
followed by other Christian denominations, such as the Catholic Church and a 
number of Protestant Churches (United States Department of State, 2011). 
Considering the policies around family planning in particular, the largest 
denominations and the Catholic Church pose obstacles to the dissemination of birth 
controlling services, namely those based on condoms. Family planning, which has 
been enhanced with the Obama Administration, is seen by several PEPFAR 
stakeholders as a solution for what is perceived as a major impediment to Ethiopian 
development (Interviewee 5; Interviewee 6; Interviewee 7). Several implementers 
work in vicinity with major religious churches with an aim to sensitize their 
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positions. The quest for implementing family planning in Ethiopia has long been 
contemplated, but always failed to materialize, as an Ethiopian senior professional 
with a United States-based NGO has declared: “Family planning started a long time 
ago, still in the time of Haile Selassie [1960s], but it did not go forward because of 
lack of resources, not political will” (Interviewee 7). 
The problem of the limited presence of state institutions in the provision of 
goods and services in the area of health has to do with broader question of the state 
assuring actual control across the vastness of the country, and the persistence of 
regional movements struggling for further autonomy, if not independence from 
Addis Ababa. Anti-governmental armed opposition occurs in some parts of Oromia, 
the surrounding region of the federal capital city Addis Ababa, and the eastern region 
of Ogaden, neighbouring Somalia, suggest that the provision of health services by 
the federal state to the local populations is very limited. As a result, this situation 
constrains the developmentalist ambition of the national government, but at the same 
time draws attention to the question of survival of the political regime, in which the 
broader foreign policies, discussed in the previous chapter, together with domestic 
developmentalist ones aim to ultimately serve.   
 
7.4. (South) African Renaissance At Home 
The South African governmental response has been different from the two 
previous cases. Rather than engaged responses explained by concerns for national 
self-help, survival and development, the South African case reflected idealist 
foundations of African Renaissance home and abroad, especially during the crucial 
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Mbeki presidency. The idealism of that presidency cuts across the entirety of the 
post-apartheid period, and is embedded in the rhetoric and practice of African 
Renaissance that home and abroad seeks to elevate the dignity and potential of the 
postcolonial African. As a project, African Renaissance proposes aid and economic-
based incentives as well as symbolic perspectives of African rehabilitation and world 
empowerment (Taylor, 2005).  
As an epidemic affecting mostly the African continent, while treatment 
remains mostly a Western property, HIV/AIDS was framed by Thabo Mbeki himself 
and his Minister of Health, late Manto Tschabalala-Msimang, as a question of racism 
and prejudice against Africans by the West-led international community. As 
explained in the previous chapter, despite alternative explanations,30 Mbeki’s 
position, domestically and for the rest of Africa is aligned with the liberal-idealist 
politics of post-apartheid African Renaissance. Eventually, the government reduced 
and suspended treatment programs, which were only reinstated following several 
court decisions, and refused foreign assistance (Youde, 2005b). The court cases were 
initiated by a South Africa-based movement of contestation against the denialist 
position of the President (Oshry, 2007). Currently, not only ‘denialism’ has been 
publicly dismissed, but the opposite direction is actually pursued. Last year President 
Zuma announced mass VCT campaigns, after he had himself taken an HIV test. This 
was observed as the burial of denialism by the South African government (Mail & 
Guardian, 2010). At the latest International AIDS Conference, Minister of Health 
Aaron Motsoaledi reiterated this policy change, expressed commitment and 
requesting assistance from foreign donors (Motsoaledi, 2010). A recent public event 
                                                 
30 See Lieberman (2009). 
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with Minister Motsoaledi in Washington, DC, was, as a participant exclaimed, “a 
celebration” of the South Africa’s renewed exemplary pledge (Motsoaledi, 2011). As 
also previously argued, this new position of the South African government reveals, 
again, liberal-idealism. It is visible not just in terms of engaging with the 
international community per se but by also by paying particular attention to the 
realities of poorer (than South Africa) countries in Africa.    
Since the beginning, the process of PEPFAR’s implementation in South 
Africa has reflected the shifting dynamics of the national governmental policy and 
the relationship between national governments and the mainstream HIV/AIDS 
epistemic community. Therefore, PEPFAR’s early establishment was constrained by 
the context of opposition between the state/government and the nongovernmental 
arena, but the situation changed. Interviewees with different types of organization – 
South African and United States-based governmental and nongovernmental – have 
converged on the idea of initial mistrust between the national government’s 
leadership and PEPFAR’s policies, which has evolved overtime. NGOs have been 
those who most insisted on that idea. One respondent has claimed that  
In the whole, in the beginning, there was a big problem. The government 
did not like [the offer of assistance] very much, because PEPFAR 
partners and the government were doing the same thing at the same time. 
This generated big delays. Government officials were not sure if they 
wanted PEPFAR or not. Now there is more involvement of the 
government. (Interviewee 19) 
Another interviewee commented on the differences between the Mbeki and the 
current Zuma periods. 
Government attitudes have changed dramatically. Now it is easier with 
Zuma than with Mbeki. In Mbeki days, civil society and community-
based organizations were fundamental in confronting the adversarial 
attitude of the government. The new government now admits they need 
help. (…) Before PEPFAR there was no money. PEPFAR put money in. 
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However, PEPFAR had no framework for engaging with the government. 
They did not get along. Both were doing different things. NGOs were 
lying in between trying to do subterranean things, trying to escape 
government punishment. But now it is different. (Interviewee 20) 
Another respondent reiterated the previous idea: “Collaboration with the 
government was a big obstacle in the beginning. But this issue has been addressed 
overtime.” (Interviewee 21) A fourth and a fifth interviewee reiterated the same 
opinion.   
In the beginning, it was not very well coordinated between the South 
African and the United States governments. Two parallel roads. (...) But 
it got better over the last years. (Interviewee 22) 
In the beginning, PEPFAR was much more about funding NGOs, namely 
American, and universities like Columbia. PEPFAR officials did not 
consult much the government. Back then, the government was holding a 
very strange position. Mbeki and the minister of health were negating the 
HIV and AIDS link and the whole AIDS ideology. (Interviewee 23)                
However, as remarked in the previous chapter, so the partnership could begin, 
the South African government subscribed to the United States government’s 
proposal; otherwise PEPFAR could not be launched. Still, a South Africa National 
AIDS Council member organization, who is an ANC affiliate too, gave a comment 
with large political significance, which is also reflective of how the governmental 
position vis-à-vis HIV/AIDS evolved over time. Moreover, it looked at how 
PEPFAR failed, in her opinion, to reach major stakeholders like local political 
leaders. 
I am an ANC member and in the beginning PEPFAR was in opposition 
to the [ANC] government. PEPFAR arrived in South Africa and wanted 
to enforce its own thing. We, civil society (sic), were not getting any 
support from PEPFAR for our projects at the community-based level. But 
more recently PEPFAR people realized they have to work with the 
communities. I am a councillor, and I am representing my community, 
and I did not see any support. Support was being given to the University 
of Natal, which was doing its stigmatizing work in black townships. They 
just go to Umlazi to do their research and analysis. Why do not they do 
that work in Glenwood and other white areas as well, and just confine 
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themselves to black areas? (…) Before 2003 we were in a state of denial. 
In the beginning, AIDS was seen as an African disease, but now we 
realized that it is out there and we have to act. (Interviewee 25) 
The recent swift in the governmental policy for HIV/AIDS is also 
contemporary to a broader policy around development in the country. This is 
moreover coincident with a propelled left-leaning behaviour of the government after 
Mbeki’s rather liberal approach to the issues of economic empowerment. Like 
Ethiopia, South Africa sets out to be a ‘developmental state.’ However, in South 
Africa, this orientation has not been so much a matter of enabling and feeding a 
process of economic growth and human development alone, but a question of 
conciliating that process with redistribution of wealth and social justice. Due to the 
regime of separate development instated by the National Party in 1948, which, drawn 
along ethnic lines, essentially strongly enhanced life opportunities (education, health, 
work) of a predominant minority (mostly of European descent) at the expense of a 
majority (mostly black). In practice, this system, which inherited many colonial 
elements, still finds continuities today, and generated diverging lifestyles of 
developed country-type for the upper-middle classes and developing country-type for 
the lower classes (Bond, 2004). Today, seventeen years into the end of the apartheid 
regime after the first multiracial, democratic presidential elections in 1994, South 
Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world, resembling countries with 
similar historical trajectories like Brazil or Mexico. As a result, the ideology of the 
developmental state has emerged with an aim to redistribute wealth across society, 
restore justice and generate opportunities for historically disadvantaged social 
groups, such as Black Economic Empowerment initiatives. Nevertheless, despite the 
current Zuma Administration’s endorsement of a more state-interventionist approach, 
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on the ground, the latest years have been featured by notable riots and protests by 
residents in townships and informal settlements for the absence of service delivery, 
leading to violent clashes with police forces, in a context of mounting 
unemployment, especially among the youth (Habib, 2005). 
Several studies have linked the proliferation of HIV/AIDS to social 
determinants rooted in the apartheid regime and the current social condition of many 
South Africans and foreigners living in South Africa, notably the lack of medical 
assistance and forceful migrations (Hlongwane, 2003; Johnson, 2004; Marks, 2002). 
South Africa holds the fourth highest prevalence rate among adults (15-49) in the 
world, with 18.1% (WHO, 2010: 32), after neighbouring Swaziland, Botswana and 
Lesotho. However, only 28% of people with advanced HIV infection receive 
antiretroviral therapy, at a much lower position than Botswana (79%) and even 
Swaziland (42%) (Ibid.: 35). The population of South Africa is of 48 668 000 
inhabitants (Ibid.: 164), meaning that a very large share of the population is not only 
infected but moreover affected by the pandemic. This includes adults and those 
dependent on them, notably children, as well as their own parents, who often have to 
be in charge of their grandchildren when parents fall ill and eventually die younger 
than expected (Bray, 2003; Tobin, 2010). Like in the case of Botswana, grim 
scenarios about the potential social, economic, and even security consequences of the 
pandemic have been put forward, particularly from the late 1990s on.  
Although the government funds up to 80% of the overall response, PEPFAR 
has played a significant role in both quantitative and qualitative terms. South Africa 
has been the major PEPFAR focus country, and its focus areas have been very 
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diverse: medical research, treatment and palliative services, orphans and vulnerable 
children, and prevention through the ABC approach, among others. Whereas some 
organizations’ work scope deals only with HIV/AIDS and correlative epidemics, like 
tuberculosis (for instance, medical research institutions and laboratories), many 
others have a wider developmental agenda upon which PEPFAR projects build. This 
was particularly visible among secular and faith-based development NGOs whose 
income generation activities for populations (primarily HIV-affected) living in 
historically disadvantaged areas, such as townships and informal settlements, 
together with facilitating access to social grants, especially by children, aimed at 
addressing the lack of economic opportunities and social security (Interviewee 44, 
2009; Interviewee 45, 2009).  
However, the government faces the dilemma of having to sustain the response 
after PEPFAR and other big donors leave. One encountered two types of reaction to 
that question, though. One type is eminently economistic, and refers that 
sustainability is dependent on the economic recovery after current days’ recession. 
Several interviewees argue, along with Minister Motsoaledi himself (Bryson, 2010a), 
that the government will not be able to take charge of the PEPFAR-initiated projects, 
due to the propelled economic downturn. Yet, another type of reaction is of rather 
ethical/juridical nature. For other stakeholders, sustainability is a matter of the 
government complying with its ‘constitutional’ responsibility of providing care for 
the humans living within the countries’ boundaries, and thus allocating resources 
accordingly. This perspective is observable in this interviewee’s comment about 
PEPFAR and the South African national response. 
PEPFAR has (…) filled gaps in the South African HIV policy providing 
ARVs to groups including illegal immigrants and refugees. However 
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these groups should be able to receive treatment from the DoH 
[Department of Health] because constitutionally all people in South 
Africa are entitled to healthcare, not just citizen and residents. 
(Interviewee 28, 2010)        
This respondent claims that PEPFAR has addressed a matter that the South African 
government should obligatorily do.  
 
7.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the way that PEPFAR interrelated with domestic 
policies of the three countries not only in the area of HIV/AIDS and health but 
national development as a whole. It showed how domestic policies contribute for the 
state’s external behaviour described in the previous chapter. Whereas in the case of 
Botswana and Ethiopia, governmental action reflected a concern for survival, the 
South African situation reveals the will of transmitting pan-African values that target 
publics both inside and outside the country. However, as noted previously, 
Botswana’s realist thinking is different from Ethiopia’s, since the former acts in 
function of the survival of the nation conceived as population and the latter in 
function of the political regime’s existence.  
In the case of Botswana, the threat to the nation is expressed in terms of the 
large prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS, particularly among the adult population. 
Moreover, intervening for the sake of the population’s survival represents the 
salvation of the whole developmental effort since the independence, apart from the 
political goal of terminating dependency from external donors for development 
purposes. That goal was accomplished in the 1990s, but had to be reverted, since 
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external donors, particularly the United States of America, were found needed to 
assist with the country’s struggle against the epidemic. Since 2001, the national 
government, with assistance from public and private donors, has largely committed 
to a massive treatment program. From a ‘country ownership’ perspective, Botswana 
represents a successful case, since the state is funding up to 80% of the effort. 
Conversely, PEPFAR offers, primarily, technical support in prevention and other 
areas conceived as goals for the current five-year period of PEPFAR’s 
implementation, centred on sustainability through country ownership. However, the 
recession that is affecting the international trade of Botswana’s most crucial asset – 
diamonds – is worrisome, and is posing serious challenges to policy-makers in terms 
of how to conciliate different agendas. In this regard, despite external pressures, as 
suggested by Allen and Heald (2004), one is convinced that it is primarily dependent 
upon national political decision how to keep responding to the emerging issues 
associated with the epidemic and trade.  
Compared to Botswana, the case of Ethiopia is more focused on the question 
of the political regime than on the population. The current governmental leadership 
of the EPRDF has been faced with challenges related to the political regime, posed 
by regionalist movements, and to the level of human development, which is still very 
low. The ruling government’s developmentalist ideology and policy includes the 
provision of health goods and services, among other dimensions. PEPFAR has been 
integrated in the Ethiopian effort as a “wrap-round tool”, since it covers manifold 
dimensions, beyond strict HIV/AIDS. In fact, unlike Botswana, this epidemic is not 
extremely dramatic in relative terms, although still affecting close to one million 
people. Planning capacity of the government is observed as an example of 
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ownership. However, the country is still highly constrained financially and in terms 
of actually being able to provide health services all around that immense country. 
Nevertheless, geopolitical issues regarding the threat to territorial integrity combined 
with humanitarian and developmentalist purposes consolidate the recipient status of 
the current regime. This reproduces the pattern from the 1980s, in which, despite the 
diverging politics of the Cold War, then-Ethiopian regime, the Dergue, and the 
United States of America maintained a relationship of cooperation. As such, despite 
strongly constrained externally in financial and policy terms, the Ethiopian 
government maintains its autonomy of action. 
Finally, the part on South Africa looked at how domestic dynamics of policy 
change impacted on PEPFAR’s implementation in the country throughout the years. 
The idealist politics of African Renaissance grounded Mbeki’s scepticism on the 
HIV/AIDS orthodoxy’s intentions on how to address the epidemic in his country and 
around Africa and the parallel search of ‘African solutions for African problems.’ As 
a result, PEPFAR’s implementation at the crucial level of inter-governmental 
relations was faulty. Yet, after Mbeki, when policy changed, the HIV/AIDS 
orthodoxy was accepted, and the government started to reengage, the values are still 
present. Currently, this response – upon which PEPFAR sits importantly, as South 
Africa is the main recipient – is also integrated in broader developmentalist efforts.  
In fact, compared to the case of the northern neighbour, Botswana, only quite 
recently the government engaged more deeply in terms of resource allocation, in the 
response to HIV/AIDS. The reason why this occurred is arguably explained by the 
differing politics that framed the two countries’ governments’ behaviour. Whereas 
Botswana was driven by the concern for survival of its small population of less than 
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1.5 million, the South African government uses its relative powerful position to 
transmit specific values and positions, through the HIV/AIDS realm, to its domestic 
and external publics. In the latter case, the content of those positions changed, but the 
framework did not, both when showing scepticism or endorsing mainstream 
HIV/AIDS science.  
The next chapter looks at the local level of inter-state relations. It addresses 
the question of values and ideas embedded in national-governmental practices and 
their outcomes, and its interrelation with PEPFAR’s implementation.                 
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Chapter 8 – Local Dynamics 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 This is the final chapter of a series of three that analysed the agency of the 
governments of Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa in the context of inter-state 
relations with the United States of America under the implementation of PEPFAR. 
Whereas the first and second chapters looked at the international and domestic levels 
of inter-state relations, and, conversely, their link to broader foreign and domestic 
policies, this one assesses the local dimension. By ‘local’ one means the actual 
political and juridical practices pursued by the national governments, and the manner 
they consolidate specific values and ideas of social organization within their 
societies. The difference between the domestic, as well as the international, and local 
levels concerns the primacy of the object under analysis. Whereas the first and 
second chapters concentrated on policies with foreign and domestic scope, this one 
focuses on the practice and outcomes of those policies. 
Proceeding from the previous two, this chapter aims at demonstrating that the 
national governments hold autonomy of action in practical terms. Moreover, it shows 
that the values and ideas underneath those practices either inhibit or reinforce the 
implementation of the leading international structure’s values and ideas. At the same 
time, the locus of implementation allows for looking at the contradictions that often 
arise from those tensions, especially in terms of constraints to action outside the 
realm of the state, social inequalities, and poverty of segments of the population. 
Considering this dissertation’s case study, values and ideas revolve around liberal 
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political and economic frameworks transmitted through PEPFAR, and their local 
political translation.  
 This chapter is divided into three sections, and maintains the same structure 
as in the previous two. The first section reflects on the problem of Botswana being 
characterised by a large degree of poverty and social inequalities despite having 
witnessed impressive economic growth in the last decades as a result of a 
developmental state endorsing liberal values. The second section addresses 
Ethiopia’s ruling party’s politics and the socio-political pressures toward liberalism 
in the country. Drawing on a number of interviews with PEPFAR implementers it 
discusses in particular the impact of the so-called ‘Charities Law of 2009’ on their 
action. Finally, the last section discusses South Africa, whose experience with liberal 
approaches to development derives from a domestic process of political change at the 
end of the apartheid. The South African experience offers a rather matured version of 
a liberal polity that precedes the contemporary set of external interventions, such as 
PEPFAR, at the level of values and practices.  
  
8.2. Social Disparities in Botswana 
The previous two chapters emphasised the developmentalist character of the 
Botswana state since the time of independence, and whose achievements have been 
recently challenged by the rampant social impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic among 
significant shares of the population. It also shed light on the particular manner the 
international community, especially the West, has constructed, both academically 
and politically, the country as an “African model” or “African miracle.” Those inputs 
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drew mostly on a mainstream body of domestic and international authors on 
development politics who have looked at the major macroeconomic wonders of the 
country. They particularly highlighted the governance capability of establishing a 
profitable partnership, Debswana, with a mineral resources giant such as De Beers, 
aimed at exploring diamonds in the country, and applying revenues in crucial 
national development initiatives (White, 2006; Picard, 1987; Schraeder, 1994; 
Acemoglu et al., 2003). At the same time, Botswana leaderships have maintained 
since the mid-1960s preferable – even if not exclusive – relations with the major 
Western countries, the United States of America and, principally, the United 
Kingdom, and as such attachment to liberal values, representative democracy and a 
market-based economic system. 
The connection to liberal values throughout the post-independence period is 
of particular relevance. On the one hand, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
transition to independence was a soft process led by the same elite – local and 
colonist – of the time of the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland. As such, in 
principle, and considering that the United Kingdom constituted the most important 
development donor for many years after 1966, the embracement of liberal values 
would be somewhat expectable. However, considering how the region surrounding 
the country was ridden by rather ‘extremist’ politics on both sides (from the ‘leftist’ 
movements of liberation around the Southern African region to the ‘rightist’ South 
African apartheid regime), it is interesting to observe that the Botswana regime 
retained its liberal principles, no matter how weak and vulnerable it was, particularly 
until the formal end of apartheid. Botswana has basically remained a liberal country, 
even if at times constrained by the necessities of assuring the country’s self-help and 
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pressures by traditional leaders and leftist parties such as the Botswana National 
Party. However, the adherence to and practice of political and institutional liberal 
and developmental values does not mean the disappearance of contradictions in that 
process. As such, this section deals with a body of literature that critically assesses 
the achievements of the ‘Botswana miracle.’   
Despite the impressive economic growth, structural social and political 
change was limited. According to Ellen Hillbom (2008), this framework is typical of 
“pre-modern growth,” in which a highly profit-making mining industry coexists with 
enduring forms of land tenure based on cattlemen and poor, subsistence agricultural 
practice. Employing Kuznet’s model of modern economic growth (Ibid.: 193-195), 
Hillbom argues that Botswana only matches two out six requirements for being a 
modern economy, i.e. “high rates of per capita and population growth, and high rate 
of productivity” (Ibid.: 194). From a technological point of view, Botswana has been 
stranded in low levels, especially in the agricultural sector, and with the exception of 
the mining industry (Ibid.: 195). At the level of the manufacturing sector, very little 
expansion has happened. Indeed, although supermarket and household lifestyle 
culture is booming in Gaborone, almost all products (except meat and milk) are 
imported from neighbouring South Africa. National production remains low, and 
Botswana remains a very subsistence-based society. This scenario is particularly 
bleak now, as the mining industry has peaked and has been tending to stagnate and 
decrease (Interviewee 29, 2010).  
 The registered high growth has not had the same repercussion in terms of 
decreases in poverty and unemployment. In fact, whereas the richest segment of 
society has grown richer, the poorest has even got poorer (Ibid.: 206). Arguably, that 
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is the outcome of ingrained historical socio-economic disparities deriving from pre-
independence (Ibid.). In addition to this, social change through the emergence of a 
challenging civil society is occurring frailly. Two explanations are concurrent. One, 
alluding to the experience of all neighbouring countries, Botswana did not undergo 
high levels of political-economic conflict to the point of generating struggle 
organisations of alternative ideological inspiration. Another echoes some Ethiopian 
features discussed above, and argues that civil society “is readily co-opted into state 
structures (…) and is prepared to work within the parameters deemed permissible by 
the state – and not beyond” (Molomo et al., 2007). 
Given the extraordinary mobilization around the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the 
experience of non-state organizations working in that realm is very useful for a 
political analysis. One of the reasons inter alia advanced to explain why prevention 
initiatives from the late 1980s thru the 1990s did not deliver positive results had to do 
with the non-involvement of traditional doctors, churches and local communities 
(Heald, 2005; Allen and Heald, 2004). These reasons are reportedly present and 
remain very challenging as two interviewees with PEPFAR implementing 
organizations emphasised. One, with a United States-based NGO, held that not only 
civil society, i.e. non-state organisations, have to be incorporated but also need to be 
taught how to intervene as such. 
Skills are necessary to be given. We face the double challenge of having 
to implement and train people at the same time. People are used to 
receive from the government, but they need to change their mindset. 
Civil society has to take its role. (Interviewee 8, 2010)  
PEPFAR has in fact been acting in terms of funding training activities, and the issue 
of civil society is also acknowledged by a respondent with a United States 
government agency: “Botswana is a middle income country. It offers good facilities. 
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People are trained. However, civil society is not part of the local culture.” 
(Interviewee 10, 2010) Yet, an interviewee with a Botswana governmental ministry 
also stressed the need for change in this area, and acknowledged PEPFAR’s role in 
it: “Without PEPFAR no CSOs [civil society organizations] would develop. It is 
assisting in building capacity for them. I worked at the district level, and what was 
working was peer-education by CSOs. They were important in mobilizing people.” 
(Interviewee 18, 2010) 
Regarding the participation of outside-state organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations and networks dealing with youth, church attendants and other publics 
were allocated participative roles within PEPFAR’s partnership framework’s 
division of labour. Available scholarship tends to divide itself into positive and 
negative assertions, in turn depending on the overall appreciation of the outcomes of 
modernization and development in the country. Whereas endorsers of the idea of 
Botswana as a ‘model’ enhance the striving and free character of civil society in the 
country (Holm et al., 1996), critical evaluations tend to emphasize its redundancy in 
the context of a dominating state (Taylor, 2003; Good and Taylor, 2008). But some 
other studies seem to diverge from these polarized perspectives too. Kiley and 
Hovorka’s (2006) study of civil society organizations in the HIV/AIDS response 
underline their marginalization by the state-led response for different reasons: 
“geographical disparities, lack of financial and human resources and socio-cultural 
elements associated with HIV intervention strategies” (Ibid.: 176). They argue that 
when better integrated and assisted they could improve the response. Attempting at 
finding reasons why prevention has been recurrently failing, Strain (2008) argues 
along the same lines. However, one’s enquiry – which did not look for reasons why 
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prevention is failing, but how implementation happens – has identified a double 
pattern. On the one hand, civil society, notably the one funded by PEPFAR, is very 
collaborative with the state; with few exceptions, NGOs are not challengers of the 
norms imposed by the Botswana government (and the United States government for 
the same reason). Yet, on the other, the international integration of local NGOs and 
similar entities with transnational, often United States-based institutions, offers 
learning experiences which allow them, at least on paper, to adopt the liberal 
approaches and ideas disseminated across the PEPFAR apparatus. As such, within 
the constraints of a pre-modern economic growth society, they become sites of 
globalization and modernity. Also in this regard, civil society organizations in 
Botswana ought to be an exemplar model for others to follow. 
Some NGO implementers have highlighted health indicators that emerge 
from a context of ongoing inequities and that PEPFAR-funded activities have helped 
to identify. One interviewee compared Botswana’s health performance to 
neighbouring countries. “Non-HIV indicators are poor. The infant mortality rate is 
very high. It is very similar to Lesotho and Swaziland, and yet Botswana is so much 
richer.” (Interviewee 29, 2010) Another focused solely on the country: “Here in 
Botswana mortality rate in general is still very serious.” (Interviewee 12, 2010) 
However, a third implementer has shed light on a further health agenda: “So many 
areas are in need such as non-communicable and mental diseases. Botswana has a 
very high rate of suicide, for example.” (Interviewee 11, 2010)  Yet, on state-society 
relations, the interviewees seem to confirm Molomo and colleagues’ quotation 
above, as they generally find themselves aligned with the state-led framework. This 
also suggests the paternalistic character of this policy, in which the state drives an 
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almost exclusive top-down biomedical approach (the treatment program) without 
incorporating and empowering its citizens. Furthermore, the perceived unsustainable 
nature of this approach is fed by the propelled ‘nouveau riche’ attitude of the state 
elites, whose recent wealth has allowed them to invest ‘luxuriously’ in facilities and 
technologies that end up being barely maximized by professionals and clients, while, 
at the same time, there are clear indications that the national income is severely at 
risk in the post-diamond future (Interviewee 28, 2010).     
Particularly since 2008, after the direct nomination by former President 
Festus Mogae of the current President, Lieutenant-General Ian Seretse Khama, a 
consolidating shift towards “liberal authoritarianism” (Molomo et al., 2007) has been 
occurring through the introduction of senior military staff in the civil service. Apart 
from that, extra-judicial killings and increasing levels of corruption among the elite 
have been reported by the media (Mmegi, 2010; Bryson, 2010b; Direng, 2010).  
Recently, a major split within the BDP led to the formation of a new political 
party, the Botswana Movement for Democracy. Although these developments 
indicate a political change in Botswana at odds with the mainstream analyses, the 
basic liberal-institutional character of Botswana’s postcolonial political regime 
seems to remain.  
 
8.3. Disciplining Society in Ethiopia 
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF) 
government in Ethiopia has been committed to the establishment of a state that is not 
only developmental, as discussed in the previous chapter, but also democratic and 
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inclusive of all Ethiopian peoples and nationalities. This was the promise made in 
1991, when the alliance of movements that founded the EPRDF ousted the Dergue 
regime, accused of dictatorial and genocide policies between 1974 and 1991. After 
the change of regime the new government in Addis Ababa has sought to obtain large 
amounts of funding from the international community with the goal of helping 
economic and political reform.  
However, according to foreign observers and opposition politicians, this has 
found limited support in reality (Human Rights Watch, 2010a; Aalen and Tronvoll, 
2009; Epstein, 2010). The EPRDF has been ruling the country since 1991 without 
interruptions, and often resorting to illiberal measures that stretch from police and 
army violence to subtle, sophisticated censorship mechanisms to keep its power 
unchallenged (Human Rights Watch, 2010a). The Ethiopian regime is continuing the 
long tradition of Abyssinian absolutist power (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003), 
although this time around led by more ethnicities than the Amhara, especially the 
Tigrayan, and under a structure of democratic representation, with regular elections.  
Especially over the course of the last five years, the EPRDF has fostered 
increasing repressive laws that hamper opposition politics and raise limitations to 
nongovernmental participation (Human Rights Watch, 2010a). This coincided with 
the aftermath of electoral process of 2005, in which 200 people were killed by police 
forces during public protests denouncing abusive governmental interference in the 
electoral process, and the latest elections in 2010, in which the EPRDF has won all 
but three seats in the national parliament (Press TV, 2010). The leader of the main 
opposition party running in the 2005 elections, Birtukan Mideksa, was kept in 
imprisonment for almost five years (Wadhams, 2010). In addition to this, a range of 
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intelligence measures that involved jamming Voice of America radio broadcasts and 
censorship of Internet sites with content that criticize the ruling executive and party 
have been adopted (Catholic Information Service for Africa, 2010). The government 
has been accused of persecuting ethnic group members assembled around the Oromia 
and Ogaden Liberation Fronts, considered ‘terrorist organizations’ by Addis Ababa 
(Davison, 2011). Moreover, great development initiatives such as the Millennium 
Dam and the land leasing programs affect the lifestyle and income of local 
subsistence peasants. It is not clear whether those projects and policies actually 
benefit the local populations or just contribute to their already marginalized socio-
economic status. Finally, according to NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (2010b), 
the massive volume of international aid, namely food and fertilizers for the 
agriculture, has been allegedly used as a tool for rewarding party loyalty and 
penalizing dissent. 
In 2009, the government issued new regulations on nongovernmental 
intervention with a potential constraining impact on PEPFAR-funded NGOs, based 
in Ethiopia and abroad. The goal is twofold. One the one hand, it aims at ensuring 
accountability and transparency. On the other, it establishes that “charities and civil 
societies should spend 70 per cent of the fund they solicit in the name of the public 
on activities to which they are established” (Ethiopian Weekly Press Digest, 2009a). 
Accordingly, NGOs receiving 10% or more funds from foreign sources are impeded 
to intervene in politically sensitive areas, such as:  
the advancement of human and democratic rights; the promotion of 
equality between peoples, sexes or religions; campaigning for children’s 
rights or the rights of the disabled; conflict resolution and reconciliation; 
work on criminal justice issues. (Ethiopian Weekly Press Digest, 2009b) 
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Expectedly, this framework was subject to much criticism from the United States 
Embassy in Addis Ababa (Ethiopian Weekly Press Digest, 2009c) and the political 
opposition in Ethiopia (Ethiopian Weekly Press Digest, 2009d). It was regarded as 
another attempt by the government to impede a larger participation in activities that 
inevitably implicate discussing the issues above.  
However, independent of the polemic, only two interviewed implementers 
declared having conflicts with the regulation. One respondent is with a major United 
States government agency (Interviewee 1, 2010), the other with a United States-
based NGO. The latter had to resort to a strategy of circumvention of the law in order 
to maintain activities in the country. “We do not speak about rights anymore. But we 
still do advocacy, although we do not speak in that way” (Interviewee 6, 2010). Yet, 
other respondents explicitly expressed an alignment with the national government’s 
legal framework, as they see themselves as part of the government’s developmental 
policies. One Ethiopian interviewee with a United States-based organization has 
stated “we always work in line with government policies, in which we assist them in 
implementing programs” (Interviewee 5, 2010). Another interviewee with the same 
profile has emphasized the centrality of the government’s policy: “building capacity 
is an ideal. However, the government does not have capacity for it yet. Civil society 
still has to assist the government. Otherwise things can go backward” (Interviewee 7, 
2010).  
The EPRDF’s stance seems to largely continue a trend initiated by former 
Emperor Haile Selassie in the 20th century. Although attempting at modernizing 
social, economic and political structures through the constitution of a European type 
of state and some sort of capitalist exploration of the land, the maintenance of a 
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regime of illiberal absolutism of self-rule remained and was further nurtured by the 
Dergue regime (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). The personalization of political life 
under the scenes of the façade of the modern state before, as cornerstone of the 
postcolonial African polity, is also found in contemporary Ethiopia, at the very 
political elite level (Ibid.). Every time forms of out-of-state contestation emerged 
they were faced with repression, as the leftist and ethno-nationalist movements of the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s – where the very EPRDF’s origins are found – experienced. 
Writing about contemporary state-NGOs relations in the country, Sarah Vaughan and 
Kjetil Tronvoll argue that  
National NGOs have often been the artificial product of the international 
need for tool to delivery of relief assistance and do not reflect the organic 
evolution and indigenous consolidation of civil society. (…) Without the 
experience of a collective struggle to establish its own legitimate space 
outside the remit of the state, the voluntary sector has lacked cohesion 
and solidarity, and been overly expectant of the largesse of state or 
international bodies in facilitating its activities. (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 
2003: 62-63)                      
The EPRDF itself has formed NGOs and development associations (Ibid.: 65-66). In 
this context, it should be remarked the role of community-based credit and savings 
organizations, iddirs (Mengesha, 2002).31 However, it remains to be assessed to what 
extent iddirs do challenge political governance in Ethiopia. 
Unlike South Africa, the field of HIV/AIDS has not represented complex, 
tense and conflicting situations between the Ethiopian government, Ethiopian civil 
society and the broader international community. One main reason has to do with the 
relatively small impact of the epidemic in the country and the concurrent most 
pressing health issues. Another reason relates to the fact that HIV/AIDS, rather than 
                                                 
31 Some iddirs have been involved in PEPFAR-funded intervention through Save the Children United 
States in terms of counseling, food donations and financial assistance (Kurata, 2008). 
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a threat to the government’s worldview and historical experience (as in the case of 
South Africa), represented an opportunity for the Ethiopian government to raise its 
international profile in the context of national difficulties and great necessity to 
secure and augment donor support for development (Wallis, 2009). As it happens 
with the PEPFAR implementers mentioned above, entities representing people living 
with AIDS are incorporated in the national, government-led response (Federal 
HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office, 2008: 22).  
The Ethiopian experience with PEPFAR suggests that an external project of 
transmission of values – presumably liberal ones – does not bear much fruit once 
implemented. The Ethiopian polity is still markedly illiberal, and this is visible in the 
instances given above on political affairs and NGO policies. The bastions of 
liberalism, advocating civil liberties and free enterprise in the country, are found in 
institutions engaged in modern knowledge production, such as Addis Ababa 
University. This is supported by a rising land bourgeoisie composed of land 
managers and small land owners (Lefort, 2010), and, very importantly, in the 
Diaspora, especially in the United States of America, where opposition members 
have been fleeing to. In other words, despite the propelled liberalism within 
interventionist policies and tools, the ruling government in Ethiopia in practice 
adapts these external pressures to its own agenda. This is not to say that the 
government does not still engage with the external institutions, and follow their 
prescriptions. Nonetheless, it maintains a large degree of control over the impact of 
those recommendations.  
A recent example came after the adoption of an International Monetary Fund-
proposed devaluation of the national currency, the Birr, in September 2010. As it 
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provoked almost immediately inflationary pressure on basic goods, the government 
decided to protect prices in face of the risk of mass public protest (Ethiopian News 
Agency, 2011). Another instance happened more recently. In the context of regional 
protests developing in several parts of the Arab world, including neighbouring 
Djibouti and Yemen, the government discouraged a planned “day of rage” against it 
for May 28, 2011, which was the day Meles Zenawi celebrated publicly twenty years 
in power in Addis Ababa’s major square, Meskel Square (Heinlein, 2011). 
 
8.4. South African Liberal Polity 
The case of South Africa accompanies Botswana in terms of the 
establishment of liberal values in function of domestic choices, although constraints 
associated with changes in the international system – end of the Cold War, demise of 
the Soviet Union and United States superpower hegemony – also played a role. The 
transition from apartheid to multiracial democracy was the result of concessions on 
both sides (supporters and opponents of the apartheid). One concession consisted on 
the inflection of the ‘revolutionary’ economic policy agenda of the far-left sectors of 
the African National Congress (ANC), aiming at the nationalization of the major 
industries (namely mineral resources) and land reform. The ruling government of the 
ANC adopted social-democratic politics, with alignment with the Western European 
Socialist ‘third-way’ parties, who themselves were initiating agendas in their 
countries after the Cold War based on privatizations and other liberalizing reforms 
(Bond, 2001). Comparing to Botswana, the South African experience of a much 
more advanced capitalist, technologically-advanced system, developed during the 
decades of apartheid, has enhanced a more matured case of a liberal polity. Yet, this 
233 
 
is a polity where the promises of social improvement in the post-apartheid era and 
the reality of social disparities often contradict each other very intensely.  
According to the previous two chapters, the post-apartheid regime under the 
leadership of the ANC has embraced a liberal-idealist politics aimed at African 
empowerment through aid, economic opportunities and development, both at home 
and around the continent. Initiatives such as the Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE), on the one hand, and the New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD), on the other, materialize the idea of African Renaissance underneath 
governmental idealism. BEE favours the inclusion of black citizens in the business 
world through company creation and management of bigger companies. However, 
although called “patriotic,” BEE has arguably generated “parasitism” (Southall, 
2004) through state sponsoring.  
The ANC is rather leaning towards construction of a procapitalist, 
interventionist state prepared to use its power, influence and divestment 
of assets to create a black bourgeoisie, expand the black middle class, 
and to generally produce a seismic transfer of wealth from white to black 
over a ten to twenty year period. Inevitably, with the state being so 
centrally involved in the task of class creation, the political connections 
enjoyed by individual capitalists become crucial in pulling down official 
loans, decisions and favours, with outright corruption a not uncommon 
outcome. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is already considerable 
evidence of Asian style, 'crony capitalism'. In short, there is often a very 
thin line between patriotism and parasitism. (Ibid.: 326-327) 
Although Roger Southall argues that this model of economic governance is at 
the end not liberal in practice (Ibid.), the organization and implementation of social 
welfare programs really follows a liberal approach through the participation of public 
and private entities. The third-way social democracy of the ANC has maintained a 
commitment to liberal-capitalist economic policies includes implementing social 
policy for the excluded populations based on a mixed system of governmental and 
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nongovernmental intervention. Apart from income transfers to disadvantaged sectors 
of the population by the government (e.g. social grants to children), an array of 
private institutions participate in poverty alleviation and economic empowerment: 
parastatal organizations, NGOs, and for-profit private companies, such as insurance 
companies. As far as PEPFAR is concerned, this framework of social policy matches 
very neatly PEPFAR’s own intervention rationales. It can be argued that the 
idealized profile for PEPFAR as grounded on liberally shared roles by the state and 
civil society is largely accomplished in South Africa, since the political-economic 
infra-structure intervention builds upon resembles the United States model. This was 
particularly remarkable to observe especially during the Mbeki presidency and the 
concomitant context of policy struggle between the government and the domestic and 
international mainstream epistemic community (Youde, 2007b) on how to 
conceptualize and respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Even though, as noted by an 
interviewee with a NGO PEPFAR implementer (Interviewee 22, 2009), the South 
African and the United States governments were, in the beginning, “two parallel 
roads,” their policy frameworks did match. 
The difficulty to respond to the growing socio-economic disparities expressed 
through constant demonstrations and strikes over salary and working conditions and 
regular riots on social delivery (power, water, jobs) across the country, especially in 
the most deprived areas, has generated a Marxist critique that argues that the current 
post-apartheid regime is a continuation of the previous exclusionary politics. 
Accordingly, racial apartheid became “class apartheid” in a context of a “global 
apartheid” essentially drawn along the lines of Global North and Global South 
(Bond, 2004). This issue of tremendous social disparities and the contradictions they 
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produce has led to two political reactions. One has led to the engagement of 
“progressive social movements” implicated in struggles around housing conditions, 
the environment, and HIV/AIDS treatments, building on the anti-apartheid 
experience, and affiliated with the World Social Forum (Bond, 2006b). Perhaps more 
visible and politically more consequential, another concerns “nativist” resolutions for 
a future South Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009), such as those boosted by Julius 
Malema. Often inspired in the praxis of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, the 
recently dismissed leader of the Youth League of the ANC has advocated the 
nationalization of mines, land reform towards black ownership and the political 
guidance of blacks, accompanied by other ethnicities that, in his view, fought 
apartheid, such as coloureds and Asians (IOL, 2009). Malema advocates the 
exclusion of whites from political and economic power structures, because they 
neither are African nor supportive of an anti-colonial political regime. Yet, for 
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, the South African liberal tradition should prevail over 
nativism, even if under severe strain. 
The Zimbabwean version of nativism has very open racial connotations. 
In a multi-racial society like South Africa, nativism immediately locked 
horns with a very strong liberal tradition that continues to defend a liberal 
trajectory. But in both countries, the future of liberal democracy remains 
uncertain. (Ibid.: 75)     
Within the formal structures of government, the ANC government has 
realized the social problems of the post-apartheid era too. Published in June 2011, the 
“Diagnostic Overview” of the National Planning Commission of the Presidency of 
the Republic (National Planning Commission, 2011) concludes that, despite “relative 
success,” “eliminating poverty and inequality remain [the country’s] main strategic 
challenges” (The Presidency, 2011). Among several specific “challenges” (poor 
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location and maintenance of infra-structure, spatial marginalization of the poor, 
unsustainable growth path, uneven public service, corruption and societal divisions), 
the report stresses the “massive disease burden” of the health system (National 
Planning Commission, 2011: 20-22). The experts who elaborated the “Diagnostic” 
remark the state’s incapacity to address the HIV/AIDS issue.     
While the country’s disease burden is rising, the health system is 
collapsing. This collapse is partly attributable to the nature of the disease 
burden; its breakdown lies also in institutional issues and implementation 
failures over a long period of time. (Ibid.: 21)  
However, apart from the issues around capacity, another aspect concerns the 
dimension of the economic empowerment of patients, particularly women and 
children living with AIDS who already find themselves at the margins of society. 
Several PEPFAR-funded programs address this dimension, as remarked previously, 
in terms of policy rationale. Some assist in applications for social grants for children 
while others implement income generation activities (Interviewee 44, 2009; 
Interviewee 45, 2009). But it is interesting to verify that, when asked about a 
propelled link between HIV/AIDS intervention and economic empowerment, many 
PEPFAR implementing interviewees (not just in South Africa, but particularly in 
South Africa) do not establish any causality between one thing and the other. And 
when they do, they do not have evidence of that apart from the personal observation 
of their own projects. One interviewee with a South Africa-based implementing 
NGO gave a rather sceptical view. In fact, the potential economic impact of 
HIV/AIDS intervention is offset by the broader political-economic context of dire 
unemployment. 
The South African government, which now is very much engaged in 
HIV/AIDS, is anxious to give good news about the epidemic. In fact 
people are healthier and living longer, however, unemployment prevents 
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people from those benefits. HIV/AIDS improvements are not having a 
direct contribution in labour productivity and economic development. 
(Interviewee 27, 2009) 
Yet, another respondent with the same profile went much further in stressing the 
defining role of unemployment by deconstructing the alleged causality between 
HIV/AIDS treatment and economic opportunities, especially among NGO 
implementers.  
PEPFAR’s activities have nothing to do with social and economic 
development. That is the mantra they [the development industry] have to 
advance in order to justify themselves before the donors. In industrialized 
countries they could relate medical treatment to productiveness. 
However, we have 80% of unemployment where we work, so it does not 
make much difference if they live longer and theoretically become more 
productive, because they do not work. In fact, we could say that longer 
lives increases unemployment. I do not see a relation between AIDS 
treatment and higher GDP. To me AIDS work is a moral responsibility 
and nothing else. (Interviewee 30, 2009) 
 However, according to the South African Presidency’s “Diagnostic,” the 
problem of unemployment lies at the core of the national socio-development 
strategy. As such, it should not constitute a ‘surprise’ to what the previous two 
respondents have stated.  
South Africa has extremely high rates of unemployment and 
underemployment. A large proportion of out-of-school youth and adults 
are not working. Those in low income households that are working 
support many dependants and earn little relative to the cost of living. This 
is a central contributor to widespread poverty. Inactivity of broad 
sections of society reduces our potential for economic expansion. 
(National Planning Commission, 2011: 9) 
 The self-reflected behaviour of the South African government on the 
achievements and challenges of the post-apartheid era that transpires from the 
“Diagnostic” demonstrates the maturity of the country’s liberal polity. But this 
liberalism might be challenged by the potential consequences that the contradictions 
that the multiracial democratic resolutions of the early 1990s, in terms of social 
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movements and especially “nativist” proposals inspired in Zimbabwe’s Robert 
Mugabe. However, this liberal polity is the outcome of a socio-political process 
composed by different, often opposing, social forces, which is eminently domestic, 
although constrained externally too. The level of integration of the South African 
economy in the global circuits of capital renders the country a large degree of 
accommodation of liberal institutions of universal ambition, even if shaped by the 
post-apartheid state in terms of favouring the creation of a black capitalism, as 
suggested by Roger Southall. Moreover, this integration in global circuits of capital 
not only largely precedes the wave of West-led neoliberal intervention of the 1980s 
onwards in Africa but also supports South Africa’s role as key promoter of liberal 
developmentalism around the continent through NEPAD.     
 
 8.5. Conclusion 
 This chapter has analysed the local level of inter-state relations by focusing 
on the actual practices, and embedded values and ideas, of the national governments 
of Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa in the domains of political, economic and 
social organisation. These practices are scrutinised in function of the external 
structural projection of values and ideas, in which PEPFAR plays a distinctive part in 
terms of HIV/AIDS, health and development policy. The external values and ideas 
are primarily rooted around liberal conceptions of organisation and reform, and 
therefore the action of the governments of these three countries is observed in terms 
of their convergence or divergence from the liberal tenets.  
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As in the other two levels of inter-state relations, the three governments exert 
agency in this process. However, several remarks need to be made. One of them is 
the issue of contradiction that emerges from individual countries’ experiences. 
However, there are two types of contradiction: one type concerns the evolution of the 
nature of the national political regime, as the case of Botswana shows; another refers 
to the apparent mismatch between the external liberal structure and its national 
counterpart, as Ethiopia reveals. 
In the case of Botswana, one witnesses a gradual shift from liberalism to 
‘illiberalism.’ At the transition from protectorate status to formal independence, the 
Botswana elites embraced basic liberal institutions of political and economic 
governance through the primacy of representative democracy, regular elections and 
the market. However, recent years have been characterised to a resort to 
militarisation of social relations, namely through the unelected nomination of a top 
military officer to the presidency of the republic, Lieutenant-General Ian Seretse 
Khama. Indeed, it is interesting to verify that the external projection of liberal values, 
namely through PEPFAR, occurs at a time when there is an arguable retreat of those 
values domestically. Some have argued that the “African miracle” that used to be 
associated with Botswana is over, and now the country likens the average African 
regime, featured by bad governance and autocracy (Taylor, 2003; Good and Taylor, 
2008; Taylor, 2006; Good and Taylor, 2006).  But why was Botswana ‘liberal’ in the 
first place? The politics of transition to independence and the conflictuality of 
Southern Africa until 1994 provide answers. First of all, the elite that brought about 
the independence and has ruled the country ever since has been the same as in the 
colonial regime. Secondly, since the independence, the regional context, featured by 
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struggling politics structured around Left, Right and Black Nationalism, forced the 
national elite to adopt a ‘centrist’ position in order to retain agency in its difficult 
relations with very powerful neighbours South Africa (and Namibia) and, until 1980, 
former Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In the last twenty years, with the absence of such 
regional hardship, the national regime and its opposition have moved beyond the 
liberal, consensual politics towards more fracturing ones, let alone effective popular 
dissatisfaction with elite’s behaviour. Additionally, the postcolonial adoption of basic 
liberal institutions and values has contributed to impressive economic growth and 
development. However, it remained mired in ‘premodernity’ in terms of ameliorating 
the status of sectors of the population still living in poverty and subsistence modes, 
as well as encouraging civil society. 
Conversely, the contradiction in the Ethiopian case is observed in the evident 
difference between the liberal values transmitted by the external structure and the 
practices of the Ethiopian ruling government, the EPRDF. Opposition politicians, 
media agents, academic experts, NGOs and foreign governments (including some of 
one’s interviewees) have given examples of the ‘illiberalism’ of the government’s 
rule in several areas.  Even though accepting many external pressures, the 
government has sought to advance legislation, such as the Charities Law of 2009, 
and measures that assure conformity to the governmental policy and reduce 
opposition politics. The question to ask is: why do external liberal actors, such as the 
United States of America, operate with the EPRDF-led government in Ethiopia? The 
main reasons concern the geopolitical situation in the Horn of Africa, and the 
realisation by Washington, DC, that the EPRDF is the most credible actor towards 
the stabilisation of the difficult situation across
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contradiction is also present in the fact that, by prioritising the national government, 
the external intervention not only consolidates the government’s power but also fails 
the liberal aspirations of the opposition. Again, as in the case of Botswana, realism 
explains this pattern of behaviour.  
The case of South Africa emerges differently. In fact, South Africa reveals an 
arguably matured version of a liberal polity featured by a third-way social-
democratic government, global integration of national capitalism and economic 
empowerment initiatives with pan-African and domestic scope. As far as social 
policy goes, a combination of public and private provision of goods and services 
illustrates the liberal approach of addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic and other 
social questions in the post-Apartheid era. Liberal reform is explained by the post-
Apartheid settlement, in which the ANC and more leftist political forces retreated 
from their agenda towards a ‘centrist’ stance that could be accepted by the Apartheid 
elite and the West (United States of America and United Kingdom). However, this 
explanation is only partial. Indeed, the liberal ‘conviction’ in South Africa has taken 
deeper roots, and is part of the liberal-idealist politics that one has been discussing 
throughout since Chapter 6. It is part of the idea of African Renaissance and 
NEPAD. However, this entrenchment of liberal politics and its social effects is 
leading to reactions that may undermine the leading liberal politics in the near future. 
An advanced, sophisticated capitalist system keeping many unemployed, poor, 
mostly young citizens at its margins has generated Marxist critiques by progressive 
social movements, but also ‘nativist’ proposals close to Zimbabwe’s Robert 
Mugabe’s policies. However, the ANC-led government has also initiated a self-
reflection through the constitution of a National Planning Commission with the aim 
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of identifying those issues and develop solutions for them, yet under the liberal 
paradigm. 
The overall discussion carried in the empirical chapters, as well as those 
preceding them, carries several conclusions – theoretical and empirical – to be 
presented in the next, final chapter        
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 Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
 
9.1. Introduction 
The discipline of International Relations has witnessed a shift of analytical 
scope from the conventional world of states towards population-related and social 
forces concerns. This was the result of both scholarly and policy change in the last 
thirty years. Considering the problem that such shift has been posing with regard to 
the issue of human agency, and the limitations of leading hegemony-based 
approaches, particularly to relations between the West and Sub-Saharan Africa, this 
dissertation pursued an analysis centred on the action of states as units of the 
international system, as proposed by Kenneth Waltz.  
However, the adoption of Waltzian concepts was not meant to be an open 
endorsement of his theory of structural realism, since it is not fully applicable to the 
reality of relations of Sub-Saharan African states with the West. First of all, 
structural realism is too elitist for the reality of the postcolonial state in Africa. 
Waltz’s theory was originally conceived to explain the behaviour of world powers, 
such as 19th century Europe or the Cold War. That is not applicable to a realm of 
states with different capabilities, where propelled weaker states are expected not to 
have a strategy of their own beyond plain bandwagoning. Secondly, the 
methodological detachment of the external sphere of the state from the internal one 
does not help grasping the full set of inter-state relations. Understood as a social 
relation, the state is sociologically and historically informed by the experience of the 
state, being that what makes it distinct from others. As a result, one has divided the 
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analysis of the individual countries’ interaction with PEPFAR, United States foreign 
policy and the international structure at large, along three independent variables: 
nature of foreign policies; nature of domestic policies; and actual state practices. 
Altogether they demonstrate a complex body of statehood which withholds agency in 
face of a globalised system. 
 
9.2. West-Africa Relations: a Struggle of Governmentalities 
The dissertation departed from the premise that relations between the West 
and Sub-Saharan Africa have been characterised by asymmetry. In part, this was due 
to the postcolonial settlement, strongly informed by the historical legacy of colonial 
regimes implemented by European powers. Difficulties of generating economic 
development, arguably explained by the neopatrimonial nature of the state, also 
contributed for such contrasting relationship.  
From the late 1970s onwards, after a relatively short period of economic 
success subsequent to the first wave of independences (1960s), Sub-Saharan African 
governments engaged in negotiations of development assistance funds from major 
donor countries and international financial institutions with the aim of resuming a 
path of economic growth and development. These negotiations not only implied the 
reproduction of a pattern of dependency to the Western donor countries and 
international financial organisations but also a subjection to conditionalities with 
socio-political effects. This neoliberally-rooted approach was maintained throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s. However, from the early 21st century onwards it was 
supplemented with policies looking at specific unresolved problems structured 
around development, security and the state, in which interventions linking security 
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goals to development appeared hand in hand with a necessity to – once again – 
reform state institutions. These are examples pointing at a striking hegemony of 
Western states and international organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa, grounding an 
analytical shift from states to population.  
However, the ‘governmentality’ of Western interventionism has been 
opposed by other governmentalities. Apart from the basic endowment that juridical 
territorial sovereignty attributes, the neopatrimonial character of Sub-Saharan 
African polity helped to retain important levels of independence. Despite the general 
context of underdevelopment of African societies, due to the reduction of investment 
in areas such as education or health, African elites sought to obtain external funding 
to retain their existence. As far as the attraction of external support is concerned, the 
2000s heralded a diversification of sources. Although Western donors remain 
relatively central, ‘new partners,’ such as China, India and several Arab countries 
(e.g. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates), have appeared as significant 
alternatives. Nevertheless, a major novelty was the return of the development state as 
ideology and policy, parallel to pan-African initiatives aiming at growth and 
development such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).  
Despite reproducing traditional neopatrimonial practices and the serious 
negative impacts that might have on their national constituencies (Taylor, 2005), 
these new developments in Africa appeared as instances of challenge to the 
perspective that Sub-Saharan Africa is subject to a Western governmentality. In fact, 
the experience of the three last decades has been demonstrating the opposite, even 
with the asymmetry that persists between the West and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well 
as between the latter region and the ‘new partners.’      
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9.3. Postcolonial African States in Global Health Governance: 
Between Facilitators and ‘Rogue’ 
Global health governance as topic of study in the latest decades demonstrates 
eminently the analytical shift from states to populations, as it precisely draws on 
individuals and communities, and the health-related phenomena they are affected by. 
Moreover, global health governance is, arguably, a Western construction with the 
aim of making sense of postcolonial relations in the area of health and disease, on the 
one hand, and of addressing the post-Cold War perceived ‘new threats’ to 
international security and stability, on the other. It is also a matter of human security 
as an academic and policy paradigm, as it embodies the questions of “freedom from 
fear” and “freedom from want” that human security policies are supposed to address. 
It has generated technical responses to specific problems, such as epidemics 
(prevention, treatment and care) or viral outbreaks, potentially fuelled by other 
population-related phenomena such as travel/migration and trade. 
This dissertation subscribes to the argument that the governance of global 
health has been a failure, despite the implementation of powerful mechanisms of 
control and intervention, such as the World Health Organisation’s International 
Health Regulations. The absence of a central government in the global realm that can 
enforce a single rule sustains this argument. Despite the importance of ‘social forces’ 
sharing, for instance, a commitment to liberal principles, the proliferating array of 
actors and agendas offers examples of the lack of such government. Consequently, 
the idea of a realm – global health – being governed with a large degree of coherence 
and consistence does not bear existence in reality. As a result, it is somewhat 
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inevitable to turn to the most stable entities in the system – states – in order to grasp 
its functioning. In spite of the prominence of private actors (private companies, 
philanthropic organisations, NGOs) in this field, the major actors are still states.  
Expectedly, the main states are the United States of America, followed by 
Western European countries and Japan. As far as the most important epidemic of 
global repercussions in the last thirty years, HIV/AIDS, the United States of America 
launched in 2003 the largest bilateral program ever to tackle that disease: PEPFAR. 
Funding states such as the United States of America are essential in the definition of 
policies of where, how and on what to allocate available funds. Conversely, despite 
the reproduced discourse of equality between donors and recipients in terms of 
responsibility sharing, as the case of PEPFAR shows, governmental counterparts in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are often assigned a strict role of recipients.  
According to the United States strategic concept, HIV/AIDS, and the 
manifold phenomena associated with it, poses a threat to international security and 
stability. Eventually, affected populations inside the recipient states are constructed 
as threatening agents, which, according to a security perspective, have to be 
contained. From a critical perspective, this security rationale has been denounced as 
a denigration of HIV-affected people in particular, and the most vulnerable 
populations to the disease in general. The postmodern feminist critique is particularly 
revealing in this regard, as the securitisation of HIV/AIDS reinforces in policy and 
practical terms the idea of women as vehicles of insecurity. As a matter of fact, 
together with children, women are but the most vulnerable to the epidemic, often 
through violent means, physical and symbolic (rape, transactional sex, prostitution). 
In addition to threats, the representation of recipient populations, and their countries, 
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as in need of United States wealthy ‘compassion’ further exemplifies the position of 
superiority of the United States of America vis-à-vis the recipient countries. 
The field research conducted in Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa points 
at other instances of the regime of superiority of the United States of America. 
Although some interviewed PEPFAR implementers acknowledge that it is a 
‘necessary evil,’ a recurrently mentioned case is the large bureaucratic compliance 
which is demanded by PEPFAR’s leadership. Often, this is observed as a hamper to a 
better client-focused service. In terms of policy, the insistence of abstinence-based 
approaches to prevention is observed as another imposition of the United States 
government on how to best control the epidemic in the different national settings. 
The same applies to policies on family planning. Finally, the scientific practices of 
some actors are also under criticism, as research institutions based in the United 
States of America collect blood samples and other material, fly them to their 
headquarters, investigate them, and finally publish results. In the end, it is not clear 
to what extent does this benefit the recipient countries, which, in this case, 
functioned as donors of such samples. Despite the rhetorical emphasis on partnership 
and country ownership by PEPFAR’s leadership, it is clear for many interviewed 
stakeholders, who are not with United States government agencies, that the United 
States of America is the leader of PEPFAR’s process. 
The asymmetry between donor and recipient has been dramatically at the core 
of health economist Mead Over’s argument on the “ballooning entitlement” 
generated under PEPFAR and other initiatives. It revolves around the uneasy system 
of dependency that those initiatives have generated, particularly at the level of 
antiretroviral drugs. In a context of still growing number of new infections in several 
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parts of the world and limited capacity to deliver by the major donors, affected 
countries might nurture grievances against donors for their reduced response. This 
kind of colonialism, as Over calls it, might entail negative repercussions for United 
States international reputation in the long run, especially in terms of rising anti-
American sentiments in countries where the United States of America has been 
enjoying a large degree of support. 
As recipients of main global health initiatives, Sub-Saharan African states are 
found behaving according to two antagonistic categories. Governments in that region 
have behaved either as facilitators, i.e. as good, reputable leaders, compliant with 
‘good practices’ at different levels, as inculcated by the international community of 
donors, activists and scientists, and providers/distributors of goods and services 
provided by the benefactors. Alternatively, some have also acted as ‘rogue,’ that is, 
as challengers of those same ‘good practices.’ As noted, the field of global health is 
one where technical problem-solving approaches to health and disease-related 
problems (e.g. epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria) recur, and in 
which political consensus has to prevail. State structures (national, regional and 
local) are implementers in a larger partnership together with foreign and 
nongovernmental entities, and as such they should implement established policies 
and practices. These include all segments of intervention, from administration to 
actual provision of goods and services to the targeted population. 
Concerning this dissertation’s study countries, all of them, except South 
Africa under President Mbeki, appear as striking cases of governments who really 
facilitate the implementation of international HIV/AIDS policies and ‘good 
practices.’ These are countries which, when the first cases of HIV were registered, 
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the national governments followed very early and very closely international advice. 
This occurred in terms of institution-building, through the creation of national AIDS 
councils, conglomerating both the public and private (civil society) spheres, and 
under higher leadership of the country’s presidency. Implementation of prevention 
and testing activities supervised by WHO and later UNAIDS and funded by major 
donors also ensued quickly. In the case of Botswana, the national government has 
gone as far as funding itself up to 80% of the ARV program launched in 2001. In the 
Ethiopian case, the government does not engage that strongly in financial terms; 
nevertheless, it has favoured the establishment of institutions and policies that could 
maximise external assistance. Conversely, South Africa has, for some time, 
constituted a case of ‘rogueness’ with regard to the governmental endorsement of 
internationally-disseminated institutions and practices as described in the Botswana 
and Ethiopian cases.                    
Frequently, ‘rogue’ behaviour is associated with real or perceived practices of 
mismanagement of external funding in the developing world, as several interviewees 
suggested. As a response, advanced mechanisms of financial control are put into 
place with the aim of securing the management of funds. However, that is not exactly 
the case of any of the three countries involved. In fact, any of them tends to be 
presented as a positive contrasting situation, i.e. a country where funds are managed 
and employed appropriately. In fact, ‘rogueness’ is applicable to the specific 
relationship between the Mbeki Presidency at the higher level, namely, first and 
foremost, Thabo Mbeki and his Minister of Health Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, and 
the HIV/AIDS international epistemic community of scientists and activists. 
Building on some unsettled scientific disputes on the nature of the HI virus, Mbeki 
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claimed that the biological causes of AIDS were unclear. For him the evident cause 
was of social nature, i.e. poverty. Poverty was the cause of HIV/AIDS. Moreover, 
what the HIV/AIDS scientific ‘orthodoxy’ was displaying was a Western renewed 
colonialist discourse on the need to save Africans from their basic sexual instincts. In 
this regard, the experience of the apartheid was also remembered to demonstrate 
negative effects of Western biomedicine in the life, primarily, of black populations in 
the country. However, following change of government in 2009, the South African 
government quickly resembled a role close to its counterparts in Botswana and 
Ethiopia.       
Table 2 shows that Botswana and Ethiopia have always been facilitators with 
regard to the adoption of internationally-backed institutions, policies (prevention, 
treatment and other public health measures) and, generally, the body of knowledge to 
tackle health problems, namely HIV/AIDS. South Africa under Mbeki appears as 
‘rogue’ in terms of policies and knowledge.  
Table 2 – Country Position vis-à-vis Global Health Leadership 
 Institutions Policies Knowledge 
Botswana Facilitator Facilitator Facilitator 
Ethiopia Facilitator Facilitator Facilitator 
South Africa Facilitator 
‘Rogue’ (Mbeki) 
Facilitator (Zuma) 
‘Rogue’ (Mbeki) 
Facilitator (Zuma) 
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While it is true that the three recipient countries correspond to the role of 
facilitators (including South Africa after Mbeki) of external policies and practices 
and collaborate in envisaged goals, that does not mean that they are under strict 
control of donors and supervising institutions. As discussed in Chapter 6 in terms of 
broader foreign policy relations between them and the international system’s leading 
state, the United States of America, there is a coincidence of goals to be achieved by 
all parts involved, although they are conceivable in different manners, i.e. whereas 
for the three countries preventing HIV/AIDS means improving the quality of life of 
some populations, for the main donors security through health intervention is one 
strategy of addressing their foreign policy concerns. States of countries under 
external intervention do retain agency, and that is visible in a several instances. 
 
9.4. Botswana, Ethiopian and South African State/Government 
Agency 
This dissertation demonstrates that, despite the unequivocal asymmetry that 
features the international system, less powerful states in Sub-Saharan Africa still act 
autonomously in that system, and, thus, pursue a strategic agenda of their own, even 
if under severe constraint. However, not only an element of asymmetry between 
states is required, but also a concept of state that encompasses its historical and 
sociological experience is demanded. Understood as a social relation, the state is 
sociologically and historically informed by the experience of the state, being that 
what makes it distinct from others. Each state/government analysed in this 
dissertation, and the characteristics of its agency vis-à-vis the international structure, 
reveal (and are revealed by) the historical experience of its construction and 
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development. Considering the group of three countries under analysis here, different 
dynamics of agency are identified.  
The pacific Botswana post-independence settlement derives from the 
circumstances of British-Boer colonial relations in Southern Africa. In the late 19th 
century, in face of pressures put by the Boer Republics in the South, Tswana leaders 
sought to exchange with the United Kingdom military protection for concession of 
Protectorate status and territory for the construction of a railway from the South 
African Cape colony to Southern Rhodesia (today’s Zimbabwe).  
Although the settlement was inclined towards the adoption of Western 
political and economic institutions, the harsh reality of lying at the core of Southern 
Africa, ridden by several high intensity armed conflicts, forced the Botswana 
leadership to engage with all parties involved. This implied positive relations with 
the United Kingdom, the main postcolonial development funder, the two world rivals 
(United States of America and Soviet Union), former Rhodesia, and, most 
importantly, South Africa. The latter not only was the regional economic hegemon, 
but also the host of De Beers, the partner in the public-private partnership Debswana, 
in charge of exploring the diamond mines in the country. Relations with South Africa 
and former Rhodesia were particularly difficult, since the white supremacy regimes 
in both countries suspected of the existence of black insurgents bases in Botswana, 
and actually raided and bombed some southern and northern parts of the country. 
In the West, namely in the United States of America, in the context of Sub-
Saharan Africa, Botswana is regarded as a ‘miracle’ of good governance, economic 
growth and development. It is observed as a politically stable and peaceful country 
due, not only to its smooth transition to independence, which occurred with almost 
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no incidents, but also to the transparent process of exploration of its mineral 
resources, primarily diamonds, and employment of the wealth associated with it. In 
1966, year of independence, Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world, 
and after few decades climbed up to a middle-income position. The country has had 
regular elections, always won by the same party (Botswana Democratic Party), and 
adopted characteristics typical to the developmental state model visible in Eastern 
Asia at the time, since public expenditure was targeted at creating strategic infra-
structures (roads, power stations). However, it should be understood that such 
reputation has not only been built around the policies and actions of Botswana’s 
leaderships but, moreover, the comparative analysis that is done between Botswana 
and the average Sub-Saharan African country. In fact, Botswana’s political elites 
have been acting according to a strong logic of self-help. More recently, the major 
threat has shifted from aggressive behaviour of political regimes around it towards 
the HIV/AIDS burden that affects a quarter of the adult population, and, as such, 
constitutes a serious threat to the national survival. 
The national government was fast persuaded by the international community 
(primarily WHO) about the necessity to intervene in order to prevent the disease. In 
the early 2000s, a number of studies on the economic impact of the epidemic 
persuaded the political leadership to advance towards the funding of a massive 
treatment program in order to contain the worrisome spread of the disease through 
the population. Initiated in 2001, this program has been assisted by the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, the Global Fund and, finally, since 2004, PEPFAR. This 
highly debated measure, considering the high costs involved, was put forward in the 
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name of national survival. For Botswana, HIV/AIDS has public health, economic, 
social and even security implications.  
The Botswana government is regarded as the main leader of the overall 
HIV/AIDS intervention in the country. This happens especially in financial terms, as 
it funds 80% of the effort, but also politically. In this regard, PEPFAR’s financial 
participation is relatively marginal, yet in diapason with the envisaged PEPFAR 
policies of country ownership and sustainability. As several respondents commented, 
“PEPFAR fills the gaps” of the overall response by addressing areas related to 
management and organisational capacity-building, something that should be 
replicated elsewhere. In this regard, again, Botswana appears as a facilitator of 
United States foreign policy. 
Currently, the HIV/AIDS epidemic poses an even more complex challenge to 
the state. Despite decreases on the cost of drugs, the recession of the global trade in 
diamonds poses an additional pressure on the relative prioritisation that the 
HIV/AIDS response has enjoyed throughout the last decade, apart from the general 
flattening on global HIV/AIDS initiatives’ funding. Therefore, it remains clear that 
HIV/AIDS policy and implementation, for the existential threat it constitutes for the 
country’s small population of 1.4 million people, shall remain under the scope of the 
national government. 
The case of Ethiopia is rather different from Botswana. The last decades have 
witnessed large-scale political violence across the country, together with serious 
problems of hunger, ill health and underdevelopment affecting several sectors of the 
country’s large, and still growing, population. Inaugurated in 1991 with the ousting 
of the previous Dergue regime through guerrilla warfare, the current regime has been 
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putting forward policies aiming at resolving long-lasting problems undermining the 
country’s development. Led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, those policies are structured 
around ‘ethnic federalism’ and state developmentalism with the goal of resolving 
domestic ethnic grievances and lifting the country from the bottom of the United 
Nations’ Human Development Index. At the same time, and concomitantly, the new 
regime has been engaging in a policy, often through heavy military means, of 
securing territorial integrity and inviolability that have been threatened by domestic 
“terrorist organisations” of ethnic/regional inspiration, as well as groups based in 
Somalia and allegedly affiliated with Al-Qaeda. As a result, the action of the national 
government in Addis Ababa is framed in terms of self-help, yet primarily concerned 
with the political regime’s existence rather than, as in the case of Botswana, with the 
population as such.  
As it was demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the interaction with the 
international structure, particularly with the United States of America, reflects this 
concern for the regime’s survival. Certainly, the issue of regime survival is 
something that, in principle, implicates all states, as Waltzian frameworks 
demonstrate. All regimes seek their self-help. Still, the interesting aspect about 
Ethiopia is that the previous regime (Dergue) was also driven by the same concern in 
its international action. Although officially assisted by the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact in light of Cold War politics, it received support, namely humanitarian, 
from the United States of America. Today, in the case of the EPRDF, assistance is 
sought from Western countries but also from ‘new partners,’ such as Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, India and China. In terms of international diplomacy, 
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the country has been represented by Zenawi and Minister of Health Tedros Adhanom 
at the higher international level: the former as African representative at summits on 
climate change, and the latter as chair of the Global Fund until September 2011.     
Apart from basic geopolitical concerns, development indeed represents the 
major topic of foreign and domestic policy of the Ethiopian government. Since 1991 
the government has been establishing five-year development plans that can be 
adapted to external assistance. The latest growth and transformation plan was 
launched in 2010 and looks forward to establish industry in 2020, based on the 
construction of the Millennium Dam on the Nile Basin and on leasing vast masses of 
agricultural land to foreign companies. Aiming at abolishing poverty in the long run, 
the plan underlines strongly a dimension of social development that includes 
improvement of health services under the guidance of the Ethiopian Ministry of 
Health. This is the part of the plan in which assistance through PEPFAR comes in, 
sitting alongside numerous other external (bilateral and multilateral) development 
initiatives, especially from Northern America, Western Europe and Japan.  
Still, despite its small epidemic, it should be noticed that in the early 2000s, in 
the eve of PEPFAR’s establishment, Ethiopia was presented as a country where the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic could reveal in the future a similar pattern of graveness as in 
Southern Africa, considering its enlarging population. Independent of the empirical 
confirmation of such scenario, the emergence of large amounts of funds to tackle the 
epidemic was welcomed by the Ethiopian leadership in order to address the 
background problem of very deficient health care around the country. Moreover, 
such openness has been witnessed since the late 1980s when the first cases were 
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identified in the country, and the international organisations in charge – first, WHO, 
then UNAIDS – came forth.     
The committed and facilitating character of the Ethiopian government has 
been regarded as an example of “country ownership” by several respondents. 
However, the country’s ability to fund large-scale interventions is still quite limited. 
In addition to this constraint, the state maintains a low capacity to reach to large 
sectors of the population, especially rural ones, where 82% of the population live. 
From a broader perspective, considering the alluded security issues, the state has 
limited access to some regions of the country, especially the surrounding region of 
Addis Ababa, Oromia, and the Eastern region of Ogaden. Yet, this is precisely 
revealing of those problems of security, and how the regime in Addis Ababa 
addresses them in order to safeguard its survival. Intended or unintendedly, this 
strategic goal is favoured by the current diversification of donors, which allows the 
government in Addis Ababa to act with less conditionalities in domains at stake in a 
context of securitisation, namely civil and media liberties. 
In South Africa, since the transition to multiracial democracy, in 1994, the 
country’s governments have leaned from hard military power during the apartheid 
towards a transmission of values that can be seen in a number of instances and 
eventually held repercussions in the area of HIV/AIDS. This ‘behaviour change’ is 
not only the result of the relatively peaceful regime transition but also a reflection of 
the relations formed during the apartheid struggle with fellow African states that 
assisted logistically and ideologically the anti-apartheid movements, specially the 
ANC. Whereas Botswana and Ethiopian dynamics point to self-help, South African 
behaviour emphasises the transmission of ideas, domestically and internationally, 
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consonant to the transition from apartheid to multiracial democracy. Post-apartheid 
politics are visible from the inception of the democratic regime on former President 
Mandela’s insistence on good governance and democracy in Africa. Later, it was 
continued by President Mbeki in discourses of African Renaissance and dignity of 
the black African. In policy terms, this new South African stance in African and 
world affairs was consolidated through the collective establishment of the New 
Partnership for African Development in 2001. At home this was represented by 
initiatives such as Black Economic Empowerment. The ‘new’ South Africa appeared 
very much aligned with the major world powers and international organisations 
through the committed adoption of liberal reforms. Furthermore, South Africa has 
been increasingly associated with typical cosmopolitan policies of human security, 
prevention of armed conflicts, or peacekeeping operations.            
Relations between South Africa and the United States of America are very 
peculiar in light of the apartheid and democratic experiences. In fact, with a very 
short intermission, which corresponded to the late 1980s, when economic sanctions 
against apartheid rule were put into place, both countries collaborated very intensely. 
During apartheid, the United States of America was counting on apartheid’s anti-
communism to contain Soviet influence in the region. Afterwards, with the end of the 
Cold War and the apartheid, relations were maintained under a spirit of humanitarian 
cooperation, as PEPFAR shows, but with a security perspective too. Together with 
Botswana, South Africa represents one of the few states which are not considered 
weak or failing in the African continent. Despite the coincidence of agendas, there 
have been issues of contention between both sides.  
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One has to do the establishment of the United States Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) in African soil, which South Africa has been barring determinately. 
Another regards HIV/AIDS, and how it came to be addressed by the South African 
leadership under Mbeki, yet arguably still in light of the idealist politics of African 
Renaissance. Mbeki appeared as a self-proclaimed ‘dissident’ of the biomedical 
recipes promoted by the international community, since it was detrimental to the 
dignity of black Africans in his country and around the continent. 
Although mainly a domestic event, Mbeki’s ‘rogue’ position echoed across 
the African continent. Arguably it reflected a will of transmitting a set of values and 
ideas across Africa centred on the dignity of Africans and their resistance to 
prevailing racist and colonial images. However, particularly outside Africa, this 
position was observed as unacceptable and even irrational, and this was the issue 
between the United States of America and the South African government at the time. 
However, when higher level positions on HIV/AIDS changed dramatically with 
President Jacob Zuma and his Minister of Health Aaron Motsoaledi, it was in light of 
the same liberal-idealist framework. In international events, the South African 
leadership exhibits a pan-African position by calling for attention of donors to the 
difficulties of poorer African nations in the struggle against the disease.                   
PEPFAR’s implementation in South Africa began in the middle of the 
controversy with President Mbeki. As a consequence, particularly during the first 
phase (2004-2008), PEPFAR’s stakeholders were confronted with the need to 
conciliate actual implementation of projects with state’s approvals. However, since 
the beginning of Zuma’s Presidency, and the ‘burial of denialism,’ similarly to 
Ethiopia, interventions in several areas (medical research, treatment and palliative 
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care, orphans and vulnerable children, prevention) under PEPFAR are incorporated 
in the state developmentalism that the ANC government is attempting to run with the 
purpose of overcoming the past of separate development and boosting economic 
empowerment. In fact, the government is now funding up 80% of the overall 
response. However, like Botswana, the economic recession affecting the country, as 
well as donors, poses challenges of sustainability. 
Table 3 presents each country’s agency in function of the policy problems 
identified, strategies devised and goals aimed. It is observable that Botswana and 
South Africa share the same policy problem (very large HIV/AIDS epidemic); 
however, the strategies and political goals do not entirely coincide. The former seeks 
survival; the latter envisages the dissemination of values. In turn, Botswana and 
Ethiopia attempt at similar goals (survival), even through the policy problem differs 
to an extent. For Botswana, the problem is eminently rooted in the epidemic; for 
Ethiopia, it lies generally on low human development. However, Botswana and 
Ethiopia share a strong state action. In the case of South Africa, despite a vivid 
governmental influence, the private sector’s interference is remarkable too.    
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Table 3: State/Government Agency in Light of PEPFAR Experience 
 
Policy 
Problem 
Strategies Political Goals 
Botswana 
Very large 
HIV/AIDS 
epidemic 
State-led response against 
HIV/AIDS, complemented by 
external assistance (Gates 
Foundation, PEPFAR, Global 
Fund) 
National survival 
Ethiopia 
Very low 
human 
development 
State-led developmentalism; 
diversification of international 
funders; international diplomacy 
(e.g. Africa, climate change, 
global health); 
 
Political regime 
survival 
South 
Africa 
Very large 
HIV/AIDS 
epidemic 
 
Transmission of values on the 
dignity of Africans; 
public-private developmentalism 
Liberal 
multiracial 
democracy; 
‘African 
Renaissance’ 
 
 
9.5. Future Avenues of Research 
 
9.5.1. Theoretical Frames of National Agency 
The acknowledgement that less powerful states, namely postcolonial and 
developing ones, hold agency vis-à-vis not only the international structure but the 
actual hegemonic powers within it paves the way to new questions regarding the 
nature of this agency. From the research conducted, the cases of Botswana and 
Ethiopia suggest a rationale of self-help and survival in the international system, 
rendering neorealism a very suitable theory to describe both past and present 
policies. In turn, South Africa is arguably driven by a liberal-idealist approach, yet 
only since 1994, following domestic regime change. As recurrently mentioned, the 
transmission of values on the dignity of Africans is part of a strategy that seeks the 
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consolidation of liberal multilateral democracy and a transcending project of 
‘African Renaissance.’ However, in the case of South Africa, the ante-1994 period 
requires a rather neorealist approach, considering the previous politics of the 
apartheid regime as well as the far wealthier and military capabilities of the state. 
Eventually, a combination of both theories can help with the analysis of South 
Africa’s behaviour, not only with regard to its broader relations with the region, the 
continent and the world, but also, and specifically with PEPFAR and the politics of 
HIV/AIDS inside and beyond borders. As such, despite the idealism, a full 
understanding of the policy requires the maintenance of a realist ‘analytical 
predisposition.’ Studying the nature of the agency identified along these lines also 
confirms the need to address these dynamics in a domestic/international dialectic 
approach, since domestic regime change has clearly influenced South Africa’s 
position internationally. 
Nevertheless, the study of PEPFAR with implementers and other stakeholders 
in the area of HIV/AIDS, complemented with other sources on the socio-political and 
economic situation, has also drawn attention to various cross-cutting problems that 
point to local dynamics of social conflict. Often, this conflictuality refers to 
overarching issues on socio-economic inequalities, poverty and even armed violence, 
and contradicts major narratives about the states involved. This is particularly salient 
in the case of Botswana and South Africa, whose peaceful transitions to 
independence and multiracial democracy are generally considered remarkable 
through the adoption of liberal institutions and values. In this regard, the question of 
adoption of liberal values and institutions, particularly in the Botswana case, is at 
stake.             
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Liberal values are not merely an object of projection by the international 
structure in the last three decades in function of the rise of neoliberalism among 
Western states and international financial organisations in the last thirty years, as 
discussed throughout Chapter 2. As the case of Botswana shows, liberal forms of 
political and economic organisation have been experienced since the independence. 
The adherence of Botswana to liberal principles of organisation has been justified 
throughout the dissertation as deriving from the post-independence settlement, in 
which the same colonial and postcolonial elite – colonist and local/native – has 
prevailed. Maintaining an umbilical relationship with the United Kingdom, former 
protector and main development supporter after 1966, the adoption of liberal tenets 
represents a continuation of British influence, even if in a context of a sovereign, 
independent country. However, it is also explained by the position of the Botswana 
governments throughout the Cold War and, more importantly, the apartheid regime 
in South Africa. Located in the heart of a region struggling with several highly 
intense ideological conflicts (leftist and black nationalist movements, on the one 
hand; rightist and white supremacist, on the other hand), the acceptance of liberal 
institutions consisted of the ‘centrist’ position that the country’s survival and 
development depended on. 
Although the combination of liberalism (e.g. regular elections, representative 
democracy, and market economy) with state developmentalism has consolidated the 
view of Botswana as an ‘African miracle,’ critical literature on national 
achievements started to question the validity of liberal values in contemporary 
Botswana. In spite of the fantastic economic growth in the 1980s, social disparities 
increased, as many Botswana citizens remained stranded in subsistence agriculture 
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and poverty. In addition to that, as the response to HIV/AIDS has shown, and several 
interviewed PEPFAR implementers confirmed, civil society, a critical bastion of 
liberalism, has not been significantly enhanced in terms of its participation in the 
country’s main challenges. Moreover, in recent years, the country has witnessed a 
rising “liberal authoritarianism,” materialised in the introduction of senior military 
staff in the civil service, extra-judicial murders and severe corruption. It is interesting 
to observe that a country with a liberal tradition seems to be receding at a time of 
alleged strong external diffusion of liberal values. How can one explain such 
apparent contradiction?  
In South Africa the adoption of liberal values was the result of the post-
apartheid compromise between the different political forces involved. To an extent, it 
implicated the retreat of revolutionary agenda of some sectors of the ANC and left 
wing parties. The ANC-led government became a social-democratic party, akin to 
the European Socialist third-way, with an aim of conciliating liberalisation of the 
economy with reduction of the deep-seated disparities inherited from apartheid. 
Major initiatives in this regard were the Black Economic Empowerment at home and 
NEPAD overseas. Additionally, it should be underlined the long-lasting integration 
of the South African economy, specially the mineral industries, in the global circuits 
of capital as a contributor for the relatively easy incorporation of liberalism in 
governance.  
Social policy has clearly followed a liberal approach, in which a range of 
state and parastatal institutions, NGOs and private companies, including those 
funded under PEPFAR, intervened in the realm of marginalised populations. 
Nevertheless, social inequalities have not shrunk but rather increased, as frequent 
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demonstrations, strikes and riots on service delivery confirm. The recently published 
Diagnostic of the National Planning Commission has also reiterated the central 
problem that growing poverty and inequality poses in strategic terms. Eventually, 
dissatisfaction with the state of affairs has led to two political responses to the 
problems of liberal in the country. One is a Marxist critique promoted by social 
movements building on the anti-apartheid struggle that rally around problems such as 
housing or HIV/AIDS. Another is markedly more visible and emulates Zimbabwean 
President Robert Mugabe’s ‘nativist’ proposals, which call for an absolute 
exoneration of white cadres in state and corporate structures, and nationalisation of 
the nation’s strategic industries. Independent of the success of forces contesting 
liberalism, South Africa is clearly undergoing challenges to its post-apartheid 
settlement rooted around liberal premises.  
Although committed to a democratic and all-inclusive state, the EPRDF 
government in Ethiopia has been severely criticised for its record so far. As 
mentioned, Ethiopia is the largest recipient in Africa of Western aid, which means 
that, in principle, is under significant exposure to conditionalities that promote liberal 
principles of governance, such as economic liberalisation or civil society promotion. 
However, according to many sources (opposition politicians, human rights NGOs, 
academics, foreign diplomats), the government has consecutively implementing 
‘illiberal’ measures that stretch from police and army violence to subtle sophisticated 
mechanisms of censorship. These measures have been accompanied by legislation 
that limits opposition politics and nongovernmental activities, e.g. the Charities Law 
of 2009. This legislation has been mentioned by PEPFAR implementers, although 
not always receiving criticism. 
267 
 
The EPRDF is found reproducing a political pattern that comes from the time 
of Haile Selassie, in which, parallel to a modernising ambition of political and social 
life, out-of-state forces are regarded with suspicion. This has implications for what 
can be taken as civil society, since the tendency, once foreign development 
assistance is assured, is for the state to create its own apparatus of nongovernmental 
organisations to apply for and administer the funding. Nonetheless, and despite 
occasional criticism at the diplomatic level, international funding is not suspended. 
The Ethiopian political arena is still highly featured by political conflict, namely 
opposition exerted by regionalist armed groups against the sovereignty of Addis 
Ababa over their regions (particularly Oromia and Ogaden) whose demands stretch 
from decentralisation to actual secession. More recently, the projects on land leasing 
and the Millennium Dam pose serious issues to the survival of resident communities, 
whose benefit from these initiatives is unclear. These dynamics suggest that more or 
less conflictual domestic dynamics may also influence the level and nature of agency 
the country holds both nationally and internationally.   
    
9.5.2. Emerging Countries in Global Health Governance 
A recent relative fall in development/health expenditure in recipient settings 
by traditional Western donors combined with a relative increase of influence by non-
traditional, non-Western donors is gradually changing the landscape of global health 
governance. Both in policy and implementation terms, Western donors face reducing 
capability to support multilateral and bilateral initiatives, at least the way they used 
to throughout the last decade. Even if this reduced capability arguably constitutes an 
undesired reaction to contextual events (financial-economic crisis), in the case of 
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PEPFAR, for instance, the focus on country ownership as a means to achieve 
sustainability reflects an interest in steadily stepping back from the initial effort. This 
change also occurs at a time of growing implication of national governmental 
institutions in health policy and implementation among recipient countries, as the 
three cases under examination here demonstrate.  
Considering non-traditional, non-Western actors, countries such as Brazil or 
India, are allegedly evolving from a situation in which they appear as objects of 
external policy, e.g. as recipients of Global Fund assistance, towards subjects of 
foreign policy. Indeed, further research is necessary to better understand these 
countries’ complex role as both donors and recipients of policy and intervention.  
Finally, as traditional, large-scale donors reduce their capabilities, recipient countries 
as a whole are challenged externally and internally to engage in health, and more 
expansively, social policy. Empirical evidence from Ethiopia, Botswana and, 
tentatively, South Africa, demonstrate the inclusion of such policy in larger state-
developmentalist agendas. In the case of ‘emerging’ actors, particularly Brazil, 
research shows the relevance of their own domestic experience with the epidemic, 
and how it contributed to larger concerns around nation-building (Lieberman, 2009) 
but also an improvement of their international standing, the case of HIV/AIDS being 
a case in point. 
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9.5.3. Security-Development Nexus 
Finally, the securitisation of development aid and humanitarian interventions 
that has been taking shape requires further research regarding its institutionalisation 
and its impact in the field of health governance. 
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Annex 1 – Questions to PEPFAR Implementers 
 
1) Apart from specific AIDS-related activities, in which areas of activity does your 
organization intervene? 
2) Which are the main facilitating conditions and obstacles you find in your projects' 
implementation? 
3) In what ways has PEPFAR funding enhanced the activities or your organization? 
4) Have there been, in your understanding, any obstacles or facilitating conditions for 
PEPFAR's implementation in Botswana/Ethiopia/South Africa? 
5) What changes do you observe in the struggle against AIDS before and after 
PEPFAR in Botswana/Ethiopia/South Africa (and elsewhere in the world)? 
6) Apart from medical outcomes, which are the major results generated by PEPFAR 
in the field of economic development in Botswana/Ethiopia/South Africa (and 
elsewhere in the world)? 
7) PEPFAR was reauthorized in 2008. But with a new United States Administration 
can you identify any changes at the implementation, framework or planning levels 
due to this change? 
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 Annex 2 – Questions to Other Organisations 
 
1) How do you generally assess PEPFAR’s implementation in the province/country? 
Could you please indicate facilitating conditions and obstacles influencing the 
process of implementation? 
2) Which are PEPFAR’s potentialities and weak links? 
3) What changes do you observe in the struggle against AIDS before and after 
PEPFAR (around 2003)? 
4) Apart from medical outcomes, which are the major results generated by PEPFAR-
supported projects in the field of social and economic development? 
5) PEPFAR was reauthorized in 2008. But with a new United States Administration 
can you identify any changes at the implementation, framework or planning levels 
due to this change? 
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Annex 3 – United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria Act of 2003 
One Hundred Eighth Congress of the 
United States of America  
AT THE FIRST SESSION  
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the seventh day of January, two thousand 
and three  
An Act  
To provide assistance to foreign countries to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and for other 
purposes.  
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled,  
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.  
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘United States Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003’’.  
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:  
 
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Findings.Sec. 3. Definitions. Sec. 4. Purpose.Sec. 5. Authority to 
consolidate and combine reports.  
TITLE I—POLICY PLANNING AND COORDINATION  
Sec. 101. Development of a comprehensive, five-year, global strategy.Sec. 102. HIV/AIDS 
Response Coordinator.  
TITLE II—SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERAL FUNDS, PROGRAMS, AND PUBLICPRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS  
Sec. 201. Sense of Congress on public-private partnerships. 
Sec. 202. Participation in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  
Sec. 203. Voluntary contributions to international vaccine funds.  
TITLE III—BILATERAL EFFORTS  
Subtitle A—General Assistance and Programs  
Sec. 301. Assistance to combat HIV/AIDS. 
Sec. 302. Assistance to combat tuberculosis.  
Sec. 303. Assistance to combat malaria.  
Sec. 304. Pilot program for the placement of health care professionals in overseas areas severely affected by 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. 
Sec. 305. Report on treatment activities by relevant executive branch agencies. 
Sec. 306. Strategies to improve injection safety. 
Sec. 307. Study on illegal diversions of prescription drugs.  
Subtitle B—Assistance for Children and Families  
Sec. 311. Findings. 
Sec. 312. Policy and requirements. 
Sec. 313. Annual reports on prevention of mother-to-child transmission of the HIV infection.  
Sec. 314. Pilot program of assistance for children and families affected by HIV/ AIDS.  
Sec. 315. Pilot program on family survival partnerships.  
TITLE IV—AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS Sec. 401. Authorization 
of appropriations.  
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H. R. 1298—2  
Sec. 402. Sense of Congress. 
Sec. 403. Allocation of funds.  
Sec. 404. Assistance from the United States private sector to prevent and reduce HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
TITLE V—INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
Sec. 501. Modification of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. Sec. 502. Report on expansion of debt relief to non-
HIPC countries.Sec. 503. Authorization of appropriations.  
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.  
Congress makes the following findings:  
(1) During the last 20 years, HIV/AIDS has assumed pandemic proportions, spreading 
from the most severely affected regions, sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, to all 
corners of the world, and leaving an unprecedented path of death and devastation.  
(2) According to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), more 
than 65,000,000 individuals worldwide have been infected with HIV since the epidemic 
began, more than 25,000,000 of these individuals have lost their lives to the disease, and 
more than 14,000,000 children have been orphaned by the disease. HIV/AIDS is the 
fourth-highest cause of death in the world.  
(3)(A) At the end of 2002, an estimated 42,000,000 individuals were infected with HIV or 
living with AIDS, of which more than 75 percent live in Africa or the Caribbean. Of 
these individuals, more than 3,200,000 were children under the age of 15 and more than 
19,200,000 were women.  
(B) Women are four times more vulnerable to infection than are men and are becoming 
infected at increasingly high rates, in part because many societies do not provide poor 
women and young girls with the social, legal, and cultural protections against high risk 
activities that expose them to HIV/AIDS.  
(C) Women and children who are refugees or are internally displaced persons are 
especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation and violence, thereby increasing the 
possibility of HIV infection.  
(4) As the leading cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa, AIDS has killed more than 
19,400,000 individuals (more than 3 times the number of AIDS deaths in the rest of the 
world) and will claim the lives of one-quarter of the population, mostly adults, in the 
next decade.  
(5) An estimated 2,000,000 individuals in Latin America and the Caribbean and another 
7,100,000 individuals in Asia and the Pacific region are infected with HIV or living with 
AIDS. Infection rates are rising alarmingly in Eastern Europe (especially in the Russian 
Federation), Central Asia, and China.  
(6) HIV/AIDS threatens personal security by affecting the health, lifespan, and 
productive capacity of the individual and the social cohesion and economic well-being of 
the family.  
(7) HIV/AIDS undermines the economic security of a country and individual businesses 
in that country by weakening the productivity and longevity of the labor force across a 
broad array of economic sectors and by reducing the potential for economic growth over 
the long term.  
(8) HIV/AIDS destabilizes communities by striking at the most mobile and educated 
members of society, many of whom are responsible for security at the local level and 
governance  
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at the national and subnational levels as well as many teachers, health care personnel, 
and other community workers vital to community development and the effort to combat 
HIV/AIDS. In some countries the overwhelming challenges of the HIV/ AIDS epidemic 
are accelerating the outward migration of critically important health care professionals.  
(9) HIV/AIDS weakens the defenses of countries severely affected by the HIV/AIDS 
crisis through high infection rates among members of their military forces and voluntary 
peacekeeping personnel. According to UNAIDS, in sub-Saharan Africa, many military 
forces have infection rates as much as five times that of the civilian population.  
(10) HIV/AIDS poses a serious security issue for the international community by—  
(A) increasing the potential for political instability and economic devastation, 
particularly in those countries and regions most severely affected by the disease;  
(B) decreasing the capacity to resolve conflicts through the introduction of peacekeeping 
forces because the environments into which these forces are introduced pose a high risk 
for the spread of HIV/AIDS; and  
(C) increasing the vulnerability of local populations to HIV/AIDS in conflict zones from 
peacekeeping troops with HIV infection rates significantly higher than civilian 
populations.  
(11) The devastation wrought by the HIV/AIDS pandemic is compounded by the 
prevalence of tuberculosis and malaria, particularly in developing countries where the 
poorest and most vulnerable members of society, including women, children, and those 
individuals living with HIV/AIDS, become infected. According to the World Health 
Organization (WHO), HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria accounted for more than 
5,700,000 deaths in 2001 and caused debilitating illnesses in millions more.  
(12) Together, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and related diseases are undermining 
agricultural production throughout Africa. According to the United Nations Food and 
Agricultural Organization, 7,000,000 agricultural workers throughout 25 African 
countries have died from AIDS since 1985. Countries with poorly developed agricultural 
systems, which already face chronic food shortages, are the hardest hit, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa, where high HIV prevalence rates are compounding the risk of 
starvation for an estimated 14,400,000 people.  
(13) Tuberculosis is the cause of death for one out of every three people with AIDS 
worldwide and is a highly communicable disease. HIV infection is the leading threat to 
tuberculosis control. Because HIV infection so severely weakens the immune system, 
individuals with HIV and latent tuberculosis infection have a 100 times greater risk of 
developing active tuberculosis diseases thereby increasing the risk of spreading 
tuberculosis to others. Tuberculosis, in turn, accelerates the onset of AIDS in individuals 
infected with HIV.  
(14) Malaria, the most deadly of all tropical parasitic diseases, has been undergoing a 
dramatic resurgence in recent years due to increasing resistance of the malaria parasite 
to inexpensive and effective drugs. At the same time, increasing  
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resistance of mosquitoes to standard insecticides makes control of transmission difficult 
to achieve. The World Health Organization estimates that between 300,000,000 and 
500,000,000 new cases of malaria occur each year, and annual deaths from the disease 
number between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000. Persons infected with HIV are particularly 
vulnerable to the malaria parasite. The spread of HIV infection contributes to the 
difficulties of controlling resurgence of the drug resistant malaria parasite.  
(15) HIV/AIDS is first and foremost a health problem. Successful strategies to stem the 
spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic will require clinical medical interventions, the 
strengthening of health care delivery systems and infrastructure, and determined 
national leadership and increased budgetary allocations for the health sector in 
countries affected by the epidemic as well as measures to address the social and 
behavioral causes of the problem and its impact on families, communities, and societal 
sectors.  
(16) Basic interventions to prevent new HIV infections and to bring care and treatment 
to people living with AIDS, such as voluntary counseling and testing and mother-to-
child transmission programs, are achieving meaningful results and are cost-effective. 
The challenge is to expand these interventions from a pilot program basis to a national 
basis in a coherent and sustainable manner.  
(17) Appropriate treatment of individuals with HIV/AIDS can prolong the lives of such 
individuals, preserve their families, prevent children from becoming orphans, and 
increase productivity of such individuals by allowing them to lead active lives and 
reduce the need for costly hospitalization for treatment of opportunistic infections 
caused by HIV.  
(18) Nongovernmental organizations, including faith-based organizations, with 
experience in health care and HIV/AIDS counseling, have proven effective in combating 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic and can be a resource in assisting indigenous organizations in 
severely affected countries in their efforts to provide treatment and care for individuals 
infected with HIV/ AIDS.  
(19) Faith-based organizations are making an important contribution to HIV prevention 
and AIDS treatment programs around the world. Successful HIV prevention programs 
in Uganda, Jamaica, and elsewhere have included local churches and faith-based groups 
in efforts to promote behavior changes to prevent HIV, to reduce stigma associated with 
HIV infection, to treat those afflicted with the disease, and to care for orphans. The 
Catholic Church alone currently cares for one in four people being treated for AIDS 
worldwide. Faith-based organizations possess infrastructure, experience, and knowledge 
that will be needed to carry out these programs in the future and should be an integral 
part of United States efforts. (20)(A) Uganda has experienced the most significant 
decline in HIV rates of any country in Africa, including a decrease among pregnant 
women from 20.6 percent in 1991 to 7.9 percent in 2000.  
(B) Uganda made this remarkable turnaround because President Yoweri Museveni 
spoke out early, breaking long-standing cultural taboos, and changed widespread 
perceptions  
 
299 
 
H. R. 1298—5 
about the disease. His leadership stands as a model for ways political leaders in Africa 
and other developing countries can mobilize their nations, including civic organizations, 
professional associations, religious institutions, business and labor to combat HIV/AIDS.  
(C) Uganda’s successful AIDS treatment and prevention program is referred to as the 
ABC model: ‘‘Abstain, Be faithful, use Condoms’’, in order of priority. Jamaica, Zambia, 
Ethiopia and Senegal have also successfully used the ABC model. Beginning in 1986, 
Uganda brought about a fundamental change in sexual behavior by developing a low-
cost program with the message: ‘‘Stop having multiple partners. Be faithful. Teenagers, 
wait until you are married before you begin sex.’’.  
(D) By 1995, 95 percent of Ugandans were reporting either one or zero sexual partners 
in the past year, and the proportion of sexually active youth declined significantly from 
the late 1980s to the mid-1990s. The greatest percentage decline in HIV infections and 
the greatest degree of behavioral change occurred in those 15 to 19 years old. Uganda’s 
success shows that behavior change, through the use of the ABC model, is a very 
successful way to prevent the spread of HIV.  
(21) The magnitude and scope of the HIV/AIDS crisis demands a comprehensive, long-
term, international response focused upon addressing the causes, reducing the spread, 
and ameliorating the consequences of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, including—  
(A) prevention and education, care and treatment, basic and applied research, and 
training of health care workers, particularly at the community and provincial levels, and 
other community workers and leaders needed to cope with the range of consequences of 
the HIV/AIDS crisis;  
(B) development of health care infrastructure and delivery systems through cooperative 
and coordinated public efforts and public and private partnerships;  
(C) development and implementation of national and community-based multisector 
strategies that address the impact of HIV/AIDS on the individual, family, community, 
and nation and increase the participation of at-risk populations in programs designed to 
encourage behavioral and social change and reduce the stigma associated with HIV/ 
AIDS; and  
(D) coordination of efforts between international organizations such as the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the World Health Organization (WHO), national governments, 
and private sector organizations, including faith-based organizations.  
(22) The United States has the capacity to lead and enhance the effectiveness of the 
international community’s response by—  
(A) providing substantial financial resources, technical expertise, and training, 
particularly of health care personnel and community workers and leaders;  
(B) promoting vaccine and microbicide research and the development of new treatment 
protocols in the public and commercial pharmaceutical research sectors;  
(C) making available pharmaceuticals and diagnostics for HIV/AIDS therapy;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
300 
 
H. R. 1298—6 
(D) encouraging governments and faith-based and community-based organizations to 
adopt policies that treat HIV/AIDS as a multisectoral public health problem affecting 
not only health but other areas such as agriculture, education, the economy, the family 
and society, and assisting them to develop and implement programs corresponding to 
these needs;  
(E) promoting healthy lifestyles, including abstinence, delaying sexual debut, 
monogamy, marriage, faithfulness, use of condoms, and avoiding substance abuse; and  
(F) encouraging active involvement of the private sector, including businesses, 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, the medical and scientific communities, 
charitable foundations, private and voluntary organizations and nongovernmental 
organizations, faith-based organizations, community-based organizations, and other 
nonprofit entities.  
(23) Prostitution and other sexual victimization are degrading to women and children 
and it should be the policy of the United States to eradicate such practices. The sex 
industry, the trafficking of individuals into such industry, and sexual violence are 
additional causes of and factors in the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. One in nine 
South Africans is living with AIDS, and sexual assault is rampant, at a victimization 
rate of one in three women. Meanwhile in Cambodia, as many as 40 percent of 
prostitutes are infected with HIV and the country has the highest rate of increase of 
HIV infection in all of Southeast Asia. Victims of coercive sexual encounters do not get to 
make choices about their sexual activities.  
(24) Strong coordination must exist among the various agencies of the United States to 
ensure effective and efficient use of financial and technical resources within the United 
States Government with respect to the provision of international HIV/AIDS assistance.  
(25) In his address to Congress on January 28, 2003, the President announced the 
Administration’s intention to embark on a five-year emergency plan for AIDS relief, to 
confront HIV/AIDS with the goals of preventing 7,000,000 new HIV/ AIDS infections, 
treating at least 2,000,000 people with life-extending drugs, and providing humane care 
for millions of people suffering from HIV/AIDS, and for children orphaned by HIV/AIDS.  
(26) In this address to Congress, the President stated the following: ‘‘Today, on the 
continent of Africa, nearly 30,000,000 people have the AIDS virus—including 3,000,000 
children under the age of 15. There are whole countries in Africa where more than one-
third of the adult population carries the infection. More than 4,000,000 require 
immediate drug treatment. Yet across that continent, only 50,000 AIDS victims—only 
50,000—are receiving the medicine they need.’’.  
(27) Furthermore, the President focused on care and treatment of HIV/AIDS in his 
address to Congress, stating the following: ‘‘Because the AIDS diagnosis is considered a 
death sentence, many do not seek treatment. Almost all who do are turned away. A 
doctor in rural South Africa describes his frustration. He says, ‘We have no medicines. 
Many hospitals tell people, you’ve got AIDS, we can’t help you. Go home and  
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die.’ In an age of miraculous medicines, no person should have to hear those words. 
AIDS can be prevented. Anti-retroviral drugs can extend life for many years * * * 
Ladies and gentlemen, seldom has history offered a greater opportunity to do so 
much for so many.’’.  
(28) Finally, the President stated that ‘‘[w]e have confronted, and will continue 
to confront, HIV/AIDS in our own country’’, proposing now that the United States 
should lead the world in sparing innocent people from a plague of nature, and 
asking Congress ‘‘to commit $15,000,000,000 over the next five years, including 
nearly $10,000,000,000 in new money, to turn the tide against AIDS in the most 
afflicted nations of Africa and the Caribbean’’.  
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.  
In this Act:  
(1) AIDS.—The term ‘‘AIDS’’ means the acquired immune deficiency syndrome.  
(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional 
committees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.  
(3) GLOBAL FUND.—The term ‘‘Global Fund’’ means the public-private partnership known 
as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria established pursuant to 
Article 80 of the Swiss Civil Code.  
(4) HIV.—The term ‘‘HIV’’ means the human immunodeficiency virus, the pathogen that 
causes AIDS.  
(5) HIV/AIDS.—The term ‘‘HIV/AIDS’’ means, with respect to an individual, an 
individual who is infected with HIV or living with AIDS.  
(6) RELEVANT EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES.—The term ‘‘relevant executive branch 
agencies’’ means the Department of State, the United States Agency for International 
Development, and any other department or agency of the United States that participates 
in international HIV/AIDS activities pursuant to the authorities of such department or 
agency or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  
 
SEC. 4. PURPOSE.  
The purpose of this Act is to strengthen United States leadership and the 
effectiveness of the United States response to certain global infectious diseases by—  
(1) establishing a comprehensive, integrated five-year, global strategy to fight HIV/AIDS 
that encompasses a plan for phased expansion of critical programs and improved 
coordination among relevant executive branch agencies and between the United States 
and foreign governments and international organizations;  
(2) providing increased resources for multilateral efforts to fight HIV/AIDS;  
(3) providing increased resources for United States bilateral efforts, particularly for 
technical assistance and training, to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria;  
(4) encouraging the expansion of private sector efforts and expanding public-private 
sector partnerships to combat HIV/ AIDS; and  
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(5) intensifying efforts to support the development of vaccines and treatment for 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. 
SEC. 5. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE AND COMBINE REPORTS.  
With respect to the reports required by this Act to be submitted by the President, to 
ensure an efficient use of resources, the President may, in his discretion and 
notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, consolidate or combine any of these 
reports, except for the report required by section 101 of this Act, so long as the required 
elements of each report are addressed and reported within a 90-day period from the 
original deadline date for submission of the report specified in this Act. The President 
may also enter into contracts with organizations with relevant expertise to develop, 
originate, or contribute to any of the reports required by this Act to be submitted by the 
President.  
TITLE I—POLICY PLANNING AND COORDINATION  
SEC. 101. DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE, FIVE-YEAR, GLOBAL STRATEGY.  
(a) STRATEGY.—The President shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, five-year 
strategy to combat global HIV/AIDS that strengthens the capacity of the United States 
to be an effective leader of the international campaign against HIV/AIDS. Such strategy 
shall maintain sufficient flexibility and remain responsive to the ever-changing nature 
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and shall—  
(1) include specific objectives, multisectoral approaches, and specific strategies to treat 
individuals infected with HIV/AIDS and to prevent the further spread of HIV infections, 
with a particular focus on the needs of families with children (including the prevention 
of mother-to-child transmission), women, young people, and children (such as 
unaccompanied minor children and orphans);  
(2) as part of the strategy, implement a tiered approach to direct delivery of care and 
treatment through a system based on central facilities augmented by expanding circles 
of local delivery of care and treatment through local systems and capacity;  
(3) assign priorities for relevant executive branch agencies;  
(4) provide that the reduction of HIV/AIDS behavioral risks shall be a priority of all 
prevention efforts in terms of funding, educational messages, and activities by 
promoting abstinence from sexual activity and substance abuse, encouraging monogamy 
and faithfulness, promoting the effective use of condoms, and eradicating prostitution, 
the sex trade, rape, sexual assault and sexual exploitation of women and children;  
(5) improve coordination and reduce duplication among relevant executive branch 
agencies, foreign governments, and international organizations;  
(6) project general levels of resources needed to achieve the stated objectives;  
(7) expand public-private partnerships and the leveraging of resources;  
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(8) maximize United States capabilities in the areas of technical assistance and training 
and research, including vaccine research;  
(9) establish priorities for the distribution of resources based on factors such as the size 
and demographics of the population with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria and the 
needs of that population and the existing infrastructure or funding levels that may exist 
to cure, treat, and prevent HIV/ AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria; and  
(10) include initiatives describing how the President will maximize the leverage of 
private sector dollars in reduction and treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria.  
(b) REPORT.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report setting 
forth the strategy described in subsection (a).  
(2) REPORT CONTENTS.—The report required by paragraph  
(1) shall include a discussion of the elements described in paragraph (3) and may include 
a discussion of additional elements relevant to the strategy described in subsection (a). 
Such discussion may include an explanation as to why a particular element described in 
paragraph (3) is not relevant to such strategy.  
(3) REPORT ELEMENTS.—The elements referred to in paragraph (2) are the following:  
(A) The objectives, general and specific, of the strategy.  
(B) A description of the criteria for determining success of the strategy.  
(C) A description of the manner in which the strategy will address the fundamental 
elements of prevention and education, care, and treatment (including increasing access 
to pharmaceuticals and to vaccines), the promotion of abstinence, monogamy, avoidance 
of substance abuse, and use of condoms, research (including incentives for vaccine 
development and new protocols), training of health care workers, the development of 
health care infrastructure and delivery systems, and avoidance of substance abuse.  
(D) A description of the manner in which the strategy will promote the development and 
implementation of national and community-based multisectoral strategies and 
programs, including those designed to enhance leadership capacity particularly at the 
community level.  
(E) A description of the specific strategies developed to meet the unique needs of women, 
including the empowerment of women in interpersonal situations, young people and 
children, including those orphaned by HIV/AIDS and those who are victims of the sex 
trade, rape, sexual abuse, assault, and exploitation.  
(F) A description of the specific strategies developed to encourage men to be responsible 
in their sexual behavior, child rearing and to respect women including the reduction of 
sexual violence and coercion.  
(G) A description of the specific strategies developed to increase women’s access to 
employment opportunities, income, productive resources, and microfinance programs.  
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(H) A description of the programs to be undertaken to maximize United States 
contributions in the areas of technical assistance, training (particularly of health care 
workers and community-based leaders in affected sectors), and research, including the 
promotion of research on vaccines and microbicides.  
(I) An identification of the relevant executive branch agencies that will be involved and 
the assignment of priorities to those agencies.  
(J) A description of the role of each relevant executive branch agency and the types of 
programs that the agency will be undertaking.  
(K) A description of the mechanisms that will be utilized to coordinate the efforts of the 
relevant executive branch agencies, to avoid duplication of efforts, to enhance on-site 
coordination efforts, and to ensure that each agency undertakes programs primarily in 
those areas where the agency has the greatest expertise, technical capabilities, and 
potential for success.  
(L) A description of the mechanisms that will be utilized to ensure greater coordination 
between the United States and foreign governments and international organizations 
including the Global Fund, UNAIDS, international financial institutions, and private 
sector organizations.  
(M) The level of resources that will be needed on an annual basis and the manner in 
which those resources would generally be allocated among the relevant executive branch 
agencies.  
(N) A description of the mechanisms to be established for monitoring and evaluating 
programs, promoting successful models, and for terminating unsuccessful programs.  
(O) A description of the manner in which private, nongovernmental entities will factor 
into the United States Government-led effort and a description of the type of 
partnerships that will be created to maximize the capabilities of these private sector 
entities and to leverage resources.  
(P) A description of the ways in which United States leadership will be used to enhance 
the overall international response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and particularly to 
heighten the engagement of the member states of the G– 8 and to strengthen key 
financial and coordination mechanisms such as the Global Fund and UNAIDS.  
(Q) A description of the manner in which the United States strategy for combating 
HIV/AIDS relates to and supports other United States assistance strategies in devel-
oping countries.  
(R) A description of the programs to be carried out under the strategy that are 
specifically targeted at women and girls to educate them about the spread of HIV/AIDS.  
(S) A description of efforts being made to address the unique needs of families with 
children with respect to HIV/AIDS, including efforts to preserve the family unit.  
(T) An analysis of the emigration of critically important medical and public health 
personnel, including physicians,  
305 
 
H. R. 1298—11  
nurses, and supervisors from sub-Saharan African countries that are acutely 
impacted by HIV/AIDS, including a description of the causes, effects, and the 
impact on the stability of health infrastructures, as well as a summary of 
incentives and programs that the United States could provide, in concert with 
other private and public sector partners and international organizations, to 
stabilize health institutions by encouraging critical personnel to remain in their 
home countries.  
(U) A description of the specific strategies developed to promote sustainability of 
HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals (including antiretrovirals) and the effects of drug resistance 
on HIV/AIDS patients.  
(V) A description of the specific strategies to ensure that the extraordinary benefit of 
HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals (especially antiretrovirals) are not diminished through the 
illegal counterfeiting of pharmaceuticals and black market sales of such 
pharmaceuticals.  
(W) An analysis of the prevalence of Human Papilloma Virus (HPV) in sub-Saharan 
Africa and the impact that condom usage has upon the spread of HPV in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 
(c) STUDY; DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES.—  
(1) STUDY.—Not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Institute of Medicine shall publish findings comparing the success rates of the various 
programs and methods used under the strategy described in subsection  
(a) to reduce, prevent, and treat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.  
(2) DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES.—In prioritizing the distribution of resources under the 
strategy described in subsection (a), the President shall consider the findings published 
by the Institute of Medicine under this subsection.  
 
SEC. 102. HIV/AIDS RESPONSE COORDINATOR.  
(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF POSITION.—Section 1 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 265(a)) is amended—  
(1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and  
(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following: ‘‘(f) HIV/AIDS RESPONSE 
COORDINATOR.—  
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—There shall be established within the Department of State in 
the immediate office of the Secretary of State a Coordinator of United States 
Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally, who shall be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Coordinator shall 
report directly to the Secretary.  
‘‘(2) AUTHORITIES AND DUTIES; DEFINITIONS.—  
‘‘(A) AUTHORITIES.—The Coordinator, acting through such nongovernmental 
organizations (including faith-based and community-based organizations) and 
relevant executive branch agencies as may be necessary and appropriate to 
effect the purposes of this section, is authorized—  
‘‘(i) to operate internationally to carry out prevention, care, treatment, 
support, capacity development, and other activities for combatting 
HIV/AIDS;  
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‘‘(ii) to transfer and allocate funds to relevant executive branch agencies; and  
‘‘(iii) to provide grants to, and enter into contracts with, nongovernmental organizations 
(including faith-based and community-based organizations) to carry out the purposes of 
section. ‘‘(B) DUTIES.—  
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—The Coordinator shall have primary responsibility for the oversight 
and coordination of all resources and international activities of the United States 
Government to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic, including all programs, projects, and 
activities of the United States Government relating to the HIV/AIDS pandemic under 
the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 
or any amendment made by that Act.  
‘‘(ii) SPECIFIC DUTIES.—The duties of the Coordinator shall specifically include the 
following:  
‘‘(I) Ensuring program and policy coordination among the relevant executive branch 
agencies and nongovernmental organizations, including auditing, monitoring, and 
evaluation of all such programs.  
‘‘(II) Ensuring that each relevant executive branch agency undertakes programs 
primarily in those areas where the agency has the greatest expertise, technical 
capabilities, and potential for success.  
‘‘(III) Avoiding duplication of effort. ‘‘(IV) Ensuring coordination of relevant 
executive branch agency activities in the field. ‘‘(V) Pursuing coordination 
with other countries and international organizations.  
‘‘(VI) Resolving policy, program, and funding disputes among the relevant executive 
branch agencies.  
‘‘(VII) Directly approving all activities of the United States (including funding) 
relating to combatting HIV/AIDS in each of Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and other countries designated by the President, which 
other designated countries may include those countries in which the United States 
is implementing HIV/ AIDS programs as of the date of the enactment of the United 
States Leadership Against HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003.  
‘‘(VIII) Establishing due diligence criteria for all recipients of funds section and all 
activities subject to the coordination and appropriate monitoring, evaluation, and 
audits carried out by the Coordinator necessary to assess the measurable outcomes 
of such activities.  
‘‘(C) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph: ‘‘(i) AIDS.—The term ‘AIDS’ means 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome.  
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‘‘(ii) HIV.—The term ‘HIV’ means the human immunodeficiency virus, the pathogen that 
causes  
AIDS.  
‘‘(iii) HIV/AIDS.—The term ‘HIV/AIDS’ means,  
with respect to an individual, an individual who is  
infected with HIV or living with AIDS.  
‘‘(iv) RELEVANT EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES.— The term ‘relevant executive 
branch agencies’ means the Department of State, the United States Agency 
for International Development, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (including the Public Health Service), and any other department 
or agency of the United States that participates in international HIV/AIDS 
activities pursuant to the authorities of such department or agency or this 
Act.’’.  
(b) RESOURCES.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
President shall specify the necessary financial and personnel resources, from funds 
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 401 for 
HIV/AIDS assistance, that shall be assigned to and under the direct control of the 
Coordinator of United States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally to 
establish and maintain the duties and supporting activities assigned to the Coordinator 
by this Act and the amendments made by this Act.  
(c) ESTABLISHMENT OF SEPARATE ACCOUNT.—There is established in the general fund of 
the Treasury a separate account which shall be known as the ‘‘Activities to Combat 
HIV/AIDS Globally Fund’’ and which shall be administered by the Coordinator of United 
States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally. There shall be deposited 
into the Fund all amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations 
under section 401 for HIV/AIDS assistance, except for amounts appropriated for United 
States contributions to the Global Fund.  
 
TITLE II—SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERAL FUNDS, 
PROGRAMS, AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS  
SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS.  
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:  
(1) Innovative partnerships between governments and organizations in the private 
sector (including foundations, universities, corporations, faith-based and community-
based organizations, and other nongovernmental organizations) have proliferated in 
recent years, particularly in the area of health.  
(2) Public-private sector partnerships multiply local and international capacities to 
strengthen the delivery of health services in developing countries and to accelerate 
research for vaccines and other pharmaceutical products that are essential to combat 
infectious diseases decimating the populations of these countries.  
(3) These partnerships maximize the unique capabilities of each sector while combining 
financial and other resources, scientific knowledge, and expertise toward common goals 
which neither the public nor the private sector can achieve alone.  
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(4) Sustaining existing public-private partnerships and building new ones are critical to 
the success of the international community’s efforts to combat HIV/AIDS and other 
infectious diseases around the globe.  
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—  
(1) the sustainment and promotion of public-private partnerships should be a priority 
element of the strategy pursued by the United States to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
and other global health crises; and  
(2) the United States should systematically track the evolution of these partnerships 
and work with others in the public and private sector to profile and build upon those 
models that are most effective.  
SEC. 202. PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA.  
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds as follows:  
(1) The establishment of the Global Fund in January 2002 is consistent with the general 
principles for an international AIDS trust fund first outlined by the Congress in the 
Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000 (Public Law 106– 264).  
(2) Section 2, Article 5 of the bylaws of the Global Fund provides for the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development to serve as the initial collection trustee for 
the Global Fund.  
(3) The trustee agreement signed between the Global Fund and the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development narrows the range of duties to include receiving 
and investing funds from donors, disbursing the funds upon the instruction of the Global 
Fund, reporting on trust fund resources to donors and the Global Fund, and providing 
an annual external audit report to the Global Fund.  
(b) AUTHORITY FOR UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION.—  
(1) UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION.—The United States is hereby authorized to participate 
in the Global Fund.  
(2) PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.—The Global Fund shall be considered a public 
international organization for purposes of section 1 of the International Organizations 
Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288).  
 
(c) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, and annually thereafter for the duration of the Global Fund, the President 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the Global Fund, 
including contributions pledged to, contributions (including donations from the private 
sector) received by, and projects funded by the Global Fund, and the mechanisms 
established for transparency and accountability in the grant-making process.  
(d) UNITED STATES FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION.—  
(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to any other funds authorized to be 
appropriated for bilateral or multilateral HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria programs, 
of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 401, there are authorized to 
be appropriated to the President up to $1,000,000,000 for the period of fiscal year 2004 
beginning on January 1, 2004, and such sums as may be necessary for  
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the fiscal years 2005–2008, for contributions to the Global Fund.  
(2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated under paragraph (1) are authorized 
to remain available until expended.  
(3) REPROGRAMMING OF FISCAL YEAR 2001 FUNDS.—Funds made available for fiscal year 
2001 under section 141 of the Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000—  
(A) are authorized to remain available until expended; and  
(B) shall be transferred to, merged with, and made available for the same purposes as, 
funds made available for fiscal years 2004 through 2008 under paragraph (1).  
(4) LIMITATION.—  
 
(A)(i) At any time during fiscal years 2004 through 2008, no United States 
contribution to the Global Fund may cause the total amount of United States 
Government contributions to the Global Fund to exceed 33 percent of the total 
amount of funds contributed to the Global Fund from all sources. Contributions to 
the Global Fund from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and the International Monetary Fund shall not be considered in determining 
compliance with this paragraph.  
(ii) If, at any time during any of the fiscal years 2004 through 2008, the 
President determines that the Global Fund has provided assistance to a country, the 
government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 
6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)), has 
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, then the United 
States shall withhold from its contribution for the next fiscal year an amount equal 
to the amount expended by the Fund to the government of each such country.  
(iii) If at any time the President determines that the expenses of the Governing, 
Administrative, and Advisory Bodies (including the Partnership Forum, the Foundation 
Board, the Secretariat, and the Technical Review Board) of the Global Fund exceed 10 
percent of the total expenditures of the Fund for any 2-year period, the United States 
shall withhold from its contribution for the next fiscal year an amount equal the to the 
average annual amount expended by the Fund for such 2-year period for the expenses of 
the Governing, Administrative, and Advisory Bodies in excess of 10 percent of the total 
expenditures of the Fund.  
(iv) The President may waive the application of clause  
(iii) if the President determines that extraordinary circumstances warrant such a 
waiver. No waiver under this clause may be for any period that exceeds 1 year.  
 
(v) If, at any time during any of the fiscal years 2004 through 2008, the 
President determines that the salary of any individual employed by the Global Fund 
exceeds the salary of the Vice President of the United States (as determined under 
section 104 of title 3, United States Code) for that fiscal year, then the United States 
shall withhold from its contribution for the next fiscal year an  
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amount equal to the aggregate amount by which the salary of each such individual 
exceeds the salary of the Vice President of the United States.  
(B)(i) Any amount made available under this subsection that is withheld by 
reason of subparagraph (A)(i) shall be contributed to the Global Fund as soon as 
practicable, subject to subparagraph (A)(i), after additional contributions to the 
Global Fund are made from other sources.  
(ii) Any amount made available under this subsection that is withheld by 
reason of subparagraph (A)(iii) shall be transferred to the Activities to Combat 
HIV/AIDS Globally Fund and shall remain available under the same terms and 
conditions as funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations 
under section 401 for HIV/ AIDS assistance.  
(iii) Any amount made available under this subsection that is withheld by 
reason of clause (ii) or (iii) of subparagraph (A) is authorized to be made available to 
carry out section 104A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 
301 of this Act). Amounts made available under the preceding sentence are in 
addition to amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations 
under section 401 of this Act for HIV/AIDS assistance.  
(C)(i) The President may suspend the application of subparagraph (A) with 
respect to a fiscal year if the President determines that an international health 
emergency threatens the national security interests of the United States.  
(ii) The President shall notify the Committee on International Relations of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate not 
less than 5 days before making a determination under clause (i) with respect to the 
application of subparagraph (A)(i) and shall include in the notification—  
(I) a justification as to why increased United States Government contributions to the 
Global Fund is preferable to increased United States assistance to combat HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria on a bilateral basis; and  
(II) an explanation as to why other government donors to the Global Fund are unable to 
provide adequate contributions to the Fund.  
 
(e) INTERAGENCY TECHNICAL REVIEW PANEL.—  
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Coordinator of United States Government Activities to Combat 
HIV/AIDS Globally, established in section 1(f)(1) of the State Department Basic Authori-
ties Act of 1956 (as added by section 102(a) of this Act), shall establish in the executive 
branch an interagency technical review panel.  
(2) DUTIES.—The interagency technical review panel shall serve as a ‘‘shadow’’ panel to 
the Global Fund by—  
(A) periodically reviewing all proposals received by the Global Fund; and  
(B) providing guidance to the United States persons who are representatives on the 
panels, committees, and boards of the Global Fund, on the technical efficacy, suitability, 
and appropriateness of the proposals, and ensuring  
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that such persons are fully informed of technical inadequacies or other aspects 
of the proposals that are inconsistent with the purposes of this or any other Act 
relating to the provision of foreign assistance in the area of AIDS.  
(3) MEMBERSHIP.—The interagency technical review panel shall consist of qualified 
medical and development experts who are officers or employees of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for 
International Development.  
(4) CHAIR.—The Coordinator referred to in paragraph (1) shall chair the interagency 
technical review panel.  
(f) MONITORING BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL.—  
(1) MONITORING.—The Comptroller General shall monitor and evaluate projects funded 
by the Global Fund.  
(2) REPORT.—The Comptroller General shall on a biennial basis shall prepare and 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the results of 
the monitoring and evaluation described in paragraph (1) for the preceding 2-year 
period.  
 
(g) PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO CONGRESS.—The Coordinator of United States 
Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally shall make available to the 
Congress the following documents within 30 days of a request by the Congress for such 
documents:  
(1) All financial and accounting statements for the Global Fund and the Activities to 
Combat HIV/AIDS Globally Fund, including administrative and grantee statements.  
(2) Reports provided to the Global Fund and the Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally 
Fund by organizations contracted to audit recipients of funds.  
(3) Project proposals submitted by applicants for funding from the Global Fund and the 
Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally Fund, but which were not funded.  
(4) Progress reports submitted to the Global Fund and the Activities to Combat 
HIV/AIDS Globally Fund by grantees.  
(h) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING ENCOURAGEMENT OF PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
GLOBAL FUND.—It is the sense of the Congress that the President should—  
(1) conduct an outreach campaign that is designed to—  
(A) inform the public of the existence of—  
(i) the Global Fund; and  
(ii) any entity that will accept private contributions intended for use by the Global Fund; 
and  
(B) encourage private contributions to the Global Fund; and  
 
(2) encourage private contributions intended for use by the Global Fund by—  
(A) establishing and operating an Internet website, and publishing information about 
the website; and  
(B) making public service announcements on radio and television.  
 
SEC. 203. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL VACCINE FUNDS.  
(a) VACCINE FUND.—Section 302(k) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2222(k)) is amended—  
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(1) by striking ‘‘$50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2001 and 2002’’ and inserting 
‘‘such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’; and  
(2) by striking ‘‘Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations’’ and inserting ‘‘Vaccine 
Fund’’.  
(b) INTERNATIONAL AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE.—Section 302(l) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2222(l)) is amended by striking ‘‘$10,000,000 for each of the fiscal 
years 2001 and 2002’’ and inserting ‘‘such sums as may be necessary for each of the 
fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’.  
(c) SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MALARIA VACCINE.— Section 302 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2222)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
new subsection: ‘‘(m) In addition to amounts otherwise available under this section, 
there are authorized to be appropriated to the President such sums as may be necessary 
for each of the fiscal years 2004 through 2008 to be available for United States 
contributions to malaria vaccine development programs, including the Malaria Vaccine 
Initiative of the Program for Appropriate Technologies in Health (PATH).’’.  
 
TITLE III—BILATERAL EFFORTS  
Subtitle A—General Assistance and Programs  
SEC. 301. ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT HIV/AIDS.  
(a) AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961.— Chapter 1 of part I of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22  
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) is amended—  
(1) in section 104(c) (22 U.S.C. 2151b(c)), by striking paragraphs (4) through (7); 
and  
(2) by inserting after section 104 the following new section:  
‘‘SEC. 104A. ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT HIV/AIDS.  
‘‘(a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes that the alarming spread of HIV/AIDS in 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and other developing countries is a 
major global health, national security, development, and humanitarian crisis.  
‘‘(b) POLICY.—It is a major objective of the foreign assistance program of the United 
States to provide assistance for the prevention, treatment, and control of HIV/AIDS. The 
United States and other developed countries should provide assistance to countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and other countries and areas to control this crisis 
through HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, monitoring, and related activities, 
particularly activities focused on women and youth, including strategies to protect 
women and prevent mother-to-child transmission of the HIV infection.  
‘‘(c) AUTHORIZATION.—  
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Consistent with section 104(c), the President is authorized to 
furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, 
for HIV/AIDS, including to prevent, treat, and monitor HIV/AIDS, and carry out 
related activities, in countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and other 
countries and areas.  
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‘‘(2) ROLE OF NGOS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should 
provide an appropriate level of assistance under paragraph (1) through 
nongovernmental organizations (including faith-based and community-based 
organizations) in countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and other coun-
tries and areas affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  
‘‘(3) COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE EFFORTS.—The President shall coordinate the 
provision of assistance under paragraph  
(1) with the provision of related assistance by the Joint United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and other appropriate 
international organizations (such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development), relevant regional multilateral development institutions, national, 
state, and local governments of foreign countries, appropriate governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations, and relevant executive branch agencies. ‘‘(d) 
ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.—Assistance provided under sub 
section (c) shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be used to carry 
out the following activities: ‘‘(1) PREVENTION.—Prevention of HIV/AIDS 
through activities including—  
‘‘(A) programs and efforts that are designed or intended to impart 
knowledge with the exclusive purpose of helping individuals avoid behaviors 
that place them at risk of HIV infection, including integration of such programs 
into health programs and the inclusion in counseling programs of information 
on methods of avoiding infection of HIV, including delaying sexual debut, 
abstinence, fidelity and monogamy, reduction of casual sexual partnering, 
reducing sexual violence and coercion, including child marriage, widow 
inheritance, and polygamy, and where appropriate, use of condoms;  
‘‘(B) assistance to establish and implement culturally appropriate 
HIV/AIDS education and prevention programs that focus on helping individuals 
avoid infection of HIV/ AIDS, implemented through nongovernmental organiza-
tions, including faith-based and community-based organizations, particularly 
those organizations that utilize both professionals and volunteers with 
appropriate skills, experience, and community presence;  
‘‘(C) assistance for the purpose of encouraging men to be responsible in 
their sexual behavior, child rearing, and to respect women;  
‘‘(D) assistance for the purpose of providing voluntary testing and 
counseling (including the incorporation of confidentiality protections with 
respect to such testing and counseling);  
‘‘(E) assistance for the purpose of preventing motherto-child transmission of 
the HIV infection, including medications to prevent such transmission and 
access to infant formula and other alternatives for infant feeding;  
‘‘(F) assistance to ensure a safe blood supply and sterile medical equipment;  
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‘‘(G) assistance to help avoid substance abuse and intravenous drug use that can lead to 
HIV infection; and  
(H) assistance for the purpose of increasing women’s access to employment 
opportunities, income, productive resources, and microfinance programs, where 
appropriate. ‘‘(2) TREATMENT.—The treatment and care of individuals  
with HIV/AIDS, including—  
‘‘(A) assistance to establish and implement programs to strengthen and broaden 
indigenous health care delivery systems and the capacity of such systems to deliver 
HIV/ AIDS pharmaceuticals and otherwise provide for the treatment of individuals 
with HIV/AIDS, including clinical training for indigenous organizations and health 
care providers;  
‘‘(B) assistance to strengthen and expand hospice and palliative care programs 
to assist patients debilitated by HIV/AIDS, their families, and the primary 
caregivers of such patients, including programs that utilize faith-based and 
community-based organizations; and  
‘‘(C) assistance for the purpose of the care and treatment of individuals with 
HIV/AIDS through the provision of pharmaceuticals, including antiretrovirals and 
other pharmaceuticals and therapies for the treatment of opportunistic infections, 
nutritional support, and other treatment modalities. ‘‘(3) PREVENTATIVE 
INTERVENTION EDUCATION AND TECH 
NOLOGIES.—(A) With particular emphasis on specific populations that represent a 
particularly high risk of contracting or spreading HIV/AIDS, including those exploited 
through the sex trade, victims of rape and sexual assault, individuals already infected 
with HIV/AIDS, and in cases of occupational exposure of health care workers, assistance 
with efforts to reduce the risk of HIV/AIDS infection including post-exposure 
pharmaceutical prophylaxis, and necessary pharmaceuticals and commodities, including 
test kits, condoms, and, when proven effective, microbicides.  
‘‘(B) Bulk purchases of available test kits, condoms, and, when proven effective, 
microbicides that are intended to reduce the risk of HIV/AIDS transmission and for 
appropriate program support for the introduction and distribution of these commodities, 
as well as education and training on the use of the technologies.  
‘‘(4) MONITORING.—The monitoring of programs, projects, and activities carried out 
pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (3), including—  
‘‘(A) monitoring to ensure that adequate controls are established and 
implemented to provide HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals and other appropriate 
medicines to poor individuals with HIV/AIDS;  
‘‘(B) appropriate evaluation and surveillance activities;  
‘‘(C) monitoring to ensure that appropriate measures are being taken to 
maintain the sustainability of HIV/ AIDS pharmaceuticals (especially 
antiretrovirals) and ensure that drug resistance is not compromising the benefits of 
such pharmaceuticals; and  
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‘‘(D) monitoring to ensure appropriate law enforcement officials are working to 
ensure that HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals are not diminished through illegal 
counterfeiting or black market sales of such pharmaceuticals. ‘‘(5) 
PHARMACEUTICALS.—  
‘‘(A) PROCUREMENT.—The procurement of HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals, antiviral 
therapies, and other appropriate medicines, including medicines to treat 
opportunistic infections.  
‘‘(B) MECHANISMS FOR QUALITY CONTROL AND SUSTAINABLE SUPPLY.—Mechanisms to 
ensure that such HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals, antiretroviral therapies, and other 
appropriate medicines are quality-controlled and sustainably supplied.  
‘‘(C) DISTRIBUTION.—The distribution of such HIV/ AIDS pharmaceuticals, 
antiviral therapies, and other appropriate medicines (including medicines to treat 
opportunistic infections) to qualified national, regional, or local organizations for the 
treatment of individuals with HIV/AIDS in accordance with appropriate HIV/AIDS 
testing and monitoring requirements and treatment protocols and for the prevention 
of mother-to-child transmission of the HIV infection. ‘‘(6) RELATED ACTIVITIES.—The 
conduct of related activities,  
including— ‘‘(A) the care and support of children who are orphaned by 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, including services designed to care 
for orphaned children in a family environment which rely on 
extended family members; ‘‘(B) improved infrastructure and 
institutional capacity to develop and manage education, 
prevention, and treatment programs, including training and 
the resources to collect and maintain accurate HIV 
surveillance data to target programs and measure the 
effectiveness of interventions; and ‘‘(C) vaccine research and 
development partnership programs with specific plans of action 
to develop a safe, effective, accessible, preventive HIV vaccine 
for use throughout the world. ‘‘(7) COMPREHENSIVE HIV/AIDS 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNER- 
SHIPS.—The establishment and operation of public-private part 
nership entities within countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the  
Caribbean, and other countries affected by the HIV/AIDS pan 
demic that are dedicated to supporting the national strategy  
of such countries regarding the prevention, treatment, and  
monitoring of HIV/AIDS. Each such public-private partnership  
should— ‘‘(A) support the development, implementation, and management 
of comprehensive HIV/AIDS plans in support of the national 
HIV/AIDS strategy; ‘‘(B) operate at all times in a manner that 
emphasizes efficiency, accountability, and results-driven 
programs; ‘‘(C) engage both local and foreign development part-
ners and donors, including businesses, government agencies, 
academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations, 
foundations, multilateral development agencies, and faith-based 
organizations, to assist the country in coordinating  
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and implementing HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and monitoring programs 
in accordance with its national HIV/ AIDS strategy;  
‘‘(D) provide technical assistance, consultant services, financial planning, 
monitoring and evaluation, and research in support of the national HIV/AIDS 
strategy; and  
‘‘(E) establish local human resource capacities for the national HIV/AIDS 
strategy through the transfer of medical, managerial, leadership, and technical 
skills.  
‘‘(e) ANNUAL REPORT.—  
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than January 31 of each year, the President shall 
submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives a report on the 
implementation of this section for the prior fiscal year.  
‘‘(2) REPORT ELEMENTS.—Each report shall include—  
‘‘(A) a description of efforts made by each relevant executive branch agency 
to implement the policies set forth in this section, section 104B, and section 
104C;  
‘‘(B) a description of the programs established pursuant to 
such sections; and ‘‘(C) a detailed assessment of the impact of 
programs established pursuant to such sections, including—  
‘‘(i)(I) the effectiveness of such programs in reducing the spread of the HIV 
infection, particularly in women and girls, in reducing mother-to-child 
transmission of the HIV infection, and in reducing mortality rates from 
HIV/AIDS; and  
‘‘(II) the number of patients currently receiving treatment for AIDS in each 
country that receives assistance under this Act.  
‘‘(ii) the progress made toward improving health care delivery systems 
(including the training of adequate numbers of staff) and infrastructure to 
ensure increased access to care and treatment;  
‘‘(iii) with respect to tuberculosis, the increase in the number of people 
treated and the increase in number of tuberculosis patients cured through 
each program, project, or activity receiving United States foreign assistance 
for tuberculosis control purposes; and  
‘‘(iv) with respect to malaria, the increase in the number of people 
treated and the increase in number of malaria patients cured through 
each program, project, or activity receiving United States foreign 
assistance for malaria control purposes. ‘‘(f) FUNDING LIMITATION.—Of the 
funds made available to carry  
out this section in any fiscal year, not more than 7 percent may  
be used for the administrative expenses of the United States Agency  
for International Development in support of activities described  
in section 104(c), this section, section 104B, and section 104C.  
Such amount shall be in addition to other amounts otherwise avail 
able for such purposes. ‘‘(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: ‘‘(1) AIDS.—The term ‘AIDS’ 
means acquired immune deficiency syndrome.  
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‘‘(2) HIV.—The term ‘HIV’ means the human immuno 
deficiency virus, the pathogen that causes AIDS.  
‘‘(3) HIV/AIDS.—The term ‘HIV/AIDS’ means, with respect  
to an individual, an individual who is infected with HIV or  
living with AIDS.  
‘‘(4) RELEVANT EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES.—The term ‘relevant executive 
branch agencies’ means the Department of State, the United States Agency for 
International Development, the Department of Health and Human Services 
(including its agencies and offices), and any other department or agency of the 
United States that participates in international HIV/ AIDS activities pursuant to 
the authorities of such department or agency or this Act.’’.  
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition to funds available under section 104(c) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b(c)) for such purpose or under any other 
provision of that Act, there are authorized to be appropriated to the President, from 
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 401, such sums as may be 
necessary for each of the fiscal years 2004 through 2008 to carry out section 104A of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as added by subsection (a).  
(2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are 
authorized to remain available until expended.  
(3) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by paragraph 
(1) for the fiscal years 2004 through 2008, such sums as may be necessary are 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out section 104A(d)(4) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (as added by subsection (a)), relating to the procurement and distribution of 
HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals.  
 
(c) RELATIONSHIP TO ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO ENHANCE NUTRITION.—In recognition of the 
fact that malnutrition may hasten the progression of HIV to AIDS and may exacerbate 
the decline among AIDS patients leading to a shorter life span, the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development shall, as appropriate—  
(1) integrate nutrition programs with HIV/AIDS activities, generally;  
(2) provide, as a component of an anti-retroviral therapy program, support for food and 
nutrition to individuals infected with and affected by HIV/AIDS; and  
(3) provide support for food and nutrition for children affected by HIV/AIDS and to 
communities and households caring for children affected by HIV/AIDS.  
(d) ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.—An organization that is otherwise eligible to receive 
assistance under section 104A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by 
subsection (a)) or under any other provision of this Act (or any amendment made by this 
Act) to prevent, treat, or monitor HIV/AIDS shall not be required, as a condition of 
receiving the assistance, to endorse or utilize a multisectoral approach to combatting 
HIV/AIDS, or to endorse, utilize, or participate in a prevention method or treatment 
program to which the organization has a religious or moral objection.  
(e) LIMITATION.—No funds made available to carry out this Act, or any amendment made 
by this Act, may be used to promote  
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or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking. Nothing in the 
preceding sentence shall be construed to preclude the provision to individuals of 
palliative care, treatment, or post-exposure pharmaceutical prophylaxis, and necessary 
pharmaceuticals and commodities, including test kits, condoms, and, when proven 
effective, microbicides.  
(f) LIMITATION.—No funds made available to carry out this Act, or any amendment made 
by this Act, may be used to provide assistance to any group or organization that does not 
have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.  
(g) SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR INDIVIDUALS LIVING WITH 
HIV/AIDS.—  
(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:  
(A) The United States provides more than 60 percent of all food assistance worldwide.  
(B) According to the United Nations World Food Program and other United Nations 
agencies, food insecurity of individuals infected or living with HIV/AIDS is a major 
problem in countries with large populations of such individuals, particularly in African 
countries.  
(C) Although the United States is willing to provide food assistance to these countries in 
need, a few of the countries object to part or all of the assistance because of fears of 
benign genetic modifications to the foods.  
(D) Healthy and nutritious foods for individuals infected or living with HIV/AIDS are an 
important complement to HIV/AIDS medicines for such individuals.  
(E) Individuals infected with HIV have higher nutritional requirements than individuals 
who are not infected with HIV, particularly with respect to the need for protein. Also, 
there is evidence to suggest that the full benefit of therapy to treat HIV/AIDS may not 
be achieved in individuals who are malnourished, particularly in pregnant and lactating 
women.  
 
(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is therefore the sense of Congress that United States 
food assistance should be accepted by countries with large populations of individuals 
infected or living with HIV/AIDS, particularly African countries, in order to help 
feed such individuals.  
SEC. 302. ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT TUBERCULOSIS.  
(a) AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961.— Chapter 1 of part I of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22  
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), as amended by section 301 of this Act, is further amended by 
inserting after section 104A the following new section:  
‘‘SEC. 104B. ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT TUBERCULOSIS.  
‘‘(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:  
‘‘(1) Congress recognizes the growing international problem of tuberculosis and 
the impact its continued existence has on those countries that had previously 
largely controlled the disease.  
‘‘(2) Congress further recognizes that the means exist to control and treat 
tuberculosis through expanded use of the DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment 
Short-course) treatment strategy, including DOTS-Plus to address multi-drug 
resistant  
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tuberculosis, and adequate investment in newly created mechanisms to increase 
access to treatment, including the Global Tuberculosis Drug Facility established in 
2001 pursuant to the Amsterdam Declaration to Stop TB and the Global Alliance for 
TB Drug Development. ‘‘(b) POLICY.—It is a major objective of the foreign assistance  
program of the United States to control tuberculosis, including the detection of at least 
70 percent of the cases of infectious tuberculosis, and the cure of at least 85 percent of 
the cases detected, not later than December 31, 2005, in those countries classified by the 
World Health Organization as among the highest tuberculosis burden, and not later 
than December 31, 2010, in all countries in which the United States Agency for 
International Development has established development programs.  
‘‘(c) AUTHORIZATION.—To carry out this section and consistent with section 104(c), 
the President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as the 
President may determine, for the prevention, treatment, control, and elimination of 
tuberculosis.  
‘‘(d) COORDINATION.—In carrying out this section, the President shall coordinate with 
the World Health Organization, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria, and other organizations with respect to the development and implementation of 
a comprehensive tuberculosis control program.  
‘‘(e) PRIORITY TO DOTS COVERAGE.—In furnishing assistance under subsection (c), 
the President shall give priority to activities that increase Directly Observed Treatment 
Short-course (DOTS) coverage and treatment of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis where 
needed using DOTS-Plus, including funding for the Global Tuberculosis Drug Facility, 
the Stop Tuberculosis Partnership, and the Global Alliance for TB Drug Development. 
In order to meet the requirement of the preceding sentence, the President should ensure 
that not less than 75 percent of the amount made available to carry out this section for a 
fiscal year should be expended for antituberculosis drugs, supplies, direct patient 
services, and training in diagnosis and treatment for Directly Observed Treatment 
Short-course (DOTS) coverage and treatment of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis using 
DOTS-Plus, including substantially increased funding for the Global Tuberculosis Drug 
Facility.  
‘‘(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:  
‘‘(1) DOTS.—The term ‘DOTS’ or ‘Directly Observed Treatment Short-course’ 
means the World Health Organization-recommended strategy for treating 
tuberculosis.  
‘‘(2) DOTS-PLUS.—The term ‘DOTS-Plus’ means a comprehensive tuberculosis 
management strategy that is built upon and works as a supplement to the standard 
DOTS strategy, and which takes into account specific issues (such as use of second 
line anti-tuberculosis drugs) that need to be addressed in areas where there is high 
prevalence of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis.  
‘‘(3) GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR TUBERCULOSIS DRUG DEVELOP-MENT.—The term ‘Global 
Alliance for Tuberculosis Drug Development’ means the public-private partnership 
that brings together leaders in health, science, philanthropy, and private industry to 
devise new approaches to tuberculosis and to ensure that new medications are 
available and affordable in high tuberculosis burden countries and other affected 
countries.  
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‘‘(4) GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS DRUG FACILITY.—The term ‘Global Tuberculosis Drug 
Facility (GDF)’ means the new initiative of the Stop Tuberculosis Partnership to 
increase access to high-quality tuberculosis drugs to facilitate DOTS expansion.  
‘‘(5) STOP TUBERCULOSIS PARTNERSHIP.—The term ‘Stop Tuberculosis Partnership’ 
means the partnership of the World Health Organization, donors including the 
United States, high tuberculosis burden countries, multilateral agencies, and non-
governmental and technical agencies committed to short- and long-term measures 
required to control and eventually eliminate tuberculosis as a public health problem 
in the world.’’.  
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition to funds available under section 104(c) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b(c)) for such purpose or under any other 
provision of that Act, there are authorized to be appropriated to the President, from 
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 401, such sums as may be 
necessary for each of the fiscal years 2004 through 2008 to carry out section 104B of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as added by subsection (a).  
(2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of 
appropriations under paragraph  
(1) are authorized to remain available until expended.  
(3) TRANSFER OF PRIOR YEAR FUNDS.—Unobligated balances of funds made available for 
fiscal year 2001, 2002, or 2003 under section 104(c)(7) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b(c)(7) (as in effect immediately before the date of enactment of this 
Act) shall be transferred to, merged with, and made available for the same purposes as 
funds made available for fiscal years 2004 through 2008 under paragraph (1).  
 
SEC. 303. ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT MALARIA.  
(a) AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961.— Chapter 1 of part I of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22  
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), as amended by sections 301 and 302 of this Act, is further amended 
by inserting after section 104B the following new section:  
‘‘SEC. 104C. ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT MALARIA.  
‘‘(a) FINDING.—Congress finds that malaria kills more people annually than any 
other communicable disease except tuberculosis, that more than 90 percent of all 
malaria cases are in sub-Saharan Africa, and that children and women are particularly 
at risk. Congress recognizes that there are cost-effective tools to decrease the spread of 
malaria and that malaria is a curable disease if promptly diagnosed and adequately 
treated.  
‘‘(b) POLICY.—It is a major objective of the foreign assistance program of the United 
States to provide assistance for the prevention, control, and cure of malaria.  
‘‘(c) AUTHORIZATION.—To carry out this section and consistent with section 104(c), 
the President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as the 
President may determine, for the prevention, treatment, control, and elimination of 
malaria.  
‘‘(d) COORDINATION.—In carrying out this section, the President shall coordinate with 
the World Health Organization, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria, the Department of Health and Human Services (the Centers for Disease 
Control  
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and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health), and other organizations with 
respect to the development and implementation of a comprehensive malaria control 
program.’’.  
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition to funds available under section 104(c) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b(c)) for such purpose or under any other 
provision of that Act, there are authorized to be appropriated to the President, from 
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 401, such sums as may be 
necessary for fiscal years 2004 through 2008 to carry out section 104C of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as added by subsection (a), including for the development of anti-
malarial pharmaceuticals by the Medicines for Malaria Venture.  
(2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are 
authorized to remain available until expended.  
(3) TRANSFER OF PRIOR YEAR FUNDS.—Unobligated balances of funds made available for 
fiscal year 2001, 2002, or 2003 under section 104(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2151b(c) (as in effect immediately before the date of enactment of this Act) 
and made available for the control of malaria shall be transferred to, merged with, and 
made available for the same purposes as funds made available for fiscal years 2004 
through 2008 under paragraph (1).  
 
(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 104(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151b(c)), as amended by section 301 of this Act, is further amended by adding 
after paragraph  
(3) the following:  
 
‘‘(4) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS.—Assistance made available under this subsection 
and sections 104A, 104B, and 104C, and assistance made available under chapter 4 of 
part II to carry out the purposes of this subsection and the provisions cited in this 
paragraph, may be made available notwithstanding any other provision of law that 
restricts assistance to foreign countries, except for the provisions of this subsection, the 
provisions of law cited in this paragraph, subsection (f), section 634A of this Act, and 
provisions of law that limit assistance to organizations that support or participate in a 
program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization included under the Child 
Survival and Health Programs Fund heading in the Consolidated Appropriations 
Resolution, 2003 (Public Law 108–7).’’.  
SEC. 304. PILOT PROGRAM FOR THE PLACEMENT OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS IN 
OVERSEAS AREAS SEVERELY AFFECTED BY HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND 
MALARIA.  
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President should establish a program to demonstrate the 
feasibility of facilitating the service of United States health care professionals in those 
areas of sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world severely affected by HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria.  
(b) REQUIREMENTS.—Participants in the program shall—  
(1) provide basic health care services for those infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria in the area in which they are serving;  
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(2) provide on-the-job training to medical and other personnel in the area in which they 
are serving to strengthen the basic health care system of the affected countries;  
(3) provide health care educational training for residents of the area in which they are 
serving;  
(4) serve for a period of up to 3 years; and  
(5) meet the eligibility requirements in subsection (d).  
(c) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—To be eligible to participate in the program, a candidate 
shall—  
(1) be a national of the United States who is a trained health care professional and who 
meets the educational and licensure requirements necessary to be such a professional 
such as a physician, nurse, physician assistant, nurse practitioner, pharmacist, other 
type of health care professional, or other individual determined to be appropriate by the 
President; or  
(2) be a retired commissioned officer of the Public Health Service Corps.  
(d) RECRUITMENT.—The President shall ensure that information on the program is widely 
distributed, including the distribution of information to schools for health professionals, 
hospitals, clinics, and nongovernmental organizations working in the areas of inter-
national health and aid.  
(e) PLACEMENT OF PARTICIPANTS.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—To the maximum extent practicable, participants in the program shall 
serve in the poorest areas of the affected countries, where health care needs are likely to 
be the greatest. The decision on the placement of a participant should be made in 
consultation with relevant officials of the affected country at both the national and local 
level as well as with local community leaders and organizations.  
(2) COORDINATION.—Placement of participants in the program shall be coordinated with 
the United States Agency for International Development in countries in which that 
Agency is conducting HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria programs. Overall coordination 
of placement of participants in the program shall be made by the Coordinator of United 
States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally (as described in section 1(f) 
of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (as added by section 102(a) of this 
Act)).  
(f) INCENTIVES.—The President may offer such incentives as the President determines to 
be necessary to encourage individuals to participate in the program, such as partial 
payment of principal, interest, and related expenses on government and commercial 
loans for educational expenses relating to professional health training and, where 
possible, deferment of repayments on such loans, the provision of retirement benefits 
that would otherwise be jeopardized by participation in the program, and other 
incentives.  
(g) REPORT.—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on steps 
taken to establish the program, including—  
(1) the process of recruitment, including the venues for recruitment, the number of 
candidates recruited, the incentives offered, if any, and the cost of those incentives;  
(2) the process, including the criteria used, for the selection of participants;  
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(3) the number of participants placed, the countries in which they were placed, and why 
those countries were selected; and  
(4) the potential for expansion of the program.  
(h) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition to amounts otherwise available for such purpose, there are 
authorized to be appropriated to the President, from amounts authorized to be 
appropriated under section 401, such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal 
years 2004 through 2008 to carry out the program.  
(2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of 
appropriations under paragraph  
(1) are authorized to remain available until expended. 
SEC. 305. REPORT ON TREATMENT ACTIVITIES BY RELEVANT EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES.  
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 months after the date of enactment of this Act, 
the President shall submit to appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
programs and activities of the relevant executive branch agencies that are directed to 
the treatment of individuals in foreign countries infected with HIV or living with AIDS.  
(b) REPORT ELEMENTS.—The report shall include—  
(1) a description of the activities of relevant executive branch agencies with respect to—  
(A) the treatment of opportunistic infections;  
(B) the use of antiretrovirals;  
(C) the status of research into successful treatment protocols for individuals in the 
developing world;  
(D) technical assistance and training of local health care workers (in countries affected 
by the pandemic) to administer antiretrovirals, manage side effects, and monitor 
patients’ viral loads and immune status;  
(E) the status of strategies to promote sustainability of HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals 
(including antiretrovirals) and the effects of drug resistance on HIV/AIDS patients; and  
(F) the status of appropriate law enforcement officials working to ensure that HIV/AIDS 
pharmaceutical treatment is not diminished through illegal counterfeiting and black 
market sales of such pharmaceuticals;  
(2) information on existing pilot projects, including a discussion of why a given 
population was selected, the number of people treated, the cost of treatment, the 
mechanisms established to ensure that treatment is being administered effectively and 
safely, and plans for scaling up pilot projects (including projected timelines and required 
resources); and  
(3) an explanation of how those activities relate to efforts to prevent the transmission of 
the HIV infection.  
 
SEC. 306. STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE INJECTION SAFETY.  
Section 307 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 242l) is amended by adding 
at the end the following:  
‘‘(d) In carrying out immunization programs and other programs in developing 
countries for the prevention, treatment, and control of infectious diseases, including 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and  
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malaria, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in coordination 
with the Coordinator of United States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS 
Globally, the National Institutes of Health, national and local government, and other 
organizations, such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations 
Children’s Fund, shall develop and implement effective strategies to improve injection 
safety, including eliminating unnecessary injections, promoting sterile injection 
practices and technologies, strengthening the procedures for proper needle and syringe 
disposal, and improving the education and information provided to the public and to 
health professionals.’’.  
SEC. 307. STUDY ON ILLEGAL DIVERSIONS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS.  
Not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, in coordination with other agencies, shall submit a report to the 
Congress that includes the following:  
(1) A thorough accounting of evidence indicating illegal diversion into the United States 
of prescription drugs donated or sold for humanitarian efforts, and an estimate of the 
extent of such diversion.  
(2) Recommendations to increase the administrative and enforcement powers of the 
United States to identify, monitor, and prevent the illegal diversion into the United 
States of prescription drugs donated or sold for humanitarian efforts.  
(3) Recommendations and guidelines to advise and provide technical assistance to 
developing countries on how to implement a program that minimizes diversion into the 
United States of prescription drugs donated or sold for humanitarian efforts.  
 
Subtitle B—Assistance for Children and Families  
SEC. 311. FINDINGS.  
Congress makes the following findings:  
(1) Approximately 2,000 children around the world are infected each day with HIV 
through mother-to-child transmission. Transmission can occur during pregnancy, labor, 
and delivery or through breast feeding. Over 90 percent of these cases are in developing 
nations with little or no access to public health facilities.  
(2) Mother-to-child transmission is largely preventable with the proper application of 
pharmaceuticals, therapies, and other public health interventions.  
(3) Certain antiretroviral drugs reduce mother-to-child transmission by nearly 50 
percent. Universal availability of this drug could prevent up to 400,000 infections per 
year and dramatically reduce the number of AIDS-related deaths.  
(4) At the United Nations Special Session on HIV/AIDS in June 2001, the United States 
committed to the specific goals with respect to the prevention of mother-to-child trans-
mission, including the goals of reducing the proportion of infants infected with HIV by 
20 percent by the year 2005 and by 50 percent by the year 2010, as specified in the 
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly at the Special Session.  
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(5) Several United States Government agencies including the United States Agency for 
International Development and the Centers for Disease Control are already supporting 
programs to prevent mother-to-child transmission in resource-poor nations and have the 
capacity to expand these programs rapidly by working closely with foreign governments 
and nongovernmental organizations.  
(6) Efforts to prevent mother-to-child transmission can provide the basis for a broader 
response that includes care and treatment of mothers, fathers, and other family 
members who are infected with HIV or living with AIDS.  
(7) HIV/AIDS has devastated the lives of countless children and families across the 
globe. Since the epidemic began, an estimated 13,200,000 children under the age of 15 
have been orphaned by AIDS, that is they have lost their mother or both parents to the 
disease. The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimates that this 
number will double by the year 2010.  
(8) HIV/AIDS also targets young people between the ages of 15 to 24, particularly young 
women, many of whom carry the burden of caring for family members living with HIV/ 
AIDS. An estimated 10,300,000 young people are now living with HIV/AIDS. One-half of 
all new infections are occurring among this age group.  
 
SEC. 312. POLICY AND REQUIREMENTS.  
(a) POLICY.—The United States Government’s response to the global HIV/AIDS 
pandemic should place high priority on the prevention of mother-to-child transmission, 
the care and treatment of family members and caregivers, and the care of children 
orphaned by AIDS. To the maximum extent possible, the United States Government 
should seek to leverage its funds by seeking matching contributions from the private 
sector, other national governments, and international organizations.  
(b) REQUIREMENTS.—The 5-year United States Government strategy required by section 
101 of this Act shall—  
(1) provide for meeting or exceeding the goal to reduce the rate of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV by 20 percent by 2005 and by 50 percent by 2010;  
(2) include programs to make available testing and treatment to HIV-positive women 
and their family members, including drug treatment and therapies to prevent motherto-
child transmission; and  
(3) expand programs designed to care for children orphaned by AIDS.  
 
SEC. 313. ANNUAL REPORTS ON PREVENTION OF MOTHER-TO-CHILD TRANSMISSION OF 
THE HIV INFECTION.  
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
and annually thereafter for a period of 5 years, the President shall submit to appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the activities of relevant executive branch agencies 
during the reporting period to assist in the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of 
the HIV infection.  
(b) REPORT ELEMENTS.—Each report shall include—  
(1) a statement of whether or not all relevant executive branch agencies have met the 
goal described in section 312(b)(1); and  
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(2) a description of efforts made by the relevant executive  
branch agencies to expand those activities, including—  
(A) information on the number of sites supported for the prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission of the HIV infection;  
(B) the specific activities supported;  
(C) the number of women tested and counseled; and  
(D) the number of women receiving preventative drug therapies.  
 
(c) REPORTING PERIOD DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘reporting period’’ means, 
in the case of the initial report, the period since the date of enactment of this Act and, in 
the case of any subsequent report, the period since the date of submission of the most 
recent report.  
SEC. 314. PILOT PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES AFFECTED BY 
HIV/AIDS.  
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President, acting through the United States Agency for 
International Development, should establish a program of assistance that would 
demonstrate the feasibility of the provision of care and treatment to orphans and other 
children and young people affected by HIV/AIDS in foreign countries.  
(b) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—The program should—  
(1) build upon and be integrated into programs administered as of the date of enactment 
of this Act by the relevant executive branch agencies for children affected by HIV/AIDS;  
(2) work in conjunction with indigenous community-based programs and activities, 
particularly those that offer proven services for children;  
(3) reduce the stigma of HIV/AIDS to encourage vulnerable children infected with HIV 
or living with AIDS and their family members and caregivers to avail themselves of 
voluntary counseling and testing, and related programs, including treatments;  
(4) ensure the importance of inheritance rights of women, particularly women in African 
countries, due to the exponential growth in the number of young widows, orphaned girls, 
and grandmothers becoming heads of households as a result of the HIV/AIDS pandemic;  
(5) provide, in conjunction with other relevant executive branch agencies, the range of 
services for the care and treatment, including the provision of antiretrovirals and other 
necessary pharmaceuticals, of children, parents, and caregivers infected with HIV or 
living with AIDS;  
(6) provide nutritional support and food security, and the improvement of overall family 
health;  
(7) work with parents, caregivers, and community-based organizations to provide 
children with educational opportunities; and  
(8) provide appropriate counseling and legal assistance for the appointment of guardians 
and the handling of other issues relating to the protection of children.  
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
President should submit a report on the implementation of this section to the 
appropriate congressional committees. Such report should include a description of 
activities undertaken to carry out subsection (b)(4).  
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—  
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(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition to amounts otherwise available for such purpose, there are 
authorized to be appropriated to the President, from amounts authorized to be 
appropriated under section 401, such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal 
years 2004 through 2008 to carry out the program. A significant percentage of the 
amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under the 
preceding sentence for a fiscal year should be made available to carry out subsection 
(b)(4).  
(2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are 
authorized to remain available until expended.  
 
SEC. 315. PILOT PROGRAM ON FAMILY SURVIVAL PARTNERSHIPS.  
(a) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to authorize the President to establish a 
program, through a public-private partnership, for the provision of medical care and 
support services to HIV positive parents and their children identified through existing 
programs to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV in countries with or at risk for 
severe HIV epidemic with particular attention to resource constrained countries.  
(b) GRANTS.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to establish a program for the award of 
grants to eligible administrative organizations to enable such organizations to award 
subgrants to eligible entities to expand activities to prevent the motherto-child 
transmission of HIV by providing medical care and support services to HIV infected 
parents and their children.  
(2) USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts provided under a grant awarded under paragraph (1) shall 
be used—  
(A) to award subgrants to eligible entities to enable such entities to carry out activities 
described in subsection (c);  
(B) for administrative support and subgrant management;  
(C) for administrative data collection and reporting concerning grant activities;  
(D) for the monitoring and evaluation of grant activities;  
(E) for training and technical assistance for sub-grantees; and  
(F) to promote sustainability.  
(c) SUBGRANTS.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—An organization awarded a grant under subsection (b) shall use 
amounts received under the grant to award subgrants to eligible entities.  
(2) ELIGIBILITY.—To be eligible to receive a subgrant under paragraph (1), an entity 
shall—  
(A) be a local health organization, an international organization, or a partnership of 
such organizations; and  
(B) demonstrate to the awarding organization that such entity—  
(i) is currently administering a proven intervention to prevent mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV in countries with or at risk for severe HIV epidemic with particular 
attention to resource constrained countries, as determined by the President;  
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(ii) has demonstrated support for the proposed program from relevant government 
entities; and  
(iii) is able to provide HIV care, including antiretroviral treatment when medically 
indicated, to HIV positive women, men, and children with the support of the project 
funding.  
(3) LOCAL HEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.— For purposes of paragraph 
(2)(A)—  
(A) the term ‘‘local health organization’’ means a public sector health system, 
nongovernmental organization, institution of higher education, community-based 
organization, or nonprofit health system that provides directly, or has a clear link with a 
provider for the indirect provision of, primary health care services; and  
(B) the term ‘‘international organization’’ means—  
(i) a nonprofit international entity;  
(ii) an international charitable institution;  
(iii) a private voluntary international entity; or  
(iv) a multilateral institution.  
(4) PRIORITY REQUIREMENT.—In awarding subgrants under this subsection, the 
organization shall give priority to eligible applicants that are currently administering a 
program of proven intervention to HIV positive individuals to prevent motherto-child 
transmission in countries with or at risk for severe HIV epidemic with particular 
attention to resource constrained countries, and who are currently administering a 
program to HIV positive women, men, and children to provide life-long care in family-
centered care programs using non-Federal funds.  
(5) SELECTION OF SUBGRANT RECIPIENTS.—In awarding sub-grants under this subsection, 
the organization should—  
(A) consider applicants from a range of health care settings, program approaches, and 
geographic locations; and  
(B) if appropriate, award not less than 1 grant to an applicant to fund a national system 
of health care delivery to HIV positive families.  
(6) USE OF SUBGRANT FUNDS.—An eligible entity awarded a subgrant under this 
subsection shall use subgrant funds to expand activities to prevent mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV by providing medical treatment and care and support services to 
parents and their children, which may include—  
(A) providing treatment and therapy, when medically indicated, to HIV-infected women, 
their children, and families;  
(B) the hiring and training of local personnel, including physicians, nurses, other health 
care providers, counselors, social workers, outreach personnel, laboratory technicians, 
data managers, and administrative support personnel;  
(C) paying laboratory costs, including costs related to necessary equipment and 
diagnostic testing and monitoring (including rapid testing), complete blood counts, 
standard chemistries, and liver function testing for infants, children, and parents, and 
costs related to the purchase of necessary laboratory equipment;  
(D) purchasing pharmaceuticals for HIV-related conditions, including antiretroviral 
therapies;  
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(E) funding support services, including adherence and psychosocial support services;  
(F) operational support activities; and  
(G) conducting community outreach and capacity building activities, including activities 
to raise the awareness of individuals of the program carried out by the sub-grantee, 
other communications activities in support of the program, local advisory board 
functions, and transportation necessary to ensure program participation.  
(d) REPORTS.—The President shall require that each organization awarded a grant under 
subsection (b)(1) to submit an annual report that includes—  
(1) the progress of programs funded under this section;  
(2) the benchmarks of success of programs funded under this section; and  
(3) recommendations of how best to proceed with the programs funded under this section 
upon the expiration of funding under subsection (e).  
(e) FUNDING.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President, from amounts 
authorized to be appropriated under section 401, such sums as may be necessary for 
each of the fiscal years 2004 through 2008 to carry out the program.  
(f) LIMITATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.—An organization shall ensure that not more 
than 7 percent of the amount of a grant received under this section by the organization 
is used for administrative expenses. 
 
TITLE IV—AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS  
SEC. 401. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.  
(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out 
this Act and the amendments made by this Act $3,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal 
years 2004 through 2008.  
(b) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of 
appropriations in subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until expended.  
(c) AVAILABILITY OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—Authorizations of appropriations under subsection 
(a) shall remain available until the appropriations are made.  
 
SEC. 402. SENSE OF CONGRESS.  
(a) INCREASE IN HIV/AIDS ANTIRETROVIRAL TREATMENT.—It is a sense of the Congress 
that an urgent priority of United States assistance programs to fight HIV/AIDS should 
be the rapid increase in distribution of antiretroviral treatment so that—  
(1) by the end of fiscal year 2004, at least 500,000 individuals with HIV/AIDS are 
receiving antiretroviral treatment through United States assistance programs;  
(2) by the end of fiscal year 2005, at least 1,000,000 such individuals are receiving such 
treatment; and  
(3) by the end of fiscal year 2006, at least 2,000,000 such individuals are receiving such 
treatment.  
(b) EFFECTIVE DISTRIBUTION OF HIV/AIDS FUNDS.—It is the sense of Congress that, of the 
amounts appropriated pursuant to  
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the authorization of appropriations under section 401 for HIV/ AIDS assistance, an 
effective distribution of such amounts would be—  
(1) 55 percent of such amounts for treatment of individuals with HIV/AIDS;  
(2) 15 percent of such amounts for palliative care of individuals with HIV/AIDS;  
(3) 20 percent of such amounts for HIV/AIDS prevention consistent with section 104A(d) 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 301 of this Act), of which such 
amount at least 33 percent should be expended for abstinenceuntil-marriage programs; 
and  
(4) 10 percent of such amounts for orphans and vulnerable children.  
 
SEC. 403. ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.  
(a) THERAPEUTIC MEDICAL CARE.—For fiscal years 2006 through 2008, not less than 55 
percent of the amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations 
under section 401 for HIV/AIDS assistance for each such fiscal year shall be expended 
for therapeutic medical care of individuals infected with HIV, of which such amount at 
least 75 percent should be expended for the purchase and distribution of antiretroviral 
pharmaceuticals and at least 25 percent should be expended for related care. For fiscal 
years 2006 through 2008, not less than 33 percent of the amounts appropriated 
pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 401 for HIV/AIDS 
prevention consistent with section 104A(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as 
added by section 301 of this Act) for each such fiscal year shall be expended for 
abstinence-until-marriage programs.  
(b) ORPHANS AND VULNERABLE CHILDREN.—For fiscal years 2006 through 2008, not less 
than 10 percent of the amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of 
appropriations under section 401 for HIV/AIDS assistance for each such fiscal year shall 
be expended for assistance for orphans and vulnerable children affected by HIV/AIDS, of 
which such amount at least 50 percent shall be provided through non-profit, 
nongovernmental organizations, including faith-based organizations, that implement 
programs on the community level.  
 
SEC. 404. ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES PRIVATE SECTOR  
TO PREVENT AND REDUCE HIV/AIDS IN SUB-SAHARAN  
AFRICA.  
It is the sense of Congress that United States businesses should be encouraged to 
provide assistance to sub-Saharan African countries to prevent and reduce the incidence 
of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. In providing such assistance, United States 
businesses should be encouraged to consider the establishment of an HIV/AIDS 
Response Fund in order to provide for coordination among such businesses in the 
collection and distribution of the assistance to sub-Saharan African countries.  
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TITLE V—INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS  
SEC. 501. MODIFICATION OF THE ENHANCED HIPC INITIATIVE.  
Title XVI of the International Financial Institutions Act (22  
U.S.C. 262p–262p–7) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:  
‘‘SEC. 1625. MODIFICATION OF THE ENHANCED HIPC INITIATIVE.  
‘‘(a) AUTHORITY.—  
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury should immediately commence 
efforts within the Paris Club of Official Creditors, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and other 
appropriate multilateral development institutions to modify the Enhanced HIPC 
Initiative so that the amount of debt stock reduction approved for a country eligible 
for debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative shall be sufficient to reduce, for 
each of the first 3 years after the date of enactment of this section or the Decision 
Point, whichever is later—  
‘‘(A) the net present value of the outstanding public and 
publicly guaranteed debt of the country— ‘‘(i) as of the decision 
point if the country has already reached its decision point; or ‘‘(ii) 
as of the date of enactment of this Act, if  
the country has not reached its decision point, to not more than 150 percent 
of the annual value of exports of the country for the year preceding the Decision 
Point; and  
‘‘(B) the annual payments due on such public and publicly guaranteed debt 
to not more than—  
‘‘(i) 10 percent or, in the case of a country suffering a public health crisis (as 
defined in subsection (e)), not more than 5 percent, of the amount of the 
annual current revenues received by the country from internal resources; or  
‘‘(ii) a percentage of the gross national product of the country, or another 
benchmark, that will yield a result substantially equivalent to that which 
would be achieved through application of subparagraph (A).  
‘‘(2) LIMITATION.—In financing the objectives of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, 
an international financial institution shall give priority to using its own resources. 
‘‘(b) RELATION TO POVERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT.—Debt can 
cellation under the modifications to the Enhanced HIPC Initiative  
described in subsection (a) should not be conditioned on any agree 
ment by an impoverished country to implement or comply with  
policies that deepen poverty or degrade the environment, including  
any policy that— ‘‘(1) implements or extends user fees on primary 
education or primary health care, including prevention and 
treatment efforts for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and 
infant, child, and maternal well-being; ‘‘(2) provides for 
increased cost recovery from poor people to finance basic 
public services such as education, health care, clean water, or 
sanitation;  
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‘‘(3) reduces the country’s minimum wage to a level of less than $2 per day or 
undermines workers’ ability to exercise effectively their internationally recognized 
worker rights, as defined under section 526(e) of the Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995 (22  
U.S.C. 262p–4p); or  
‘‘(4) promotes unsustainable extraction of resources or results in reduced budget 
support for environmental programs. ‘‘(c) CONDITIONS.—A country shall not be 
eligible for cancella 
tion of debt under modifications to the Enhanced HIPC Initiative  
described in subsection (a) if the government of the country— ‘‘(1) has an 
excessive level of military expenditures; ‘‘(2) has repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism, as 
determined by the Secretary of State under section 6(j)(1) of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)) or 
section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2371(a)); ‘‘(3) is failing to cooperate on international narcotics 
control matters; or ‘‘(4) engages in a consistent pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights (including 
its military or other security forces). ‘‘(d) PROGRAMS TO COMBAT 
HIV/AIDS AND POVERTY.—A  
country that is otherwise eligible to receive cancellation of debt  
under the modifications to the Enhanced HIPC Initiative described  
in subsection (a) may receive such cancellation only if the country  
has agreed— ‘‘(1) to ensure that the financial benefits of debt cancellation are 
applied to programs to combat HIV/AIDS and poverty, in particular 
through concrete measures to improve basic services in health, 
education, nutrition, and other development priorities, and to redress 
environmental degradation; ‘‘(2) to ensure that the financial benefits 
of debt cancellation are in addition to the government’s total spending 
on poverty reduction for the previous year or the average total of such 
expenditures for the previous 3 years, whichever is greater; ‘‘(3) to 
implement transparent and participatory policy-making and budget 
procedures, good governance, and effective anticorruption measures; 
and ‘‘(4) to broaden public participation and popular understanding of 
the principles and goals of poverty reduction. ‘‘(e) DEFINITIONS.—In 
this section: ‘‘(1) COUNTRY SUFFERING A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS.—The 
term ‘country suffering a public health crisis’ means a country in 
which the HIV/AIDS infection rate, as reported in the most recent 
epidemiological data for that country compiled by the Joint United 
Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, is at least 5 percent among women 
attending prenatal clinics or more than 20 percent among individuals 
in groups with high-risk behavior. ‘‘(2) DECISION POINT.—The term 
‘Decision Point’ means the date on which the executive boards of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 
International Monetary Fund review the debt sustainability analysis 
for a country and determine that the country is eligible for debt relief 
under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.  
‘‘(3) ENHANCED HIPC INITIATIVE.—The term ‘Enhanced HIPC Initiative’ means the 
multilateral debt initiative for  
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heavily indebted poor countries presented in the Report of G–7 Finance Ministers 
on the Cologne Debt Initiative to the Cologne Economic Summit, Cologne, June 18–
20, 1999.’’.  
SEC. 502. REPORT ON EXPANSION OF DEBT RELIEF TO NON-HIPC COUNTRIES.  
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to Congress a report on—  
(1) the options and costs associated with the expansion of debt relief provided by the 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative to include poor countries that were not eligible for inclusion 
in the Enhanced HIPC Initiative;  
(2) options for burden-sharing among donor countries and multilateral institutions of 
costs associated with the expansion of debt relief; and  
(3) options, in addition to debt relief, to ensure debt sustain-ability in poor countries, 
particularly in cases when the poor country has suffered an external economic shock or a 
natural disaster.  
(b) SPECIFIC OPTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED.—Among the options for the expansion of debt 
relief provided by the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, consideration should be given to 
making eligible for that relief poor countries for which outstanding public and publicly 
guaranteed debt requires annual payments in excess of 10 percent or, in the case of a 
country suffering a public health crisis (as defined in section 1625(e) of the Financial 
Institutions Act, as added by section 501 of this Act), not more than 5 percent, of the 
amount of the annual current revenues received by the country from internal resources.  
(c) ENHANCED HIPC INITIATIVE DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘Enhanced HIPC 
Initiative’’ means the multilateral debt initiative for heavily indebted poor countries 
presented in the Report of G–7 Finance Ministers on the Cologne Debt Initiative to the 
Cologne Economic Summit, Cologne, June 18–20, 1999.  
 
SEC. 503. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.  
(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President such sums as 
may be necessary for the fiscal year 2004 and each fiscal year thereafter to carry out 
section 1625 of the International Financial Institutions Act, as added by section 501 of 
this Act.  
H. R. 1298—40  
(b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) are 
authorized to remain available until expended.  
 
 
Speaker of the House of Representatives.  
Vice President of the United States and 
President of the Senate.  
 
Source: PEPFAR (2012) “United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003” 
http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/108294.pdf [19 March 2012]. 
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Annex 4 – Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act 
of 2008 
 H. R. 5501  
One Hundred Tenth Congress of the 
United States of America  
AT THE SECOND SESSION  
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday, the third day of January, two thousand 
and eight  
An Act  
To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 to provide assistance to foreign countries to 
combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and for other purposes.  
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled,  
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.  
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United 
States Global Leadership Against HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
Reauthorization Act of 2008’’.  
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:  
 
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Findings. Sec. 3. Definitions. Sec. 4. Purpose. Sec. 5. Authority to 
consolidate and combine reports.  
TITLE I—POLICY PLANNING AND COORDINATION  
Sec. 101. Development of an updated, comprehensive, 5-year, global strategy. Sec. 102. Interagency working 
group. Sec. 103. Sense of Congress.  
TITLE II—SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERAL FUNDS, PROGRAMS, AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS  
Sec. 201. Voluntary contributions to international vaccine funds.  
Sec. 202. Participation in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  
Sec. 203. Research on methods for women to prevent transmission of HIV and other diseases.  
Sec. 204. Combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria by strengthening health policies and health systems 
of partner countries.  
Sec. 205. Facilitating effective operations of the Centers for Disease Control.  
Sec. 206. Facilitating vaccine development.  
TITLE III—BILATERAL EFFORTS  
Subtitle A—General Assistance and Programs  
Sec. 301. Assistance to combat HIV/AIDS. Sec. 302. Assistance to combat tuberculosis. Sec. 303. Assistance to 
combat malaria. Sec. 304. Malaria Response Coordinator. Sec. 305. Amendment to Immigration and 
Nationality Act. Sec. 306. Clerical amendment. Sec. 307. Requirements. Sec. 308. Annual report on prevention 
of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. Sec. 309. Prevention of mother-to-child transmission expert panel.  
TITLE IV—FUNDING ALLOCATIONS  
Sec. 401. Authorization of appropriations.  
335 
 
H. R. 5501—2  
Sec. 402. Sense of Congress. Sec. 403. Allocation of funds.  
TITLE V—MISCELLANEOUS Sec. 501. Machine 
readable visa fees.  
TITLE VI—EMERGENCY PLAN FOR INDIAN SAFETY AND HEALTH Sec. 601. Emergency 
plan for Indian safety and health.  
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.  
Section 2 of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7601) is amended by adding at the end the following:  
‘‘(29) On May 27, 2003, the President signed this Act into law, launching the 
largest international public health program of its kind ever created.  
‘‘(30) Between 2003 and 2008, the United States, through the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and in conjunction with other bilateral 
programs and the multilateral Global Fund has helped to—  
‘‘(A) provide antiretroviral therapy for over 1,900,000 people;  
‘‘(B) ensure that over 150,000 infants, most of whom would have likely been 
infected with HIV during pregnancy or childbirth, were not infected; and  
‘‘(C) provide palliative care and HIV prevention assistance to millions of other 
people. ‘‘(31) While United States leadership in the battles against  
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria has had an enormous impact, these diseases 
continue to take a terrible toll on the human race.  
‘‘(32) According to the 2007 AIDS Epidemic Update of the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)— ‘‘(A) an estimated 2,100,000 people died of 
AIDS- 
related causes in 2007; and  
‘‘(B) an estimated 2,500,000 people were newly infected with HIV during that 
year. ‘‘(33) According to the World Health Organization, malaria  
kills more than 1,000,000 people per year, 70 percent of whom are children under 5 
years of age.  
‘‘(34) According to the World Health Organization, 1⁄3 of the world’s population is 
infected with the tuberculosis bacterium, and tuberculosis is 1 of the greatest 
infectious causes of death of adults worldwide, killing 1,600,000 people per year.  
‘‘(35) Efforts to promote abstinence, fidelity, the correct and consistent use of 
condoms, the delay of sexual debut, and the reduction of concurrent sexual partners 
represent important elements of strategies to prevent the transmission of HIV/ 
AIDS.  
‘‘(36) According to UNAIDS— ‘‘(A) women and girls make up 
nearly 60 percent of persons in sub-Saharan Africa who are 
HIV positive; ‘‘(B) women and girls are more biologically, 
economically, and socially vulnerable to HIV infection; and  
‘‘(C) gender issues are critical components in the effort to prevent HIV/AIDS 
and to care for those affected by the disease. ‘‘(37) Children who have lost a 
parent to HIV/AIDS, who  
are otherwise directly affected by the disease, or who live  
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in areas of high HIV prevalence may be vulnerable to the disease or its 
socioeconomic effects.  
‘‘(38) Lack of health capacity, including insufficient personnel and inadequate 
infrastructure, in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions of the world is a critical barrier 
that limits the effectiveness of efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, 
and to achieve other global health goals.  
‘‘(39) On March 30, 2007, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies 
released a report entitled ‘PEPFAR Implementation: Progress and Promise’, which 
found that budget allocations setting percentage levels for spending on prevention, care, 
and treatment and for certain subsets of activities within the prevention category—  
‘‘(A) have ‘adversely affected implementation of the  
U.S. Global AIDS Initiative’; ‘‘(B) have inhibited comprehensive, integrated, 
evidence  
based approaches; ‘‘(C) ‘have been counterproductive’; ‘‘(D) ‘may have been 
helpful initially in ensuring a  
balance of attention to activities within the 4 categories of prevention, treatment, 
care, and orphans and vulnerable children’;  
‘‘(E) ‘have also limited PEPFAR’s ability to tailor its activities in each country to the 
local epidemic and to coordinate with the level of activities in the countries’ national 
plans’; and  
‘‘(F) should be removed by Congress and replaced with more appropriate 
mechanisms that—  
‘‘(i) ‘ensure accountability for results from Country Teams to the U.S. Global 
AIDS Coordinator and to Congress’; and  
‘‘(ii) ‘ensure that spending is directly linked to and commensurate with 
necessary efforts to achieve both country and overall performance targets for 
prevention, treatment, care, and orphans and vulnerable children’.  
‘‘(40) The United States Government has endorsed the principles of harmonization 
in coordinating efforts to combat HIV/ AIDS commonly referred to as the ‘Three Ones’, 
which includes—  
‘‘(A) 1 agreed HIV/AIDS action framework that provides the basis for 
coordination of the work of all partners; ‘‘(B) 1 national HIV/AIDS 
coordinating authority, with a broadbased multisectoral mandate; and  
‘‘(C) 1 agreed HIV/AIDS country-level monitoring and evaluating system. ‘‘(41) In 
the Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis  
and Other Related Infectious Diseases, of April 26–27, 2001 (referred to in this Act as 
the ‘Abuja Declaration’), the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU)—  
‘‘(A) declared that they would ‘place the fight against HIV/AIDS at the forefront and 
as the highest priority issue in our respective national development plans’;  
‘‘(B) committed ‘TO TAKE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PROVIDE 
LEADERSHIP for the activities of the National AIDS Commissions/Councils’;  
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‘‘(C) resolved ‘to lead from the front the battle against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Other Related Infectious Diseases by personally ensuring that such bodies 
were properly convened in mobilizing our societies as a whole and providing 
focus for unified national policymaking and programme implementation, 
ensuring coordination of all sectors at all levels with a gender perspective and 
respect for human rights, particularly to ensure equal rights for people living 
with HIV/AIDS’; and  
‘‘(D) pledged ‘to set a target of allocating at least 15% of our annual budget to 
the improvement of the health sector’.’’.  
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.  
Section 3 of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,  
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7602) is  
amended—  
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘Committee on International Relations’’ and inserting 
‘‘Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations’’;  
(2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (12);  
(3) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (5), as paragraphs (4) through (6), 
respectively;  
 
(4) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:  
‘‘(3) GLOBAL AIDS COORDINATOR.—The term ‘Global AIDS Coordinator’ means the 
Coordinator of United States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS 
Globally.’’; and  
(5) by inserting after paragraph (6), as redesignated, the following:  
‘‘(7) IMPACT EVALUATION RESEARCH.—The term ‘impact evaluation research’ 
means the application of research methods and statistical analysis to measure the 
extent to which change in a population-based outcome can be attributed to program 
intervention instead of other environmental factors.  
‘‘(8) OPERATIONS RESEARCH.—The term ‘operations research’ means the 
application of social science research methods, statistical analysis, and other 
appropriate scientific methods to judge, compare, and improve policies and program 
outcomes, from the earliest stages of defining and designing programs through their 
development and implementation, with the objective of the rapid dissemination of 
conclusions and concrete impact on programming.  
‘‘(9) PARAPROFESSIONAL.—The term ‘paraprofessional’ means an individual who 
is trained and employed as a health agent for the provision of basic assistance in the 
identification, prevention, or treatment of illness or disability.  
‘‘(10) PARTNER GOVERNMENT.—The term ‘partner government’ means a 
government with which the United States is working to provide assistance to 
combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria on behalf of people living within the 
jurisdiction of such government.  
‘‘(11) PROGRAM MONITORING.—The term ‘program monitoring’ means the 
collection, analysis, and use of routine program data to determine—  
‘‘(A) how well a program is carried out; and  
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‘‘(B) how much the program costs.’’.  
SEC. 4. PURPOSE.  
Section 4 of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7603) is amended to read as follows:  
‘‘SEC. 4. PURPOSE.  
‘‘The purpose of this Act is to strengthen and enhance United States leadership and 
the effectiveness of the United States response to the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria pandemics and other related and preventable infectious diseases as part of the 
overall United States health and development agenda by—  
‘‘(1) establishing comprehensive, coordinated, and integrated 5-year, global 
strategies to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria by—  
‘‘(A) building on progress and successes to date;  
‘‘(B) improving harmonization of United States efforts with national strategies 
of partner governments and other public and private entities; and  
‘‘(C) emphasizing capacity building initiatives in order to promote a transition 
toward greater sustainability through the support of country-driven efforts; ‘‘(2) 
providing increased resources for bilateral and multi 
lateral efforts to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria as integrated 
components of United States development assistance;  
‘‘(3) intensifying efforts to— ‘‘(A) prevent HIV infection; ‘‘(B) ensure the 
continued support for, and expanded  
access to, treatment and care programs; ‘‘(C) enhance the 
effectiveness of prevention, treatment, and care programs; and  
‘‘(D) address the particular vulnerabilities of girls and women; ‘‘(4) encouraging 
the expansion of private sector efforts  
and expanding public-private sector partnerships to combat 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria; ‘‘(5) reinforcing efforts to— 
‘‘(A) develop safe and effective vaccines, microbicides, and other 
prevention and treatment technologies; and  
‘‘(B) improve diagnostics capabilities for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria; 
and ‘‘(6) helping partner countries to—  
‘‘(A) strengthen health systems; ‘‘(B) expand health workforce; and ‘‘(C) 
address infrastructural weaknesses.’’.  
SEC. 5. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE AND COMBINE REPORTS.  
Section 5 of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7604) is amended by inserting ‘‘, with the exception of the 
5-year strategy’’ before the period at the end.  
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TITLE I—POLICY PLANNING AND COORDINATION  
SEC. 101. DEVELOPMENT OF AN UPDATED, COMPREHENSIVE, 5-YEAR, GLOBAL STRATEGY.  
(a) STRATEGY.—Section 101(a) of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7611(a)) is amended to read as follows:  
‘‘(a) STRATEGY.—The President shall establish a comprehensive,  
integrated, 5-year strategy to expand and improve efforts to combat  
global HIV/AIDS. This strategy shall— ‘‘(1) further strengthen the 
capability of the United States to be an effective leader of the 
international campaign against this disease and strengthen 
the capacities of nations experiencing HIV/AIDS epidemics 
to combat this disease; ‘‘(2) maintain sufficient flexibility and 
remain responsive to— ‘‘(A) changes in the epidemic; ‘‘(B) 
challenges facing partner countries in developing and 
implementing an effective national response; and ‘‘(C) 
evidence-based improvements and innovations in the 
prevention, care, and treatment of HIV/AIDS; ‘‘(3) situate 
United States efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria within the broader United States global health and 
development agenda, establishing a roadmap to link 
investments in specific disease programs to the broader 
goals of strengthening health systems and infrastructure 
and to integrate and coordinate HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, or 
malaria programs with other health or development 
programs, as appropriate; ‘‘(4) provide a plan to— ‘‘(A) 
prevent 12,000,000 new HIV infections worldwide; ‘‘(B) 
support— ‘‘(i) the increase in the number of individuals with 
HIV/AIDS receiving antiretroviral treatment above the goal 
established under section 402(a)(3) and increased pursuant 
to paragraphs (1) through (3) of section 403(d); and ‘‘(ii) 
additional treatment through coordinated multilateral 
efforts; ‘‘(C) support care for 12,000,000 individuals infected 
with or affected by HIV/AIDS, including 5,000,000 orphans 
and vulnerable children affected by HIV/AIDS, with an 
emphasis on promoting a comprehensive, coordinated 
system of services to be integrated throughout the con-
tinuum of care; ‘‘(D) help partner countries in the effort to 
achieve goals of 80 percent access to counseling, testing, and 
treatment to prevent the transmission of HIV from mother 
to child, emphasizing a continuum of care model; ‘‘(E) help 
partner countries to provide care and treatment services to 
children with HIV in proportion to their percentage within 
the HIV-infected population in each country;  
‘‘(F) promote preservice training for health professionals designed to strengthen 
the capacity of institutions  
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to develop and implement policies for training health workers to combat HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria;  
‘‘(G) equip teachers with skills needed for HIV/AIDS prevention and support for 
persons with, or affected by, HIV/AIDS;  
‘‘(H) provide and share best practices for combating HIV/AIDS with health 
professionals;  
‘‘(I) promote pediatric HIV/AIDS training for physicians, nurses, and other health 
care workers, through public-private partnerships if possible, including through the 
designation, if appropriate, of centers of excellence for training in pediatric 
HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment in partner countries; and  
‘‘(J) help partner countries to train and support retention of health care 
professionals and paraprofessionals, with the target of training and retaining at 
least 140,000 new health care professionals and paraprofessionals with an emphasis 
on training and in country deployment of critically needed doctors and nurses and to 
strengthen capacities in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, to 
deliver primary health care with the objective of helping countries achieve staffing 
levels of at least 2.3 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 1,000 population, as called 
for by the World Health Organization; ‘‘(5) include multisectoral approaches and 
specific strategies  
to treat individuals infected with HIV/AIDS and to prevent the further transmission of 
HIV infections, with a particular focus on the needs of families with children (including 
the prevention of mother-to-child transmission), women, young people, orphans, and 
vulnerable children;  
‘‘(6) establish a timetable with annual global treatment targets with country-level 
benchmarks for antiretroviral treatment;  
‘‘(7) expand the integration of timely and relevant research within the prevention, 
care, and treatment of HIV/AIDS;  
‘‘(8) include a plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact 
evaluation and for the dissemination of a best practices report to highlight findings;  
‘‘(9) support the in-country or intra-regional training, preferably through public-
private partnerships, of scientific investigators, managers, and other staff who are 
capable of promoting the systematic uptake of clinical research findings and other 
evidence-based interventions into routine practice, with the goal of improving the 
quality, effectiveness, and local leadership of HIV/AIDS health care;  
‘‘(10) expand and accelerate research on and development of HIV/AIDS prevention 
methods for women, including enhancing inter-agency collaboration, staffing, and 
organizational infrastructure dedicated to microbicide research;  
‘‘(11) provide for consultation with local leaders and officials to develop prevention 
strategies and programs that are tailored to the unique needs of each country and 
community and targeted particularly toward those most at risk of acquiring HIV 
infection;  
‘‘(12) make the reduction of HIV/AIDS behavioral risks a priority of all prevention 
efforts by—  
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‘‘(A) promoting abstinence from sexual activity and encouraging monogamy and 
faithfulness;  
‘‘(B) encouraging the correct and consistent use of male and female condoms and 
increasing the availability of, and access to, these commodities;  
‘‘(C) promoting the delay of sexual debut and the reduction of multiple concurrent 
sexual partners;  
‘‘(D) promoting education for discordant couples (where an individual is infected 
with HIV and the other individual is uninfected or whose status is unknown) about 
safer sex practices;  
‘‘(E) promoting voluntary counseling and testing, addiction therapy, and other 
prevention and treatment tools for illicit injection drug users and other substance 
abusers;  
‘‘(F) educating men and boys about the risks of procuring sex commercially and 
about the need to end violent behavior toward women and girls;  
‘‘(G) supporting partner country and community efforts to identify and address 
social, economic, or cultural factors, such as migration, urbanization, conflict, 
gender-based violence, lack of empowerment for women, and transportation 
patterns, which directly contribute to the transmission of HIV;  
‘‘(H) supporting comprehensive programs to promote alternative livelihoods, safety, 
and social reintegration strategies for commercial sex workers and their families;  
‘‘(I) promoting cooperation with law enforcement to prosecute offenders of 
trafficking, rape, and sexual assault crimes with the goal of eliminating such 
crimes; and  
‘‘(J) working to eliminate rape, gender-based violence, sexual assault, and the sexual 
exploitation of women and children; ‘‘(13) include programs to reduce the 
transmission of HIV,  
particularly addressing the heightened vulnerabilities of women and girls 
to HIV in many countries; and ‘‘(14) support other important means of 
preventing or  
reducing the transmission of HIV, including— ‘‘(A) medical male circumcision; ‘‘(B) the 
maintenance of a safe blood supply; ‘‘(C) promoting universal precautions in 
formal and  
informal health care settings;  
‘‘(D) educating the public to recognize and to avoid risks to contract HIV through 
blood exposures during formal and informal health care and cosmetic services;  
‘‘(E) investigating suspected nosocomial infections to identify and stop further 
nosocomial transmission; and  
‘‘(F) other mechanisms to reduce the transmission of HIV; ‘‘(15) increase support for 
prevention of mother-to-child  
transmission;  
‘‘(16) build capacity within the public health sector of developing countries by 
improving health systems and public health infrastructure and developing indicators to 
measure changes in broader public health sector capabilities;  
‘‘(17) increase the coordination of HIV/AIDS programs with development programs;  
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‘‘(18) provide a framework for expanding or developing existing or new country or 
regional programs, including— ‘‘(A) drafting compacts or other agreements, as appro-
priate; ‘‘(B) establishing criteria and objectives for such compacts and agreements; and 
‘‘(C) promoting sustainability;  
‘‘(19) provide a plan for national and regional priorities for resource distribution and a 
global investment plan by region; ‘‘(20) provide a plan to address the immediate and 
ongoing  
needs of women and girls, which— ‘‘(A) addresses the 
vulnerabilities that contribute to their elevated risk of 
infection; ‘‘(B) includes specific goals and targets to 
address these factors;  
‘‘(C) provides clear guidance to field missions to integrate gender across prevention, 
care, and treatment programs;  
‘‘(D) sets forth gender-specific indicators to monitor progress on outcomes and 
impacts of gender programs;  
‘‘(E) supports efforts in countries in which women or orphans lack inheritance rights 
and other fundamental protections to promote the passage, implementation, and 
enforcement of such laws;  
‘‘(F) supports life skills training, especially among women and girls, with the goal of 
reducing vulnerabilities to HIV/AIDS;  
‘‘(G) addresses and prevents gender-based violence; and  
‘‘(H) addresses the posttraumatic and psychosocial consequences and provides 
postexposure prophylaxis protecting against HIV infection to victims of gender-
based violence and rape; ‘‘(21) provide a plan to—  
‘‘(A) determine the local factors that may put men and boys at elevated risk of 
contracting or transmitting HIV;  
‘‘(B) address male norms and behaviors to reduce these  
risks, including by reducing alcohol abuse; ‘‘(C) promote responsible male 
behavior; and ‘‘(D) promote male participation and leadership at the  
community level in efforts to promote HIV prevention, reduce stigma, promote 
participation in voluntary counseling and testing, and provide care, treatment, and 
support for persons with HIV/AIDS; ‘‘(22) provide a plan to address the 
vulnerabilities and  
needs of orphans and children who are vulnerable to, or affected by, HIV/AIDS;  
‘‘(23) encourage partner countries to develop health care curricula and promote 
access to training tailored to individuals receiving services through, or exiting from, 
existing programs geared to orphans and vulnerable children;  
‘‘(24) provide a framework to work with international actors and partner countries 
toward universal access to HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care programs, 
recognizing that prevention is of particular importance;  
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‘‘(25) enhance the coordination of United States bilateral  
efforts to combat global HIV/AIDS with other major public  
and private entities;  
‘‘(26) enhance the attention given to the national strategic  
HIV/AIDS plans of countries receiving United States assistance  
by—  
‘‘(A) reviewing the planning and programmatic decisions associated with that 
assistance; and  
‘‘(B) helping to strengthen such national strategies, if necessary; ‘‘(27) support 
activities described in the Global Plan to  
Stop TB, including—  
‘‘(A) expanding and enhancing the coverage of the Directly Observed Treatment 
Short-course (DOTS) in order to treat individuals infected with tuberculosis and 
HIV, including multi-drug resistant or extensively drug resistant tuberculosis; 
and  
‘‘(B) improving coordination and integration of HIV/ AIDS and tuberculosis 
programming; ‘‘(28) ensure coordination between the Global AIDS Coordi 
nator and the Malaria Coordinator and address issues of comorbidity between 
HIV/AIDS and malaria; and  
‘‘(29) include a longer term estimate of the projected resource needs, progress 
toward greater sustainability and country ownership of HIV/AIDS programs, and 
the anticipated role of the United States in the global effort to combat HIV/ AIDS 
during the 10-year period beginning on October 1, 2013.’’.  
(b) REPORT.—Section 101(b) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7611(b)) is 
amended to read as follows: ‘‘(b) REPORT.—  
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than October 1, 2009, the President shall submit a 
report to the appropriate congressional committees that sets forth the strategy 
described in subsection (a).  
‘‘(2) CONTENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall 
include a discussion of the following elements: ‘‘(A) The purpose, 
scope, methodology, and general and specific objectives of the 
strategy. ‘‘(B) The problems, risks, and threats to the successful 
pursuit of the strategy. ‘‘(C) The desired goals, objectives, activities, 
and outcome-related performance measures of the strategy. ‘‘(D) A 
description of future costs and resources needed to carry out the 
strategy.  
‘‘(E) A delineation of United States Government roles, responsibility, and 
coordination mechanisms of the strategy.  
‘‘(F) A description of the strategy—  
‘‘(i) to promote harmonization of United States assistance with that of other 
international, national, and private actors as elucidated in the ‘Three 
Ones’; and  
‘‘(ii) to address existing challenges in harmonization and alignment. ‘‘(G) A 
description of the manner in which the strategy  
will—  
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‘‘(i) further the development and implementation  
of the national multisectoral strategic HIV/AIDS  
frameworks of partner governments; and  
‘‘(ii) enhance the centrality, effectiveness, and  
sustainability of those national plans.  
‘‘(H) A description of how the strategy will seek to achieve the specific targets described 
in subsection (a) and other targets, as appropriate.  
‘‘(I) A description of, and rationale for, the timetable for annual global treatment targets 
with country-level estimates of numbers of persons in need of antiretroviral treatment, 
country-level benchmarks for United States support for assistance for antiretroviral 
treatment, and numbers of persons enrolled in antiretroviral treatment programs 
receiving United States support. If global benchmarks are not achieved within the 
reporting period, the report shall include a description of steps being taken to ensure 
that global benchmarks will be achieved and a detailed breakdown and justification of 
spending priorities in countries in which benchmarks are not being met, including a 
description of other donor or national support for antiretroviral treatment in the 
country, if appropriate.  
‘‘(J) A description of how operations research is addressed in the strategy and how such 
research can most effectively be integrated into care, treatment, and prevention 
activities in order to—  
‘‘(i) improve program quality and efficiency;  
‘‘(ii) ascertain cost effectiveness;  
‘‘(iii) ensure transparency and accountability;  
‘‘(iv) assess population-based impact;  
‘‘(v) disseminate findings and best practices; and  
‘‘(vi) optimize delivery of services.  
‘‘(K) An analysis of United States-assisted strategies to prevent the transmission of 
HIV/AIDS, including methodologies to promote abstinence, monogamy, faithfulness, the 
correct and consistent use of male and female condoms, reductions in concurrent sexual 
partners, and delay of sexual debut, and of intended monitoring and evaluation 
approaches to measure the effectiveness of prevention programs and ensure that they 
are targeted to appropriate audiences.  
‘‘(L) Within the analysis required under subparagraph (K), an examination of additional 
planned means of preventing the transmission of HIV including medical male 
circumcision, maintenance of a safe blood supply, public education about risks to acquire 
HIV infection from blood exposures, promotion of universal precautions, investigation of 
suspected nosocomial infections and other tools.  
‘‘(M) A description of efforts to assist partner country and community to identify and 
address social, economic, or cultural factors, such as migration, urbanization, conflict, 
gender-based violence, lack of empowerment for women, and transportation patterns, 
which directly contribute to the transmission of HIV.  
‘‘(N) A description of the specific targets, goals, and strategies developed to address the 
needs and  
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vulnerabilities of women and girls to HIV/AIDS,  
including—  
‘‘(i) activities directed toward men and boys;  
‘‘(ii) activities to enhance educational, micro- 
finance, and livelihood opportunities for women and  
girls;  
‘‘(iii) activities to promote and protect the legal  
empowerment of women, girls, and orphans and  
vulnerable children;  
‘‘(iv) programs targeted toward gender-based  
violence and sexual coercion;  
‘‘(v) strategies to meet the particular needs of  
adolescents;  
‘‘(vi) assistance for victims of rape, sexual abuse,  
assault, exploitation, and trafficking; and  
‘‘(vii) programs to prevent alcohol abuse.  
‘‘(O) A description of strategies to address male norms and behaviors that contribute to 
the transmission of HIV, to promote responsible male behavior, and to promote male 
participation and leadership in HIV/AIDS prevention, care, treatment, and voluntary 
counseling and testing.  
‘‘(P) A description of strategies—  
‘‘(i) to address the needs of orphans and vulnerable  
children, including an analysis of—  
‘‘(I) factors contributing to children’s vulner 
ability to HIV/AIDS; and  
‘‘(II) vulnerabilities caused by the impact of  
HIV/AIDS on children and their families; and  
‘‘(ii) in areas of higher HIV/AIDS prevalence, to  
promote a community-based approach to vulnerability,  
maximizing community input into determining which  
children participate.  
‘‘(Q) A description of capacity-building efforts undertaken by countries themselves, 
including adherents of the Abuja Declaration and an assessment of the impact of 
International Monetary Fund macroeconomic and fiscal policies on national and donor 
investments in health.  
‘‘(R) A description of the strategy to—  
‘‘(i) strengthen capacity building within the public  
health sector;  
‘‘(ii) improve health care in those countries;  
‘‘(iii) help countries to develop and implement  
national health workforce strategies;  
‘‘(iv) strive to achieve goals in training, retaining,  
and effectively deploying health staff;  
‘‘(v) promote the use of codes of conduct for ethical  
recruiting practices for health care workers; and  
‘‘(vi) increase the sustainability of health programs.  
‘‘(S) A description of the criteria for selection, objectives, methodology, and structure of 
compacts or other framework agreements with countries or regional organizations, 
including—  
‘‘(i) the role of civil society;  
‘‘(ii) the degree of transparency;  
‘‘(iii) benchmarks for success of such compacts or  
agreements; and  
346 
 
H. R. 5501—13  
‘‘(iv) the relationship between such compacts or agreements and the 
national HIV/AIDS and public health strategies and commitments of 
partner countries. ‘‘(T) A strategy to better coordinate HIV/AIDS assist 
ance with nutrition and food assistance programs.  
‘‘(U) A description of transnational or regional initiatives to combat regionalized 
epidemics in highly affected areas such as the Caribbean.  
‘‘(V) A description of planned resource distribution and global investment by 
region.  
‘‘(W) A description of coordination efforts in order to better implement the Stop 
TB Strategy and to address the problem of coinfection of HIV/AIDS and 
tuberculosis and of projected challenges or barriers to successful 
implementation.  
‘‘(X) A description of coordination efforts to address malaria and comorbidity 
with malaria and HIV/AIDS.’’.  
(c) STUDY.—Section 101(c) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 7611(c)) is amended 
to read as follows: ‘‘(c) STUDY OF PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF POLICY 
OBJECTIVES.—  
‘‘(1) DESIGN AND BUDGET PLAN FOR DATA EVALUATION.— The Global AIDS 
Coordinator shall enter into a contract with the Institute of Medicine of the 
National Academies that provides that not later than 18 months after the date of 
the enactment of the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 
2008, the Institute, in consultation with the Global AIDS Coordinator and other 
relevant parties representing the public and private sector, shall provide the Global 
AIDS Coordinator with a design plan and budget for the evaluation and collection of 
baseline and subsequent data to address the elements set forth in paragraph (2)(B). 
The Global AIDS Coordinator shall submit the budget and design plan to the 
appropriate congressional committees.  
‘‘(2) STUDY.—  
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 4 years after the date of the enactment of the 
Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, the 
Institute of Medicine of the National Academies shall publish a study that 
includes—  
‘‘(i) an assessment of the performance of United States-assisted global 
HIV/AIDS programs; and  
‘‘(ii) an evaluation of the impact on health of prevention, treatment, and 
care efforts that are supported by United States funding, including 
multilateral and bilateral programs involving joint operations. ‘‘(B) 
CONTENT.—The study conducted under this para 
graph shall include— ‘‘(i) an assessment of progress toward prevention, treatment, and 
care targets;  
‘‘(ii) an assessment of the effects on health systems, including on the 
financing and management of health systems and the quality of service 
delivery and staffing;  
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‘‘(iii) an assessment of efforts to address gender-specific aspects of 
HIV/AIDS, including gender related constraints to accessing services and 
addressing underlying social and economic vulnerabilities of women and 
men;  
‘‘(iv) an evaluation of the impact of treatment and care programs on 5-year 
survival rates, drug adherence, and the emergence of drug resistance;  
‘‘(v) an evaluation of the impact of prevention programs on HIV incidence in 
relevant population groups;  
‘‘(vi) an evaluation of the impact on child health and welfare of 
interventions authorized under this Act on behalf of orphans and 
vulnerable children;  
‘‘(vii) an evaluation of the impact of programs and activities authorized in 
this Act on child mortality; and  
‘‘(viii) recommendations for improving the programs referred to in 
subparagraph (A)(i). ‘‘(C) METHODOLOGIES.—Assessments and impact  
evaluations conducted under the study shall utilize sound statistical methods 
and techniques for the behavioral sciences, including random assignment 
methodologies as feasible. Qualitative data on process variables should be used 
for assessments and impact evaluations, wherever possible. ‘‘(3) CONTRACT 
AUTHORITY.—The Institute of Medicine may  
enter into contracts or cooperative agreements or award grants to conduct the study 
under paragraph (2).  
‘‘(4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are  
authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary  
to carry out the study under this subsection.’’.  
(d) REPORT.—Section 101 of such Act, as amended by this section, is 
further amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘(d) COMPTROLLER 
GENERAL REPORT.—  
‘‘(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of 
the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, the Comptroller 
General of the United States shall submit a report on the global HIV/AIDS 
programs of the United States to the appropriate congressional committees.  
‘‘(2) CONTENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include—  
‘‘(A) a description and assessment of the monitoring and evaluation practices 
and policies in place for these programs;  
‘‘(B) an assessment of coordination within Federal agencies involved in these 
programs, examining both internal coordination within these programs and 
integration with the larger global health and development agenda of the United 
States;  
‘‘(C) an assessment of procurement policies and practices within these 
programs;  
‘‘(D) an assessment of harmonization with national government HIV/AIDS and 
public health strategies as well as other international efforts;  
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‘‘(E) an assessment of the impact of global HIV/AIDS funding and programs on other 
United States global health programming; and  
‘‘(F) recommendations for improving the global HIV/ AIDS 
programs of the United States. ‘‘(e) BEST PRACTICES REPORT.— ‘‘(1) 
IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date  
of the enactment of the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United  
States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and  
Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, and annually thereafter,  
the Global AIDS Coordinator shall publish a best practices  
report that highlights the programs receiving financial assist 
ance from the United States that have the potential for replica 
tion or adaption, particularly at a low cost, across global AIDS  
programs, including those that focus on both generalized and  
localized epidemics. ‘‘(2) DISSEMINATION OF FINDINGS.— ‘‘(A) PUBLICATION ON 
INTERNET WEBSITE.—The Global AIDS Coordinator shall disseminate 
the full findings of the annual best practices report on the Internet 
website of the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. ‘‘(B) 
DISSEMINATION GUIDANCE.—The Global AIDS Coordinator shall develop 
guidance to ensure timely submission and dissemination of significant 
information regarding best practices with respect to global AIDS pro-
grams.  
‘‘(f) INSPECTORS GENERAL.— ‘‘(1) OVERSIGHT PLAN.— ‘‘(A) 
DEVELOPMENT.—The Inspectors General of the Department of 
State and Broadcasting Board of Governors, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, and the United States Agency for 
International Development shall jointly develop 5 coordinated 
annual plans for oversight activity in each of the fiscal years 2009 
through 2013, with regard to the programs authorized under this 
Act and sections 104A, 104B, and 104C of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b–2, 2151b–3, and 2151b– 4). ‘‘(B) 
CONTENTS.—The plans developed under subparagraph (A) shall 
include a schedule for financial audits, inspections, and 
performance reviews, as appropriate. ‘‘(C) DEADLINE.— ‘‘(i) INITIAL 
PLAN.—The first plan developed under subparagraph (A) shall be 
completed not later than the later of— ‘‘(I) September 1, 2008; or 
‘‘(II) 60 days after the date of the enactment of the Tom Lantos 
and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 
2008. ‘‘(ii) SUBSEQUENT PLANS.—Each of the last four plans 
developed under subparagraph (A) shall be completed not later 
than 30 days before each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2013, 
respectively.  
349 
 
H. R. 5501—16  
‘‘(2) COORDINATION.—In order to avoid duplication and maximize efficiency, the 
Inspectors General described in paragraph (1) shall coordinate their activities 
with—  
‘‘(A) the Government Accountability Office; and  
‘‘(B) the Inspectors General of the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
Defense, the Department of Labor, and the Peace Corps, as appropriate, 
pursuant to the 2004 Memorandum of Agreement Coordinating Audit Coverage 
of Programs and Activities Implementing the President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief, or any successor agreement. ‘‘(3) FUNDING.—The Global AIDS 
Coordinator and the  
Coordinator of the United States Government Activities to Combat Malaria Globally 
shall make available necessary funds not exceeding $15,000,000 during the 5-year 
period beginning on October 1, 2008 to the Inspectors General described in para-
graph (1) for the audits, inspections, and reviews described in that paragraph.’’.  
(e) ANNUAL STUDY; MESSAGE.—Section 101 of such Act, as amended by this section, is 
further amended by adding at the end the following:  
‘‘(g) ANNUAL STUDY.—  
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than September 30, 2009, and annually thereafter 
through September 30, 2013, the Global AIDS Coordinator shall complete a study of 
treatment providers that—  
‘‘(A) represents a range of countries and service environments;  
‘‘(B) estimates the per-patient cost of antiretroviral HIV/AIDS treatment and 
the care of people with HIV/ AIDS not receiving antiretroviral treatment, 
including a comparison of the costs for equivalent services provided by 
programs not receiving assistance under this Act;  
‘‘(C) estimates per-patient costs across the program  
and in specific categories of service providers, including— ‘‘(i) urban 
and rural providers; ‘‘(ii) country-specific providers; and ‘‘(iii) other 
subcategories, as appropriate.  
‘‘(2) PUBLICATION.—Not later than 90 days after the completion of each study 
under paragraph (1), the Global AIDS Coordinator shall make the results of such 
study available on a publicly accessible Web site. ‘‘(h) MESSAGE.—The Global AIDS 
Coordinator shall develop  
a message, to be prominently displayed by each program receiving  
funds under this Act, that— ‘‘(1) demonstrates that the program is a 
commitment by citizens of the United States to the global 
fight against HIV/ AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria; and  
‘‘(2) enhances awareness by program recipients that the program is an effort on 
behalf of the citizens of the United States.’’.  
SEC. 102. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.  
Section 1(f)(2) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 
2651a(f)(2)) is amended—  
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(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ‘‘, partner country finance, health, and other 
relevant ministries,’’ after ‘‘community based organizations)’’ each place it appears;  
(2) in subparagraph (B)(ii)—  
(A) by striking subclauses (IV) and (V);  
(B) by inserting after subclause (III) the following:  
 
‘‘(IV) Establishing an interagency working group on HIV/AIDS headed by 
the Global AIDS Coordinator and comprised of representatives from the 
United States Agency for International Development and the Department 
of Health and Human Services, for the purposes of coordination of activities 
relating to HIV/AIDS, including—  
‘‘(aa) meeting regularly to review progress in partner countries toward 
HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care objectives;  
‘‘(bb) participating in the process of identifying countries to consider for 
increased assistance based on the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS in those 
countries, including clear evidence of a public health threat, as well as 
government commitment to address the HIV/AIDS problem, relative 
need, and coordination and joint planning with other significant actors;  
‘‘(cc) assisting the Coordinator in the evaluation, execution, and 
oversight of country operational plans;  
‘‘(dd) reviewing policies that may be obstacles to reaching targets set 
forth for HIV/ AIDS prevention, treatment, and care; and  
‘‘(ee) consulting with representatives from additional relevant agencies, 
including the National Institutes of Health, the Health Resources and 
Services Administration, the Department of Labor, the Department of 
Agriculture, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Peace Corps, 
and the Department of Defense. ‘‘(V) Coordinating overall United 
States HIV/  
AIDS policy and programs, including ensuring the coordination of relevant 
executive branch agency activities in the field, with efforts led by partner 
countries, and with the assistance provided by other relevant bilateral and 
multilateral aid agencies and other donor institutions to promote 
harmonization with other programs aimed at preventing and treating 
HIV/AIDS and other health challenges, improving primary health, 
addressing food security, promoting education and development, and 
strengthening health care systems.’’;  
(C) by redesignating subclauses (VII) and VIII) as sub-clauses (IX) and (XII), 
respectively;  
(D) by inserting after subclause (VI) the following:  
‘‘(VII) Holding annual consultations with nongovernmental organizations in 
partner countries that provide services to improve health, and advocating 
on behalf of the individuals with HIV/AIDS  
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and those at particular risk of contracting HIV/ AIDS, including 
organizations with members who are living with HIV/AIDS.  
‘‘(VIII) Ensuring, through interagency and international coordination, 
that HIV/AIDS programs of the United States are coordinated with, 
and complementary to, the delivery of related global health, food 
security, development, and education.’’;  
(E) in subclause (IX), as redesignated by subparagraph (C)—  
(i) by inserting ‘‘Vietnam,’’ after ‘‘Uganda,’’;  
(ii) by inserting after ‘‘of 2003’’ the following: ‘‘and other countries in which the United 
States is implementing HIV/AIDS programs as part of its foreign assistance program’’; 
and  
(iii) by adding at the end the following: ‘‘In designating additional countries under this 
subparagraph, the President shall give priority to those countries in which there is a 
high prevalence of HIV or risk of significantly increasing incidence of HIV within the 
general population and inadequate financial means within the country.’’;  
(F) by inserting after subclause (IX), as redesignated by subparagraph (C), the following:  
 
‘‘(X) Working with partner countries in which the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
is prevalent among injection drug users to establish, as a national 
priority, national HIV/AIDS prevention programs.  
‘‘(XI) Working with partner countries in which the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
is prevalent among individuals involved in commercial sex acts to 
establish, as a national priority, national prevention programs, 
including education, voluntary testing, and counseling, and referral 
systems that link HIV/AIDS programs with programs to eradicate 
trafficking in persons and support alternatives to prostitution.’’;  
(G) in subclause (XII), as redesignated by subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘funds 
section’’ and inserting ‘‘funds appropriated for HIV/ AIDS assistance pursuant 
to the authorization of appropriations under section 401 of the United States 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 
U.S.C. 7671)’’; and  
(H) by adding at the end the following:  
‘‘(XIII) Publicizing updated drug pricing data to inform the purchasing 
decisions of pharmaceutical procurement partners.’’.  
SEC. 103. SENSE OF CONGRESS.  
Section 102 of the United States Leadership Against HIV/  
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7612)  
is amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It 
is the sense of Congress that— ‘‘(1) full-time country level coordinators, 
preferably with management experience, should head each HIV/AIDS 
country  
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team for United States missions overseeing significant HIV/ AIDS programs;  
‘‘(2) foreign service nationals provide critically important services in the design 
and implementation of United States country-level HIV/AIDS programs and their 
skills and experience as public health professionals should be recognized within 
hiring and compensation practices; and  
‘‘(3) staffing levels for United States country-level HIV/ AIDS teams should be 
adequately maintained to fulfill oversight and other obligations of the positions.’’.  
TITLE II—SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERAL FUNDS, 
PROGRAMS, AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  
SEC. 201. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL VACCINE FUNDS.  
Section 302 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2222) is amended—  
(1) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:  
‘‘(d) TUBERCULOSIS VACCINE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.—In addition to amounts 
otherwise available under this section, there are authorized to be appropriated to the 
President such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2013, 
which shall be used for United States contributions to tuberculosis vaccine development 
programs, which may include the Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation.’’;  
(2) in subsection (k)—  
(A) by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal years 2009 through 
2013’’; and  
(B) by striking ‘‘Vaccine Fund’’ and inserting ‘‘GAVI Fund’’.  
 
(3) in subsection (l), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal 
years 2009 through 2013’’; and  
(4) in subsection (m), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal 
years 2009 through 2013’’.  
 
SEC. 202. PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND 
MALARIA.  
(a) FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Section 202(a) of the United States Leadership 
Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7622(a)) is 
amended to read as follows:  
‘‘(a) FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.— ‘‘(1) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the 
following findings:  
‘‘(A) The establishment of the Global Fund in January 2002 is consistent with 
the general principles for an international AIDS trust fund first outlined by 
Congress in the Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000 (Public Law 
106–264).  
‘‘(B) The Global Fund is an innovative financing mechanism 
which— ‘‘(i) has made progress in many areas in combating 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria; and  
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‘‘(ii) represents the multilateral component of this Act, extending United States 
efforts to more than 130 countries around the world. ‘‘(C) The Global Fund and 
United States bilateral  
assistance programs—  
‘‘(i) are demonstrating increasingly effective coordination, with each possessing 
certain comparative advantages in the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria; and  
‘‘(ii) often work most effectively in concert with each other. ‘‘(D) The United States 
Government—  
‘‘(i) is the largest supporter of the Global Fund in terms of resources and 
technical support; ‘‘(ii) made the founding contribution to the Global Fund; 
and ‘‘(iii) is fully committed to the success of the Global Fund as a 
multilateral public-private partnership. ‘‘(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the 
sense of Congress that— ‘‘(A) transparency and accountability are crucial to 
the long-term success and viability of the Global Fund;  
‘‘(B) the Global Fund has made significant progress toward addressing concerns raised 
by the Government Accountability Office by—  
‘‘(i) improving risk assessment and risk management capabilities; ‘‘(ii) 
providing clearer guidance for and oversight of Local Fund Agents; 
and  
‘‘(iii) strengthening the Office of the Inspector General for the Global Fund; ‘‘(C) the 
provision of sufficient resources and authority  
to the Office of the Inspector General for the Global Fund to ensure that office has the 
staff and independence necessary to carry out its mandate will be a measure of the 
commitment of the Global Fund to transparency and accountability;  
‘‘(D) regular, publicly published financial, programmatic, and reporting audits of the 
Fund, its grantees, and Local Fund Agents are also important benchmarks of 
transparency;  
‘‘(E) the Global Fund should establish and maintain a system to 
track— ‘‘(i) the amount of funds disbursed to each sub-recipient on the 
grant’s fiscal cycle; and  
‘‘(ii) the distribution of resources, by grant and principal recipient, for prevention, 
care, treatment, drug and commodity purchases, and other purposes; ‘‘(F) relevant 
national authorities in recipient countries  
should exempt from duties and taxes all products financed by Global Fund grants and 
procured by any principal recipient or subrecipient for the purpose of carrying out such 
grants;  
‘‘(G) the Global Fund, UNAIDS, and the Global AIDS Coordinator should work together 
to standardize program indicators wherever possible;  
‘‘(H) for purposes of evaluating total amounts of funds contributed to the Global Fund 
under subsection  
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(d)(4)(A)(i), the timetable for evaluations of contributions from sources other 
than the United States should take into account the fiscal calendars of other 
major contributors; and  
‘‘(I) the Global Fund should not support activities involving the ‘Affordable 
Medicines Facility-Malaria’ or similar entities pending compelling evidence of 
success from pilot programs as evaluated by the Coordinator of United States 
Government Activities to Combat Malaria Globally.’’.  
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—Section 202(b) of such Act is amended by adding at the end 
the following:  
‘‘(3) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—The United States Government regards the imposition by 
recipient countries of taxes or tariffs on goods or services provided by the Global Fund, 
which are supported through public and private donations, including the substantial 
contribution of the American people, as inappropriate and inconsistent with standards of 
good governance. The Global AIDS Coordinator or other representatives of the United 
States Government shall work with the Global Fund to dissuade governments from 
imposing such duties, tariffs, or taxes.’’.  
(c) UNITED STATES FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION.—Section 202(d) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 
7622(d)) is amended—  
(1) in paragraph (1)—  
(A) by striking ‘‘$1,000,000,000 for the period of fiscal year 2004 beginning on January 1, 
2004’’ and inserting ‘‘$2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2009,’’; and  
(B) by striking ‘‘the fiscal years 2005–2008’’ and inserting ‘‘each of the fiscal years 2010 
through 2013’’;  
(2) in paragraph (4)—  
(A) in subparagraph (A)—  
(i) in clause (i), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal years 
2009 through 2013’’;  
(ii) in clause (ii)—  
(I) by striking ‘‘during any of the fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘during 
any of the fiscal years 2009 through 2013’’; and  
(II) by adding at the end the following: ‘‘The President may waive the application of this 
clause with respect to assistance for Sudan that is overseen by the Southern Country 
Coordinating Mechanism, including Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile 
State, and Abyei, if the President determines that the national interest or humanitarian 
reasons justify such a waiver. The President shall publish each waiver of this clause in 
the Federal Register and, not later than 15 days before the waiver takes effect, shall 
consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the proposed waiver.’’; and  
(iii) in clause (vi)—  
(I) by striking ‘‘for the purposes’’ and inserting ‘‘For the purposes’’;  
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(II) by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal years 2009 through 
2013’’; and  
(III) by striking ‘‘prior to fiscal year 2004’’ and inserting ‘‘before fiscal year 2009’’;  
(B) in subparagraph (B)(iv), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting 
‘‘fiscal years 2009 through 2013’’; and  
(C) in subparagraph (C)(ii), by striking ‘‘Committee on International Relations’’ and 
inserting ‘‘Committee on Foreign Affairs’’; and  
(3) by adding at the end the following:  
‘‘(5) WITHHOLDING FUNDS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 20 percent of 
the amounts appropriated pursuant to this Act for a contribution to support the Global 
Fund for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2013 shall be withheld from obligation to 
the Global Fund until the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees that the Global Fund—  
‘‘(A) has established an evaluation framework for the performance of Local Fund 
Agents (referred to in this paragraph as ‘LFAs’);  
‘‘(B) is undertaking a systematic assessment of the 
performance of LFAs; ‘‘(C) has adopted, and is implementing, a 
policy to  
publish on a publicly available Web site— ‘‘(i) grant performance reviews; 
‘‘(ii) all reports of the Inspector General of the  
Global Fund, in a manner that is consistent with the Policy for Disclosure of 
Reports of the Inspector General, approved at the 16th Meeting of the Board of 
the Global Fund;  
‘‘(iii) decision points of the Board of the Global Fund; ‘‘(iv) 
reports from Board committees to the Board; and  
‘‘(v) a regular collection and analysis of performance data and funding of grants 
of the Global Fund, which shall cover all principal recipients and all sub-
recipients; ‘‘(D) is maintaining an independent, well-staffed Office  
of the Inspector General that— ‘‘(i) reports directly to 
the Board of the Global Fund; and  
‘‘(ii) compiles regular, publicly published audits of financial, programmatic, and 
reporting aspects of the Global Fund, its grantees, and LFAs; ‘‘(E) has 
established, and is reporting publicly on,  
standard indicators for all program areas; ‘‘(F) has established a 
methodology to track and is publicly reporting on—  
‘‘(i) all subrecipients and the amount of funds disbursed to each subrecipient on 
the grant’s fiscal cycle; and  
‘‘(ii) the distribution of resources, by grant and principal recipient, for 
prevention, care, treatment, drugs and commodities purchase, and other 
purposes;  
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‘‘(G) has established a policy on tariffs imposed by national governments on all 
goods and services financed by the Global Fund;  
‘‘(H) through its Secretariat, has taken meaningful steps to prevent national 
authorities in recipient countries from imposing taxes or tariffs on goods or 
services provided by the Fund;  
‘‘(I) is maintaining its status as a financing institution focused on programs 
directly related to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis;  
‘‘(J) is maintaining and making progress on— ‘‘(i) sustaining its 
multisectoral approach, through country coordinating 
mechanisms; and  
‘‘(ii) the implementation of grants, as reflected in the proportion of 
resources allocated to different sectors, including governments, civil society, 
and faith-and community-based organizations; and ‘‘(K) has established 
procedures providing access by  
the Office of Inspector General of the Department of State and Broadcasting 
Board of Governors, as cognizant Inspector General, and the Inspector General 
of the Health and Human Services and the Inspector General of the United 
States Agency for International Development, to Global Fund financial data, 
and other information relevant to United States contributions (as determined 
by the Inspector General in consultation with the Global AIDS Coordinator). 
‘‘(6) SUMMARIES OF BOARD DECISIONS AND UNITED STATES  
POSITIONS.—Following each meeting of the Board of the Global Fund, the 
Coordinator of United States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally 
shall report on the public website of the Coordinator a summary of Board decisions 
and how the United States Government voted and its positions on such decisions.’’.  
SEC. 203. RESEARCH ON METHODS FOR WOMEN TO PREVENT TRANSMISSION OF HIV AND 
OTHER DISEASES.  
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress recognizes the need and urgency to expand the range 
of interventions for preventing the transmission of human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV), including nonvaccine prevention methods that can be controlled by women.  
(b) NIH OFFICE OF AIDS RESEARCH.—Subpart 1 of part D of title XXIII of the Public 
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300cc– 40 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
2351 the following:  
 
‘‘SEC. 2351A. MICROBICIDE RESEARCH.  
‘‘(a) FEDERAL STRATEGIC PLAN.—The Director of the Office  
shall— ‘‘(1) expedite the implementation of the Federal strategic plans 
required by section 403(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 
U.S.C. 283(a)(5)) regarding the conduct and support of research 
on, and development of, a microbicide to prevent the transmission 
of the human immunodeficiency virus; and ‘‘(2) review and, as 
appropriate, revise such plan to prioritize funding and activities 
relative to their scientific urgency and potential market readiness.  
357 
 
H. R. 5501—24  
‘‘(b) COORDINATION.—In implementing, reviewing, and prioritizing elements of the 
plan described in subsection (a), the Director of the Office shall consult, as appropriate, 
with—  
‘‘(1) representatives of other Federal agencies involved in  
microbicide research, including the Coordinator of United  
States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally,  
the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,  
and the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter 
national Development;  
‘‘(2) the microbicide research and development community;  
and  
‘‘(3) health advocates.’’.  
(c) NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES.—Subpart 6 of part C of 
title IV of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 285f et seq.) is amended by adding at 
the end the following:  
‘‘SEC. 447C. MICROBICIDE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.  
‘‘The Director of the Institute, acting through the head of the Division of AIDS, 
shall, consistent with the peer-review process of the National Institutes of Health, carry 
out research on, and development of, safe and effective methods for use by women to 
prevent the transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus, which may include 
microbicides.’’.  
(d) CDC.—Part B of title III of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 243 et seq.) 
is amended by inserting after section 317S the following:  
‘‘SEC. 317T. MICROBICIDE RESEARCH.  
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is 
strongly encouraged to fully implement the Centers’ microbicide agenda to support 
research and development of microbicides for use to prevent the transmission of the 
human immunodeficiency virus.  
‘‘(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated 
such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 2009 through 2013 to carry out 
this section.’’.  
(e) UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, in coordination with the Coordinator of United States Government 
Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally, may facilitate availability and accessibility of 
microbicides, provided that such pharmaceuticals are approved, tentatively approved, or 
otherwise authorized for use by—  
(A) the Food and Drug Administration;  
(B) a stringent regulatory agency acceptable to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services; or  
(C) a quality assurance mechanism acceptable to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services.  
(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated 
under section 401 of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7671) for HIV/AIDS assistance, there are authorized to 
be appropriated to the President such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal 
years 2009 through 2013 to carry out this subsection.  
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SEC. 204. COMBATING HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA BY STRENGTHENING 
HEALTH POLICIES AND HEALTH SYSTEMS OF PARTNER COUNTRIES.  
(a) IN GENERAL.—Title II of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7621) is amended by adding at the end 
the following:  
‘‘SEC. 204. COMBATING HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA BY STRENGTHENING 
HEALTH POLICIES AND HEALTH SYSTEMS OF PARTNER COUNTRIES.  
‘‘(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United 
States Government— ‘‘(1) to invest appropriate resources authorized 
under this Act—  
‘‘(A) to carry out activities to strengthen HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria 
health policies and health systems; and  
‘‘(B) to provide workforce training and capacity-building consistent with the 
goals and objectives of this Act; and ‘‘(2) to support the development of a sound 
policy environ 
ment in partner countries to increase the ability of such 
countries— ‘‘(A) to maximize utilization of health care 
resources from donor countries;  
‘‘(B) to increase national investments in health and education and maximize the 
effectiveness of such investments;  
‘‘(C) to improve national HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria 
strategies; ‘‘(D) to deliver evidence-based services in an effective 
and efficient manner; and  
‘‘(E) to reduce barriers that prevent recipients of services from achieving maximum 
benefit from such services. ‘‘(b) ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT  
SYSTEMS.—  
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Consistent with the authority under section 129 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2152), the Secretary of the Treasury, 
acting through the head of the Office of Technical Assistance, is authorized to 
provide assistance for advisors and partner country finance, health, and other 
relevant ministries to improve the effectiveness of public finance management 
systems in partner countries to enable such countries to receive funding to carry out 
programs to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria and to manage such 
programs.  
‘‘(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the amounts authorized to be 
appropriated under section 401 for HIV/AIDS assistance, there are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary of the Treasury such sums as may be necessary for 
each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2013 to carry out this subsection. ‘‘(c) PLAN 
REQUIRED.—The Global AIDS Coordinator, in  
collaboration with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), shall develop and implement a plan to combat HIV/AIDS by 
strengthening health policies and health systems of partner countries as part of 
USAID’s ‘Health  
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Systems 2020’ project. Recognizing that human and institutional capacity form the core 
of any health care system that can sustain the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria, the plan shall include a strategy to encourage postsecondary educational 
institutions in partner countries, particularly in Africa, in collaboration with United 
States postsecondary educational institutions, including historically black colleges and 
universities, to develop such human and institutional capacity and in the process further 
build their capacity to sustain the fight against these diseases.’’.  
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the United States Leadership 
Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7601 note) is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 203, as added by section 203 of 
this Act, the following:  
‘‘Sec. 204. Combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria by strengthening health policies and health 
systems of partner countries.’’.  
SEC. 205. FACILITATING EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS OF THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL.  
Section 307 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 242l) is amended—  
(1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows: ‘‘(a) The Secretary may 
participate with other countries in cooperative endeavors in—  
‘‘(1) biomedical research, health care technology, and the health services 
research and statistical analysis authorized under section 306 and title IX; and  
‘‘(2) biomedical research, health care services, health care research, or other 
related activities in furtherance of the activities, objectives or goals authorized 
under the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against 
HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008.’’; and  
(2) in subsection (b)—  
(A) in paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the semicolon at the end;  
(B) by striking ‘‘The Secretary may not, in the exercise of his authority under this 
section, provide financial assistance for the construction of any facility in any foreign 
country.’’  
(C) in paragraph (8), by striking ‘‘for any purpose.’’ and inserting ‘‘for the purpose of any 
law administered by the Office of Personnel Management;’’; and  
 
(D) by adding at the end the following:  
‘‘(9) provide such funds by advance or reimbursement to the Secretary of State, 
as may be necessary, to pay the costs of acquisition, lease, construction, alteration, 
equipping, furnishing or management of facilities outside of the United States; and  
‘‘(10) in consultation with the Secretary of State, through grant or cooperative 
agreement, make funds available to public or nonprofit private institutions or 
agencies in foreign countries in which the Secretary is participating in activities 
described under subsection (a) to acquire, lease, construct, alter, or renovate 
facilities in those countries.’’.  
(3) in subsection (c)—  
(A) by striking ‘‘1990’’ and inserting ‘‘1980’’; and  
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(B) by inserting or ‘‘or section 903 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4083)’’ 
after ‘‘Code’’.  
SEC. 206. FACILITATING VACCINE DEVELOPMENT.  
(a) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.—The Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development, utilizing public-private partners, 
as appropriate, and working in coordination with other international development agen-
cies, is authorized to strengthen the capacity of developing countries’ governmental 
institutions to—  
(1) collect evidence for informed decision-making and introduction of new vaccines, 
including potential HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria vaccines, if such vaccines are 
determined to be safe and effective;  
(2) review protocols for clinical trials and impact studies and improve the 
implementation of clinical trials; and  
(3) ensure adequate supply chain and delivery systems.  
(b) ADVANCED MARKET COMMITMENTS.—  
(1) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this subsection is to improve global health by requiring the 
United States to participate in negotiations for advance market commitments for the 
development of future vaccines, including potential vaccines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
and malaria.  
(2) NEGOTIATION REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall enter into 
negotiations with the appropriate officials of the International Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development (World Bank) and the GAVI Alliance, the member nations of such 
entities, and other interested parties to establish advanced market commitments to 
purchase vaccines to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other related 
infectious diseases.  
(3) REQUIREMENTS.—In negotiating the United States participation in programs for 
advanced market commitments, the Secretary of the Treasury shall take into account 
whether programs for advance market commitments include—  
(A) legally binding contracts for product purchase that include a fair market price for up 
to a maximum number of treatments, creating a strong market incentive;  
(B) clearly defined and transparent rules of program participation for qualified 
developers and suppliers of the product;  
(C) clearly defined requirements for eligible vaccines to ensure that they are safe and 
effective and can be delivered in developing country contexts;  
(D) dispute settlement mechanisms; and  
(E) sufficient flexibility to enable the contracts to be adjusted in accord with new 
information related to projected market size and other factors while still maintaining 
the purchase commitment at a fair price.  
(4) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act—  
(A) the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional 
committees on the status of the United States negotiations to participate in programs for 
the advanced market commitments under this subsection; and  
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(B) the President shall produce a comprehensive report, written by a study group of 
qualified professionals from relevant Federal agencies and initiatives, nongovernmental 
organizations, and industry representatives, that sets forth a coordinated strategy to 
accelerate development of vaccines for infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
and tuberculosis, which includes—  
(i) initiatives to create economic incentives for the research, development, and 
manufacturing of vaccines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other infectious 
diseases;  
(ii) an expansion of public-private partnerships and the leveraging of resources from 
other countries and the private sector; and  
(iii) efforts to maximize United States capabilities to support clinical trials of vaccines in 
developing countries and to address the challenges of delivering vaccines in developing 
countries to minimize delays in access once vaccines are available.  
TITLE III—BILATERAL EFFORTS  
Subtitle A—General Assistance and Programs  
SEC. 301. ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT HIV/AIDS.  
(a) AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961.—  
(1) FINDING.—Section 104A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b–
2(a)) is amended by inserting ‘‘Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America’’ after 
‘‘Caribbean,’’.  
(2) POLICY.—Section 104A(b) of such Act is amended to read as follows: ‘‘(b) POLICY.—  
 
‘‘(1) OBJECTIVES.—It is a major objective of the foreign assistance program of the 
United States to provide assistance for the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS 
and the care of those affected by the disease. It is the policy objective of the United 
States, by 2013, to—  
‘‘(A) assist partner countries to— ‘‘(i) prevent 12,000,000 new HIV infections worldwide; 
‘‘(ii) support—  
‘‘(I) the increase in the number of individuals with HIV/AIDS receiving 
antiretroviral treatment above the goal established under section 
402(a)(3) and increased pursuant to paragraphs (1) through  
(3) of section 403(d); and  
‘‘(II) additional treatment through coordinated multilateral efforts; 
‘‘(iii) support care for 12,000,000 individuals  
infected with or affected by HIV/AIDS, including 5,000,000 orphans and 
vulnerable children affected by  
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HIV/AIDS, with an emphasis on promoting a comprehensive, coordinated system of 
services to be integrated throughout the continuum of care;  
‘‘(iv) provide at least 80 percent of the target population with access to 
counseling, testing, and treatment to prevent the transmission of HIV from 
mother-to-child;  
‘‘(v) provide care and treatment services to children with HIV in proportion to 
their percentage within the HIV-infected population of a given partner country; 
and  
‘‘(vi) train and support retention of health care professionals, paraprofessionals, 
and community health workers in HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care, 
with the target of providing such training to at least 140,000 new health care 
professionals and paraprofessionals with an emphasis on training and in 
country deployment of critically needed doctors and nurses; ‘‘(B) strengthen the 
capacity to deliver primary health  
care in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa;  
‘‘(C) support and help countries in their efforts to achieve staffing levels of at least 
2.3 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 1,000 population, as called for by the World 
Health Organization; and  
‘‘(D) help partner countries to develop independent, sustainable HIV/AIDS 
programs. ‘‘(2) COORDINATED GLOBAL STRATEGY.—The United States  
and other countries with the sufficient capacity should provide assistance to countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, 
and other countries and regions confronting HIV/AIDS epidemics in a coordinated global 
strategy to help address generalized and concentrated epidemics through HIV/AIDS 
prevention, treatment, care, monitoring and evaluation, and related activities.  
‘‘(3) PRIORITIES.—The United States Government’s response to the global HIV/AIDS 
pandemic and the Government’s efforts to help countries assume leadership of 
sustainable campaigns to combat their local epidemics should place high priority on—  
‘‘(A) the prevention of the transmission of HIV; ‘‘(B) moving toward 
universal access to HIV/AIDS prevention counseling and services; ‘‘(C) 
the inclusion of cost sharing assurances that meet the requirements 
under section 110; and  
‘‘(D) the inclusion of transition strategies to ensure sustainability of such programs 
and activities, including health care systems, under other international donor sup-
port, or budget support by respective foreign governments.’’.  
(b) AUTHORIZATION.—Section 104A(c) of such Act is amended—  
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘and other countries and areas.’’ and inserting ‘‘Central 
Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and other countries and areas, particularly with 
respect to refugee populations or those in postconflict settings in such countries and 
areas with significant or increasing HIV incidence rates.’’;  
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(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and other countries and areas affected by the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic’’ and inserting ‘‘Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and 
other countries and areas affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, particularly with respect 
to refugee populations or those in post-conflict settings in such countries and areas with 
significant or increasing HIV incidence rates.’’; and  
(3) in paragraph (3)—  
(A) by striking ‘‘foreign countries’’ and inserting ‘‘partner countries, other international 
actors,’’; and  
(B) by inserting ‘‘within the framework of the principles of the Three Ones’’ before the 
period at the end.  
(c) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.—Section 104A(d) of such Act is amended—  
(1) in paragraph (1)—  
(A) in subparagraph (A)—  
(i) by inserting ‘‘and multiple concurrent sexual partnering,’’ after ‘‘casual sexual 
partnering’’; and  
(ii) by striking ‘‘condoms’’ and inserting ‘‘male and female condoms’’;  
(B) in subparagraph (B)—  
(i) by striking ‘‘programs that’’ and inserting ‘‘programs that are designed with local 
input and’’; and  
(ii) by striking ‘‘those organizations’’ and inserting ‘‘those locally based organizations’’;  
(C) in subparagraph (D), by inserting ‘‘and promoting the use of provider-initiated or 
‘opt-out’ voluntary testing in accordance with World Health Organization guidelines’’ 
before the semicolon at the end;  
(D) by redesignating subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H) as subparagraphs (H), (I), and (J), 
respectively;  
 
(E) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following: ‘‘(F) assistance to—  
‘‘(i) achieve the goal of reaching 80 percent of pregnant women for 
prevention and treatment of mother-to-child transmission of HIV in 
countries in which the United States is implementing HIV/AIDS programs 
by 2013; and  
‘‘(ii) promote infant feeding options and treatment  
protocols that meet the most recent criteria established  
by the World Health Organization;  
‘‘(G) medical male circumcision programs as part of  
national strategies to combat the transmission of HIV/ AIDS;’’;  
(F) in subparagraph (I), as redesignated, by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; and  
(G) by adding at the end the following: ‘‘(K) assistance for counseling, testing, treatment, 
care, and support programs, including— ‘‘(i) counseling and other services for the 
prevention of reinfection of individuals with HIV/AIDS; ‘‘(ii) counseling to prevent sexual 
transmission of HIV, including— ‘‘(I) life skills development for practicing  
 
abstinence and faithfulness; ‘‘(II) reducing the number of sexual 
partners; ‘‘(III) delaying sexual debut; and  
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‘‘(IV) ensuring correct and consistent use of condoms; ‘‘(iii) assistance to engage 
underlying  
vulnerabilities to HIV/AIDS, especially those of women and girls;  
‘‘(iv) assistance for appropriate HIV/AIDS education programs and training targeted 
to prevent the transmission of HIV among men who have sex with men;  
‘‘(v) assistance to provide male and female condoms; ‘‘(vi) diagnosis 
and treatment of other sexually transmitted infections; ‘‘(vii) 
strategies to address the stigma and discrimination that impede 
HIV/AIDS prevention efforts; and  
‘‘(viii) assistance to facilitate widespread access to microbicides for HIV prevention, 
if safe and effective products become available, including financial and technical 
support for culturally appropriate introductory programs, procurement, 
distribution, logistics management, program delivery, acceptability studies, provider 
training, demand generation, and postintroduction monitoring.’’; and  
(2) in paragraph (2)—  
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end;  
(B) in subparagraph (C)—  
(i) by inserting ‘‘pain management,’’ after ‘‘opportunistic infections,’’; and  
(ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and  
(C) by adding at the end the following:  
 
‘‘(D) as part of care and treatment of HIV/AIDS, assistance (including prophylaxis and 
treatment) for common HIV/AIDS-related opportunistic infections for free or at a rate at 
which it is easily affordable to the individuals and populations being served;  
‘‘(E) as part of care and treatment of HIV/AIDS, assistance or referral to available and 
adequately resourced service providers for nutritional support, including counseling and 
where necessary the provision of commodities, for persons meeting malnourishment 
criteria and their families;’’;  
(3) in paragraph (4)—  
(A) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end;  
(B) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and  
 
(C) by adding at the end the following:  
‘‘(E) carrying out and expanding program monitoring, impact evaluation research and 
analysis, and operations research and disseminating data and findings through 
mechanisms to be developed by the Coordinator of United States Government Activities 
to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally, in coordination with the Director of the Centers for 
Disease Control, in order to—  
‘‘(i) improve accountability, increase transparency, and ensure the delivery of 
evidence-based services through the collection, evaluation, and analysis of data  
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regarding gender-responsive interventions,  
disaggregated by age and sex; ‘‘(ii) identify and replicate effective models; and 
‘‘(iii) develop gender indicators to measure out 
comes and the impacts of interventions; and ‘‘(F) establishing appropriate 
systems to— ‘‘(i) gather epidemiological and social science data on HIV; 
and  
‘‘(ii) evaluate the effectiveness of prevention efforts among men who have sex with 
men, with due consideration to stigma and risks associated with disclosure.’’;  
(4) in paragraph (5)—  
(A) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); and  
 
(B) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following:  
‘‘(C) MECHANISM TO ENSURE COST-EFFECTIVE DRUG PUR-CHASING.—Subject to subparagraph 
(B), mechanisms to ensure that safe and effective pharmaceuticals, including 
antiretrovirals and medicines to treat opportunistic infections, are purchased at the 
lowest possible price at which such pharmaceuticals may be obtained in sufficient 
quantity on the world market, provided that such pharmaceuticals are approved, 
tentatively approved, or otherwise authorized for use by—  
‘‘(i) the Food and Drug Administration; ‘‘(ii) a stringent regulatory agency 
acceptable to the Secretary of Health and Human Services; or ‘‘(iii) a quality 
assurance mechanism acceptable to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services.’’;  
(5) in paragraph (6)—  
(A) by amending the paragraph heading to read as follows: ‘‘(6) RELATED AND 
COORDINATED ACTIVITIES.—’’;  
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end;  
(C) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and  
 
(D) by adding at the end the following: ‘‘(D) coordinated or referred 
activities to— ‘‘(i) enhance the clinical impact of HIV/AIDS care and 
treatment; and  
‘‘(ii) ameliorate the adverse social and economic costs often affecting AIDS-impacted 
families and communities through the direct provision, as necessary, or through the 
referral, if possible, of support services, including—  
‘‘(I) nutritional and food support; ‘‘(II) safe drinking water and adequate 
sanita 
tion; ‘‘(III) nutritional counseling; ‘‘(IV) income-generating activities and 
liveli 
hood initiatives; ‘‘(V) maternal and child health care; ‘‘(VI) primary health 
care; ‘‘(VII) the diagnosis and treatment of other  
infectious or sexually transmitted diseases; ‘‘(VIII) substance abuse 
and treatment services; and  
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‘‘(IX) legal services;  
‘‘(E) coordinated or referred activities to link programs addressing HIV/AIDS with 
programs addressing gender-based violence in areas of significant HIV prevalence to 
assist countries in the development and enforcement of women’s health, children’s 
health, and HIV/AIDS laws and policies that—  
‘‘(i) prevent and respond to violence against women and girls;  
‘‘(ii) promote the integration of screening and assessment for gender-based 
violence into HIV/AIDS programming;  
‘‘(iii) promote appropriate HIV/AIDS counseling, testing, and treatment into 
gender-based violence programs; and  
‘‘(iv) assist governments to develop partnerships with civil society organizations 
to create networks for psychosocial, legal, economic, or other support services; 
‘‘(F) coordinated or referred activities to—  
‘‘(i) address the frequent coinfection of HIV and tuberculosis, in accordance with 
World Health Organization guidelines;  
‘‘(ii) promote provider-initiated or ‘opt-out’ HIV/ AIDS counseling and testing 
and appropriate referral for treatment and care to individuals with tuberculosis 
or its symptoms, particularly in areas with significant HIV prevalence; and  
‘‘(iii) strengthen programs to ensure that individuals testing positive for HIV 
receive tuberculosis screening and to improve laboratory capacities, infection 
control, and adherence; and ‘‘(G) activities to—  
‘‘(i) improve the effectiveness of national responses to HIV/AIDS;  
‘‘(ii) strengthen overall health systems in high-prevalence countries, including 
support for workforce training, retention, and effective deployment, capacity 
building, laboratory development, equipment maintenance and repair, and 
public health and related public financial management systems and operations; 
and  
‘‘(iii) encourage fair and transparent procurement practices among partner 
countries; and  
‘‘(iv) promote in-country or intra-regional pediatric training for physicians and 
other health professionals, preferably through public-private partnerships 
involving colleges and universities, with the goal of increasing pediatric HIV 
workforce capacity.’’; and  
(6) by adding at the end the following:  
‘‘(8) COMPACTS AND FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS.—The development of compacts or 
framework agreements, tailored to local circumstances, with national governments or 
regional partnerships in countries with significant HIV/AIDS burdens to promote host 
government commitment to deeper integration of HIV/AIDS services into health 
systems, contribute to health systems overall, and enhance sustainability, including—  
‘‘(A) cost sharing assurances that meet the requirements under section 110; and  
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‘‘(B) transition strategies to ensure sustainability of such programs and 
activities, including health care systems, under other international donor 
support, or budget support by respective foreign governments.’’.  
(d) COMPACTS AND FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS.—Section 104A of such Act is amended—  
(1) by redesignating subsections (e) through (g) as subsections (f) through (h); and  
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following: ‘‘(e) COMPACTS AND FRAMEWORK 
AGREEMENTS.— ‘‘(1) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:  
 
‘‘(A) The congressionally mandated Institute of Medicine report entitled 
‘PEPFAR Implementation: Progress and Promise’ states: ‘The next strategy [of 
the U.S. Global AIDS Initiative] should squarely address the needs and 
challenges involved in supporting sustainable country HIV/ AIDS programs, 
thereby transitioning from a focus on emergency relief.’.  
‘‘(B) One mechanism to promote the transition from an emergency to a public 
health and development approach to HIV/AIDS is through compacts or 
framework agreements between the United States Government and each 
participating nation. ‘‘(2) ELEMENTS.—Compacts on HIV/AIDS authorized under  
subsection (d)(8) shall include the following elements:  
‘‘(A) Compacts whose primary purpose is to provide direct services to combat 
HIV/AIDS are to be made between—  
‘‘(i) the United States Government; and  
‘‘(ii)(I) national or regional entities representing low-income countries 
served by an existing United States Agency for International Development 
or Department of Health and Human Services presence or regional 
platform; or  
‘‘(II) countries or regions—  
‘‘(aa) experiencing significantly high HIV prevalence or risk of 
significantly increasing incidence within the general population;  
‘‘(bb) served by an existing United States Agency for International 
Development or Department of Health and Human Services presence 
or regional platform; and  
‘‘(cc) that have inadequate financial means within such country or 
region.  
‘‘(B) Compacts whose primary purpose is to provide limited technical assistance 
to a country or region connected to services provided within the country or 
region—  
‘‘(i) may be made with other countries or regional entities served by an 
existing United States Agency for International Development or 
Department of Health and Human Services presence or regional platform;  
‘‘(ii) shall require significant investments in HIV prevention, care, and 
treatment services by the host country;  
‘‘(iii) shall be time-limited in terms of United States contributions; and  
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‘‘(iv) shall be made only upon prior notification  
to Congress— ‘‘(I) justifying the need for such compacts; ‘‘(II) describing the 
expected investment by the  
country or regional entity; and  
‘‘(III) describing the scope, nature, expected total United States investment, and 
time frame of the limited technical assistance under the compact and its 
intended impact.  
‘‘(C) Compacts shall include provisions to— ‘‘(i) promote local and 
national efforts to reduce stigma associated with HIV/AIDS; and  
‘‘(ii) work with and promote the role of civil society in combating HIV/AIDS. ‘‘(D) 
Compacts shall take into account the overall  
national health and development and national HIV/AIDS and public health 
strategies of each country. ‘‘(E) Compacts shall contain—  
‘‘(i) consideration of the specific objectives that the country and the United States 
expect to achieve during the term of a compact;  
‘‘(ii) consideration of the respective responsibilities of the country and the United 
States in the achievement of such objectives;  
‘‘(iii) consideration of regular benchmarks to measure progress toward achieving 
such objectives;  
‘‘(iv) an identification of the intended beneficiaries, disaggregated by gender and 
age, and including information on orphans and vulnerable children, to the 
maximum extent practicable;  
‘‘(v) consideration of the methods by which the compact is intended 
to— ‘‘(I) address the factors that put women and girls at greater risk 
of HIV/AIDS; and  
‘‘(II) strengthen elements such as the economic, educational, and social status of 
women, girls, orphans, and vulnerable children and the inheritance rights and 
safety of such individuals; ‘‘(vi) consideration of the methods by which the  
compact will—  
‘‘(I) strengthen the health care capacity, including factors such as the training, 
retention, deployment, recruitment, and utilization of health care workers;  
‘‘(II) improve supply chain management; and  
‘‘(III) improve the health systems and infrastructure of the partner country, 
including the ability of compact participants to maintain and operate 
equipment transferred or purchased as part of the compact; ‘‘(vii) consideration 
of proposed mechanisms to pro 
vide oversight;  
‘‘(viii) consideration of the role of civil society in the development of a compact and 
the achievement of its objectives;  
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‘‘(ix) a description of the current and potential participation of other donors 
in the achievement of such objectives, as appropriate; and  
‘‘(x) consideration of a plan to ensure appropriate fiscal accountability for 
the use of assistance. ‘‘(F) For regional compacts, priority shall be given to  
countries that are included in regional funds and programs in existence as of 
the date of the enactment of the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States 
Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2008.  
‘‘(G) Amounts made available for compacts described in subparagraphs (A) and 
(B) shall be subject to the inclusion of—  
‘‘(i) cost sharing assurances that meet the requirements under section 110; 
and  
‘‘(ii) transition strategies to ensure sustainability of such programs and 
activities, including health care systems, under other international donor 
support, and budget support by respective foreign governments.  
‘‘(3) LOCAL INPUT.—In entering into a compact on HIV/ AIDS authorized under 
subsection (d)(8), the Coordinator of United States Government Activities to Combat 
HIV/AIDS Globally shall seek to ensure that the government of a country—  
‘‘(A) takes into account the local perspectives of the rural and urban poor, 
including women, in each country; and  
‘‘(B) consults with private and voluntary organizations, including faith-based 
organizations, the business community, and other donors in the country. ‘‘(4) 
CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC NOTIFICATION AFTER  
ENTERING INTO A COMPACT.—Not later than 10 days after entering into a compact 
authorized under subsection (d)(8), the Global AIDS Coordinator shall—  
‘‘(A) submit a report containing a detailed summary of the compact and a copy 
of the text of the compact to—  
‘‘(i) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
‘‘(ii) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
‘‘(iii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives; and  
‘‘(iv) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and 
‘‘(B) publish such information in the Federal Register  
and on the Internet website of the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator.’’.  
(e) ANNUAL REPORT.—Section 104A(f) of such Act, as redesignated, is amended—  
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘Committee on International Relations’’ and 
inserting ‘‘Committee on Foreign Affairs’’; and  
(2) in paragraph (2)—  
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end;  
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(B) by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the following: ‘‘(C) a detailed breakdown 
of funding allocations, by program and by country, for prevention activities; and ‘‘(D) a 
detailed assessment of the impact of programs established pursuant to such sections, 
including— ‘‘(i)(I) the effectiveness of such programs in reducing— ‘‘(aa) the 
transmission of HIV, particularly in women and girls;  
‘‘(bb) mother-to-child transmission of HIV, including through drug treatment and 
therapies, either directly or by referral; and  
‘‘(cc) mortality rates from HIV/AIDS;  
‘‘(II) the number of patients receiving treatment  
for AIDS in each country that receives assistance under  
this Act;  
‘‘(III) an assessment of progress towards the achievement of annual goals set forth 
in the timetable required under the 5-year strategy established under section 101 of 
the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 
2003 and, if annual goals are not being met, the reasons for such failure; and  
‘‘(IV) retention and attrition data for programs receiving United States assistance, 
including mortality and loss to follow-up rates, organized overall and by country;  
‘‘(ii) the progress made toward—  
‘‘(I) improving health care delivery systems (including the training of health 
care workers, including doctors, nurses, midwives, pharmacists, laboratory 
technicians, and compensated community health workers, and the use of codes 
of conduct for ethical recruiting practices for health care workers);  
‘‘(II) advancing safe working conditions for health care workers; and  
‘‘(III) improving infrastructure to promote progress toward universal access to 
HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care by 2013; ‘‘(iii) a description of 
coordination efforts with rel 
evant executive branch agencies to link HIV/AIDS clinical and social services with 
non-HIV/AIDS services as part of the United States health and development 
agenda;  
‘‘(iv) a detailed description of integrated HIV/AIDS  
and food and nutrition programs and services,  
including—  
‘‘(I) the amount spent on food and nutrition  
support; ‘‘(II) the types of activities supported; and ‘‘(III) an assessment of 
the effectiveness of  
interventions carried out to improve the health status of persons with 
HIV/AIDS receiving food or nutritional support;  
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‘‘(v) a description of efforts to improve harmonization, in terms of relevant executive 
branch agencies, coordination with other public and private entities, and coordination 
with partner countries’ national strategic plans as called for in the ‘Three Ones’;  
‘‘(vi) a description of—  
‘‘(I) the efforts of partner countries that were signatories to the Abuja Declaration on 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious Diseases to adhere to the 
goals of such Declaration in terms of investments in public health, including 
HIV/AIDS; and  
‘‘(II) a description of the HIV/AIDS investments of partner countries that were not 
signatories to such Declaration; ‘‘(vii) a detailed description of any compacts or  
framework agreements reached or negotiated between the United States and any 
partner countries, including a description of the elements of compacts described in 
subsection (e);  
‘‘(viii) a description of programs serving women and girls, including—  
‘‘(I) HIV/AIDS prevention programs that address the vulnerabilities of girls and 
women to HIV/AIDS;  
‘‘(II) information on the number of individuals served by programs aimed at 
reducing the vulnerabilities of women and girls to HIV/AIDS and data on the types, 
objectives, and duration of programs to address these issues;  
‘‘(III) information on programs to address the particular needs of adolescent girls 
and young women; and  
‘‘(IV) programs to prevent gender-based violence or to assist victims of gender based 
violence as part of, or in coordination with, HIV/ AIDS programs; ‘‘(ix) a description 
of strategies, goals, programs,  
and interventions to— ‘‘(I) address the needs and 
vulnerabilities of youth populations;  
‘‘(II) expand access among young men and women to evidence-based HIV/AIDS 
health care services and HIV prevention programs, including abstinence education 
programs; and  
‘‘(III) expand community-based services to meet the needs of orphans and of 
children and adolescents affected by or vulnerable to HIV/AIDS without increasing 
stigmatization; ‘‘(x) a description of—  
‘‘(I) the specific strategies funded to ensure the reduction of HIV infection among 
injection drug users;  
‘‘(II) the number of injection drug users, by country, reached by such strategies; 
and ‘‘(III) medication-assisted drug treatment for individuals with HIV or at 
risk of HIV;  
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‘‘(xi) a detailed description of program monitoring, operations research, and 
impact evaluation research, including—  
‘‘(I) the amount of funding provided for each research 
type; ‘‘(II) an analysis of cost-effectiveness models; and  
‘‘(III) conclusions regarding the efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of 
services as derived from previous or ongoing research and monitoring 
efforts; ‘‘(xii) building capacity to identify, investigate, and  
stop nosocomial transmission of infectious diseases, including HIV and 
tuberculosis; and  
‘‘(xiii) a description of staffing levels of United States government 
HIV/AIDS teams in countries with significant HIV/AIDS programs, 
including whether or not a full-time coordinator was on staff for the year.’’.  
(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Section 301(b) of the United States Leadership 
Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7631(b)) is 
amended—  
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal 
years 2009 through 2013’’; and  
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal 
years 2009 through 2013’’.  
(g) RELATIONSHIP TO ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO ENHANCE NUTRITION.—Section 301(c) of 
such Act is amended to read as follows:  
 
‘‘(c) FOOD AND NUTRITIONAL SUPPORT.—  
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—As indicated in the report produced by the Institute of 
Medicine, entitled ‘PEPFAR Implementation: Progress and Promise’, inadequate 
caloric intake has been clearly identified as a principal reason for failure of clinical 
response to antiretroviral therapy. In recognition of the impact of malnutrition as a 
clinical health issue for many persons living with HIV/AIDS that is often associated 
with health and economic impacts on these individuals and their families, the 
Global AIDS Coordinator and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development shall—  
‘‘(A) follow World Health Organization guidelines for HIV/AIDS food and 
nutrition services;  
‘‘(B) integrate nutrition programs with HIV/AIDS activities through effective 
linkages among the health, agricultural, and livelihood sectors and establish 
additional services in circumstances in which referrals are inadequate or 
impossible;  
‘‘(C) provide, as a component of care and treatment programs for persons with 
HIV/AIDS, food and nutritional support to individuals infected with, and 
affected by, HIV/ AIDS who meet established criteria for nutritional support 
(including clinically malnourished children and adults, and pregnant and 
lactating women in programs in need of supplemental support), including—  
‘‘(i) anthropometric and dietary assessment; ‘‘(ii) counseling; and ‘‘(iii) 
therapeutic and supplementary feeding;  
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‘‘(D) provide food and nutritional support for children affected by HIV/AIDS and 
to communities and households caring for children affected by HIV/AIDS; and  
‘‘(E) in communities where HIV/AIDS and food insecurity are highly prevalent, 
support programs to address these often intersecting health problems through 
community-based assistance programs, with an emphasis on sustainable 
approaches. ‘‘(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the amounts  
authorized to be appropriated under section 401, there are authorized to be 
appropriated to the President such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal 
years 2009 through 2013 to carry out this subsection.’’.  
(h) ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.—Section 301(d) of such Act is amended to read as 
follows:  
‘‘(d) ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.—An organization, including a faith-based 
organization, that is otherwise eligible to receive assistance under section 104A of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, under this Act, or under any amendment made by this 
Act or by the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, for HIV/AIDS 
prevention, treatment, or care—  
‘‘(1) shall not be required, as a condition of receiving such 
assistance— ‘‘(A) to endorse or utilize a multisectoral or 
comprehensive approach to combating HIV/AIDS; or  
‘‘(B) to endorse, utilize, make a referral to, become integrated with, or otherwise 
participate in any program or activity to which the organization has a religious 
or moral objection; and ‘‘(2) shall not be discriminated against in the solicitation  
or issuance of grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements under such provisions of 
law for refusing to meet any requirement described in paragraph (1).’’.  
SEC. 302. ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT TUBERCULOSIS.  
(a) POLICY.—Section 104B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151b–3(b)) is amended to read as follows:  
‘‘(b) POLICY.—It is a major objective of the foreign assistance program of the United 
States to control tuberculosis. In all countries in which the Government of the United 
States has established development programs, particularly in countries with the highest 
burden of tuberculosis and other countries with high rates of tuberculosis, the United 
States should support the objectives of the Global Plan to Stop TB, including through 
achievement of the following goals:  
‘‘(1) Reduce by half the tuberculosis death and disease burden from the 1990 
baseline.  
‘‘(2) Sustain or exceed the detection of at least 70 percent of sputum smear-
positive cases of tuberculosis and the successful treatment of at least 85 percent of 
the cases detected in countries with established United States Agency for Inter-
national Development tuberculosis programs.  
‘‘(3) In support of the Global Plan to Stop TB, the President shall establish a 
comprehensive, 5-year United States strategy to expand and improve United States 
efforts to combat tuberculosis globally, including a plan to support—  
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‘‘(A) the successful treatment of 4,500,000 new sputum smear tuberculosis 
patients under DOTS programs by 2013, primarily through direct support for 
needed services, commodities, health workers, and training, and additional 
treatment through coordinated multilateral efforts; and  
‘‘(B) the diagnosis and treatment of 90,000 new multiple drug resistant 
tuberculosis cases by 2013, and additional treatment through coordinated 
multilateral efforts.’’.  
(b) PRIORITY TO STOP TB STRATEGY.—Section 104B(e) of such Act is 
amended to read as follows: ‘‘(e) PRIORITY TO STOP TB STRATEGY.—In 
furnishing assistance under subsection (c), the President shall give priority 
to—  
‘‘(1) direct services described in the Stop TB Strategy, including expansion and 
enhancement of Directly Observed Treatment Short-course (DOTS) coverage, rapid 
testing, treatment for individuals infected with both tuberculosis and HIV, and 
treatment for individuals with multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR–TB), 
strengthening of health systems, use of the International Standards for 
Tuberculosis Care by all providers, empowering individuals with tuberculosis, and 
enabling and promoting research to develop new diagnostics, drugs, and vaccines, 
and program-based operational research relating to tuberculosis; and  
‘‘(2) funding for the Global Tuberculosis Drug Facility, the Stop Tuberculosis 
Partnership, and the Global Alliance for TB Drug Development.’’.  
(c) ASSISTANCE FOR THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND THE STOP TUBERCULOSIS 
PARTNERSHIP.—Section 104B of such Act is amended—  
(1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (h); and  
(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:  
 
‘‘(f) ASSISTANCE FOR THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND THE STOP TUBERCULOSIS 
PARTNERSHIP.—In carrying out this section, the President, acting through the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, is authorized 
to provide increased resources to the World Health Organization and the Stop 
Tuberculosis Partnership to improve the capacity of countries with high rates of 
tuberculosis and other affected countries to implement the Stop TB Strategy and specific 
strategies related to addressing multiple drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR–TB) and 
extensively drug resistant tuberculosis (XDR–TB).’’.  
(d) ANNUAL REPORT.—Section 104B of such Act is amended by inserting after 
subsection (f), as added by subsection (c) of this section, the following:  
‘‘(g) ANNUAL REPORT.—The President shall submit an annual  
report to Congress that describes the impact of United States foreign  
assistance on efforts to control tuberculosis, including— ‘‘(1) the number of 
tuberculosis cases diagnosed and the number of cases cured in countries 
receiving United States bilateral foreign assistance for tuberculosis 
control purposes; ‘‘(2) a description of activities supported with United 
States tuberculosis resources in each country, including a description of 
how those activities specifically contribute to increasing the number of 
people diagnosed and treated for tuberculosis;  
‘‘(3) in each country receiving bilateral United States foreign assistance for 
tuberculosis control purposes, the percentage provided for direct tuberculosis 
services in countries receiving  
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United States bilateral foreign assistance for tuberculosis control purposes;  
‘‘(4) a description of research efforts and clinical trials to develop new tools to 
combat tuberculosis, including diagnostics, drugs, and vaccines supported by United 
States bilateral assistance;  
‘‘(5) the number of persons who have been diagnosed and started treatment for 
multidrug-resistant tuberculosis in countries receiving United States bilateral 
foreign assistance for tuberculosis control programs;  
‘‘(6) a description of the collaboration and coordination of United States anti-
tuberculosis efforts with the World Health Organization, the Global Fund, and other 
major public and private entities within the Stop TB Strategy;  
‘‘(7) the constraints on implementation of programs posed by health 
workforce shortages and capacities; ‘‘(8) the number of people trained in 
tuberculosis control; and  
‘‘(9) a breakdown of expenditures for direct patient tuberculosis services, drugs 
and other commodities, drug management, training in diagnosis and treatment, 
health systems strengthening, research, and support costs.’’.  
(e) DEFINITIONS.—Section 104B(h) of such Act, as redesignated by subsection (c), is 
amended—  
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking the period at the end and 
inserting the following: ‘‘including— ‘‘(A) low-cost and effective 
diagnosis, treatment, and  
monitoring of tuberculosis; ‘‘(B) a reliable drug supply; ‘‘(C) a management 
strategy for public health systems; ‘‘(D) health system strengthening; ‘‘(E) 
promotion of the use of the International Stand 
ards for Tuberculosis Care by all care providers; ‘‘(F) bacteriology under an 
external quality assessment  
framework; ‘‘(G) short-course chemotherapy; and ‘‘(H) sound reporting and 
recording systems.’’; and  
(2) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and  
(3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:  
 
‘‘(5) STOP TB STRATEGY.—The term ‘Stop TB Strategy’ means the 6-point strategy 
to reduce tuberculosis developed by the World Health Organization, which is 
described in the Global Plan to Stop TB 2006–2015: Actions for Life, a com-
prehensive plan developed by the Stop TB Partnership that sets out the actions 
necessary to achieve the millennium development goal of cutting tuberculosis 
deaths and disease burden in half by 2015.’’.  
(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Section 302 (b) of the United States 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 
7632(b)) is amended—  
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal 
years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘a total of $4,000,000,000 for the 5-year period 
beginning on October 1, 2008.’’; and  
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal 
years 2009 through 2013.’’.  
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SEC. 303. ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT MALARIA.  
(a) AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961.— Section 104C(b) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151–4(b)) is amended by inserting ‘‘treatment,’’ after 
‘‘control,’’.  
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Section 303 of the United States Leadership 
Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 
U.S.C. 7633) is amended—  
(1) in subsection (b)—  
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2004 
through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘$5,000,000,000 during the 5-year period beginning on 
October 1, 2008’’; and  
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal 
years 2009 through 2013’’; and  
(2) by adding at the end the following:  
 
‘‘(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—Providing assistance for the  
prevention, control, treatment, and the ultimate eradication of  
malaria is— ‘‘(1) a major objective of the foreign assistance program of the United States; and 
‘‘(2) 1 component of a comprehensive United States global health strategy to reduce 
disease burdens and strengthen communities around the world. ‘‘(d) DEVELOPMENT OF A 
COMPREHENSIVE 5-YEAR STRATEGY.—  
The President shall establish a comprehensive, 5-year strategy to  
combat global malaria that— ‘‘(1) strengthens the capacity of the 
United States to be an effective leader of international 
efforts to reduce malaria burden; ‘‘(2) maintains sufficient 
flexibility and remains responsive to the ever-changing 
nature of the global malaria challenge; ‘‘(3) includes specific 
objectives and multisectoral approaches and strategies to 
reduce the prevalence, mortality, incidence, and spread of 
malaria; ‘‘(4) describes how this strategy would contribute to 
the United States’ overall global health and development 
goals; ‘‘(5) clearly explains how outlined activities will 
interact with other United States Government global health 
activities, including the 5-year global AIDS strategy 
required under this Act; ‘‘(6) expands public-private 
partnerships and leverage of resources; ‘‘(7) coordinates 
among relevant Federal agencies to maximize human and 
financial resources and to reduce duplication among these 
agencies, foreign governments, and international 
organizations; ‘‘(8) coordinates with other international 
entities, including the Global Fund; ‘‘(9) maximizes United 
States capabilities in the areas of technical assistance and 
training and research, including vaccine research; and  
‘‘(10) establishes priorities and selection criteria for the distribution of 
resources based on factors such as— ‘‘(A) the size and demographics of the 
population with malaria;  
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‘‘(B) the needs of that population; ‘‘(C) the country’s existing infrastructure; 
and ‘‘(D) the ability to closely coordinate United States  
Government efforts with national malaria control plans of partner countries.’’.  
SEC. 304. MALARIA RESPONSE COORDINATOR.  
Section 304 of the United States Leadership Against HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7634) is amended to read as follows:  
‘‘SEC. 304. MALARIA RESPONSE COORDINATOR.  
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—There is established within the United States Agency for 
International Development a Coordinator of United States Government Activities to 
Combat Malaria Globally (referred to in this section as the ‘Malaria Coordinator’), who 
shall be appointed by the President.  
‘‘(b) AUTHORITIES.—The Malaria Coordinator, acting through nongovernmental 
organizations (including faith-based and community-based organizations), partner 
country finance, health, and other relevant ministries, and relevant executive branch 
agencies as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out this section, is authorized 
to—  
‘‘(1) operate internationally to carry out prevention, care, treatment, support, 
capacity development, and other activities to reduce the prevalence, mortality, and 
incidence of malaria;  
‘‘(2) provide grants to, and enter into contracts and cooperative agreements 
with, nongovernmental organizations (including faith-based organizations) to carry 
out this section; and  
‘‘(3) transfer and allocate executive branch agency funds that have been 
appropriated for the purposes described in paragraphs (1) and (2). ‘‘(c) DUTIES.—  
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Malaria Coordinator has primary responsibility for the 
oversight and coordination of all resources and international activities of the United 
States Government relating to efforts to combat malaria.  
‘‘(2) SPECIFIC DUTIES.—The Malaria Coordinator shall—  
‘‘(A) facilitate program and policy coordination of antimalarial efforts among 
relevant executive branch agencies and nongovernmental organizations by 
auditing, monitoring, and evaluating such programs;  
‘‘(B) ensure that each relevant executive branch agency undertakes 
antimalarial programs primarily in those areas in which the agency has the 
greatest expertise, technical capability, and potential for success;  
‘‘(C) coordinate relevant executive branch agency activities in the field of 
malaria prevention and treatment;  
‘‘(D) coordinate planning, implementation, and evaluation with the Global AIDS 
Coordinator in countries in which both programs have a significant presence;  
‘‘(E) coordinate with national governments, international agencies, civil society, 
and the private sector; and  
‘‘(F) establish due diligence criteria for all recipients of funds appropriated by 
the Federal Government for malaria assistance.  
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‘‘(d) ASSISTANCE FOR THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.—In carrying out this section, 
the President may provide financial assistance to the Roll Back Malaria Partnership of 
the World Health Organization to improve the capacity of countries with high rates of 
malaria and other affected countries to implement comprehensive malaria control 
programs.  
‘‘(e) COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE EFFORTS.—In carrying out this section and in 
accordance with section 104C of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b–4), 
the Malaria Coordinator shall coordinate the provision of assistance by working with—  
‘‘(1) relevant executive branch agencies, including— ‘‘(A) the Department of 
State (including the Office of  
the Global AIDS Coordinator); ‘‘(B) the Department of Health and Human 
Services; ‘‘(C) the Department of Defense; and ‘‘(D) the Office of the United 
States Trade Representa 
tive;  
‘‘(2) relevant multilateral institutions, including— ‘‘(A) the World Health 
Organization; ‘‘(B) the United Nations Children’s Fund; ‘‘(C) the United 
Nations Development Programme; ‘‘(D) the Global Fund; ‘‘(E) the World 
Bank; and ‘‘(F) the Roll Back Malaria Partnership;  
‘‘(3) program delivery and efforts to lift barriers that would impede effective and 
comprehensive malaria control programs; and  
‘‘(4) partner or recipient country governments and national entities including 
universities and civil society organizations (including faith- and community-based 
organizations). ‘‘(f) RESEARCH.—To carry out this section, the Malaria Coordi 
nator, in accordance with section 104C of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
1151d–4), shall ensure that operations and implementation research conducted under 
this Act will closely complement the clinical and program research being undertaken by 
the National Institutes of Health. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
should advise the Malaria Coordinator on priorities for operations and implementation 
research and should be a key implementer of this research.  
‘‘(g) MONITORING.—To ensure that adequate malaria controls are established and 
implemented, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention should advise the Malaria 
Coordinator on monitoring, surveillance, and evaluation activities and be a key imple-
menter of such activities under this Act. Such activities shall complement, rather than 
duplicate, the work of the World Health Organization.  
‘‘(h) ANNUAL REPORT.—  
‘‘(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the 
Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, and annually 
thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional 
committees that describes United States assistance for the prevention, treatment, 
control, and elimination of malaria.  
‘‘(2) CONTENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall describe—  
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‘‘(A) the countries and activities to which malaria  
resources have been allocated;  
‘‘(B) the number of people reached through malaria assistance programs, 
including data on children and pregnant women;  
‘‘(C) research efforts to develop new tools to combat malaria, including drugs 
and vaccines;  
‘‘(D) the collaboration and coordination of United States antimalarial efforts 
with the World Health Organization, the Global Fund, the World Bank, other 
donor governments, major private efforts, and relevant executive agencies;  
‘‘(E) the coordination of United States antimalarial efforts with the national 
malarial strategies of other donor or partner governments and major private 
initiatives;  
‘‘(F) the estimated impact of United States assistance on childhood 
mortality and morbidity from malaria; ‘‘(G) the coordination of 
antimalarial efforts with broader health and development programs; and 
‘‘(H) the constraints on implementation of programs posed by health 
workforce shortages or capacities; and ‘‘(I) the number of personnel trained 
as health workers and the training levels achieved.’’.  
SEC. 305. AMENDMENT TO IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.  
Section 212(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1182(a)(1)(A)(i)) is amended by striking ‘‘, which shall include infection with the etiologic 
agent for acquired immune deficiency syndrome,’’ and inserting a semicolon.  
SEC. 306. CLERICAL AMENDMENT.  
Title III of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7631 et seq.) is amended by striking the heading for 
subtitle B and inserting the following:  
‘‘Subtitle B—Assistance for Women, Children, and 
Families’’.  
SEC. 307. REQUIREMENTS.  
Section 312(b) of the United States Leadership Against HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7652(b)) is amended by striking paragraphs (1), (2), 
and (3) and inserting the following:  
‘‘(1) establish a target for the prevention and treatment of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV that, by 2013, will reach at least 80 percent of pregnant women 
in those countries most affected by HIV/AIDS in which the United States has HIV/ 
AIDS programs;  
‘‘(2) establish a target that, by 2013, the proportion of children receiving care 
and treatment under this Act is proportionate to their numbers within the 
population of HIV infected individuals in each country;  
380 
 
H. R. 5501—47  
‘‘(3) integrate care and treatment with prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV programs to improve outcomes for HIV-affected women and 
families as soon as is feasible and support strategies that promote successful follow-
up and continuity of care of mother and child;  
‘‘(4) expand programs designed to care for children orphaned by, affected by, or 
vulnerable to HIV/AIDS;  
‘‘(5) ensure that women in prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV 
programs are provided with, or referred to, appropriate maternal and child services; 
and  
‘‘(6) develop a timeline for expanding access to more effective regimes to prevent 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV, consistent with the national policies of 
countries in which programs are administered under this Act and the goal of 
achieving universal use of such regimes as soon as possible.’’.  
SEC. 308. ANNUAL REPORT ON PREVENTION OF MOTHER-TO-CHILD TRANSMISSION OF HIV.  
Section 313(a) of the United States Leadership Against HIV/  
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7653(a))  
is amended by striking ‘‘5 years’’ and inserting ‘‘10 years’’.  
SEC. 309. PREVENTION OF MOTHER-TO-CHILD TRANSMISSION EXPERT PANEL.  
Section 312 of the United States Leadership Against HIV/  
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7652)  
is amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘(c) PREVENTION OF MOTHER-TO-CHILD 
TRANSMISSION EXPERT  
PANEL.— ‘‘(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Global AIDS Coordinator shall 
establish a panel of experts to be known as the Prevention of 
Mother-to-Child Transmission Panel (referred to in this sub-
section as the ‘Panel’) to— ‘‘(A) provide an objective review of 
activities to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV; and 
‘‘(B) provide recommendations to the Global AIDS Coordinator 
and to the appropriate congressional committees for scale-up of 
mother-to-child transmission prevention services under this Act 
in order to achieve the target established in subsection (b)(1). 
‘‘(2) MEMBERSHIP.—The Panel shall be convened and chaired by 
the Global AIDS Coordinator, who shall serve as a nonvoting 
member. The Panel shall consist of not more than 15 members 
(excluding the Global AIDS Coordinator), to be appointed by the 
Global AIDS Coordinator not later than 1 year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, including— ‘‘(A) 2 members from the 
Department of Health and Human Services with expertise 
relating to the prevention of mother-to-child transmission 
activities; ‘‘(B) 2 members from the United States Agency for 
International Development with expertise relating to the 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission activities; ‘‘(C) 2 
representatives from among health ministers of national 
governments of foreign countries in which programs under this 
Act are administered; ‘‘(D) 3 members representing 
organizations implementing prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission activities under this Act;  
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‘‘(E) 2 health care researchers with expertise relating to global HIV/AIDS activities; 
and  
‘‘(F) representatives from among patient advocate groups, health care professionals, 
persons living with HIV/ AIDS, and non-governmental organizations with expertise 
relating to the prevention of mother-to-child transmission activities, giving priority 
to individuals in foreign countries in which programs under this Act are 
administered. ‘‘(3) DUTIES OF PANEL.—The Panel shall—  
‘‘(A) assess the effectiveness of current activities in reaching the target described in 
subsection (b)(1);  
‘‘(B) review scientific evidence related to the provision of mother-to-child 
transmission prevention services, including programmatic data and data from 
clinical trials;  
‘‘(C) review and assess ways in which the Office of the United States Global AIDS 
Coordinator collaborates with international and multilateral entities on efforts to 
prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV in affected countries;  
‘‘(D) identify barriers and challenges to increasing access to mother-to-child 
transmission prevention services and evaluate potential mechanisms to alleviate 
those barriers and challenges;  
‘‘(E) identify the extent to which stigma has hindered pregnant women from 
obtaining HIV counseling and testing or returning for results, and provide 
recommendations to address such stigma and its effects;  
‘‘(F) identify opportunities to improve linkages between mother-to-child 
transmission prevention services and care and treatment programs; and  
‘‘(G) recommend specific activities to facilitate reaching the target described in 
subsection (b)(1). ‘‘(4) REPORT.—  
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which the Panel is first 
convened, the Panel shall submit a report containing a detailed statement of the 
recommendations, findings, and conclusions of the Panel to the appropriate 
congressional committees.  
‘‘(B) AVAILABILITY.—The report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall be made 
available to the public. ‘‘(C) CONSIDERATION BY COORDINATOR.—The Coordi 
nator shall— ‘‘(i) consider any recommendations contained in the report submitted 
under subparagraph (A); and  
‘‘(ii) include in the annual report required under section 104A(f) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 a description of the activities conducted in 
response to the recommendations made by the Panel and an explanation of 
any recommendations not implemented at the time of the report. ‘‘(5) 
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are  
authorized to be appropriated to the Panel such sums as may  
be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2011  
to carry out this section. ‘‘(6) TERMINATION.—The Panel shall terminate on the date  
that is 60 days after the date on which the Panel submits  
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the report to the appropriate congressional committees under paragraph (4).’’.  
TITLE IV—FUNDING ALLOCATIONS  
SEC. 401. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.  
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 401(a) of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7671(a)) is amended by striking 
‘‘$3,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2004 through 2008’’ and inserting 
‘‘$48,000,000,000 for the 5-year period beginning on October 1, 2008’’.  
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that the appropriations 
authorized under section 401(a) of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, as amended by subsection (a), should be allocated 
among fiscal years 2009 through 2013 in a manner that allows for the appropriations to 
be gradually increased in a manner that is consistent with program requirements, 
absorptive capacity, and priorities set forth in such Act, as amended by this Act.  
 
SEC. 402. SENSE OF CONGRESS.  
Section 402(b) of the United States Leadership Against HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7672(b)) is amended by striking ‘‘an effective 
distribution of such amounts would be’’ and all that follows through ‘‘10 percent of such 
amounts’’ and inserting ‘‘10 percent should be used’’.  
SEC. 403. ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.  
Section 403 of the United States Leadership Against HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7673) is amended—  
(1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows: ‘‘(a) BALANCED 
FUNDING REQUIREMENT.— ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Global AIDS 
Coordinator shall— ‘‘(A) provide balanced funding for prevention 
activities for sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS; and  
‘‘(B) ensure that activities promoting abstinence, delay of sexual debut, 
monogamy, fidelity, and partner reduction are implemented and funded in a 
meaningful and equitable way in the strategy for each host country based on 
objective epidemiological evidence as to the source of infections and in 
consultation with the government of each host county involved in HIV/AIDS 
prevention activities. ‘‘(2) PREVENTION STRATEGY.—  
‘‘(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the Global AIDS 
Coordinator shall establish an HIV sexual transmission prevention strategy 
governing the expenditure of funds authorized under this Act to prevent the 
sexual transmission of HIV in any host country with a generalized epidemic.  
‘‘(B) REPORT.—In each host country described in subparagraph (A), if the 
strategy established under subparagraph (A) provides less than 50 percent of 
the funds described in subparagraph (A) for activities promoting abstinence, 
delay of sexual debut, monogamy,  
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fidelity, and partner reduction, the Global AIDS Coordinator shall, not later 
than 30 days after the issuance of this strategy, report to the appropriate 
congressional committees on the justification for this decision. ‘‘(3) EXCLUSION.—
Programs and activities that implement  
or purchase new prevention technologies or modalities, such as medical male 
circumcision, public education about risks to acquire HIV infection from blood 
exposures, promoting universal precautions, investigating suspected nosocomial 
infections, pre-exposure pharmaceutical prophylaxis to prevent transmission of 
HIV, or microbicides and programs and activities that provide counseling and 
testing for HIV or prevent mother-to-child prevention of HIV, shall not be included 
in determining compliance with paragraph (2).  
‘‘(4) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Tom 
Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, and annually thereafter as 
part of the annual report required under section 104A(e) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b–2(e)), the President shall—  
‘‘(A) submit a report on the implementation of paragraph (2) for the most 
recently concluded fiscal year to the appropriate congressional committees; and  
‘‘(B) make the report described in subparagraph (A) available to the public.’’;  
(2) in subsection (b)—  
(A) by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2006 through 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal years 2009 through 
2013’’; and  
(B) by striking ‘‘vulnerable children affected by’’ and inserting ‘‘other children affected 
by, or vulnerable to,’’; and  
(3) by adding at the end the following:  
 
‘‘(c) FUNDING ALLOCATION.—For each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2013, more 
than half of the amounts appropriated for bilateral global HIV/AIDS assistance 
pursuant to section 401 shall be expended for—  
‘‘(1) antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS; ‘‘(2) clinical monitoring of HIV-
seropositive people not in  
need of antiretroviral treatment; ‘‘(3) care for associated opportunistic infections; 
‘‘(4) nutrition and food support for people living with HIV/  
AIDS; and  
‘‘(5) other essential HIV/AIDS-related medical care for people living with 
HIV/AIDS. ‘‘(d) TREATMENT, PREVENTION, AND CARE GOALS.—For each of  
the fiscal years 2009 through 2013—  
‘‘(1) the treatment goal under section 402(a)(3) shall be increased above 
2,000,000 by at least the percentage increase in the amount appropriated for 
bilateral global HIV/AIDS assistance for such fiscal year compared with fiscal year 
2008;  
‘‘(2) any increase in the treatment goal under section 402(a)(3) above the 
percentage increase in the amount appropriated for bilateral global HIV/AIDS 
assistance for such fiscal year compared with fiscal year 2008 shall be based on 
long- 
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term requirements, epidemiological evidence, the share of treatment needs being 
met by partner governments and other sources of treatment funding, and other 
appropriate factors;  
‘‘(3) the treatment goal under section 402(a)(3) shall be increased above the 
number calculated under paragraph (1) by the same percentage that the average 
United States Government cost per patient of providing treatment in countries 
receiving bilateral HIV/AIDS assistance has decreased compared with fiscal year 
2008; and  
‘‘(4) the prevention and care goals established in clauses  
(i) and (iv) of section 104A(b)(1)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151b–2(b)(1)(A)) shall be increased consistent with epidemiological evidence and 
available resources.’’.  
TITLE V—MISCELLANEOUS  
SEC. 501. MACHINE READABLE VISA FEES.  
(a) FEE INCREASE.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law—  
(1) not later than October 1, 2010, the Secretary of State shall increase by $1 the fee or 
surcharge authorized under section 140(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103–236; 8 U.S.C. 1351 note) for processing 
machine readable nonimmigrant visas and machine readable combined border crossing 
identification cards and nonimmigrant visas; and  
(2) not later than October 1, 2013, the Secretary shall increase the fee or surcharge 
described in paragraph (1) by an additional $1.  
(b) DEPOSIT OF AMOUNTS.—Notwithstanding section 140(a)(2) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103–236; 8 U.S.C. 1351 
note), fees collected under the authority of subsection (a) shall be deposited in the 
Treasury.  
 
TITLE VI—EMERGENCY PLAN FOR INDIAN 
SAFETY AND HEALTH  
SEC. 601. EMERGENCY PLAN FOR INDIAN SAFETY AND HEALTH.  
(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF FUND.—There is established in the Treasury of the United States a 
fund, to be known as the ‘‘Emergency Fund for Indian Safety and Health’’ (referred to in 
this section as the ‘‘Fund’’), consisting of such amounts as are appropriated to the Fund 
under subsection (b).  
(b) TRANSFERS TO FUND.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Fund, out of funds of the 
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, $2,000,000,000 for the 5-year period beginning on 
October 1, 2008.  
(2) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS.—Amounts deposited in the Fund under this section shall—  
(A) be made available without further appropriation;  
(B) be in addition to amounts made available under any other provision of law; and  
(C) remain available until expended.  
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(c) EXPENDITURES FROM FUND.—On request by the Attorney General, the Secretary of the 
Interior, or the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall transfer from the Fund to the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Interior, or 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, as appropriate, such amounts as the 
Attorney General, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services determines to be necessary to carry out the emergency plan under subsection 
(f).  
(d) TRANSFERS OF AMOUNTS.—  
(1) IN GENERAL.—The amounts required to be transferred to the Fund under this section 
shall be transferred at least monthly from the general fund of the Treasury to the Fund 
on the basis of estimates made by the Secretary of the Treasury.  
(2) ADJUSTMENTS.—Proper adjustment shall be made in amounts subsequently 
transferred to the extent prior estimates were in excess of or less than the amounts 
required to be transferred.  
(e) REMAINING AMOUNTS.—Any amounts remaining in the Fund on September 30 of an 
applicable fiscal year may be used by the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Interior, 
or the Secretary of Health and Human Services to carry out the emergency plan under 
subsection (f) for any subsequent fiscal year.  
(f) EMERGENCY PLAN.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Attorney General, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, in consultation with Indian tribes (as defined in section 4 of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b)), shall jointly establish an 
emergency plan that addresses law enforcement, water, and health care needs of Indian 
tribes under which, for each of fiscal years 2010 through 2019, of amounts in the Fund—  
(1) the Attorney General shall use—  
(A) 18.5 percent for the construction, rehabilitation, and replacement of Federal Indian 
detention facilities;  
(B) 1.5 percent to investigate and prosecute crimes in Indian country (as defined in 
section 1151 of title 18, United States Code);  
(C) 1.5 percent for use by the Office of Justice Programs for Indian and Alaska Native 
programs; and  
(D) 0.5 percent to provide assistance to—  
(i) parties to cross-deputization or other cooperative agreements between State or local 
governments and Indian tribes (as defined in section 102 of the Federally Recognized 
Indian Tribe List Act of 1994 (25 U.S.C. 479a)) carrying out law enforcement activities 
in Indian country; and  
(ii) the State of Alaska (including political subdivisions of that State) for carrying out the 
Village Public Safety Officer Program and law enforcement activities on Alaska Native 
land (as defined in section 3 of Public Law 103–399 (25 U.S.C. 3902));  
(2) the Secretary of the Interior shall—  
(A) deposit 15.5 percent in the public safety and justice account of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs for use by the Office of Justice Services of the Bureau in providing law  
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enforcement or detention services, directly or through contracts or compacts with 
Indian tribes under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
(25  
U.S.C. 450 et seq.); and  
(B) use 50 percent to implement requirements of Indian water settlement 
agreements that are approved by Congress (or the legislation to implement such an 
agreement) under which the United States shall plan, design, rehabilitate, or 
construct, or provide financial assistance for the planning, design, rehabilitation, or 
construction of, water supply or delivery infrastructure that will serve an Indian 
tribe (as defined in section 4 of the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b)); and  
(3) the Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting through the Director of the 
Indian Health Service, shall use  
12.5 percent to provide, directly or through contracts or compacts with Indian tribes 
under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450 et 
seq.)—  
(A) contract health services;  
(B) construction, rehabilitation, and replacement of Indian health facilities; and  
(C) domestic and community sanitation facilities serving members of Indian tribes (as 
defined in section 4 of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 
U.S.C. 450b)) pursuant to section 7 of the Act of August 5, 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2004a).  
 
Speaker of the House of Representatives.  
Vice President of the United States and 
President of the Senate.  
 
Source: PEPFAR (2012) “Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 
2008” http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/108294.pdf [19 March 2012]. 
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Annex 5 – Botswana Partnership Framework for HIV/AIDS 2010 - 2014: 
A Collaborative Effort between The Government of Botswana and The 
Government of the United States of America (December 2010) 
    
 
Section 1 - Introduction 
  
1. The Botswana Partnership Framework on HIV/AIDS outlines the strategy for 
the Government of Botswana (GOB) and the Government of the United 
States of America (USG) through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) to work together to continue to address HIV/AIDS in 
Botswana over the next five years (2010-2014). This Partnership Framework 
provides a strategic overview, defines key partner roles, and summarizes the 
harmonized contributions of the GOB, PEPFAR and other development 
partners. 
2. The Partnership Framework was developed through a highly consultative 
process, between June-October 2009, and included all key government 
ministries and departments involved in leading the HIV/AIDS response in 
Botswana, as well as all USG (United States Government) agencies 
implementing the PEPFAR program in the country. Development partners 
and other relevant stakeholders drawn from the private and civil society 
sector were also involved in the Partnership Framework formulation process. 
3. This consultative process was organized by the Framework Management and 
Communications Team, chaired by the National AIDS Coordinating Agency 
(NACA), and including GOB and USG representatives, who met on a regular 
basis throughout the entire process. The overall design of the document was 
initially established by a broad-based Framework Design and Implementation 
Committee, which included representation from GOB agencies and 
ministries, USG in-country PEPFAR agencies, and civil society, other donors 
and stakeholders. The technical details were provided by four Technical 
Working Groups (TWGs) that align with the goals of the GOB’s Second 
National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework (NSF II) as well as with the 
Partnership Framework goals. The TWGs were co-chaired by the GOB and 
USG, and membership included technical experts from the GOB and USG as 
well as other donor and stakeholder experts. Finally, the framework National 
Steering Committee (NSC), chaired by the National Coordinator of NACA 
and consisting of Executive level leadership from GOB departments and 
ministries, USG agencies, the US Ambassador, and the leadership of donor 
and stakeholder organizations, met to review the progress and evaluate the 
final Partnership Framework document. 
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4. The development of the Partnership Framework implementation will be 
subsumed into the National Operational Plan (NOP). No separate 
implementation plan will be developed. The operationalization of the 
Partnership Framework is expected to be outlined in a detailed National 
Operational Plan for the Second Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS 2010 to 
2016. The NOP will establish baselines, set targets and timelines and provide 
detailed information on specific activities and planned contributions by GOB, 
PEPFAR, and other donors and stakeholders in Botswana. The same 
consultative processes used for developing the Partnership Framework are 
expected to be used for the development of the detailed National Operational 
Plan. The planned steps required to develop the National Operational Plan are 
outlined in Section 5. 
5. The planned activities described within this document are subject to 
availability of funds and continued needs in Botswana. Through a 
consultative process, this document may be modified or revised as needed 
with the written approval of both partners. 
1.1 Background 
6. Botswana is a middle-income country (nominal GDP per capita $7,096 in 
2009) in Southern Africa with a stable, democratic government, which has 
been implementing effective development policies since independence in 
1966. Given this context, the wise use of the country’s mineral wealth and the 
GOB’s commitment, Botswana has seen significant growth and major 
reductions in the poverty levels of its citizens over the last 40 years. The 
country has one of the most developed public health systems in Africa, which 
is built on a strong health infrastructure system. Key successes include: 
• 97% antenatal care coverage 
• 94% of deliveries are attended by a skilled health worker 
• 97% of one-year-old children are fully immunized for DPT3 
• 100% of facilities providing antenatal care also provide HIV testing and 
counseling 
7. However, HIV/AIDS remains the most significant social and public health 
problem in Botswana. The country is experiencing one of the most severe 
HIV/AIDS epidemics in the world, affecting both urban and rural areas with 
equal ferocity. UNAIDS estimated that in Botswana’s population of about 1.8 
million, close to one out of four adults aged 15-49 were HIV positive in 2007. 
In addition, national sentinel surveillance over the last five years found that 
one out of three pregnant women is HIV positive. Currently about 300,000 
adults and children are estimated to be HIV positive and 160,000 are in need 
of antiretroviral therapy. Finally, more than 52,000 children have been 
orphaned after losing one or both parents as a result of HIV/AIDS. 
8. Despite the strong health system foundation, responding to this massive 
epidemic has severely stressed the existing human resources and health 
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system infrastructure. There is a health personnel gap coupled with increased 
demand to focus on cost-effectiveness of service delivery, human resources 
and financial management issues. Procurements and logistics are weak areas 
and the Central Medical Stores needs significant efforts to strengthen its 
services. 
9. The HIV epidemic has also severely impacted Botswana’s labor force, 
affecting productivity and investment and increasing financial outlays by the 
Government to sustain existing programs and services. A 2006 report funded 
by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on behalf of NACA, 
The Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Botswana, estimated that in the next 20 
years, the economy will be decreased by 30% due to the impact of 
HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, the GOB projects that by 2021 Botswana’s 
population will be reduced by 18% from what it would have been in the 
absence of the epidemic. 
10. Since the beginning of the epidemic, the GOB has shown a high-level of 
commitment in mitigating the impact of HIV/AIDS. The GOB investment of 
domestic resources to support AIDS prevention, care and treatment is 
estimated to be between 2-3% of GDP and the GOB contributes between 80-
90% of the required resources for HIV/AIDS treatment. The national 
response is guided by clear national priorities and strategies outlined in the 
NSF II, the Tenth National Development Plan (NDP10), and HIV/AIDS 
related goals as contained within the nation’s development blueprint, Vision 
2016. 
11. For the past several years the GOB has made commendable achievements in 
its fight against HIV/AIDS. Some of the success stories include: 
• The National Antiretroviral (ARV) Program covers almost 82% of citizens in 
need of treatment (approximately 133,032 as of September 30, 2009). 
• Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT) counseling and testing 
services reach over 95% of pregnant women, lowering HIV transmission to 
less than 4% of infants born to HIV positive mothers. 
• Strong national HIV/AIDS Counseling and Testing (HCT) and routine testing 
programs nationwide. 
These achievements were made possible with financial and technical contributions 
from the US Government and other development partners. 
12. Under PEPFAR I (2004-2008), the USG played a major role in assisting the 
GOB in mitigating the impact of HIV/AIDS. Through PEPFAR financial and 
technical assistance, a number of interventions were strengthened and new 
services have been established at all levels. For the past five years, GOB 
ministries and departments and civil society organizations have benefited 
from PEPFAR support. Some of the accomplishments of this support can be 
exemplified in the strengthening of the following programs: HCT, Orphans 
and Vulnerable Children (OVC), PMTCT, lab infrastructure, biomedical 
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transmissions, drug procurement and infrastructure development. 
Furthermore, PEPFAR technical assistance has contributed toward the 
development of various national guidelines, manuals and systems 
strengthening. In addressing human capacity needs, PEPFAR supported 
several programs aimed at strengthening the capacity of human resources for 
health. 
13. PEPFAR has also developed strong partnerships with the National AIDS 
Coordinating Agency (NACA), the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), the 
Ministries of Health (MOH), Ministry of Local Government (MLG), Ministry 
of Education and Skills Development (MOESD), Ministry of Youth, Sports 
and Culture, as well as with civil society and private sector organizations. 
1.2 Progressing Towards a Technical Assistance Model 
14. Since the beginning of the national response, the GOB has led the way 
politically, technically and financially. The GOB covers the majority of the 
costs to support AIDS prevention, care and treatment, contributing an 
estimated 2-3% of gross Domestic Product (GDP). As a result, unlike many 
other PEFPAR countries, PEPFAR in Botswana does not directly support 
large scale delivery of a wide range of HIV/AIDS-related services. Instead, 
PEPFAR has played an important role in supporting Botswana’s HIV/AIDS 
response by strategically filling service delivery gaps, while providing 
technical support to GOB and civil society’s efforts to scale up and roll out 
services at national and local levels. 
15. In Botswana, PEPFAR support already has several components of a technical 
assistance (TA) model such as support for policy and curriculum 
development. However, the continued need to strategically fill service 
delivery gaps remains. Given the declining revenues from diamond exports in 
Botswana and the fact that PEPFAR still supports critical services in the 
country, the transition to a pure TA model will be a gradual process. This 
process will be tied closely to Botswana’s future economic conditions; 
however, purposeful planning on transitioning PEPFAR support services to 
the GOB will be pursued and negotiated targets established. 
1.3 Alignment of GOB Strategies and the Partnership Framework Goals 
16. This Partnership Framework was prepared during a period of transition from 
the first National Strategic Framework (NSF I, 2003-2009) to the Second 
National Strategic Framework (NSF II, 2010-2016), as well as the launching 
of its National Development Plan 10 (NDP 10, 2010-2016). 
17. In 2007 a mid-term review (MTR) of the first NSF was undertaken to inform 
the development of the NSF II. The MTR found that although outstanding 
achievements were made in terms of treating and caring for those already 
infected, there was no corresponding achievement in prevention of new 
infections. While the MTR recognized the need to maintain the excellent 
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results in care and treatment, it was recommended that the next plan period 
should intensify and accelerate proven prevention efforts. Such an approach 
would maintain the required delicate balance between meeting the needs of 
those living with HIV and AIDS, and at the same time prevent new HIV 
infections. 
18. As a result, the NSF II is built on the following four priority areas, which 
constitute the current strategic priorities of the national response to HIV and 
AIDS: 
• Priority Area 1: Prevention 
• Priority Area 2: Systems Strengthening 
• Priority Area 3: Strategic Information Management 
• Priority Area 4: Treatment, Care and Support 
19. These four priority areas are ranked in order of their perceived importance as 
they relate to delivering a sustained and targeted impact on HIV transmission 
and AIDS related illnesses and deaths. 
20. The Partnership Framework outlines goals and objectives aligned with the 
NSF II and the NDP 10, and summarize how PEPFAR resources are expected 
to be used over the next five years to support the GOB’s national priorities 
for HIV/AIDS. This is envisioned to help direct PEPFAR’s support to the 
national program, and in particular, the GOB’s ongoing efforts to increase the 
cost effectiveness and quality of the Botswana national response. (Please see 
Annex 1, which contains the approved version of the NSF II.) 
21. The Partnership Framework also takes into account the second phase of 
PEPFAR, which encourages USG support in all countries to begin to shift 
from providing emergency support toward supporting increased sustainability 
of each country’s HIV/AIDS response. This shift is particularly critical for 
PEPFAR-supported programs in Botswana, given the likely decrease in 
PEPFAR support in coming years. 
22. The consultative process utilized in developing the Partnership Framework 
has strengthened transparency and collaboration between USG, GOB and 
other partners in addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Botswana. 
1.4 Governing Principles 
The development of the Partnership Framework was governed by the following 
principles: 
• Demonstrate high level political commitment and ownership of the national 
response by the GOB and all the sectors involved in HIV and AIDS; 
• Align with the national priorities that are clearly outlined in NSFII, NDP10 
and other national frameworks including Vision 2016; 
• Build on Botswana’s strong national HIV/AIDS response; 
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• Promote the three ones: One National Strategy, One Coordinating Agency 
and One National Monitoring and Evaluation System; 
• Promote true ownership and transparency in resource allocations; 
• Partner with and strengthen civil society organizations in complementing 
national responses in the fight against HIV/AIDS, with a focus on financial 
resource management by local organizations; 
• Increase involvement of affected communities especially people living with 
HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) and most at risk populations (MARPS); 
• Consider gender sensitive approach in all programs; 
• Promote public-private partnerships to enhance sustainability and additional 
resources; 
• Leverage resources from other development partners; 
• Ensure accurate and timely reporting and accountability resources. 
 
Section 2 - Five-Year Strategic Overview 
  
23. The Partnership Framework aims to support the GOB’s existing plans by 
establishing a strategy for the use of PEPFAR resources over the next five 
years to support the national response to HIV/AIDS. The general principles 
outlined in key GOB strategic documents (as explained above in Section 1) 
have been used to help prioritize specific contributions and policy initiatives 
that the partners provide to each program area. 
24. The Partnership Framework outlines how the partners envision working 
together to: 
• Maintain critical HIV/AIDS services 
• Address existing gaps in Botswana’s HIV/AIDS response 
• Include gender-sensitive approaches in all aspects of HIV programming and 
service delivery 
• Improve the quality and long-term sustainability of Botswana’s HIV/AIDS 
response 
• Support policy development and implementation that enhances the national 
response 
• Leverage additional resources from other donors 
• Capacitate local organizations in program management and financial 
management to improve sustainability 
2.1 Gender as a Cross-Cutting Issue 
25. The NSF II guides all partners to include gender-sensitive approaches in all 
aspects of HIV programming and service delivery. The GOB and PEPFAR 
are also committed to working together to find solutions to gender-based 
violence, stigma, low male partner involvement and other drivers of the 
epidemic. 
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26. The NSF II states: 
“The status of women, especially adolescent girls, is one of the most powerful drivers 
of the AIDS epidemic. Women are very often caught within a vicious set of 
circumstances. As they tend to have little power over their own bodies, they are put 
at risk by a combination of tacit social acceptance of male partners having more 
than one sexual relationship, inability to negotiate condom use, and sexual 
exploitation, especially among younger girls. Thus, socially as well as biologically, 
they are more susceptible to HIV infection. There is also growing evidence in the 
region on gender violence, sexual abuse and how they could be associated with risk 
to HIV infections. If the national response does not begin to deal effectively with this 
larger reality experienced by women and girls, it cannot hope to achieve the goal of 
Vision 2016.” 
27. The pattern of HIV/AIDS in Botswana, particularly in the sexually active age 
groups, shows a gender bias. A number of factors fuel the spread of the 
epidemic, such as multiple concurrent partners (MCP), high population 
mobility, shifting social and cultural norms, stigma and gender-based 
violence (GBV). HIV prevalence is higher among females than males, 20.4% 
and 14.2%, respectively (Botswana AIDS Impact Survey, III, 2009), which is 
attributed to women's inability to negotiate for safe sex. 
28. Gender-based violence (GBV) is a world-wide problem that poses significant 
health and human rights concerns to vulnerable populations. GBV fosters the 
spread of HIV/AIDS because it limits women’s and girls’ ability to negotiate 
sexual practices, to disclose HIV status and to access services due to fear of 
GBV. 
29. The GOB, through the Women's Affairs Department (WAD) and the National 
AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) in collaboration with UNDP piloted a 
gender mainstreaming project in ministries. In 2008, a National Policy on 
Gender and Development recognized both men and women as vital resources 
for developing the country and identify and eliminate all obstacles impeding 
their economic, political and social participation. Furthermore, in the NDP10, 
the GOB plans include mainstreaming gender in all HIV/AIDS programs. 
Likewise, all planning, programming and service delivery under the 
Botswana Partnership Framework should also be held to these high standards 
and aim to bring gender equity in all program areas. Therefore, the programs 
supported by the Partnership Framework should include a gender focus in 
every program area. This focus should address not only the inequalities that 
women face, but also consider gender appropriate interventions targeting men 
and how they play a role in reduction of infections, as well as improved care 
and support for their female partners and the orphans and vulnerable children 
in their families and communities. 
2.2 Achieving Sustainability through Empowering Local Organizations 
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30. Key to the success and sustainability of the Partnership Framework 
interventions is the intensive involvement of local actors and capacitating of 
these entities during the first few years of implementation. To achieve this 
aim, the Partnership Framework should serve as a guide to the partners in 
working toward a more cost-effective and sustainable model for the 
PEPFAR-supported components of HIV/AIDS services in Botswana. Key 
elements of this strategy are (1) to substantially increase the percentage of 
funding that is channeled through local organizations over the five-year 
period, (2) to ensure that local implementing partners are empowered and 
entrusted with decisions to develop and implement programs tailored to meet 
local needs, while international organizations support their efforts by 
providing much needed technical capacity where there is need with the 
intention to transition in the next two to three years of implementation of the 
framework to local organizations. The ultimate accountability for 
management decisions and results should also rest with local organizations. 
Together, this approach should be a significant departure from the old 
implementation modalities where significant resources were held through 
international organizations and local implementing partners were not always 
given the support they need to be successful, self-sustaining implementers. 
31. During the development of the NOP, the team expects to set a baseline and 
targets for percentages of funding to be channeled through local organizations 
over the life of the Partnership Framework. 
2.3 Partnership Framework Goals and Objectives 
This Partnership Framework lays out the following goals: 
• Goal 1: Prevention - “To reduce the number of new HIV infections by 50%.” 
• Goal 2: Capacity Building and Health Systems Strengthening - “To increase 
the GOB, civil society and private sector ability to sustain high quality, cost 
effective HIV/AIDS services.” 
• Goal 3: Strategic Information - “To strengthen strategic information 
management of the National Response to enhance evidence based planning.” 
• Goal 4: Treatment Care and Support - “To provide comprehensive and 
quality treatment, care and support services to people infected and affected by 
HIV.” 
2.4 Policy Strengthening 
32. As one of the first countries to confront the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa, 
the GOB has a history of leading the way in policy development and 
implementation relating to HIV/AIDS that began well before PEPFAR. 
During the first five years of PEPFAR, the USG supported the GOB’s 
continuing efforts to develop and implement policies that improve access, 
quality, effectiveness and sustainability of HIV/AIDS services. The USG 
intends to continue to support the GOB’s policy strengthening efforts during 
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PEPFAR II by providing technical assistance in policy development, and 
financial and technical support in policy implementation. 
33. Some of the remaining HIV/AIDS-related policy challenges that Botswana 
faces are very difficult issues, with complex short and long-term impacts. 
Many of these policy challenges are faced by other countries as well, and 
those countries may look toward Botswana for continued leadership in 
addressing them. 
 
34. The Partnership Framework also represents the continuation and 
strengthening of the ongoing resolve of the GOB, PEPFAR and other donors 
and stakeholders to actively work together to find solutions to these policy 
challenges. 
35. Key PEPFAR and GOB policy challenges for ongoing dialog, technical 
assistance and support include, but not limited to, the following: 
• Strengthening institutional arrangements, for example, the Central Medical 
Stores (CMS) for improved commodities management and logistical support 
in the country 
• Encouraging greater private sector involvement 
• Supporting livelihoods for OVC and people living with HIV (PLHIV) so they 
may be more self-sufficient 
• Enhancing the environment for improved civil society engagement and 
operations in the country 
• Providing services to the entirety of the population 
• Provision of quality and comprehensive services in a tightening economic 
environment through improved cost-effectiveness 
36. Progress in addressing these policy challenges directly impacts the goals and 
objectives of the Partnership Framework. Shared support for the development 
and implementation of these and other policy-related issues are outlined 
along with other anticipated financial, service delivery and technical support 
contributions in the Roles and Expected Contributions section below. 
 
Section 3 – Partner Roles and Expected Contributions 
  
37. The following section outlines how the resources of the Government of 
Botswana, PEPFAR, and other donors and stakeholders should be 
harmonized in support of the GOB’s national program. In addition, it also 
provides indicators, baselines and targets for program areas where that 
information has been mutually decided upon in the areas of Prevention and 
Treatment, Care and Support. The remaining indicators, baselines and targets, 
including those for the Health System Strengthening (HSS) and Strategic 
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Information (SI) goals, are expected to be included in the National 
Operational Plan. 
3.1 The Government of Botswana 
38. The Government of Botswana should develop strategies for implementation 
of the Second National Strategic Framework. The GOB would effectively 
lead all donors and stakeholders in designing, implementing and monitoring 
programs that support the national strategy. The GOB should move forward 
with its new Prevention Plan which will include a significant male 
circumcision strategy and provision for programs to reduce multiple 
concurrent partnering. The GOB should work with civil society, private 
sector and faith based organizations toward increasing their capacity for 
program implementation to enhance service coverage throughout the country 
39. The GOB currently spends over $200 million per year to address the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, revenues have fallen sharply as a result of the 
global economic downturn, and the subsequent weakness in the diamond 
market – an important source of the GOB’s financial resources. The current 
economic outlook does not indicate that the diamond revenue will return to 
previous levels for a few more years. As a result, original plans to continue to 
absorb positions and programs currently funded by donors have had to be put 
on hold, and cuts have had to be made to the GOB’s own budgets. 
40. Once the economy recovers, the GOB aims to increase spending as much as 
possible and revive plans to gradually absorb programs and positions 
currently supported by donors, including PEPFAR. 
3.2 PEPFAR 
41. The USG investment should focus on increasing technical assistance since 
past support and investment has gone largely to infrastructure development, 
support for staff positions and procurements. PEPFAR proposes to support 
research in prevention, treatment and care to improve the quality and cost-
effectiveness of treatment and care interventions. PEPFAR also proposes to 
help build the capacity of local civil society and private sector organizations 
to design and manage programs that are identified as community priorities 
and to foster development of public-private partnerships to increase 
sustainability of activities over the coming years. 
42. In 2009, PEPFAR contributed $92 million to support the HIV/AIDS efforts in 
Botswana. However, this level of financial commitment is likely to slowly 
decline each year over the next five years. This increases the importance of 
finding cost-effective mechanisms and sustainable solutions in which to 
invest in over the next five years. 
3.3 Other Donors and Stakeholders 
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43. The GOB should seek to leverage additional resources from other 
development partners such as the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS 
Partnership (ACHAP), the World Bank (WB), the European Community 
(EC), the Clinton Foundation and the United Nations (UN) Agencies. GOB is 
currently working with these development partners under specific program 
areas such as Prevention, Systems Strengthening, Capacitation of local 
organizations and Treatment, Care and support. 
44. Currently the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships (ACHAP), the 
public-private partnership between the GOB, the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation and the Merck Company Foundation/Merck & Co, Inc., has 
recently made a second five-year commitment to support HIV programs in 
Botswana although with a limited budget. ACHAP is also shifting its 
program focus from treatment to prevention. 
45. At the same time, the World Bank is launching a new $50 million project to 
support the GOB’s management of HIV programs and provide funding to 
communities for prevention activities. The European Community’s current 
five-year plan focuses on human resources development across several 
sectors and supports a multi-sectoral approach to mainstreaming HIV/AIDS, 
as well as strengthening governance in local NGOs. UN agencies support 
prevention, treatment, care and support interventions and provide technical 
assistance to Government of Botswana while the Clinton Foundation assists 
the MOH to make cost-effective ARV purchases and strengthen pediatric 
AIDS treatment. In addition international academic institutions such as 
Harvard, Baylor, and the University of Pennsylvania are currently supporting 
GOB in research, clinical care and training. It is, however, also important to 
make sure that some of the activities in the country Global Fund proposals are 
also linked and complement the Partnership Framework. 
46. Local institutions such as civil society, private sector and academia also 
contribute immensely to prevention, treatment, care and support programs. It 
is expected that their capacity will be strengthened during the course of 
implementation of this Partnership Framework. 
3.4 Indicators, Baselines, Targets, and Specific Commitments 
47. As Botswana transitions to the NSF II, and begins a parallel process of 
developing the NSF II National Operational Plan, more detailed indicators, 
baselines, targets and specific commitments should be identified upon in an 
open forum. The information provided here includes the high-level political 
commitments already accepted by the GOB and the PEPFAR teams. 
However, the participants intend to develop more specifics during the 
implementation planning phase. Subsuming the development of the 
Partnership Framework implementation plan with the NSF II National 
Operational Plan is intended to ensure the “Three Ones” principle is put into 
practice, i.e. one national plan and which helps avoid duplication of efforts 
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3.5 Goal 1: Prevention - “To reduce the number of new HIV infections by 50% 
48. A number of critical strategies and interventions should be used to reduce 
new HIV infections in Botswana. These are expected to include 
implementing behavioural change interventions aimed at addressing the main 
drivers of the epidemic such as multiple concurrent sexual partnerships, 
intergenerational sex, high consumption of alcohol, high population mobility, 
shifting social and cultural norms, stigma, and gender based violence. Scaling 
up cost-effective clinical prevention programs including safe male 
circumcision is recognized as crucial to enhance HIV prevention, as well as 
strengthening the capacity of Community Based Organizations (CBOs) to 
develop and implement context specific strategies to improve access to and 
utilization of HIV and AIDS services. 
3.5.1 Behavior Change Interventions and Communication (BCIC) 
 
Strategic Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions 
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To increase the adoption 
of safer sexual behaviors 
and practices 
Provide 
coordination and 
support to 
implementing 
partners across the 
public sector, civil 
society 
organizations and 
private sector in 
the following 
program areas: 
1) Mainstreaming 
and 
implementation of 
campaigns to 
reduce multiple 
and concurrent 
partnerships 
through mass 
media, community 
mobilization and 
peer education. 
2) Life skills and 
abstinence 
programs, mass 
Support projects on 
MCP, condom 
distribution, HIV 
prevention; 
interventions for 
Most At Risk 
Populations, 
capacity building to 
districts in HIV 
prevention, mass 
media addressing 
HIV prevention 
Support 
community-based 
organizations and 
the Botswana 
Defense Force, HIV 
prevention projects 
Support capacity 
building projects for 
civil society and 
FBOs 
Support projects 
that target 
ACHAP: 
Expressed desire 
to support this 
area (but formal 
agreement not 
concluded) 
World Bank: 
Support 
prevention 
to Ministry of 
Health; Ministry 
of Labor and 
Home Affairs; 
Ministry of 
Education and 
Skills 
Development; 
Ministry of Local 
Government 
UNFPA: 
Commodity 
provision (and 
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media, community 
mobilization and 
peer education to 
strengthen social 
support for 
monogamy and 
reduced # of 
partners. 
3) Promotion of 
correct and 
consistent male 
and female 
condom use 
through targeted 
interventions. 
4) Strategic 
support to the 
uniformed forces 
on HIV prevention 
campaigns, 
distribute 
condoms and 
interventions that 
promote safer sex 
practices. 
5) Conduct 
behavioral studies 
to inform and 
evaluate 
interventions on 
prevention 
activities. 
vulnerable girls, 
youth and parents 
Support programs 
that focus on gender 
equity 
Support Life Skills 
programs 
Support 
development of 
innovative 
interventions to 
address alcohol 
abuse and its links 
to the spread of 
HIV/AIDS 
potentially 
financial support) 
to Ministry of 
Health; Ministry 
of Education and 
Skills 
Development; 
Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
Royal 
Netherlands 
Embassy: 
Financial support 
 
3.5.1.1 Behavior Change Interventions and Communication Indicators* 
 
Indicator Baseline Target 
Percentage of sexually 
active people who engage 
in multiple concurrent 
partnerships 
  Reduced by 50% 
Percentage of sexually 
active women and men 
  Reduce by X% (To be 
determined during 
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aged 10-18 who have 
partners 10 or more years 
older 
development of the 
Partnership Framework 
Implementation Plan) 
Percentage of the 
population who have sexual 
intercourse before the age 
of 15 
3.5% Reduced by 50% to 1.75% 
Percentage of the sexually 
active population who 
report correct and 
consistent condom use 
  Increased by X% (TBD in 
NOP) 
Percentage of sexually 
active population who 
engage in risky sexual 
behaviors after consuming 
alcohol and other 
substances 
  Reduced by X% (TBD in 
NOP) 
Percentage of the 
population who express 
accepting attitudes towards 
people living with 
HIV/AIDS 
  Increased by X% (TBD in 
NOP) 
Number of people who 
experience gender related 
sexual violence and 
coercion. 
  Reduced by X (TBD in 
NOP) 
Number of community 
interventions or services 
that explicitly address 
norms about masculinity 
related to HIV/AIDS 
  TBD 
Number of community 
based interventions or 
services that explicitly 
address the legal rights and 
protection of women and 
girls 
  TBD 
Number of services or 
interventions that explicitly 
aim at increasing access to 
income and productive 
resources of women and 
girls impacted by 
HIV/AIDS 
  TBD 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
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3.5.1.2 Male Circumcision (MC) 
  
Strategic 
Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions 
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To increase 
demand for safe 
male 
circumcision and 
circumcise 80% 
of males aged 0-
49 
Financial and technical 
support 
Coordination and policy 
development 
Procurement of MC 
supplies and equipment 
Provision of in-service 
training to MC providers 
Recruitment of and 
salary support for MC 
providers 
Development of M&E 
tools 
Refurbishment of 
facilities for MC 
services 
Provide support to 
disciplined forces, 
private sector and CSOs 
to implement safe MC 
Support for salaries of 
MC providers 
Integration of MC 
curricula into Health 
Training Institutes 
Refurbishment of MC 
procedure rooms, 
including at BDF 
clinics 
Development of IEC 
materials and branding 
of MC campaign 
Public Health 
Evaluations for MC 
service delivery 
Revisions and updates 
of MC training 
materials, guidelines 
and policies 
Coordination of US 
military trained 
physicians to support 
MC services for 
disciplined services 
ACHAP: 
Financial and 
technical support 
WHO: 
Financial and 
technical support 
3.5.1.2.1. Male Circumcision Indicators* 
 
Indicator Baseline Target 
Percent of males aged 0-49 
who are circumcised 
11% 80% by 2016 
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* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
3.5.1.3 HIV Testing and Counseling (HCT) 
 
Strategic 
Objective 
GOB Expected 
Contributions  
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To expand access 
to quality HIV 
Testing and 
Counseling 
services 
Financial and technical 
support of HCT services 
Coordination and Policy 
direction 
Increase and strengthen 
the provision of post test 
services for HCT clients 
Procurement, distribution, 
and quality assurance of 
test kits and testing 
reagents 
Strengthen capacity of 
CSO, private sector and 
armed forces to provide 
HCT services 
Increase visibility of 
HCT services and new 
programs 
Build capacity, improve 
quality, provide M&E 
and increase uptake of 
RHT 
Financial and technical 
assistance in supply 
chain management of 
HCT commodities, 
M&E activities, and 
development of national 
guidelines and policies 
Financial and technical 
assistance for provision 
of VCT services and 
development of HCT 
protocols, interventions, 
and curricula adaptations 
into the local context 
Build capacity of civil 
society organizations to 
promote HCT services 
and link these services to 
HIV care and treatment 
Mentor potential HCT 
service providers and 
staying current on 
evidence based HCT 
interventions and inform 
GOB of new 
ACHAP: 
Financial and 
technical 
assistance 
WHO to 
MOH 
UNICEF to 
MOH 
UNAIDS to 
MOH 
UNFPA to 
MOH: 
Financial and 
technical 
assistance 
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developments 
Promote collaboration 
between RHT and VCT 
Joint development of 
operational research 
projects & protocols 
3.5.1.3.1 HIV Testing and Counseling Indicators* 
  
Indicator Baseline Target 
Proportion of Batswana 
who have ever been tested 
56% Increased by X (TBD in 
NOP) 
Number of Batswana who 
are referred to appropriate 
services 
  Increased by X (TBD in 
NOP) 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
3.5.1.4 Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) 
  
Strategic 
Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions 
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To increase 
access to quality 
PMTCT services 
Increase early infant HIV 
testing and diagnosis 
Coordination and policy 
direction 
Procurement, 
distribution, and quality 
assurance of test kits, 
infant formula, and 
antiretroviral (ARV) 
drugs for all service 
providers 
Provision of trainings, 
equipment, infrastructure 
Provision of laboratory 
supplies and equipment 
for early infant diagnosis 
program 
Financial and technical 
assistance for logistics 
management 
information systems for 
infant formula, trainings 
and training curricula, 
psycho-social support 
activities, and increasing 
male partner 
involvement 
Botswana-
Harvard 
Partnership: 
Conducting 
HIV research to 
better inform 
PMTCT 
Program 
UNICEF and 
UNFPA: 
Financial and 
technical 
assistance to 
Ministry of 
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and staff salaries for 
PMTCT activities 
Strengthen post-natal 
care services and linking 
PMTCT to HIV care and 
treatment services 
Ensure availability of 
family planning (FP) 
services at all health 
facilities and integrate FP 
into ARV services 
Review and update of 
guidelines and policies 
Joint development of 
operational research 
projects & protocols 
Strengthen community 
involvement in PMTCT 
Improve data quality 
Financial and technical 
assistance for 
development of national 
guidelines and policies 
Joint development of 
operational research 
projects & protocols 
Health 
3.5.1.4.1 Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) Indicators* 
 
Indicator Baseline Target 
Percentage of pregnant 
women who access PMTCT 
services (prophylaxis 
uptake) 
91% 100% 
PMTCT rates 4% <1% 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
3.5.1.5: Medical Transmission (Blood and Injection Safety) 
 
Strategic 
Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions 
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To provide 
quality, safe, 
adequate and 
Finalize and implement 
national blood 
Financial and technical 
assistance for 
development of national 
WHO:  
Provision of 
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accessible blood 
and blood 
products in 
Botswana 
transfusion policy 
Strengthen blood donor 
mobilization strategy 
through media, 
community mobilization 
and peer education to 
promote voluntary non-
remunerated blood 
donation 
Recruit potential blood 
donors country wide in 
collaboration with 
Botswana Red Cross 
Society (BRCS) 
Scale up Pledge 25 
project in collaboration 
with Ministry of 
Education and Skills 
Development(MOESD) 
and Ministry of Youth, 
Sports and Culture 
(MYSC) 
Build Capacity of the 
NBTS through human 
resources, training, 
equipment and 
infrastructure 
Implement Quality 
Management System in 
National Blood 
Transfusion Service. 
Promote rationale use of 
blood 
Integrate blood safety 
with other programs 
(e.g., laboratory, care 
and treatment, HIV 
counseling and testing, 
injection safety and 
malaria) 
guidelines and policies 
Financial and technical 
support for the 
development of 
communications 
interventions to promote 
blood safety 
Financial and technical 
support for the 
recruitment of blood 
donors 
Financial and technical 
support to National 
Blood Transfusion 
Service (NBTS) for the 
expansion of the Pledge 
25 project 
Financial and technical 
support for critical 
human resources (e.g., 
medical director), 
training, equipment and 
infrastructure 
Financial support for the 
implementation of a 
Quality Management 
System in the NBTS 
Financial support for 
promotion of rational use 
of blood 
Financial and technical 
support for integration of 
blood safety with other 
programs 
Financial and technical 
support strengthening 
M&E of blood safety 
and for improving data 
quality 
financial and 
technical 
assistance to 
Ministry of 
Health 
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Strengthen M&E and 
data management 
systems 
To develop and 
implement 
National Infection 
Prevention & 
Control Program 
Develop and implement 
the National Infection 
Prevention & Control 
Policy guidelines and 
standard operating 
procedures 
Integrate and scale-up 
Injection Safety, 
Phlebotomy and other 
related procedures with 
the national infection 
prevention and control 
structures 
Build capacity of the 
Occupational Health and 
Safety through human 
resource and training 
Scale up management of 
health care waste 
Strengthen HIV post-
exposure prophylaxis 
Develop and implement 
training program and 
standards for infection 
control 
Develop and implement 
M&E and data 
management systems for 
infection control and 
healthcare waste 
management strategies 
Financial and technical 
assistance for 
development of national 
guidelines and policies 
Financial and technical 
assistance for integrating 
and scaling-up Injection 
Safety, Phlebotomy and 
other related procedures 
with the national 
infection prevention and 
control structures 
Financial and technical 
support for critical 
human resources at the 
Occupational Health 
Unit of MOH and 
training 
Technical assistance in 
Scale up management of 
health care waste 
Financial and technical 
assistance for scaling up 
post-exposure 
prophylaxis 
Financial support for the 
development of 
communications 
interventions to promote 
infection prevention and 
control, including 
injection safety 
Technical assistance in 
developing and 
implementing a training 
program and standards 
for infection control 
Financial and technical 
United 
Nations:  
Provision of 
financial and 
technical 
assistance 
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support to strengthen 
M&E and data 
management systems for 
infection control and 
healthcare waste 
management strategies 
 
3.5.1.5.1 Medical Transmission Indicators 
 
Indicator Baseline Target 
Number of blood units 
collected per year 
23,275 TBD 
% of blood units screened 
for HIV in a quality assured 
manner 
100% 100% 
Proportion of health 
facilities receiving 100% of 
the blood units for 
transfusion from NBTS 
80%( 28 of 35 facilities) 100% 
% of blood units discarded 
due to Transfusion 
Transmissible Infections 
(TTI) including HIV 
reactivity 
4.6% TBD 
% of HIV prevalence in 
donated blood 
1.5% <1% 
% increase in regular 
voluntary non-remunerated 
blood donors 
TBD TBD 
% HIV incidence in regular 
blood donors 
TBD TBD 
Number of healthcare 
workers who successfully 
completed an in-service 
training program in 
different aspects of blood 
transfusion 
N/A 1,000 
% of hospitals with 
operational blood 
transfusion committees 
46% (16 of 35 hospitals) 100% 
Number of hospitals 
performing blood 
transfusion which have 
hemovigilance system 
0 35 
Number of blood 0 3 
408 
 
transfusion centers with 
ISO 9001 certification 
Number of health facilities 
with designated Infection 
Control focal person 
23% (8/34) 100% (34) 
Number of health districts 
with designated Infection 
Control focal person 
0 100% (29) 
Number of health facilities 
implementing National 
Infection Prevention & 
Control policy guidelines 
0 60% (472/786) 
Number of healthcare 
workers trained in Infection 
Prevention & Control and 
health waste management 
54% (8,153) 90% (13,500/15,000) 
Number of health facilities 
that provide routine reports 
on sharps injuries quarterly 
to DEOH 
0 100% (786) 
Proportion health facilities 
that provide HIV PEP 
TBD TBD 
Number of persons 
provided with 
post-exposure prophylaxis 
(PEP) 
By exposure type: 
Occupational, Rape/Sexual 
Assault Victims, or Other 
Non-Occupational 
TBD TBD 
Proportion of Healthcare 
workers that received a 
complete vaccination of 
hepatitis B 
<10% 95% 
Percentage of health 
facilities with satisfactory 
health care waste 
management systems 
0 (no National data) 85% 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
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3.6 Goal 2: Capacity Building and Health Systems Strengthening – “To increase 
the GOB, civil society and private sector ability to sustain high quality, cost effective 
HIV/AIDS services.” 
49. To achieve the national goals for HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment, 
Botswana will need to strengthen the public health delivery system, build the 
capacity of civil society organizations and facilitate more effective 
participation of the private sector in the national response. The Partnership 
Framework should build on previous investments by the GOB in 
strengthening human resources for health (HRH), training in leadership and 
governance and improving infrastructure and procuring supplies and 
equipment, by taking a more comprehensive, strategic approach to building 
sustainable systems that creates efficiencies and improves overall service 
delivery. 
3.6.1 Human Resources for Health* 
  
Strategic Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions  
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To enhance and 
coordinate quality 
service delivery in 
the health system 
through increased 
human resources for 
health 
Put policies and 
structures in place to 
increase health worker 
training output at local 
health training 
institutes and 
absorption and 
retention of graduates 
into the workforce 
Implement critical 
elements of HRH 
Plan: 
- Attraction and 
retention plan 
- Use, decentralization 
of the HRIS 
- Strengthen 
management of HRH 
Develop appropriate 
policies, strategies and 
Financial and technical 
assistance to expand 
staff, infrastructure and 
equipment as necessary 
to accommodate 
increased intake and 
improve quality of pre-
service education 
Technical assistance to 
implement the HRH 
and retention plans and 
HRIS rollout 
Technical assistance to 
improve the 
management of human 
resources for health 
Technical assistance to 
strengthen in-service 
training for health 
workers (coordination 
and implementation of 
technical, managerial 
WHO: 
Technical 
assistance in 
HRH to 
Ministry of 
Health 
University 
Partners: 
Support health 
worker training 
(for example: 
University of 
Pennsylvania 
(UPENN) and 
Baylor are 
contributing to 
the 
development of 
the medical 
school. UPENN 
also does 
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SOPs for new and 
established cadres 
Strengthen the role 
and function of 
councils 
Coordinate and 
provide leadership for 
HIV in-service 
training for health 
workers 
and leadership 
training) 
Technical support to 
strengthen the role and 
functions of the 
councils 
clinical training 
in the hospitals 
and clinics; 
Harvard assists 
in the area of 
in-service 
training for the 
ARV program; 
Baylor does 
pediatric 
training) 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
3.6.2. Health Systems Structures* 
 
Strategic Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions  
PEPFAR 
Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To integrate and 
strengthen the national 
health system structures 
for effective service 
delivery 
Implement and roll 
out the 10-year 
Essential health 
service plan 
Increase and 
strengthen the 
national 
warehousing and 
distribution system 
Technical 
assistance to 
implement the 
health systems 
plan 
Financial and 
technical support 
to strengthen the 
health inspectorate 
to improve quality 
of service delivery 
Support the 
strengthening of 
the Central 
Medical Stores 
(CMS) 
WHO to Ministry 
of Health 
ACHAP 
World Bank to 
Ministry of Health 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
Partnership Framework Implementation Plan. 
3.6.3 Leadership/Governance/Coordination* 
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Strategic Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions  
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To strengthen, civil 
society and private 
sector capacity 
(leadership, 
governance, 
coordination and 
partner/sector 
mobilization) at all 
levels in order to 
achieve the objectives 
of the national 
response 
Review and revise 
national 
coordination 
mechanisms and 
structures in order 
to harmonize and 
align all HIV 
actors under the 
Partnership Forum 
on AIDS 
Develop 
guidelines for 
partner 
engagement in 
HIV/AIDS 
Strengthen 
evidence-based 
planning and 
decision-making 
Regulate health-
related activities 
and accredit health 
service 
Develop and 
implement 
National 
Community 
Mobilization 
Strategy 
Complete and 
implement the 
National Strategy 
for NGO Capacity 
Building 
Financial and technical 
assistance to national 
NGO networks to 
coordinate, 
communicate with and 
represent their member 
NGOs and CBO's 
Financial and technical 
assistance to National 
NGOs that have 
affiliates countrywide 
and potential for broad 
reach to expand their 
services 
Financial and technical 
support in targeted 
districts in remote, 
underserved locations 
to provide strategic 
resources and linkages 
between the 
government at district 
level and local CBOs 
Provide financial 
support for 
development of 
national guidelines 
Provide technical 
support and funding to 
support HR policies, 
HR systems, good 
governance and quality 
care 
Funding and technical 
assistance to MLG 
district/city/village 
structures to support 
Community 
World Bank: 
Funding to 
Ministry of State 
President - 
NACA 
ACHAP: 
Technical and 
financial 
assistance 
SIDA: 
Provide technical 
assistance 
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Mobilization Strategy 
Technical assistance 
and funding for NGO 
networks including on-
line ICT support, 
district coalitions and 
Centers of Excellence 
Ensure complementary 
funding for program 
and operational costs to 
civil society groups 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
3.6.4 Infrastructure and Maintenance* 
  
Strategic Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions 
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To create a conducive and 
supportive environment 
aimed at ensuring quality 
service provision through 
improved infrastructure 
and maintenance of 
facilities and equipment 
Construct a 
National Public 
Health Laboratory 
and National 
Quality control 
laboratory 
structures to 
improve service 
delivery 
Develop and 
implement a 
preventive 
maintenance plan 
of facilities and 
equipment 
Provide technical 
assistance and 
funding to support 
transformation of 
Bio-engineering 
Department and the 
new laboratories 
including staffing, 
training, and 
operations 
Improve CSO 
facilities through 
provision of 
adequate office 
space, transportation 
and ICT 
Provide technical 
assistance for health 
facility management 
Solicit and fund 
ACHAP: 
Turn over to 
Ministry of 
Health aligned 
with plan to 
transform Bio-
engineering Dept 
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PPPs to operate ICT 
in remote areas 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
 
3.6.5 Resource Mobilization/Financial Management* 
 
Strategic Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions 
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To provide sustainable 
financial support for cost 
effective interventions in 
the national response 
Facilitate effective 
resource 
mobilization 
efforts for the 
national 
HIV/AIDS 
response 
Conduct and 
institutionalize 
National AIDS 
Spending 
Assessment 
(NASA) 
Carry-out costing 
studies 
Review and revise 
procurement 
policies to reduce 
costs 
Review public-
private partnership 
policies/incentives 
to increase 
contribution of 
private sector to 
GOB and civil 
society HIV 
programs 
Provide funding and 
technical assistance 
for costs studies of 
prevention, OVC, 
care and support, 
and NSFII 
implementation plan 
Participate and 
support NASA 
exercise 
Provide technical 
assistance and 
funding to foster 
PPPs and complete 
the Health 
Financing Strategy 
Support NGOs for 
income generating 
activities and 
improved financial 
management and 
accountability 
Provide financial 
and technical 
support towards 
development of the 
HIV/AIDS database 
Technical assistance 
ACHAP:  
Financial and 
technical 
assistance 
WHO and 
UNAIDS: 
Technical 
assistance to 
Ministry of State 
President - 
NACA 
NGOs: 
Develop income-
generation 
activities 
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Complete and 
implement the 
Health Financing 
Strategy (in IHSP) 
Develop 
comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS 
database for 
tracking resources 
mobilized and 
used in the 
national response 
Conduct the 
HIV/AIDS 
sustainable 
financing study 
to undertake the 
National Health 
Accounts 
Financial support 
for the conduct of 
the sustainable 
financing study for 
HIV/AIDS 
programs 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
 
3.7 Goal 3: Strategic Information – “To strengthen Strategic Information 
management of the National Response to enhance evidence based planning.” 
50. Over the next five years, the Partnership Framework seeks to strengthen and 
implement a comprehensive and integrated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
framework. This is expected to be achieved by the GOB leading a review of 
the National M&E Framework, and the development of an M&E plan, 
operational manuals and standardized tools. 
51. The GOB and other partners also expect to facilitate development of a 
prioritized national research agenda which includes evaluation, scientific 
research and surveillance. The partnership also seeks to strengthen 
documentation processes and information sharing mechanisms. 
52. The Partnership Framework also seeks to strengthen Information 
Management systems through the development of a strategic plan led by the 
GOB. This plan should in turn guide the networking of computerization of 
hospitals and clinics, ensure the integration and interfacing of information 
systems, and provide guidance on record linkage, data security and 
assessment of patient identifiers. 
3.7.1 Strategic Information Management Systems* 
Strategic Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions 
PEPFAR 
Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions from 
other Donors 
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To strengthen the 
strategic information 
management systems 
at all levels 
Develop and 
implement a 
comprehensive and 
integrated 
HIV/AIDS M&E 
framework 
Lead review of 
national M&E 
framework, 
development of 
M&E plan, 
operational 
manuals and 
standardized tools 
Provide technical 
assistance and 
financial support 
for the review of 
framework, 
development of 
plan, operational 
manuals, and data 
audit tools 
WHO and UNAIDS: 
Financial support and 
technical assistance to 
Ministry of State 
President (NACA) 
Build capacity of 
institutions 
Continue 
supporting M&E 
positions until 
they are absorbed 
by the GOB 
Continue 
supporting M&E 
capacity building 
within civil 
society 
Provide financial 
and technical 
assistance to 
strengthen training 
and educational 
opportunities for 
M&E cadre 
ACHAP: 
Financial support and 
technical assistance 
 
WHO and UNAIDS: 
Offer financial 
support and technical 
assistance to Ministry 
of the State President 
-NACA and 
BONASO 
Provide leadership 
and guidance in 
expansion and 
integration of HIV 
and other health 
related surveillance 
activities and 
surveys 
Coordinate the 
development and 
execution of a 
national scientific 
research and 
Provide financial 
support and 
technical 
assistance to 
develop and 
execute the 
strategic 
documents on 
HIV surveillance 
and the Evaluation 
Agenda. 
Continue to 
support operations 
ACHAP: 
Financial support and 
technical assistance in 
areas in line with its 
Phase II objectives 
WHO and UNAIDS: 
Financial support and 
technical assistance to 
MOH and Ministry of 
State President -
NACA 
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evaluation agenda. 
Coordinate 
information 
dissemination to 
provide for a 
culture of 
information use for 
planning 
research to ensure 
evidence- based 
interventions and 
cost effectiveness 
Provide financial 
support and 
technical 
assistance for 
information 
resource centers 
Lead in the 
development of an 
HIMS strategic 
plan 
Continue giving 
financial support 
and technical 
assistance in 
development of 
HIMS strategic 
plan and on 
integration & 
harmonization of 
systems 
Stakeholders: 
Work together to 
engage private sector 
to assist with systems 
harmonization and 
integration 
ACHAP: 
Financial support and 
technical assistance 
UNAIDS: 
Financial and 
technical support to 
Ministry of State 
President-NACA and 
MOH 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
3.8 Goal 4: Treatment, Care and Support – “To provide comprehensive and 
quality treatment, care and support services to people infected and affected by HIV.” 
53. In 2002, the GOB initiated the MASA Program, a national HIV/AIDS 
treatment program with the goal of universal access to treatment for all 
eligible citizens. The MASA Program now provides ART to more than 82% 
of PLWHA in need, making Botswana one of the few countries providing 
almost universal access. Throughout the life of this program, the GOB has 
provided strong leadership and management of the MASA Program, even 
during the period of rapid massive scale-up, allowing PEPFAR support to 
focus on technical capacity strengthening and training of personnel to 
promote quality – a relationship that the Partnership Framework seeks to 
continue to support. 
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54. The overall goal is supported by five objectives: Treatment, TB-HIV, 
Laboratory Services, Care and Support, and Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children (OVC). 
55. To this end, sub-objectives include building the capacity of health care 
workers to provide quality services through pre-service and in-service 
training and improved staff retention. Improvement of the logistic and 
procurement mechanisms should streamline availability of safe and 
efficacious medicines throughout the country. 
3.8.1 Treatment 
 
Strategic Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions 
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To decrease the 
morbidity and mortality 
of PLHIV 
Strengthen ART 
service delivery for 
improved coverage 
and access 
Policy formulation, 
coordination, 
implementation and 
financial support 
Build capacity of 
health care workers 
to provide quality 
care and treatment 
services 
Improve pediatrics 
and adolescents 
access and adherence 
to treatment 
Improve the supply 
chain management 
system of drugs 
including ARVs and 
other related 
commodities 
Strengthen the Drug 
Regulatory Unit 
(DRU) and the 
Financial support 
and technical 
assistance in 
strengthening of 
procurement, 
warehousing and 
distribution of 
ARVs at CMS 
Training of health 
care workers 
Systems 
strengthening at 
Drug Regulatory 
Unit and National 
Drug Quality 
Laboratory 
ACHAP: 
Technical and 
financial support 
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National Drug 
Quality Control 
Laboratory(NDQCL) 
to ensure availability 
of safe, efficacious 
and quality 
medicines in the 
country 
Strengthen the 
management and 
capacity for infection 
control in health 
facilities 
Expand the 
participation of 
private partners in 
treatment programs 
Expand and improve 
electronic patient 
monitoring systems 
3.8.1.1 Treatment Indicators* 
 
Indicator Baseline Target 
The five year survival after 
initiation of ART 
89% 95% 
Percentage in need of ARV 
therapy receiving ART 
82% 95% 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
3.8.2 TB/HIV 
 
Strategic Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions  
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To reduce the burden of 
TB in Botswana, 
particularly amongst 
those infected by 
Provide leadership 
in strategic planning 
and review of TB 
Provide funding and 
technical support for 
pre-service and in-
service training of 
WHO: 
Provide technical 
support to the 
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HIV/AIDS control efforts 
Implement the 
findings of the 
national TB 
program evaluation 
conducted in 2009 
Identify and 
institute appropriate 
institutional 
arrangements for 
MDR TB 
surveillance and 
management 
Training health care 
providers on MDR 
TB management 
Procure laboratory 
equipment and 
supplies, and anti-
TB drugs 
The BDF will 
improve TB/HIV 
clinical care through 
trainings and 
mentorship 
Conduct program-
based operational 
research 
health care workers 
Support the 
upgrading of TB 
laboratory services 
Fund upgrading and 
maintenance of TB 
data management 
system 
Ministry of 
Health in the 
development of 
policy and 
guidelines; 
conduct an 
impact evaluation 
ACHAP: 
Provide technical 
support and 
funding 
Global Fund: 
Work with the 
Ministry of 
Health to 
implement 
TB/HIV 
collaborative 
activities as per 
Round 5 proposal 
 
3.8.2.1 TB/HIV Indicators* 
 
Indicator Baseline Target 
Proportion of people seen in 
HIV care settings who are 
screened for TB 
Not known 90% 
Proportion of TB patients 
who test for HIV 
68% 90% 
Proportion of HIV-positive 
TB patients who receive 
35% 90% 
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antiretroviral therapy 
3.8.3 Laboratory 
 
Strategic Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions  
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To strengthen laboratory 
services for improved 
service delivery 
Establish a public 
health laboratory 
Provide capacity 
to the laboratory 
quality assurance 
and management 
systems 
Improve the 
supply chain 
management of 
laboratory 
commodities and 
maintenance of 
lab equipment 
Policy formulation 
and coordination 
Provide technical 
assistance and 
funding to support 
the renovation of 
the existing 
National Health 
Laboratory 
Establish additional 
testing capacity and 
an integrated 
national quality 
assurance laboratory 
Establish 
collaboration and 
twinning program 
with other public 
health laboratory 
Provide technical 
support, adequate 
equipments and 
training to the 
biomedical 
engineering unit to 
strengthen the 
capacity for 
equipment 
maintenance and 
calibration 
  
 
3.8.3.1 Laboratory Indicators* 
 
Indicator Baseline Target 
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Percentage of laboratories 
adhering to quality 
assurance 
30% 100% 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan 
 
3.8.4 Care and Support 
  
Strategic Objective 
GOB Expected 
Contributions 
PEPFAR Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To strengthen the 
provision of 
comprehensive quality 
care and support services 
Improve the 
quality of the 
management of 
OIs and other co-
morbidities 
Increase access to 
quality end of life 
care for patients 
suffering from 
terminal AIDS 
Develop 
mechanisms for 
improving the 
civil society 
response in care 
and support 
services 
Develop strategies 
to improve the 
household 
economic 
livelihoods of 
families affected 
and infected by 
HIV/AIDS 
Provide financial 
and technical 
support in the 
review of STI 
guidelines to 
incorporate 
management of 
Viral STIs and for 
PwP, MARPS and 
Partner tracing. 
Financial support 
for the evaluation of 
the STI program. 
Financial support 
for critical 
management and 
coordination 
positions and 
trainings 
Give financial and 
technical support for 
the procurement of 
opiods for pain 
management. 
Provide technical 
WHO: 
Technical and 
financial support 
to MOH 
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Improve 
coordination, 
monitoring and 
evaluation of care 
and support 
interventions 
Intensify 
nutritional support 
for children and 
adults 
Registration and 
regulation of pain 
control drugs 
including opioids 
and improving 
their supply chain 
management 
support in the 
formulation of 
palliative care 
policy 
Provide financial 
and technical 
support for 
strengthening civil 
society 
organizations 
capacity and 
organizational 
ability to deliver 
community based 
care & support 
services. 
 
3.8.4.1 Care and Support Indicators* 
  
Indicator Baseline Target 
Percentage of registered 
community home based 
care patients receiving 
quality care and support 
92% 100% 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
 
3.8.5 Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children 
Strategic Objectives 
GOB Expected 
Contributions  
PEPFAR 
Expected 
Contributions 
Anticipated 
Contributions 
from other 
Donors 
To improve the quality of life 
of orphans and vulnerable 
children by ensuring access to 
optimal care and support 
Establish the 
National 
Children’s 
Council and other 
child care 
Support the GOB 
contributions 
through funding 
and technical 
assistance to 
UNICEF: 
Provide support 
for technical 
exchange 
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protection 
structures as 
provided for in the 
Children’s Act 
Strengthen the 
coordination and 
monitoring of 
OVC program 
Facilitate and 
monitor 
implementation of 
policy and 
legislation for the 
protection of 
orphans and 
vulnerable 
children 
Identify and 
implement 
mechanisms for 
increased access 
for OVC to 
essential services 
Strengthen the 
capacity of 
families and 
communities to 
protect, support 
and care for OVC 
continue their 
OVC service 
delivery efforts 
Provide financial 
support to fill 
service delivery 
gaps, particularly 
in the areas of pre-
school and 
psycho-social 
support 
Provide funding 
and technical 
assistance for 
cost-effective, 
sustainable OVC 
service delivery 
by building the 
capacity of 
community based 
organizations 
Provide technical 
support to help 
explore 
opportunities and 
benefits of a 
livelihoods policy 
visits/programs 
and/or provide 
technical 
support for 
research to 
Ministry of 
Local 
Government 
World Bank: 
Funds to 
support projects 
for the Ministry 
of Local 
Government 
SIDA: 
Provide 
financial and 
technical 
support to NGO 
networks for 
adolescent 
programs 
(Ministry of 
Local 
Government 
and Ministry of 
Youth, Sports 
and Culture) 
3.8.5.1 Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children Indicators* 
 
Indicator Baseline Target 
Percentage of OVC 
receiving basic services 
75% 90% 
* All baselines and targets should be finalized during the development of the 
National Operational Plan. 
 
Section 4 - Management and Communications Plan 
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56. Implementation of the Botswana PEPFAR Partnership Framework is 
expected to require increased coordination between the GOB and the USG as 
well as other donors and stakeholders. This increased coordination should 
improve coordination, harmonization and alignment, cost-effectiveness, and 
transparency. It should also hold all partners accountable to supporting the 
GOB’s program through the expected contributions outlined in the 
Partnership Framework. 
57. While existing mechanisms in Botswana are effective at information sharing 
at technical and program management levels, their mandates will need to be 
reviewed and or expanded to sufficiently meet the management and 
communications needs required for the implementation of this Framework. 
Therefore, the GOB, the USG and other donors and stakeholders intend to 
implement several initiatives to strengthen HIV/AIDS management and 
coordination within the framework of existing structures. The completed 
needs assessment on coordination, harmonization and alignment should 
inform the final structural arrangements for effective program 
implementation of the framework. 
58. The structures used in the development of the PF should be integrated inline 
with structural arrangements for development and oversight of 
implementation of the Second National Strategic Framework National 
Operational Plan. 
59. The existing Joint Oversight Committee (JOC) for the development and 
oversight of implementation of the Second NSF made up of executive-level 
leaders from key Government Ministries, USG agencies, and other donors 
and stakeholders, and chaired by the National AIDS Coordinating Agency 
(NACA), will provide leadership and oversight. This committee should meet 
semi-annually to review plans and reports from donors, and provide high-
level strategic direction for the national HIV/AIDS program. 
60. The Joint Oversight Committee (JOC) is a special committee of the Botswana 
Partnership Forum on AIDS that oversees the development and 
implementation of the NSF II and NOP. The JOC is chaired by NACA, and 
includes the USG team (in addition to other donors and stakeholders), and is 
responsible for coordinating the national response on a regular basis. This 
mechanism may also establish special management sub-committees, as 
needed, to provide coordinated management support, such as harmonizing 
M&E and donor reporting, tracking and supporting key policy initiatives, 
coordinating public communications efforts, improving cost-effectiveness of 
PEPFAR resources, or creating ad hoc committees to plan special national 
meetings or events. This team reports directly to the Joint Oversight 
Committee described above and to the bigger Partnership Forum. 
61. Existing National Operational Plan Technical Planning Groups (TPG) aligned 
with the goals and objectives of the second National Strategic Plan for 
HIV/AIDS (NSF II) will be responsible for identifying challenges and 
proposing solutions to those challenges to facilitate effective program 
implementation. They are expected to report to the Joint Oversight 
Committee through the Management and Support Committee and also 
regularly share information with other larger existing committees or fora in 
their specific focus areas as well as the Partnership Forum. 
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Section 5 - Steps to Complete Implementation Plan 
  
62. The goals and objectives outlined in the Botswana Partnership Framework 
are linked to specific Government of Botswana plans outlined in the National 
Development Plan 10 (NDP 10) and the Second National Strategic 
Framework for HIV and AIDS, 2009-2016 (NSF II). Many of the PEPFAR-
supported objectives in these documents contain baselines, indicators and 
targets, which, when finalized, should be used as the starting point for those 
included in the National Operational Plan. 
63. The following tasks are already underway as the Framework is undergoing 
final approvals: 
• The Technical Planning Groups, which were originally TWGs that developed 
this document, have begun developing the NOP and looking at the baselines, 
indicators and targets in the national plans to analyze what gaps exist, and 
how these will be inclusive of the PEPFAR requirements. 
• As the Government of Botswana’s planning cycle goes through 2016, it is 
necessary for all NDP 10 and NSF II targets in the National Operational Plan 
to show how PEPFAR will contribute toward those targets through 2014, i.e., 
through the end of PEPFAR II. Therefore, the TPGs are also analyzing the 
Government’s planned seven year targets, and developing appropriate 
algorithms to estimate how PEPFAR is expected to contribute to those targets 
over the next five years. 
64. The Management and Support Committee (MSC) with support from the 
TPGs has the responsibility for managing the National Operational Plan 
development process and the Joint Oversight Committee has the 
responsibility for reviewing and approving the final plan and oversight of its 
implementation 
 
Section 6 - Signatures 
Government of Botswana 
Honorable Lesego Motsumi, Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public 
Administration 
 
Government of the United States of America 
Ambassador Stephen J. Nolan 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ACHAP African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships 
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
426 
 
ART Anti-Retroviral Therapy 
ARV Anti-Retroviral 
BAIS Botswana AIDS Impact Survey 
BBCA 
BCIC 
Botswana Business Coalition against AIDS 
Behavior Change Interventions and Communication 
BHRIMS 
BONASO 
BRCS 
CBO 
Botswana HIV/AIDS Response Information 
Management System 
Botswana AIDS Service Organsation 
Botswana Redcross Society 
Community Based Organisation 
CHBC Community Home-Based Care 
CSO 
CSO 
Central Statistics Office 
Civil Society Organisation 
EC European Commission 
HIV 
HRH 
HSS 
ICT 
IEC 
JOC 
GOB 
GBV 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
Human Resources for Health 
Health Systems Strengthening 
Information Communication Technology 
Information Education and Communication 
Joint Oversight Committee 
Government of Botswana 
Gender based Violence 
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation 
MARPS 
MC 
Most At Risk Populations 
Male Circumcision 
MCP 
MDR 
Multiple and Concurrent Partnerships 
Multi-Drug Resistant 
MLG Ministry of Local Government 
MOH Ministry of Health 
MTR 
MYSC 
Mid-Term Review 
Ministry of Youth Sport and Culture 
NAC National AIDS Council 
NACA 
NASA 
NBTS 
NDP 10 
NDQCL 
National AIDS Coordinating Agency 
National AIDS Spending Assessment 
National Blood Transfusion Service 
National Development Plan 10 
National Drug Quality Control Laboratory 
NGO 
NOP 
Non-governmental Organization 
National Operational Plan 
NSF National Strategic Framework 
OVC Orphans and Vulnerable Children 
PEPFAR President’s Emergency Program for HIV/AIDS Relief 
PEP Post-exposure Prophylaxsis 
PMTCT 
PPP 
Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission 
Public Private Partnership 
RHT 
SIDA 
Routine HIV Testing 
Swedish International Development Agency 
SRH Sexual and Reproductive Health 
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STI Sexually Transmitted Infection 
TB 
TPG 
UN 
Tuberculosis 
Technical Planning Group 
United Nations 
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
UNGASS 
United Nations General Assembly Special Session (on 
HIV/AIDS) 
UNICEF 
UPENN 
USG 
VCT 
United Nations Children’s Fund 
University of Pennsylvania 
United States Government 
Voluntary Testing and Counselling 
WAD Women Affairs Department 
WHO World Health Organization 
 
Source: PEPFAR (2012) “Botswana Partnership Framework for HIV/AIDS 2010 - 
2014: A Collaborative Effort between The Government of Botswana and The 
Government of the United States of America (December 2010)” 
http://www.pepfar.gov/frameworks/botswana/158545.htm [19 March 2012]. 
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Annex 6 – Five-Year Partnership Framework in Support of the 
Ethiopian National Response to HIV/AIDS 2010 - 2014 Between The 
Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the 
Government of the United States of America (October 2010) 
Acronyms 
  
ABC Abstinence, Be faithful, Condom use  
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome  
ANC Antenatal Care  
ART Antiretroviral Treatment  
BCC Behavior Change Communication  
CHAI Clinton Health Access Initiative  
CSO Civil Society Organizations  
CT Counseling and Testing  
DFID Department for International Development  
EHNRI Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute  
EID Early Infant Diagnosis  
FBOs Faith-Based Organizations  
FGM Female Genital Mutilation  
GF(ATM) Global Fund (to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria)  
GOE Government of Ethiopia  
HAPCO HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office  
HBC Home-Based Care  
HEW Health Extension Worker  
HSS Health Systems Strengthening  
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus  
HMIS Health Management Information System  
HRH Human Resources for Health  
HSDP IV Health Sector Development Program (2010/11-2014/15)  
IGAs Income Generating Activities  
IHP+ International Health Partnership  
LMIS Logistics Management Information System  
MAP Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program  
MARPs Most At Risk Populations  
MCP Multiple Concurrent Partner  
MDG Millennium Development Goals  
M & E Monitoring and Evaluation  
MNCH Maternal Neonatal and Child Health  
MOE Ministry of Education  
MOH Ministry of Health  
NASA National AIDS Spending Assessment  
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NHA National Health Account  
OI Opportunistic Infection  
OVC Orphans and Vulnerable Children  
PBS Population Based Survey 
PEPFAR United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief 
PF Partnership Framework 
PFIP Partnership Framework Implementation Plan 
PFSA Pharmaceutical Fund and Supply Agency 
PHCU Primary Health Care unit 
PLHA People Living with HIV/AIDS 
PMTCT Prevention of Mother-To-Child Transmission 
PR Principal Recipient 
SI Strategic Information 
SNNPR Southern Nations & Nationalities and Peoples Region 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
SPM-I Strategic Plan for Intensifying Multisectoral HIV and 
AIDS response in Ethiopia I (2004-08) 
SPM-II Strategic Plan for Intensifying Multisectoral HIV and 
AIDS response in Ethiopia II (2010-2014) 
STI Sexually Transmitted Infection 
TA Technical Assistance 
TB Tuberculosis 
UHEW Urban Health Extension Worker 
UN United Nations 
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization 
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF The United Nations Children’s Fund 
VAT Value Added Tax 
WB World Bank 
WFP World Food Program 
WHO World Health Organization 
 
 
I. Purpose and Principles 
This Partnership Framework reflects the outcome of joint discussions and respective 
contributions of the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) and the Government of the 
United States of America (U.S. Government) (hereinafter the Participants) to 
collaboratively expand, and sustain an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
in Ethiopia over the next five years. The Partnership Framework goals and objectives 
are consistent with Ethiopia’s Strategic Plan for Intensifying Multisectoral 
HIV/AIDS Response in Ethiopia 2010-2014 (SPM II) and the Health Sector 
Development Plan IV 2010/11-2014/15 (HSDP IV), the strategic plan of the 
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President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the principles of the 
U.S. government’s Global Health Initiative. The Partnership Framework also seeks 
to ensure that U.S. Government contributions towards the SPM II and broader health 
sector development programs complement and leverage other stakeholders. 
Through the signing of this Partnership Framework, both governments acknowledge 
a shared desire to strengthen their relationship, and increase the effectiveness, 
efficiency and sustainability of the national response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
Ethiopia. The Partnership Framework supports the Government of Ethiopia’s unique 
leadership role in coordinating and mainstreaming efforts among many sectors to 
create an efficient, effective and sustainable response to HIV/AIDS in Ethiopia. The 
Partnership Framework is intended to work in close collaboration with other 
Ethiopian collaborative arrangements such as the International Health Partnership 
(IHP+) and other multilateral and bilateral relationships. 
This Partnership Framework between the GOE and the U.S. Government also 
articulates the joint understanding and commitment to the following principles to 
guide how the two governments intend to combine efforts to combat HIV/AIDS in 
Ethiopia: 
Country Leadership: The Partnership Framework supports Ethiopian national plans 
and priorities, is responsive to national planning processes, and seeks to uphold 
national high level leadership and continued ownership of the response by the 
Government and people of Ethiopia. 
Cooperation and Partnership: The Partnership Framework outlines plans to 
strengthen the ongoing relationship between the GOE and U.S. Government and 
recognizes the need to increase the GOE’s management and financial responsibility 
for the national HIV/AIDS response. The Framework also builds upon a foundation 
of an organized and concerted joint planning effort from all stakeholders, including 
multiple government sectors, private sector, civil society, faith-based organizations, 
donor organizations, people living with HIV/AIDS, and communities at large to 
enhance HIV/AIDS programs. 
Evidence based and strategic decision making: The HIV/AIDS response should be 
led by planning for implementation of programs that have evidence supporting their 
effectiveness. Programs should be rigorously monitored and evaluated. Decision 
making should be data driven and be based on the most strategic investment of 
available resources in order to maximize program impact. 
Accountability: The Partnership Framework assumes that the two Governments 
meet all Framework objectives and may be answerable to interested constituencies. 
The Partnership Framework Implementation Plan should outline the schedule and 
method by which the governments expect to review progress toward Framework 
objectives. 
Equitable, universally-accessible, quality care: The Framework is to be guided by 
the vision that systems and services related to HIV/AIDS should be equitable, move 
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towards universal access, be of high quality, and support a family and community 
based approach. Gender inequalities should be addressed by all sectors to ensure 
more effective HIV/AIDS prevention care, treatment and mitigation programs. 
Programs should also take into account and work towards ensuring that all people 
with disabilities receive equitable and accessible standard quality services. 
Integration: The Partnership Framework should further support, where possible, the 
progressive and bi-directional integration of HIV/AIDS interventions with other 
health services, as well as integration of other needed services into those for 
HIV/AIDS. 
While the U.S. Government’s main modality of delivering development assistance is 
to be project support, U.S. Government investments in Ethiopia should be based on a 
joint plan, include country leadership in decision-making on where investments are 
made, be transparent and support the principles of the “Three Ones.” 
Financial Principles 
In addition to the above Principles, the two Governments affirm their understanding 
of the importance of the following financial principles: 
Recognition that, as U.S. Government and GOE resources are limited, prioritization 
is necessary to achieve the most immediate and durable public health impact, and 
planned investments are subject to the availability of funds. 
Recognition that achievement of national HIV/AIDS goals may require resource 
levels beyond the ability of any one partner, and that the constraints on availability of 
funding from either Government or from other key partners may lead to a review and 
revision of priorities. 
Recognition that where U.S. Government assistance is to be provided directly to the 
GOE under this Partnership Framework, GOE contributions are expected to meet 
host country cost sharing needs under U.S. foreign assistance programs and 
progressively cover recurrent expenditures. Details regarding the GOE’s financial 
and/or in-kind contributions to programs under this Partnership Framework are to be 
provided in the Partnership Framework Implementation Plan. 
Recognition that transparency in HIV/AIDS-related resource allocation and 
expenditures is expected from both Participants. 
Recognition that both Participants should continue to work in collaboration with 
other stakeholders to reduce redundancies and inefficiencies in allocation of HIV 
resources for HIV/AIDS interventions. 
Recognition that both Participants should support full and open competition in the 
funding of non-governmental implementing partners. 
II. Background/Context 
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Ethiopia has a population of 80 million[1] and is the second most populous country 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a low-income country with a real per capita income is 
US $232[2] and an estimated 39% of the population living below the international 
poverty line of $1.25/day.[3] It is also one of the least urbanized countries with 84% 
of the population living in rural areas. 
Although improvements have been made, the health status of Ethiopia is still low, as 
in other Sub-Saharan countries. This is largely attributable to preventable infectious 
diseases and nutritional deficiencies associated with poor hygienic conditions, 
improper waste disposal practices, and insufficient access to clean water. Infectious 
and communicable diseases account for about 60-80% of the health problems in the 
country.[4] Life expectancy is 53 years of age, the infant mortality rate is 77 per 
1,000 live births and the child mortality rate is 123 per 1,000 live births. Neonatal 
mortality contributes 30% of the under 5 mortality, with pneumonia and diarrheal 
disease contributing an additional 22% and 17% respectively. Access to and use of 
maternity services is very weak. Ethiopia has a high maternal mortality rate at 673 
per 100,000 births and only 20% of births are attended by a skilled attendant. 
Predictably, neonatal mortality is also high at 39 per 1000 births with asphyxia, 
sepsis and preterm birth the major contributors.[5] 
Ethiopia’s HIV/AIDS epidemic has placed substantial demand on the country’s 
already strained resources. Although Ethiopia’s 2009 HIV point prevalence estimate 
of 2.3% is lower than many other Sub-Saharan countries, there are still over 1.1 
million people living with HIV in Ethiopia. Of Ethiopia’s estimated 5.4 million 
orphans, 855,720 were orphaned due to AIDS. Prevalence is higher in women than in 
men (2.8% and 1.8%, respectively). Ethiopia represents a low level generalized 
epidemic with wide urban to rural differences in prevalence (7.7% and 0.9% 
respectively), with most at risk groups driving the epidemic.[6] A National 
Prevention Summit attended by key stakeholders held in April 2009 reached 
consensus to strengthen prevention activities and also increase efforts to reach Most 
at Risk Populations (MARPs) with interventions. Population groups most at risk of 
HIV infection include female sex workers, migrant workers, long distance drivers, 
uniformed forces, discordant couples and men having sex with men. Common 
                                                 
[1] Based on the 2007 National Census (Central Statistical Agency) and extrapolated 
to include a 2.6% annual population growth rate. 
[2] National 5 Year Growth Transformation Plan, Federal Ministry of Finance & 
Economic Development, August 2010 
[4] Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSDP III) 2005/06-2009/10. Federal Ministry of 
Health. 
[6] Strategic Plan for Intensifying Multisectoral HIV and AIDS Response in Ethiopia 
(SPM II) 2010-2014. 
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settings with MARPs include economic and infrastructure development schemes, 
brothels, high transport corridors, refugee camps and surrounding populations.[7] 
The Government of Ethiopia has been innovative and has taken an active role in 
addressing the country’s health challenges. This includes a doubling of the treasury 
budget for health over the past 5 years. Taking into account additional resources 
obtained through PEPFAR and the Global Fund, the annual per capita expenditure on 
health has increased from $7.1 in 2004/5 to $16.1 in 2007/8[8], although this is still 
well below the World Health Organization’s recommended $34 per capita. The 
contribution of the GOE to HSDP IV is expected to increase from $249 million in 
2009/10 to $298 million in 2014/15; the 2009/10 contribution is 4.4% of the total 
national budget. Ethiopia is the largest recipient of grants from the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) which together with PEPFAR 
resources provided 90% of donor support for HIV/AIDS in 2009. Other donors 
include the UN Joint Program, the World Bank, UNITAID and other bilateral 
donors. Ethiopia was one of the first signatories to the International Health 
Partnership (IHP+). 
With PEPFAR support, the GOE has demonstrated strong leadership and 
commitment to addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic with significant achievements. 
This has resulted in increased social mobilization, an expansion of health facilities 
and services, improved access to antiretroviral treatment (ART), and enhanced 
efforts to build human capacity. The number of facilities offering counseling and 
testing has almost tripled from 658 in 2005 to 1596 in 2009; coupled with significant 
efforts being made in community mobilization through the Millennium AIDS 
Campaign; as a result, HIV testing increased from 436,854 (2004/5) to 5,800,248 
(2008/09). Service expansion and service uptake significantly and consistently 
increased during the Strategic Plan for Multisectoral Response (SPM I) period (2004-
2008). In 2005, only 3 facilities were offering ART; by 2009, these services were 
available in 481 facilities. From a baseline of 8,226 persons ever started on ART in 
2005, over 241,250 were started on treatment by 2009.[9] As of March 2010, there 
were 186,154 (62% of estimated need) persons still on ART. The dropout rate of 
those ever started and the current number of patients on ART is comprised of 
patients that have died, those that have transferred out, stopped treatment and the 
“true” lost to follow-up” which is estimated at around 7%. A significant lost to 
follow up is found among pre-ART patients. 
Despite a three-fold increase in the number of sites providing PMTCT, only 8.2% of 
the estimated eligible number of HIV-infected pregnant women received 
prophylaxis. Due to limited access to quality ANC and maternity services, the 
challenges with reaching targets in PMTCT has been acknowledged by the GOE, 
partners and donors alike. Similarly, even with significant expansion of primary 
health care facilities, the health sector infrastructure falls well below the WHO 
recommended facility to population ratio. And, although the GOE has considerably 
expanded its number of health centers, a recent survey assessing health facilities 
illustrates that on average only 60% and 3.2%, respectively, had basic and high level 
supplies in place.[10] It is anticipated that through the hiring, training and 
deployment of 30,000 Health Extension Workers (HEWs) focused on health 
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promotion, disease prevention and provision of basic health care services and 
referrals, significant progress should be made at the community level to increase 
PMTCT services and the number of births managed by a skilled birth attendant. 
Ethiopia is one of 57 countries recognized by WHO as having a health workforce 
crisis, marked by chronic under-production of trained personnel, especially at high 
and mid-levels, and poorly motivated underpaid staff with low retention. In addition, 
there are major rural:urban distribution disparities with health worker density ranging 
from 0.24 to 2.7 per 1,000 population, respectively. There are 2,151 physicians in the 
country, a ratio of 1 to 36,710 people which is far below WHO standards.[11] 
Ethiopia has been visionary in task-shifting HIV/AIDS services in order to 
compensate for the severe shortage of high and mid-level trained health workers to 
bring essential services to those in need. 
The development of a Partnership Framework comes at a critical point. PEPFAR is 
moving from an emergency to a more sustainable response with greater emphasis on 
country ownership. This is outlined in the next 5-year PEPFAR strategy by which 
“PEPFAR will work through partner governments to support a sustainable, 
integrated, and country-led response to HIV/AIDS”.[12] Ethiopia is in the process of 
finalizing its Health Sector Development Plan 2010/11-2014/15 (HSDP IV) and has 
recently drafted the Second Strategic Plan for Intensified Multisectoral Response to 
HIV/AIDS 2010-2014 (SPM II). These strategic policy documents build upon the 
gains and lessons learned to date. Through this Partnership Framework, the U.S. 
Government and the GOE should consolidate the gains achieved through 
partnerships in the first five years and move forwards with an increased focus on 
country ownership and leadership, while strengthening health systems that integrate 
prevention, care and treatment services. 
Policy Environment 
The overarching health sector plan is outlined in the Health Sector Development Plan 
IV (HSDP IV) which is in final draft. This takes into account the Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP 2007-2010) 
which is currently being updated. The Strategic Plan for Intensifying Multisectoral 
HIV/AIDS Response in Ethiopia 2010-2014 (SPM II) outlines in greater detail the 
country’s response to HIV/AIDS. In the development of this Partnership Framework 
and in the elaboration of the Partnership Framework Implementation Plan, policy 
issues have been identified. These include development of a National Condom 
Strategy, enforcement of free maternity services at primary health care level, 
ratification of policy on task shifting and broadening of the policy to allow urban 
health extension workers to distribute ARVs as part of PMTCT prophylaxis and 
revision of the social welfare policy. The status of the policy environment and how 
the policy agenda may be moved forwards should be further outlined in the PFIP. 
The SPM II identifies selected strategies addressing gender inequality, including 
gender based violence. HIV programs should be encouraged to systematically 
mainstream gender, including integration into sectoral policies and programs. 
Awareness creation and punitive approaches should be implemented on perpetrators 
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of Gender based violence (GBV), which includes abduction, wife battering and 
female genital mutilation (FGM). HIV post exposure prophylaxis should be available 
to survivors of sexual violence. The SPM II also promotes the education of girls and 
gender norms to facilitate gender equality. The SPM II plans to conduct a stigma 
index study, advocate against stigma and discrimination, promote respect for human 
rights, protect from gender-based violence and multimedia censorship for minors, 
early marriage and FGM. 
III. Five-year strategic overview 
The U.S. Government recognizes that the national response to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in Ethiopia is led and coordinated by the Government of Ethiopia (GOE). 
The health sector spearheads the National HIV/AIDS response. HIV/AIDS programs 
are coordinated through and led by the Federal HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control 
Office (HAPCO) and the National AIDS Council, and involve a range of institutions 
including but not limited to the Ministry of Health, other line Ministries, the 
Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute (EHNRI), the Pharmaceutical 
Fund and Supply Agency (PFSA), and the Drug Administration and Control 
Authority (DACA). Within Ethiopia’s federal system, there are also regional 
HAPCOs, regional health bureaus, and emerging regional AIDS Councils. 
This Partnership Framework represents the joint work with the GOE designated 
members of the HAPCO team and PEPFAR. It also incorporates comments and 
inputs from other multi-lateral and bilateral donors, other government sectors and 
civil society. In August 2009, the U.S. Government Deputy Chief of Mission 
communicated the concept of the Partnership Framework to the Ethiopian Minister 
of Health, who designated HAPCO as the U.S. Government’s key contact. The 
Partnership Framework was developed by a design team comprised of members of 
the GOE and the U.S. Government, in consultation with multi and bilateral donors 
and civil society. The GOE and the U.S. Government held a number of joint design 
team meetings over the intervening period. There was some delay as the GOE 
finalized their new five year strategy, with the U.S. Government and other 
multilateral donors, working with the GOE to rationalize some of the ambitious 
targets. Based on the finalization of the SPM II document, within the Partnership 
Framework, the U.S. Government has clearly defined what is within its manageable 
interest and focus by specifying expected U.S. Government contributions towards 
achieving the goals and objectives. A number of consultation meetings with other 
development partners were held to elicit their input into both the policy agenda and 
their expected contributions towards the goals and objectives as identified within the 
Partnership Framework. The U.S. Government also consulted with its implementing 
partners. HAPCO also called a broader stakeholder consultation to bring in other 
sectoral ministries and partners. Drafts of the Partnership Framework document have 
been shared with the GOE and other development partners at various points in the 
process and comments elicited. 
The first government Strategic Plan for intensifying the Multisectoral Response to 
HIV/AIDS (SPM I) covered the period from 2004-2008. The Partnership Framework 
builds upon the Strategic Plan for Intensifying Multisectoral HIV/AIDS Response in 
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Ethiopia II: 2010-2014 (SPM II) and the HSDP IV. The SPM II places priority on the 
following thematic areas: 
• Creating an enabling environment 
• Intensifying HIV prevention 
• Increasing access to and improving quality of HIV/AIDS care and treatment 
• Intensifying mitigation efforts against the epidemic 
• Strengthening the generation and use of strategic information 
The Partnership Framework supports the SPM II, which also forms part of the HSDP 
IV. Health systems’ strengthening is a broader goal which constitutes part of HSDP 
IV and is set forth within Goal 3 in the Partnership Framework. This Partnership 
Framework illustrates an enhanced coordination of resources and harmonization of 
goals and objectives between the GOE, PEPFAR and other key donors. Transitioning 
ownership of HIV/AIDS programs to Ethiopia’s leadership is expected to require an 
organized, strategic approach that promotes sustainability of the programs. This 
Partnership Framework aims to create an enabling environment that ensures the 
active involvement and ownership across all sectors, enhances partnership under the 
“Three Ones Principles” and mobilizes appropriate use of resources.[13] 
The Global health Initiative (GHI) serves as the whole-of-U.S. Government approach 
to further coordinate and integrate the U.S. Government’s global health efforts in 
partner countries and is intended to form the health component of future country 
development cooperation strategies. Through GHI, the U.S. Government intends to 
help partner countries improve health outcomes through strengthened health systems, 
with a particular focus on improving the health of women, adolescent girls, newborns 
and children through programs that address infectious disease, nutrition, maternal 
and child health, family planning, safe water, sanitation and hygiene. GHI should 
take into account and leverage the health and development efforts of partner 
countries, other bilateral donors, multilateral organizations, civil society, private 
sector, and faith-based and non-governmental organizations to achieve the greatest 
possible impact through U.S. Government investments. The GHI model has dual 
objectives of achieving significant health improvements and fostering effective, 
efficient and country-led platforms that deliver essential health care and public health 
programs sustainably. This Partnership Framework, although addressing primarily 
HIV/AIDS programs, also embodies the principles outlined in GHI. 
The Partnership Framework aims to achieve the following four goals in support of 
the GOE’s plan to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic: 
Goal I: Reduce the national HIV incidence by 50% by 2014: Under this goal, the 
GOE, U.S. Government and other stakeholders recognize the importance of focusing 
efforts on evidence-based prevention and display their shared desire and commitment 
to increase comprehensive HIV knowledge and behavior change among the adult 
population, provide additional focus on intervention packages that are designed to 
reach MARPs, increase the availability of counseling and testing, and expand the 
availability of comprehensive youth focused ABC programs. Additionally, the two 
governments recognize the priority of putting into action efforts to significantly 
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increase the availability and utilization of PMTCT services. As a result of increased 
efforts for combination prevention[14] for the general population, and MARPs as 
well as higher uptake of PMTCT services, there should be an anticipated decrease in 
the incidence of new infections. 
Goal II: To reduce morbidity and mortality and improve the quality of life for 
people living with HIV by expanding access to quality care, treatment and 
support by 2014: Under this goal, the U.S. Government plans to work jointly with 
the GOE and other stakeholders to ensure the continued provision of quality 
HIV/AIDS care, treatment and support services, including services to OVC with 
available resources. Emphasis should also continue to be given to enrolling more 
children into care and treatment and to ensuring, as with ARVs for adults, that 
available pediatric ARV formulations are available in an uninterrupted manner. As a 
result of investments in care, the increased detection and treatment of TB/HIV co-
infection and other opportunistic infections, and improved treatment and follow-up 
services, it is anticipated that 12-months survival rate should increase. In addition, 
support for strengthening of psycho-social support for orphans and PLHAs, including 
improved access to livelihood options, should improve quality of life. 
Goal III: Health systems necessary for universal access are functional by 2014. 
In partnership with the GOE, the U.S. Government and other stakeholders should 
work collaboratively to focus their activities and contributions towards creating a 
better-functioning health system. This is to include adequate human resources for 
health, expanded and improved physical infrastructure, increased capacity for 
planning, management, and finance of programs, especially at regional levels. This is 
to be based on functioning systems for health management information, surveillance, 
other sources of data and laboratory, all supported by adequate systems to ensure un-
interrupted procurement and supply of essential HIV/AIDS commodities. 
Goal IV: Multisectoral response in place to prevent the spread of HIV and 
mitigate its impacts by 2014. Under this goal, in partnership with the GOE, the U.S. 
Government and other stakeholders intend to promote the strengthening of leadership 
so that Ethiopia may coordinate and implement one multisectoral and strategic 
national response. Several GOE ministries have committed 2% of their budget to 
mainstreaming within their sector. The U.S. Government should engage with the 
GOE to strengthen coordinating bodies, accelerate implementation, enforce 
accountability of leadership, and intensify involvement of civil society and the 
private sector. 
IV. OWNERSHIP 
With the development of the SPM II and HSDP IV, the GOE demonstrates strong 
leadership and ownership in the proposed development of Ethiopia’s health sector. 
The HSDP IV has applied the following principles: 
1. Government leadership 
2. Enhanced responsiveness to community health needs 
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3. Extensive consultation and consensus with stakeholders 
4. Comprehensive coverage of priority health sector issues 
5. Linkage between HSDP IV and sub-national HSDPs, strategies, programs on 
priorities and targets.[15] 
The SPM II aspires to prevent and control Ethiopia’s HIV/AIDS epidemic and to 
mitigate its impacts through intensified community mobilization and empowerment 
as well as through capacity building. The SPM II also aims to strengthen the active 
participation and involvement among all sectors. Creating an enabling environment 
is one of five strategic issues set forth by the GOE in the SPM II that helps to 
conceptualize the meaning of host country ownership for Ethiopia. Capacity 
building, community mobilization and empowerment, leadership and governance, 
mainstreaming, coordination and partnership are key components of Ethiopia’s 
growing ability to create an enabling environment. Such an environment should 
strengthen the effective management, implementation and evaluation of Ethiopia’s 
multisectoral and strategic response. 
Specifically, the U.S. Government and the GOE intend to promote greater country 
ownership of programs and activities by the government, local organizations and 
other stakeholders through: 
 Jointly deciding upon indicators that characterize ownership and outlining 
incremental and time-delineated steps to strengthen host country ownership. 
 Increasing the proportion of local partners receiving PEPFAR funds in 
Ethiopia, including but not limited to the GOE. 
 Increasing the proportion of PEPFAR funds that goes to local partners. 
 Developing an appropriate plan to build local capacity that serves to enable 
transition from non-Ethiopian partners receiving PEPFAR funds. 
 Ensuring that PEPFAR-funded activities are aligned and support other key 
GOE plans which include HSDP IV, SPM II, HMIS, HRH, Laboratory 
Master Plan, etc. 
 Maintaining open, transparent, and regular communication between U.S. 
Government, the GOE, and other key partners such as primary recipients of 
GFATM and IHP+ partners. 
 Aligning U.S. Government coordination for health activities with the MOH 
(federal and regional) and for multisectoral activities with the HAPCO 
(federal and regional). 
 An evidence-based response, led by the GOE at all levels, with enhanced 
partnership of all stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector, 
under the principles of the “Three Ones” to institute the Partnership 
Framework principles and goals. 
The U.S. Government anticipates ongoing discussions with the GOE to further define 
and progressively move toward greater country ownership. 
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Goal 1: To reduce the national HIV incidence by 50% by 2014.  
Under this goal, the GOE, U.S. Government and other stakeholders, recognize the 
importance of focusing efforts on prevention and display their shared desire and 
commitment to increase comprehensive HIV knowledge among the adult population, 
provide additional focus on combination prevention intervention packages that 
should reach Most at Risk Populations and vulnerable groups, increase the 
availability of counseling and testing and the availability of comprehensive youth 
focused abstinence, be faithful, and condom (ABC) programs resulting in behavior 
change. Additionally, the two governments recognize and should put into action 
significantly increasing the availability and utilization of PMTCT services. 
Objectives Expected Contributions Expected steps 
for 
development 
of PFIP and 
identified 
policy issues 
  GOE PEPFAR Other[16]   
1.1: To 
increase HIV 
comprehensiv
e knowledge 
among adult 
population 
aged 15-49 
from 22.6% in 
2005 to 80% 
by 2014. 
· Intensify social 
mobilization 
through 
community 
conversation 
· Provide HIV 
prevention 
communication 
programs house 
to house to 
general 
population 
· Ensure 
provision of 
comprehensive 
workplace HIV 
prevention 
communication 
programs 
· Support 
outreach to the 
general 
population in 
high prevalence 
areas with 
comprehensive 
HIV prevention 
communication 
and behavior 
change programs 
· Support 
evidence-based 
programs that 
provide effective 
one-to-one or 
small groups 
based BCC 
interventions 
including CT and 
the development 
and 
dissemination of 
materials and 
training 
· Joint UN 
support for 
increasing 
knowledge 
among general 
population 
through 
integration of 
HIV into relevant 
sectoral 
interventions and 
community 
processes 
· Global Fund: 
Support training 
of community 
conversation 
facilitators 
· Support 
provision of 
comprehensive 
HIV prevention 
communication 
programs 
· World Bank: 
Support for 
community 
· 
Programmatic 
evaluation of 
effect of large 
scale general 
population 
activities on 
behavior 
change 
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conversations, 
peer education 
groups under 
MAP II 
1.2: By 2014, 
increased 
percentage of 
MARPs are 
reached with 
HIV 
intervention 
programs. 
· Before end of 
2010, lead study 
on MARPs 
identification, 
size estimation, 
distribution, HIV 
prevalence and 
mapping of 
hotspots 
· Develop 
comprehensive 
HIV prevention 
services 
packages of HIV 
services and 
communication 
strategy for 
MARPs 
· Organize, 
coordinate, and 
ensure provision 
of HIV 
prevention 
services to 
MARPs 
· Support in 
MARPs 
identification, 
size estimation, 
and mapping of 
hot spot areas 
· Generate 
evidence of the 
level of multiple 
concurrent 
partnerships and 
modes of 
transmission 
· Support 
development and 
implementation 
of specific 
intervention 
packages 
including 
condoms, 
HIV/AIDS and 
STI treatment in 
Urban and Peri-
Urban hot spots 
· Support efforts 
to decrease 
stigmatization of 
MARPs and 
ensure increased 
access to services 
· Support efforts 
for greater 
involvement by 
NGOs, FBOs and 
CSOs 
· Joint UN 
technical support 
for development 
of MARPS 
surveillance and 
intervention 
packages 
· Joint UN team 
provides 
normative and 
M&E guidance 
and 
implementation 
support for MCP 
interventions 
· Netherlands 
support for 
MARPs programs 
· Global Fund: 
Support provision 
of HIV 
prevention 
programs to 
MARPs 
· Global Fund: 
Supports 
increased 
involvement of 
FBOs 
· World Bank: 
MARPs focused 
peer education 
and support 
groups and small 
community based 
grants for IGAs 
and to support 
above activities 
under MAPII 
· Identify size 
and mapping 
of MARPs 
population, 
behavioral 
characteristics 
and HIV 
prevalence 
among the 
identified 
MARPs 
· Develop 
comprehensive 
prevention 
packages of 
HIV services 
and 
communicatio
n strategy for 
MARPs, 
· Policy 
decisions 
around new 
and most cost-
effective 
interventions 
as they become 
available 
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1.3: By 2014, 
the percentage 
of young 
people aged 
15-24 who use 
condoms 
consistently 
while having 
sex with non-
regular 
partners 
should 
increase from 
< 50% (2005) 
to 80%. 
· Ensure health 
facility based 
distribution of 
condoms 
· Provide 
condoms to 
development 
schemes through 
outreach 
programs 
· Ensure 
provision of 
condoms to 
MARPs 
· Provide 
condoms on free 
and social 
marketing basis 
to Urban and 
Peri-Urban areas 
· Participate in 
National 
Condom Strategy 
development 
· Support the 
development and 
strengthening of 
Condom Logistic 
management 
system 
· Support BCC 
efforts (including 
CT), materials 
and training that 
promotes 
condoms 
· 
· Joint UN 
support to ensure 
supply and 
procurement of 
condoms and 
enhanced 
technical capacity 
for resource 
mobilization 
· DFID, IrishAid 
and Netherlands 
government 
support condom 
social marketing 
programs 
· UNICEF 
support in-school 
and out-of-school 
youth programs 
with MOE and 
MOYS 
· Global Fund 
Support provision 
of condoms to 
development 
schemes and 
youth centers 
· World Bank 
School based peer 
education 
programs, Anti-
AIDS clubs, 
under MAP II 
· Develop 
national 
condom 
strategy 
· 100% of 
estimated 
national need 
and 
distribution of 
condoms is 
available by 
2015 
 
 
1.4: By 2014, 
85% of HIV 
positive 
pregnant 
women[17] 
and their 
infants receive 
complete 
· Intensify social 
mobilization for 
prevention of 
mother-to-child 
transmission of 
HIV 
· Lead 
integration of 
PMTCT with 
· Support 
comprehensive 
ethnographic 
studies to better 
understand 
cultural and 
utilization 
barriers for 
PMTCT services 
in order to 
increase 
· WHO provides 
strategic advice, 
including 
adoption of new 
global guidelines, 
and UNICEF 
supports training 
in PMTCT 
settings 
· UNICEF 
· Involvement 
of urban 
HEWs in 
appropriate 
aspects of 
PMTCT 
services 
including 
distribution of 
ARV 
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ARV 
prophylaxis or 
treatment. 
MNCH services 
· Provide 
PMTCT at all 
PHCUs with 
outreach 
community 
services 
· Based on 
evidence, address 
barriers to access 
and utilization of 
PMTCT services 
utilization of 
these services 
· Support HMIS 
to use PMTCT 
cascade for 
program 
improvement 
· Support 
integration of 
PMTCT services 
into other 
maternal and 
child health 
programming 
· Support 
community based 
PMTCT 
programs, 
focusing on 
HEW, UHEW, 
and mother 
support groups as 
appropriate 
· Focus on 
measures that 
increases the 
quality of 
PMTCT services 
to encourage 
utilization 
· Support 
increased private 
sector 
involvement in 
PMTCT 
· Address gender 
issues in 
accessing 
PMTCT services 
· Contribute to 
health facility 
support for 
integration of 
PMTCT services 
into MNCH 
· Global Fund: 
Support provision 
of PMTCT 
service provision 
at facility and 
community 
outreaches 
· CHAI: 
Strengthen/initiat
e comprehensive 
PMTCT services 
in 30 Primary 
Health Care Units 
and hospitals 
prophylaxis 
· Plan for roll-
out of new 
WHO 
guidelines 
related to 
PMTCT 
· Enforcement 
of free 
maternity 
services at 
primary health 
care level 
443 
 
and health 
worker skills 
· Support 
infrastructure 
improvements to 
make sites more 
accessible and 
female- and 
family-friendly 
1.5: A 
cumulative 
total of 42 
million people 
counseled and 
tested for HIV 
by 2014. 
· Intensify social 
mobilization for 
counseling and 
testing among 
vulnerable and 
most at risk 
population 
groups 
· Ensure 
provision of 
counseling & 
testing services 
at health facility 
and in 
community 
outreach 
activities 
· Expand sites 
for provision of 
counseling and 
testing service 
· Enhance 
targeting and 
quality assurance 
mechanisms 
· Support 
targeted CT 
program in hot 
spots 
· Increase CT to 
reach Most at 
Risk Populations 
and vulnerable 
groups 
· Strengthen 
couples/family 
CT 
· Evaluate home-
based CT 
· Strengthen 
referral linkages 
and post test 
clubs 
· Support quality 
assurance 
mechanisms for 
CT 
· Strengthen 
supply chain for 
test kits 
· Support 
provider-initiated 
counseling and 
testing in clinical 
sites 
· Joint UN 
support for 
normative 
guidelines, 
service delivery 
enhancement and 
CT and periodic 
M&E 
· Global Fund: 
Support HCT 
services through 
supply of rapid 
test kits and 
expanding service 
delivery sites 
· CHAI: Pilot 
HIV C&T at rural 
health Post level 
· Strengthen HCT 
at hospital and 
HC level 
· Dialogue on 
improved 
targeting for 
testing 
populations at 
high risk of 
infection 
1.6: Reduce · Ensure · Support BCC · UNESCO, · Evaluation of 
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percentage of 
young people 
aged 15-19 
with sexual 
debut < 15 
years from 
8.4% in 2005 
to 1.7%; 
11.1% to 2.2% 
in females and 
male from 
1.7% to 0.34% 
by 2014. 
provision of age 
appropriate 
HIV/reproductiv
e health services 
including BCC 
· Expand school-
based 
interventions 
· Encourage 
family-life 
education at 
schools and 
conversations at 
household level 
· Ensure 
implementation 
of education 
sector policies 
and strategies 
· Enforce 
policies 
prohibiting the 
access of minors 
to alcohol, illegal 
substances, etc 
efforts (including 
CT), materials 
and training that 
promote delay of 
sexual debut for 
youth 
· Involve FBOs, 
CSOs and 
communities 
· Address Gender 
and Male Norms 
related behaviors 
· Strengthen 
linkages with 
education 
programs – 
support in school 
and out of school 
programs which 
include training 
of teachers both 
in school and in 
TTIs, youth 
leadership 
development, 
mass media 
campaigns 
through school 
radio, TV, print 
serial dramas etc. 
· Engage youth 
in constructive 
afterschool 
activities (Peace 
Corps) 
UNHCR and 
UNAIDS provide 
inputs to strategic 
planning, 
supportive 
supervision and 
enhanced 
management 
capacities for 
supplies to 
schools 
· UNICEF and 
UNFPA HIV 
prevention work 
with young 
people in and out 
of schools and in 
tertiary education 
institutions 
· Global Fund: 
Support BCC 
programs in 
school youth and 
out of school 
youth 
· World Bank TA 
for school based 
programs 
schools 
community 
conversations 
and anti-AIDS 
clubs 
1.7 Increase 
availability of 
biomedical 
prevention 
measures: 
a) Universal 
precautions 
employed in 
· Enforce 
universal 
precaution 
standards in all 
health facilities 
· Implement 
quality assurance 
measures to 
· Support the 
provision of 
universal 
precautions in all 
health facilities 
· Support 
production of 
local low cost 
· Global Fund: 
Procure infection 
prevention 
materials and 
renovation of 
blood banks 
· WHO provides 
PEPFAR funded 
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all health 
facilities by 
2014 
b) Ensure safe 
blood supplies 
are available 
throughout the 
country at 
hospital level 
c)Accelerate 
access to male 
circumcision 
screen all 
donated blood 
· Provide 
leadership in 
providing a 
national blood 
transfusion 
service 
· Ensure 
provision of male 
circumcision at 
major health 
centers and 
hospitals 
· Conduct 
targeted 
promotion of 
male 
circumcision 
geographical 
areas with lower 
rates of male 
circumcision 
locally 
customized IP 
supplies 
· Support 
renovation of 
blood banks, and 
provide training 
and supplies 
· Support the 
rollout of male 
circumcision in 
targeted areas 
TA for national 
blood transfusion 
service 
 
 
Goal 2: To reduce morbidity and mortality and improve the quality of life for 
people living with HIV by expanding access to quality care, treatment and 
support by 2014. 
Under this goal, the U.S. Government and other partners plan to work jointly with 
the GOE to ensure the continued provision of quality HIV/AIDS care, treatment and 
support services, including services to OVCs. This goal should focus on scaling up 
and sustaining treatment and care services with available resources. 
Objectives Expected Contributions Expected steps 
for 
development of 
PFIP and 
identified 
policy issues 
  GOE PEPFAR Other[18]   
2.1: By 2014, 
12-month 
survival 
among those 
· Strengthen 
adherence 
counseling and 
· Support GOE in 
considering 
implementing new 
WHO guidelines; 
· WHO provides 
TA for new 
guideline 
· Funds 
identified for 
drug 
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receiving 
treatment is 
increased from 
73% to 80%. 
follow up 
· Ensure 
uninterrupted 
supply of ARVs 
and OI drugs 
· Adapt new 
WHO guidelines 
after considering 
cost 
implications and 
feasibility 
· Ensure access 
to and quality of 
chronic care and 
treatment 
services, 
including 
adherence, 
follow-up, etc 
· Provide 
leadership and 
coordination 
around program 
management 
emphasize 
strengthening 
mechanisms for 
follow-up 
· Support efforts 
for earlier access 
and initiation to 
ART 
· Enhance efforts 
to increase OI 
diagnosis and 
management 
· Expand EID 
access 
· Carry out efforts 
to better 
understand and 
address obstacles 
to optimal 
adherenceProvide 
costing data to 
facilitate decision-
making and 
planning for 
increasing access 
to ART 
· Develop SOP to 
manage discordant 
couples 
implementation 
· CHAI: 
Introduce new 
products to 
improve patient 
adherence 
· UNICEF 
supports 
integrated 
IMNCI and 
Pediatric HIV 
services 
procurement 
· Implications 
of new WHO 
guidelines are 
assessed and 
costed 
2.2: Increase 
ART 
enrolment 
from 73% to 
95% of those 
eligible by 
2014. 
· Expand ART 
service by 
ensuring 
fulfillment of 
minimum 
standards for 
expansion of 
ART services 
· Expand 
number of sites 
for ART 
services 
· Provide TA to 
support increased 
skills at service 
points and 
increase capacity 
for ART, 
including task 
shifting 
· Provide costing 
data to facilitate 
decision-making 
and planning for 
increasing access 
· WHO support 
to enhance 
technical skills 
for the scale-up 
of ART and 
health center 
support 
· Global Fund: 
Support supply 
of 1st line ARVs, 
OI drugs, and 
reagents 
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· Deploy health 
personnel for 
HIV and 
comprehensive 
health care 
services 
· Ensure 
uninterrupted 
supply of ARVs 
and OIs 
· Adopt new 
guidelines after 
considering 
costing 
implications & 
feasibility 
to ART 
· Support health 
facility 
infrastructure to 
improve ART 
accessibility 
· Invest in pre- 
and in-service 
education to 
increase the 
number and 
quality of human 
resources for 
health 
· Support case 
management to 
link positive 
persons to 
treatment 
Support 
expansion of 
ART services 
· CHAI: Supply 
pediatric and 
adult 2nd line 
ARVs until 2011 
· Decentralize 
ART services to 
lower tier of 
health system (in 
4 regions at 
identified 30 
woreda level 
(Amhara, Tigray, 
Oromia and 
SNNPR) 
· Strengthen 
client referral 
and tracking 
system 
2.3: An 
increased 
number of 
individuals in 
all age groups 
access a 
continuum of 
quality 
comprehensiv
e clinical 
HIV/AIDS 
care and 
treatment 
services, 
including 
TB/HIV by 
2014. 
· Strengthen 
service linkages 
and integration 
· Develop 
guidelines, 
SOPs, and 
formats for 
service linkages 
and referral 
systems 
· Ensure 
functional inter 
and intra facility 
community 
referrals to 
linkages 
· Identify and 
support measures 
that strengthen 
linkages between 
counseling and 
testing and getting 
into care 
· Support 
functional referral 
and follow up 
systems to ensure 
patients enter 
treatment early 
and remain in 
treatment 
· Integrate 
HIV/AIDS 
services into other 
health programs 
· Update 
guidelines, 
· Joint UN 
agencies to 
increase 
provision and 
utilization of 
treatment, care 
and support 
services for 
PLHIV and 
others (focus on 
quality assurance 
and 
strengthening 
referral/service 
integration and 
outcome 
monitoring) 
Global Fund: 
Support linkages 
of prevention and 
care services 
· CHAI: 
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training manuals 
and support pre 
and in-service 
training 
· Support quality 
improvement 
processes at all 
levels 
· Support case 
management to 
better link clients 
to facility- and 
community-based 
services 
· Support 
increased range 
and quality of 
psychosocial 
services 
· Support basic 
care package (e.g. 
cotrimoxazole 
prophylaxis, Safe 
water) 
· Provision of 
therapeutic 
feeding for 
malnourished 
PLHIV 
Strengthen 
PHCU capacity 
to provide 
comprehensive 
services 
including 
TB/HIV in 4 
regions at 
identified 30 
woreda level 
(Amhara, Tigray, 
Oromia and 
SNNPR) 
2.4: Increase 
care and 
support to 
needy PLHIV 
from 20% in 
2008 to 50% 
by 2014. 
· Ensure 
implementation 
of GIPA 
· Strengthen 
IGA activities 
· Ensure 
provision of care 
and support to 
needy PLHIV 
· Support 
increased access 
to sustainable 
livelihood 
programs 
· Collaborate with 
other partners to 
increase 
household food 
security 
· Support HIV 
case management 
· UNFPA to 
enhance access 
to care and 
support packages 
UNICEF and 
WFP financial 
and food support 
to HIV – affected 
and food 
insecure HHs 
· Global Fund: 
Support PLHIV 
· Develop 
national 
standards for 
care and 
support service 
package 
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provided by and 
for PLHIV to 
better link clients 
to facility- and 
community-based 
services 
to engage in 
marketable IGA 
schemes 
· Support 
nutritional & 
HBC for PLHIV 
2.5: Increase 
care and 
support to 
needy OVC 
from 30% in 
2008 to 50% 
by 2014. 
· Ensure access 
to Education by 
OVC 
· Strengthen 
care & support 
to needy OVCs 
in their familial 
networks 
· Support 
increased range, 
age-appropriate 
and quality of 
psychosocial 
services 
· Support 
increased access 
to sustainable 
livelihood 
programs 
· Collaborate with 
other partners to 
increase 
household food 
security 
· Support basic 
care package (e.g. 
Safe water) 
· Support 
Implementation of 
OVC minimum 
standards 
· Support 
strengthening of 
community-based 
organizations 
· Joint UN 
support to 
increase 
provision of care 
and supportive 
supervision in 
delivering 
services to OVCs 
· UN supported 
social transfers 
to OVC HHs (e.g 
cash 
transfers/voucher
s child support 
grants, disability 
benefits, foster 
care grants, 
interest free 
micro-credit) 
UNICEF support 
to training of 
para-professional 
social work 
cadre & 
strengthening of 
social protection 
programs 
· Global Fund: 
Support 
schooling to 
OVC 
· Support for 
basic needs for 
the needy OVCs 
· Support 
guardian and 
· Enforce 
implementation 
of national 
standards of 
OVC care and 
support 
· National OVC 
situational 
analysis is to be 
commenced 
· 
Operationalizat
ion of 
guidelines 
· Social welfare 
policy revision 
is to be 
commenced 
(including 
assessment of 
capacity and 
service 
provision. 
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OVCs above 14 
years to engage 
in vocational 
training & IGA 
· CHAI: Link 
HCVs with 
orphanages 
· 
Goal 3: Health systems necessary for universal access are functional by 2014. 
Under this goal, the U.S. Government plans to collaborate with the GOE and other 
donors to strengthen health systems, including the involvement of private sector and 
civil society at all levels. This goal focuses on recruiting, training and retaining 
human resources as well as supporting the GOE in its implementation of the HMIS 
and the Health Network Model. Through this goal, health insurance, supply chain 
mechanisms and laboratory services have been identified as key objectives that 
should be reached in order to offer a functional health system to the people of 
Ethiopia. Key aspects of this goal include investments in pre-service training and 
infrastructure, policy reform and performance-based management. 
Objectives Expected Contributions Expected steps 
for 
development of 
PFIP and 
identified 
policy issues 
  GOE PEPFAR OTHER   
3.1: Increased 
availability of 
trained human 
resources for 
health to 
support 
accelerated 
scale up of 
comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS 
programs by 
2014. 
· Increase 
enrollment 
capacity of 
health 
professionals in 
training colleges 
and universities 
· Ensure 
continuous 
education 
provision to 
health 
professionals 
· Staffing health 
facilities is 
identified in 
GOE standards 
· Strengthen HR 
planning, 
leadership and 
management 
including task 
shifting, retention 
strategies, gender 
equity and HRIS. 
· Support pre-
service and in-
service training 
including capacity 
building of public 
and private 
training 
institutions 
· Support quality 
assurance through 
· Joint UN 
efforts to scale 
up HR capacity 
through training 
and supportive 
supervision to 
ensure 
sustainable & 
effective 
response to 
HIV/AIDS 
· Global Fund: 
Support the 
implementation 
human resource 
strategy and plan 
· CHAI: Enhance 
capacity of 
· There is a 
need to develop 
costed 
implementation 
plan for the 
HRH strategy. 
· Ratify policy 
on task shifting 
may be needed 
· Plan for the 
transfer of 
personnel 
currently 
supported 
through 
PEPFAR 
resources to 
regular budget 
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· Enforce human 
resource 
strategy 
development 
· Help 
strengthen and 
coordinate in-
service and pre-
service trainings 
· Institute 
initiatives to 
improve 
retention and 
motivation from 
health workers 
· Institute 
performance-
based 
management 
· Scale up task 
shifting 
continued 
professional 
development, 
accreditation and 
licensing of health 
professionals. 
· Support hospital 
management 
training for CEOs 
and other 
administrators to 
improve personnel 
management, 
facility 
maintenance and 
infrastructure, 
morale, and staff 
retention 
· Support the 
development of 
the public health 
workforce (e.g. 
Masters programs 
FELTP, HIT etc) 
· Support 
development of a 
public health 
workforce 
PHCU (in 4 
regions at 
identified 30 
woreda level 
(Amhara, Tigray, 
Oromia and 
SNNPR) 
support. 
3.2: The health 
network model 
is improved by 
increased 
operational 
capacity at all 
levels—
national, 
regional, 
zonal, woreda, 
facility and 
community by 
2014. 
· Strengthen 
referral system 
· Strengthen 
service linkages 
and integration 
· Scale up task 
shifting and 
mentoring 
· Support the 
development of a 
standardized 
referral system 
· Expand technical 
assistance 
provided at the 
regional level 
· Focus on 
building the 
capacity of 
regional and sub-
regional offices in 
planning and 
coordination of 
· UN support to 
system 
functioning 
ensuring 
effective service 
operations of 
regional 
coordination and 
functioning 
· Governance 
Pool Fund 
(DFID, Irish, 
Italian 
Cooperation) 
with HAPCO to 
increase capacity 
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HIV/AIDS and 
health programs. 
· Support select 
construction of 
health facilities 
and 
accountability at 
regional levels 
· Global Fund: 
Support 
strengthening of 
referral system 
· World Bank 
capacity building 
support at RHB 
and woreda 
levels under 
MAP II 
3.3: Planning 
at all levels is 
evidence 
based. 
· Coordinate and 
lead evidence 
based 
multisectoral 
response 
planning at all 
levels 
· Support, 
facilitate and 
participate in 
planning at all 
levels 
· Support and 
participate in 
efforts to collect 
quality data and 
evaluate programs 
· Support efforts 
to use data for 
decision-making 
· Joint UN 
support for 
enhanced sector 
management and 
strategic 
planning 
· UNICEF, 
WHO and 
UNFPA support 
annual woredas 
based planning 
· Governance 
Pool Fund 
(DFID, Irish, 
Italian 
Cooperation) 
with HAPCO to 
increase capacity 
and 
accountability at 
regional levels 
· Prioritized 
planning at all 
levels takes 
into account 
evidence based 
information and 
available 
resources 
3.4: Health 
management 
information 
systems 
(HMIS) are 
functional 
throughout all 
regions by 
2014. 
· Implement 
HMIS at full 
scale 
· Train 
workforce in 
HMIS and M 
and E (in service 
) 
· Support HMIS 
roll-out through 
technical 
assistance, 
training, and 
investments in 
HMIS and ICT 
infrastructure 
· Support the 
· WHO technical 
support towards 
9 key 
components of 
HMIS Support 
HMIS 
implementation 
· CHAI targets 
HCs implement 
· Scale up 
staffing at the 
regional level 
for HMIS 
· Staffing in 
place for HMIS 
at health 
centers and 
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development of a 
community based 
information 
system 
· Support efforts 
to improve the 
HMIS to meet 
evolving 
information needs 
to support 
decision-making 
HMIS 
· World Bank – 
TA support 
under MAP II 
hospitals. 
· Ongoing 
review and 
modification of 
HMIS to 
incorporate 
improvements 
3.5: 
Additional 
sources of 
strategic 
information 
provide timely 
inputs to 
evidence 
based planning 
for HIV/AIDS 
programs by 
2014. 
· Ensure five-
year 
implementation 
of master plan 
strategy for 
strategic 
information and 
surveillance. 
· Provide 
leadership and 
coordination to 
implement five 
year master plan 
· Support the 
collection and 
generation of 
strategic 
information at the 
national and 
regional level 
· Support the 
design and 
implementation of 
program 
evaluations as 
well as various 
surveys and 
surveillance 
· 
· Operational 
research from 
pooled fund 
· UNICEF 
support 
operations 
research in using 
modern 
telecommunicati
on for improved 
PMTCT uptake 
· 5 year master 
plan for 
Surveillance 
and other SI 
information is 
to be finalized 
and 
implemented 
3.6: Expanded 
social and 
community 
health 
insurance 
schemes and 
improved 
utilization of 
user-fee 
revenue by 
2014. 
· Ensure 
implementation 
of social 
insurance 
· Address key 
policy challenges 
in health insurance 
in Ethiopia 
· Support the 
management of 
facility level user 
fees for effective 
utilization 
· Support 
community based 
insurance schemes 
for PLHIV 
· Support the 
training of 
· World Bank: 
TA to MOH for 
pilot community 
insurance 
schemes jointly 
working with 
PEPFAR funded 
partners under 
MAP II 
· Ratify legal 
framework for 
community 
health 
insurance and 
social insurance 
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hospital/health 
system chief 
executive officers 
3.7: Primary 
health care 
infrastructure 
improved to 
support 
universal 
access to 
quality 
services by 
2014. 
· Ensure the 
achievement of 
quality universal 
primary 
healthcare 
coverage 
· Provide 
leadership and 
coordination for 
improved 
infrastructure 
· Ensure 
expansion of 
infrastructure 
for Universal 
Access 
· Continue 
renovation to 
provide 
continued 
quality care 
· Ensure 
maintenance of 
facilities 
· Support 
functioning basic 
amenities in 
facilities 
· Support limited 
construction of 
new high-burden 
health facilities 
· UN support in 
the procurement 
of supplies & 
management of 
HFs 
· Strengthen the 
capacity of 
PHCUs 
· World Bank 
through PBS II 
procurement of 
medical 
equipment, 
supplies, drugs at 
all levels. 
· UNICEF 
support 
improving water 
supply and 
sanitation in 
health centers 
· 
Standardization 
of facilities and 
services may be 
required 
· Inclusion of 
maintenance 
budget for all 
facilities 
3.8: Chronic 
care sites 
covered with 
basic 
laboratory 
services by 
2014. 
· Ensure 
availability of 
laboratory 
services 
· Ensure 
implementation 
of national 
laboratory plan 
· Provide 
leadership and 
coordination 
· Ensure 
maintenance of 
· Focus on 
delivery of basic 
supplies and 
equipment 
· Focus on Lab 
quality assurance 
· Support national 
laboratory 
accreditation 
efforts 
· Support selected 
renovation or 
construction of 
· WHO and 
UNICEF to 
procure and 
supply lab 
commodities 
· World Bank 
through PBS II 
procurement of 
lab at all levels 
· 
National/region
al Lab 
maintenance 
plan developed 
and 
implemented 
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laboratories 
· Institute 
national quality 
assurance 
mechanisms 
laboratories 
· Support program 
for training of 
laboratory 
technicians and 
maintenance 
specialists 
3.9: Supply 
chain system 
in place 
ensuring 
consistent 
availability of 
essential HIV 
–related drugs 
and 
commodities 
by 2014. 
· Ensure the 
availability of 
essential drugs 
and 
commodities 
· Strengthen 
drug supply 
management 
system 
· Ensure 
implementation 
of national 
logistic master 
plan 
· Lead and 
coordinate the 
supply chain 
system 
· Support the 
implementation of 
Pharmaceutical 
logistic 
management plan 
(PLMP) and 
logistics 
management 
information 
systems (LMIS) 
including the 
development of a 
handover plan 
· Joint UN 
Technical 
support for 
uninterrupted 
supply of drugs 
and commodities 
· DFID, through 
MDG 
Performance 
Fund, support for 
commodities 
· World Bank 
TA to PFSA to 
strengthen 
procurement and 
financial 
management 
· Plan 
developed for 
the GOE to 
subsume the 
distribution 
costs of all 
supplies and 
commodities 
which are 
currently 
covered 
through 
PEPFAR 
resources 
· Directives of 
the exemption 
of VAT for all 
health related 
commodities 
Goal 4: Multisectoral response in place to prevent the spread of HIV and 
mitigate its impacts by 2014. 
Under this goal, the GOE, the U.S. Government along with other partners intend to 
promote the multisectoral and strategic national response. The U.S. Government 
should join efforts with the GOE and other partners to strengthen local leadership and 
coordination, enforce accountability of leadership, and intensify involvement of civil 
society and the private sector. 
Objectives Expected Contributions Expected steps 
for 
development of 
PFIP and 
identified 
policy issues 
  GOE PEPFAR OTHER   
4.1: Ensure 
sustained 
commitment 
of leadership 
· Strengthen 
leadership and 
governance of 
HIV/AIDS 
· Focus on 
strengthening 
capacity at 
regional and sub 
· Concerted joint 
UN support to 
enhance 
institutions. 
· Plan for 
activation of 
Regional AIDS 
Councils and 
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at all levels to 
take 
HIV/AIDS as 
strategic 
development 
issue and to 
enforce 
accountability 
programs at all 
levels 
· Ensure 
capacity 
building of 
leadership at all 
levels 
· Enforce 
accountability 
mechanisms to 
ensure 
responsiveness 
· Strengthen 
active 
multisectoral 
involvement at 
biannual 
program reviews
regional levels 
· Aim for 
participatory 
governance of 
public health 
programs with the 
inclusion of the 
private sector, 
CSOs and other 
stakeholders 
· Identify and 
adapt best 
practices from 
other countries to 
enhance 
governance and 
leadership 
· Fund capacity 
building for 
planning, 
budgeting, 
management, 
accountability and 
technical 
oversight by 
regions, kebeles 
and woredas 
· Fund and 
provide training 
on strategic 
leadership for 
HIV/AIDS 
response 
· Fund and 
conduct periodic 
review of 
multisectoral 
response and 
provision of 
feedback from 
governing bodies 
· Provide technical 
Structures and 
coordination 
capacities at all 
levels (focus on 
emerging 
regions) 
· Governance 
Pool Fund 
(DFID, Irish, 
Italian 
Cooperation) 
with HAPCO to 
increase capacity 
and 
accountability at 
all levels 
· GF -Support 
capacity building 
for leadership 
and governance 
coordinating 
bodies 
· Active 
multisectoral 
involvement at 
bi-annual 
program 
reviews 
· Strengthen 
Regional AIDS 
Councils and 
coordinating 
bodies through 
active 
multisectoral 
involvement 
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assistance in 
administrative and 
fiscal management 
4.2: HIV 
programs are 
integrated into 
other sectoral 
budgets, work 
plans and 
review 
mechanisms 
by 2014. 
· Ensure 
mainstreaming 
of HIV/AIDS 
into key 
strategic sectors 
· Build capacity 
for 
mainstreaming 
· Ensure 
provision of 
workplace 
policies and 
strategies 
· Strengthen 
coordinating 
bodies in 
multisectoral 
programming 
· Assist GOE to 
incorporate 
workplace and 
sectoral 
HIV/AIDS 
activities into 
sector plans and 
ensure 
implementation 
· Assist GOE in 
ensuring the sector 
management 
information 
system and review 
mechanisms 
tracks workplace 
HIV activities 
· Joint UN 
efforts to 
facilitate 
multisectoral 
integration of 
HIV and 
strengthen M&E 
capacity 
GF Support 
mainstreaming of 
HIV/AIDS in 
key strategic 
sectors 
  
4.3: Increased 
participation 
of civil society 
in the national 
response by 
2014. 
· Ensure civil 
society 
participation in 
multisectoral 
HIV/AIDS 
response at all 
levels 
· Strengthen 
partnership 
forums and 
networking 
· Increase CSO 
participation in 
governance and 
delivery of public 
health services by 
building their 
capacities 
· Advocate for 
participation and 
leadership from 
young people, 
women and 
PLHIV 
· Joint UN 
support to 
enhance 
multisectoral 
management and 
leadership 
capacity (focus 
on strengthening 
umbrella bodies, 
coordination, 
networking and 
advocacy 
capacities) 
Global Fund 
· Support 
community 
system 
strengthening 
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· Support CSOs 
to provide HIV 
services 
· Support in 
strengthening 
partnership 
· World Bank 
TA to assist with 
development of 
improved social 
accountability 
and transparency 
at community 
level 
4.4: Increased 
participation 
of the private 
sector in the 
national 
response by 
2014. 
· Ensure private 
sector 
participation in 
multisectoral 
HIV/AIDS 
response at all 
levels 
· Develop 
standardized 
guidelines for 
provision of 
services 
· Ensure 
implementation 
of private-public 
partnership 
guidelines 
· Improve access 
and quality of 
health services by 
creating well 
regulated, 
competitive 
environment for 
the private health 
sector 
· Continue to 
expand and 
enhance public-
private 
partnerships 
· Continue efforts 
to educate and 
engage 
professional 
societies in the 
national response 
(e.g. EPHA, 
EMA, ESOG, 
etc.) 
Global Fund: 
· Support 
community 
system 
strengthening 
· Support private 
sectors to 
provide HIV 
services 
· Support in 
strengthening 
partnership 
· Further define 
roles and 
responsibilities 
within GOE for 
private sector 
· Identify what 
workplace 
programs are in 
place 
· Draw up list 
of private 
sector health 
education 
institutions; 
define 
accreditation 
standards 
· Guidelines on 
standardization 
of private-
public 
partnership 
· Guidelines on 
standardization 
of private 
sector services 
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V. Partners Roles and Objectives  
The Partnership Framework builds on the GOE’s high level of ownership and shared 
objectives with the U.S. Government and other partners to controlling the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. At the federal level, HAPCO is the national coordinating body for 
ensuring that all HIV/AIDS interventions in Ethiopia are harmonized and aligned 
with national priorities and strategies. The Goals and Objectives table outlines the 
various stakeholder contributions within the four Partnership Framework Goals. The 
goal statements are aligned with and, in several instances, excerpted directly from the 
SPM II (2010-2014) and the HSDP IV. Each goal is associated with several 
objectives which contribute towards the achievement of that goal. Expected 
contributions from government and other groups overall reflect an integrated national 
response. 
Ethiopia receives a substantial amount of Global Fund resources. Currently the U.S. 
Government and the GOE have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which 
delineates the complementary roles of Global Fund and PEPFAR resources. As an 
essential step in the development of the Partnership Framework Implementation 
Plan, the GOE and PEPFAR intend to review and harmonize their investments, 
within a revised MOU. The U.S. Government is a member of the Country 
Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria (GFATM). Technical assistance is provided to the GOE to develop 
proposals for HIV, malaria and TB. 
The GOE receives health sector development aid from a wide array of donors. It is 
the function of the Federal Ministry of Health to coordinate this assistance. However 
it is also incumbent on multilateral and bilateral donors to clearly provide their 
assistance in support of the GOE’s priorities moving towards the principle of the 
“Three Ones”. Coordination of donor response towards HIV/AIDS programs falls 
within the mandate of FHAPCO. 
VI. Plans for developing the Partnership Framework Implementation Plan 
The Partnership Framework Implementation Plan is to provide the opportunity to 
operationalize the high level goals and objectives expressed in the Partnership 
Framework document. The development of the Implementation Plan should focus 
chiefly on the detailed plans that may be required to achieve the identified goals and 
objectives, with identified annual targets and benchmarks. The U.S. Government is 
committed to strengthening joint planning of activities with the GOE and other 
development partners to achieve these goals and targets. An important component of 
this effort should be harmonization with the Plan of Action for all resources obtained 
through the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the regular sharing 
of information regarding programming of resources for both GFATM and PEPFAR 
funding. The Implementation Plan should also address a prioritization of key 
activities based on available resources, to be evaluated annually and adjustments 
made as may be required. The development of the Implementation Plan should be a 
highly consultative process similar to that adopted for the Partnership Framework 
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document. The design team responsible for the Partnership Framework plans should 
guide the development of the Implementation Plan. Many of the details of the plan 
are already outlined within the SPM II and HSDP IV documents. In addition, U.S. 
Government and the GOE are committed to promoting the types of policy, strategies 
and guidelines that should foster success and maximize investments. 
Estimated Timeline: 
• End of December Submit draft Implementation Plan to OGAC 
• January OGAC review Implementation Plan 
• End of January Implementation Plan signed 
 
VII. Management and communications 
On signature of the Partnership Framework and the subsequent Implementation Plan, 
responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the goals and objectives should 
be steered by FHAPCO. Review of progress should be conducted on a bi-annual 
basis at the GOE’s bi-annual review of the implementation of the SPM II. This well-
attended meeting is to include participation from government ministries, donors, 
implementation partners and civil society. This forum should also allow for review of 
the ongoing policy agenda which should support the successful implementation of 
the Partnership Framework. Interim reviews should be commenced through 
established regular meeting schedules between the PEPFAR /Ethiopia team and 
GOE. High level oversight should be provided through regular meetings held 
between the Minister of Health and the US Ambassador. 
 
VIII. Signatures 
 
 
 
[3] UN country level statistics, Federal HIV/AIDS Prevention & Control office, 
Federal Ministry of Health. 
[5] World Health Organization: The neonatal mortality breakdown is taken from the 
National child survival Strategy Document (which was based on the situation 
analysis document prepared before the development strategy). 
[7] Strategic Plan for Intensifying Multisectoral HIV and AIDS Response in Ethiopia 
(SPM II) 2010-2014. 
[8] 4th National Health Accounts; Federal Ministry of Health; April 2010 
(2007/2008). 
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[9] Strategic Plan for Intensifying Multisectoral HIV and AIDS Response in Ethiopia 
(SPM II) 2010-2014. 
[10] Five-Year Evaluation of Global Fund Health Impact Evaluation: Health Facility 
Report. Federal Ministry of Health, Ethiopian Health & Nutrition Research Institute 
(2008). 
[11] Health Sector Development Program (2010/11-2014/15) 
[12] PEPFAR Five-Year Strategy (2009) 
[13] Strategic Plan for Intensifying Multisectoral HIV and AIDS Response in 
Ethiopia (SPM II) 2010-2014. 
[14] Combination prevention can be considered as a multilevel approach that 
encompasses behavioral strategies integrated with biomedical and structural 
approaches, and treatment for HIV infection. Coates, T, Richter, L., Caceres, C., 
Lancet: 372:669-684 (2008). 
[15] Health Sector Development Program IV (2010/11-2014/15) Ministry of Health, 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 
[16] World Bank contributions: The current MAP II program is likely to end June 
2011. There are ongoing discussions as regards future WB support – all inputs here 
outside MAPII are illustrative. 
[17] 85% refers to total estimated number of HIV+ve pregnant women 
[18] World Bank contributions: The current MAP II program is likely to end June 
2011. There are ongoing discussions as regards future WB support – all inputs here 
outside MAPII are illustrative. 
 
Source: PEPFAR (2012) “Five-Year Partnership Framework in Support of the 
Ethiopian National Response to HIV/AIDS 2010 - 2014 Between The Government 
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the United 
States of America (October 2010)” 
http://www.pepfar.gov/frameworks/ethiopia/158572.htm [19 March 2012]. 
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Annex 7 – Partnership Framework in Support of South Africa's National 
HIV & AIDS and TB Response 2012/13 - 2016/17 between the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the United States of 
America (December 2010) 
 
1. Purpose and Principles 
The purpose of this five-year Partnership Framework (2012/13–2016/17) is to 
improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the South African national 
HIV and TB response. To achieve this, the Governments of South Africa (SAG) and 
the United States of America (USG), through its PEPFAR program[1], have 
dedicated themselves to improving coordination and cooperation to prevent and 
mitigate the impact of these epidemics. 
In the reauthorization of the USG PEPFAR program in 2008, the scope of the U.S. 
program shifted from an emergency response to that of building and sustaining 
health outcomes and systems through a closer alignment with host country priorities. 
This Partnership Framework seeks to articulate this change in direction and to outline 
the parameters of engagement to guide how the two countries cooperate in the 
response to the HIV & AIDS and TB epidemics in South Africa. 
While the Partnership Framework is a non-binding arrangement between the national 
governments, integration and implementation is intended to be coordinated across 
government departments at all levels, including provinces and districts, and to entail 
collaboration and partnership with non-state actors. 
By the end of the five year period, and in line with national priorities outlined in 
SAG’s official strategic documents[2], the implementation of this joint framework is 
expected to result in the reduction of HIV and TB transmission, expanded and 
sustained national HIV and TB services, and the strengthening of the systems that 
underpin the national response. 
The national HIV & AIDS and TB response is envisioned to be supported by 
PEPFAR’s financial and technical assistance to help build the leadership and 
implementation capacity of SAG and civil society. Specifically, such capacity 
building should include, but not be limited to, performance management, policy 
analysis, strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, coordination, financial 
resource management, and quality improvement. 
This Partnership Framework details the broad strategic plan for cooperation and 
coordination between the two governments. The operational details of this 
Framework are intended to be developed in a Partnership Framework 
Implementation Plan (PFIP), as described in Section 5 below. 
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In considering how best to achieve this purpose, the USG and the SAG have 
dedicated themselves to the following principles: 
1. South African Leadership 
The SAG is at the center of decision-making, leadership, and management of the 
national HIV and TB response, including development partner programs. 
2. Alignment 
PEPFAR operations, including its civil society partners, should support national 
priorities, using national systems where possible. 
3. Sustainability 
Sustainability of the national response should be enhanced by mainstreaming the 
response to HIV and TB and through addressing the cost efficiency of operations, 
diversifying funding sources, investing in proven and scalable interventions, shifting 
appropriate USG-supported staff to SAG, and improving coordination across all 
partners. 
4. Innovation and Responsiveness to the Epidemic 
To improve the effectiveness of the national response, this partnership aims to 
promote knowledge-based interventions. The Partnership Framework encourages 
flexibility and innovation to achieve true value for money across the response. 
5. Mutual Accountability  
The relationship between the SAG and the USG is based on mutual accountability 
and transparency in resource allocation, expenditure tracking, the collection, use and 
sharing of strategic information, and programmatic decision-making. 
6. Multi-Sectoral Engagement and Participation 
The implementation of this Partnership Framework should be inclusive and 
participatory. It is intended to support SAG efforts to mainstream the national 
response across all government departments and strengthen engagement across 
different stakeholders (inclusive of community-based organizations, non-
governmental organizations, the private sector, PLHIV, the academic sector, and 
other development partners). 
7. Gender Sensitivity 
Disproportional vulnerabilities to HIV infection and access to treatment and care are 
influenced by gender. The design and implementation of programs and policies aim 
to ensure full attention to this reality. 
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8. Expected Financial Contributions and Transparency 
USG assistance to South Africa should support the government sector and be in line 
with defined national plans. Resource allocation decisions in the planning and 
implementation of this Partnership Framework, along with the underlining rationale, 
should be pro-actively shared by both governments. 
The Partnership Framework recognizes that SAG and USG resources are limited and 
that achievement of national HIV and TB goals requires resource flows beyond the 
ability of any one partner. The proportion of USG contributions to total HIV and 
AIDS spending is likely to decline over time. In addition, planned USG investments 
are always subject to the availability of funds. Changes in budgetary requirements or 
availability of funds from either government or from other key partners could lead to 
a review and revision of priorities and activities. 
9. Collaborative and Not Contractual 
This Partnership Framework is a non-legally binding joint strategic planning 
document that outlines the goals and objectives to be achieved, and the expected 
roles and contributions of all participating Partnership Framework partners. The 
Partnership Framework is intended to facilitate communication and collaboration 
among partners, including ensuring that programs are more sustainable and 
integrated. The Partnership Framework does not alter existing USG or SAG rules, 
regulations, cooperative agreements or contracts, and does not constitute an 
obligation of funds. 
2. Background and Context 
South Africa represents 0.7% of the global population but carries 17% of the global 
burden of HIV & AIDS (approximately 5.7 million people living with HIV) and has 
the world’s fourth highest incidence of TB (948/100,000 population/year). An 
estimated 31% of all TB-HIV cases in Africa occur within South Africa, and co-
infection rates exceed 70%. HIV prevalence amongst adults (15-49 years) is 
estimated at 18%, with women and girls bearing 60% of the disease burden. Despite 
being a middle-income country, key maternal and child health outcomes and 
developmental milestones have declined over the last fifteen years due to the impact 
of HIV. South Africa is one of only twelve countries in which mortality rates for 
children younger than five-years have increased since 1990. 
To respond to the TB and HIV epidemics, South Africa has reaffirmed its 
commitment to preventing and mitigating the impact by scaling up the national 
prevention and treatment response across all sectors. This is being led by the most 
senior members in government, and is bolstered by increasing financial resources. 
This leadership has included the strengthening of the South African National AIDS 
Council (SANAC) to coordinate and oversee the multi-sectoral national response, a 
structure that is replicated at provincial and district levels. Despite these efforts, the 
response still requires significant financial and technical inputs from stakeholders to 
match needs to resources. 
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PEPFAR in South Africa 
The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was launched in 
2003 as an emergency response to the HIV epidemic with the goals of preventing 
new infections, treating those already infected and assisting those affected by the 
epidemic. 
The USG PEPFAR team in South Africa is comprised of several government 
agencies, including the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, Peace Corps, State Department, and the U.S. 
Department of Defense. 
PEPFAR leverages the multi-sectoral governmental response of the SAG by working 
with key departments at the national level and in all provinces. These include the 
Departments of Health, Social Development, Basic Education, Correctional Services, 
Defence, Public Service and Administration, and Treasury. 
PEPFAR programs respond to SAG priorities primarily through grants and 
cooperative agreements with over 500 prime and sub-partners, including non-
governmental organizations, private entities and universities, most of which are 
South African. Direct funding and technical assistance to the SAG, currently less 
than 10% of overall PEPFAR funding, includes funding provided to several SAG 
departments and parastatals. 
The 2010 fiscal year[3] budget is in excess of $500 million (R3.5 billion). Over the 
period of the Partnership Framework, the U.S. expected contribution to the South 
African national response is likely to decrease, both in real terms and as a proportion 
of overall funding contributions from the SAG and other development partners. It is 
imperative, therefore, that additional resources are mobilized, that the contributions 
of other development partners are leveraged, and that current programs become more 
effective and efficient. 
3. Five Year Strategic Focus 
SAG provides strategic direction for the national HIV and TB response through the 
following strategic documents: 1) the Medium Term Strategic Framework[4]; 2) the 
Ministerial Negotiated Service Delivery Agreements[5]; 3) the current and successive 
versions of the National Strategic Plan for HIV & AIDS and STIs[6]; 4) the TB 
Strategic Plan[7]; 5) the National HIV & AIDS and TB management policy; 6) the 
Aid Effectiveness Framework for Health; 7) the Department of Basic Education HIV 
                                                 
[4] The Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) is the guiding document on 
SAG priorities for the period 2009-2014 
[5] The Ministerial Negotiated Service Delivery Agreements (NSDAs) reflect the 
agreements between National Ministries and the Presidency on key deliverables. The 
NSDAs reflect the priorities of each department for implementing the MTSF. 
466 
 
& AIDS Integrated Strategy (2011-2015); and 8) the Policy Framework for Orphans 
and Other Children made vulnerable by HIV & AIDS. 
Some of the long-term outcomes in these strategic documents include the following: 
• Increasing life expectancy; 
• Decreasing maternal and child mortality; 
• Reducing HIV and TB incidence; 
• Strengthening community systems to prevent the transmission, and mitigate 
the impact of HIV and TB in the home, the workplace, across the education 
system and in communities; 
• Strengthening financial and accountability systems to improve planning, 
costing, and budgeting in order to optimize and leverage needed resources; 
• Strengthening managerial capacity across the public sector, particularly in 
monitoring and evaluation, policy analysis, implementation and HIV 
mainstreaming; 
• Increasing institutional capacities to deliver health system functions and 
initiating major structural reforms (particularly at the primary health care 
level); and 
• Strengthening coordination of the national response across all sectors and 
levels (national, provincial and district). 
The Partnership Framework aims to support the achievement of these outcomes. 
Critical to that effort is strengthening South African engagement and coordination 
with the PEPFAR program. 
Goals and Objectives 
The goals and objectives of the Partnership Framework cover the following areas: 
PREVENT NEW HIV AND TB INFECTIONS: The prevention of new HIV and 
TB infections is the number one priority of the national response. Responsibility for 
the prevention agenda rests with all government departments, development partners, 
communities, civil society, and the private sector. The Partnership Framework is 
dedicated to this multi-faceted and multi-sector approach. The two countries intend 
to work together to 1) expand biomedical and behavioral prevention interventions 
that address the various drivers of the epidemics; 2) reduce vulnerability to HIV 
and TB infection, especially focusing on the needs of infants, girls and women; 
and 3) increase the number of persons who know their HIV and TB status and link 
them to appropriate services. This goal seeks to create a social, political and 
operational environment supportive of the prevention agenda over the next five 
years. This effort is expected to be guided by stronger coordination mechanisms 
among all stakeholders, and a robust operational research and performance 
monitoring and evaluation plan to improve strategic decision-making for HIV 
prevention programming. 
INCREASE LIFE EXPECTANCY AND IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE 
FOR PEOPLE LIVING WITH AND AFFECTED BY HIV AND TB: Under this 
goal, the Partnership seeks to address declining life expectancy by focusing on 
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reducing HIV and TB related morbidity and mortality and on mitigating the impact 
of the epidemics. The three-pronged approach includes 1) expanding integrated 
treatment, care, and support services; 2) decreasing infant, child and maternal 
mortality due to HIV & AIDS and TB; and 3) mitigating the impact of HIV & 
AIDS and TB on individuals, families and communities, especially orphans and 
vulnerable children. 
STRENGTHEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE HIV AND TB RESPONSE 
SYSTEM: This goal seeks to strengthen the leadership, planning, coordination, 
financing, and performance management capacity of state and non-state actors at 
national, provincial and district levels necessary to deliver the national response. 
Within this goal the two countries plan to work to 1) strengthen and improve access 
to institutions and services, especially primary institutions; 2) strengthen the use of 
quality epidemiological and program information to inform planning, policy and 
decision making; 3) improve planning and management of human resources to 
meet the changing needs of the epidemic; and 4) to improve health care and 
prevention financing. 
All three goals are interrelated and sufficiently broad in their respective scopes to 
ensure the long-term viability of the management and service delivery systems in the 
country while attempting to slow the spread of HIV and TB and support those South 
Africans already infected and affected. The PFIP should prioritize activities that 
support these goals and objectives. 
Constraints and Challenges 
South Africa faces explosive HIV and TB epidemics, a high burden of chronic 
illness, mental health disorders, injury and violence-related deaths, as well as the 
continued epidemic of maternal, neonatal, and child mortality. The country has the 
highest per capita health burden of any middle-income country in the world. The 
health care system is overstressed and experiencing a major crisis due to growing 
demands. To support the health and social needs of a country with the world’s largest 
HIV burden and a worsening TB epidemic is anticipated to require additional 
investments in implementation effectiveness, financial management, infrastructure 
improvements, human capacity, and managerial competence across district, 
provincial and national levels. 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION CONSTRAINTS: The SAG has very progressive 
policies; however, implementing these policies has been a challenge. There is a 
shortage of adequate technical and management staff in most government 
departments at all levels. Similarly, there is a need to strengthen district-level 
systems to implement quality improvement strategies. 
EFFECTIVE COORDINATION OF THE NATIONAL RESPONSE: The 
challenge of reducing HIV and TB incidence, mitigating its impact, and providing 
care and treatment requires that all government departments and sectors take greater 
responsibility for HIV and TB. This requires much more efficient engagement of all 
stakeholders by the SAG through strengthening the capacity of SANAC and the 
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Provincial and District AIDS Councils. This effort also requires stronger SAG 
leadership to coordinate all stakeholders (including development partners) engaged 
in the HIV and TB response. 
THE NEED FOR SIGNIFICANT RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND 
INCREASED EFFICIENCY: Although South Africa is an upper middle-income 
country, its health and social outcomes are those of a low-income country. There are 
insufficient resources devoted to providing HIV and TB prevention, treatment and 
care to all of those who need it. Although South Africa devotes 8.7% of its GDP to 
health, the allocation and management of these resources are fragmented, inequitably 
distributed between the public and private sectors, and, in some instances, inefficient. 
The long-term budget requirements of the AIDS response in the country are 
significant – an estimated R35-R45 billion per annum ($6.5 billion) by the year 
2020[8]. Currently, the collective spending on HIV & AIDS (public funding and 
development partner funding) in South Africa is only R17 billion ($2.5 billion) in 
2010, which represents an increase from R9 billion ($1.2 billion) in 2008. Yet this 
falls short of the overall need. In order to ensure that South Africa is able to meet its 
own health and development outcomes, additional financial resources need to be 
mobilized both internally and from development partners. SAG must secure the 
necessary political leadership and support to devote increasingly significant portions 
of the government budget to overcome the HIV and TB epidemics for at least the 
next four decades. National efforts to improve the efficiency of public health 
expenditures should be coupled with much greater diversification, predictability, and 
coordination of donor support over the medium to long term. 
USG CHALLENGES: PEPFAR’s key focus is to address the HIV epidemic. This 
therefore limits the availability of PEPFAR funding to only HIV and related 
programs. Therefore, diseases such as TB, STIs, and others may only be addressed 
with PEPFAR funds through their relevance to the HIV epidemic. 
PEPFAR has a comprehensive approach to HIV/AIDS programming that balances 
access to prevention, care and support, treatment, impact mitigation, and health 
systems strengthening. The percentage of funds devoted to each program should 
respect that balanced approach. This means that the entire PEPFAR budget for South 
Africa cannot be directed to a single program area, and has to be spread across all 
HIV & AIDS and related TB programs, including but not limited to improvement of 
community-based primary health care systems, strengthening quality of care, early 
initiation of ART, and enhanced procurement and management of commodities. 
However, at least 10% of the total PEPFAR program budget is currently earmarked 
for OVC programs and services, and 50% of total resources must be dedicated to 
treatment and care for PLHIV and preventing mother to child transmission of HIV. 
MANAGING PEPFAR’s TRANSITION: The alignment of the PEPFAR program 
to increased SAG leadership allows for a stronger partnership but also poses several 
significant challenges for both SAG and USG. For instance, the process of 
transitioning direct service delivery related responsibilities currently under PEPFAR 
(staffing, financing, monitoring and evaluation systems, and provision of services) to 
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SAG involves careful negotiation, planning and management through the PFIP. 
Similarly, increasing direct funding to the SAG may require strengthening the 
financial management and absorptive and fiduciary oversight capacity of the SAG. 
In addition, the transition process should be done in a way that does not destabilize 
the SAG system. A comprehensive assessment of the direct services supported by 
PEPFAR is needed in order to jointly plan for a transition that avoids any potential 
disruption in services. 
The PFIP aims to identify key, realistic benchmarks for the process, including which 
elements of the direct service delivery component of the USG’s operations may be 
transferred (staffing, financing, M&E, provision of services), when, to whom, and 
how. Both SAG institutions and NGOs could be considered as potential recipients of 
financial and programmatic management responsibilities. 
Sustainability 
STRENGTHEN THE PREVENTION OF NEW HIV AND TB INFECTIONS: 
Given the epidemiology of the epidemics in South Africa as well as the constraints 
on resources, South Africa cannot afford to focus its resources only on HIV and TB 
treatment. The sustainability of the SAG response is reliant on a reduction of new 
HIV and TB infections through adequately funding effective prevention 
interventions. South Africa, through the SAG and relevant structures (e.g. SANAC), 
intends to implement stronger coordination mechanisms to ensure that all 
stakeholders implement a single national prevention strategy. 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY: To improve the financing of the HIV and TB 
response, the Partnership Framework aims to work to improve the cost efficiency of 
all HIV and TB interventions. Several SAG and USG initiatives are already 
underway to effectively cost their respective operations and identify areas where 
savings can be achieved. Chief among these are commodity procurement and human 
resource management. 
The Partnership Framework is intended to support strengthening SAG capacity at 
national, provincial and district levels to budget, allocate, and manage financial 
resources efficiently so as to achieve desired results. The SAG also intends also 
continuously increase its financial contribution and diversify its funding base through 
greater engagement with the private sector and other development partners. 
COMMUNITY SYSTEM STRENGTHENING: Community participation at the 
national, provincial and district levels of the HIV and TB response is critical. The 
Partnership Framework is expected to facilitate the strengthening of these 
community systems – social and professional networks, governance structures, and 
leadership – and work to build linkages between communities, civil society and the 
public sector to ensure a single comprehensive and coordinated national response. 
4. Partners: Roles and Expected Contributions 
Goal 1. Prevent new HIV and TB infections 
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SAG and USG plan to intensify prevention efforts using a comprehensive, multi-
sectoral, integrated, and epidemiological focus. The Partnership Framework is 
intended to expand the coverage of an appropriate mix of biomedical, behavioral and 
structural interventions (combination prevention) and improve the coordination of all 
stakeholders in order to most effectively reduce the rate of new infections. 
 
 
Objectives 
Expected Contributions 
  SAG USG Other 
1.1. Expand 
biomedical and 
behavioral 
prevention 
interventions 
that address the 
various drivers 
of the epidemics 
a) Increase the 
availability of and 
access to the full range 
of biomedical 
prevention 
interventions. 
b) Target interventions 
to address the health, 
social and structural 
drivers of the 
epidemics. 
c) Coordinate and align 
all stakeholders 
(government 
departments, private 
sector, civil society 
organizations, 
communities, 
development partners) 
around a single 
evidence-based 
national prevention 
strategy. 
d) Improve the quality, 
effectiveness and 
coverage of an optimal 
combination of 
prevention 
interventions. 
e) Identify and 
leverage HIV and TB 
research activities (of 
universities, 
parastatals, 
a) Support SAG to 
improve the quality, 
effectiveness and 
coverage of an optimal 
combination of 
prevention interventions 
that address the 
biomedical, behavioral, 
and structural drivers of 
the epidemic. 
b) Strengthen SAG 
capacity in evidence-
based decision making 
for effective prevention 
programming and 
resource allocation at all 
levels (national, 
provincial, district, and 
sub-district). 
c) Ensure that prevention 
interventions supported 
through USG funding are 
responsive to SAG 
priorities. 
d) Support SAG in the 
identification and 
execution of priority 
programmatic, behavioral 
and epidemiological HIV 
and TB prevention 
interventions. 
e) Support research 
activities that advance the 
SAG prevention agenda. 
· TB HIV 
integration 
(Italy) 
· Provision of 
Voluntary 
Medical Male 
Circumcision 
(France, 
Germany 
[planned]) 
· Provision of 
HCT (Germany, 
Sweden) 
· Behavior 
Change 
Communication 
and Social 
mobilization 
(Germany, 
Global Fund R9) 
· HIV prevention 
interventions 
(Germany, 
Ireland, 
Netherlands) 
· Capacity 
development and 
Technical 
assistance (UN, 
Germany) 
· Drug resistance 
surveillance and 
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development partners 
and NGOs) to advance 
the SAG prevention 
agenda. 
treatment 
monitoring of 
public sector 
ART program 
(UK) 
1.2. Reduce 
vulnerability to 
HIV and TB 
infection 
especially 
focusing on the 
needs of infants, 
girls and 
women 
a) Increase HIV and 
TB prevention 
outreach at the 
community level. 
b) Strengthen 
interventions that 
address the 
vulnerability of infants, 
orphans and vulnerable 
children, girls and 
women to HIV and TB 
infection. 
c) Strengthen services 
and implement 
interventions targeted 
at youth (under the age 
of 26). 
d) Implement 
comprehensive HIV 
and TB programs 
across the social 
education system. 
e) Strengthen 
interventions that 
address unequal power 
relations and the role 
of sexual violence in 
HIV transmission. 
a) Support SAG 
initiatives in community-
led HIV and TB 
prevention interventions. 
b) Improve access to and 
availability of high 
quality evidence-based 
services to reduce the 
vulnerability of infants, 
orphans and vulnerable 
children, girls and 
women to HIV and TB 
infection. 
c) Improve the 
effectiveness of targeted 
prevention programs to 
reduce vulnerability to 
HIV and TB infection 
amongst the youth. 
d) Support SAG to 
leverage the education 
system to implement a 
comprehensive HIV and 
TB program. 
e) Strengthen SAG 
capacity to identify and 
implement interventions 
that address unequal 
power relations and the 
role of sexual violence in 
HIV transmission. 
· Programs 
addressing youth 
at risk (Canada, 
Germany) 
· Programs 
addressing GBV 
and other high 
risk factors 
(Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Sweden) 
· Budgetary 
support to DoH 
for maternal and 
child health 
(UK) 
· Care and 
support to OVC 
and others 
(Germany, 
Netherlands) 
1.3. Increase the 
number of 
persons who 
know their HIV 
and TB status 
and link them to 
appropriate 
services 
a) Provide access to 
and increase uptake of 
quality HIV counseling 
and testing (HCT) 
services and TB 
screening and 
diagnosis through all 
a) Support SAG to 
expand coverage of, 
demand for, and access to 
quality HCT services and 
TB screening and 
diagnosis. 
b) Provide technical 
· Provision of 
HCT (Germany, 
Sweden) 
· Increase access 
to HIV & AIDS 
and sexual and 
reproductive 
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sectors of society. 
b) Reinforce linkages 
between and among 
prevention, treatment, 
care, reproductive 
health, and other 
relevant services and 
institutions with HCT 
and TB screening 
services. 
c) Implement 
evidence-based stigma 
reduction 
interventions. 
assistance to reinforce 
linkages between and 
among prevention, 
treatment, care, 
reproductive health, and 
other relevant services 
and institutions with 
HCT and TB screening 
services. 
c) Provide technical 
assistance to improve the 
quality of counseling and 
referral services. 
health 
information and 
services (UK) 
· Social 
mobilization in 
support of HCT 
and link to 
services 
(Belgium, 
Germany, 
Global Fund 
Round 9) 
 
 
 
Goal 2: Increase life expectancy and improve the quality of life for people living 
with and affected by HIV and TB 
TB and HIV-related conditions are the leading cause of death in South Africa. Under 
Goal 2, SAG and USG plan to reduce HIV & AIDS and TB related morbidity and 
mortality by strengthening linkages between prevention, early diagnosis and related 
support, treatment, and care services. This goal should support SAG efforts to 
expand, integrate and decentralize treatment, care and support services and 
strengthen family-centered / community-based responses. 
Objectives Expected Contributions 
  SAG USG Other 
Partners 
2.1. Expand 
integrated 
treatment, care 
and support 
services 
a) Strengthen the 
expansion, integration and 
decentralization of HIV 
and TB services through 
the primary health care 
system. 
b) Improve the retention 
of TB and ART patients 
in care and support 
services. 
c) Strengthen family 
centered, community-
based responses for 
protection, support and 
a) Provide technical and 
financial resources to 
support the expansion, 
integration and 
decentralization of HIV 
and TB services. 
b) Support SAG efforts 
to strengthen 
surveillance and patient 
identification & 
tracking systems. 
c) Strengthen the 
quality and cost-
efficiency of the 
· TB-HIV 
integration 
(Italy) 
· Provision of 
TB/HIV/STI 
prevention, 
treatment care 
and support 
services 
(Belgium, 
Netherlands) 
· Direct 
funding or 
technical 
473 
 
care, including vulnerable 
children. 
d) Strengthen the 
implementation 
mechanism of the 
National Action Plan for 
OVC. 
integrated services. 
d) Support the 
development and/or 
implementation of 
appropriate policies 
designed to enhance the 
delivery of the 
integrated services. 
assistance to 
DoH for 
strengthening 
the delivery of 
PHC and HIV 
& AIDS 
services (EU, 
UK, UN) 
· Provision of 
treatment 
literacy and 
HIV and TB 
education (UK) 
· Technical 
assistance to 
NDoH to 
support 
treatment 
expansion, 
integration & 
decentralization 
(CHAI, UN) 
2.2. Decrease 
infant, child and 
maternal 
mortality due to 
HIV & AIDS 
and TB 
a) Improve early HIV and 
TB diagnosis and link 
identified patients into 
care, support and 
treatment programs. 
b) Support the expansion 
of PMTCT and sexual 
and reproductive health 
services. 
c) Expand the community 
component of the PMTCT 
and Integrated 
Management of 
Childhood Illnesses 
(IMCI) programs. 
d) Create HIV and TB 
competent communities. 
e) Strengthen 
community’s ability to 
protect and provide access 
a) Strengthen the 
implementation 
mechanisms designed to 
support and improve 
interventions for OVC. 
b) Support SAG’s 
maternal and child 
health priorities to meet 
the Millennium 
Development Goal 
targets. 
c) Support SAG efforts 
to improve community 
health through stronger 
linkages between 
communities and health 
and social welfare 
services. 
· Addressing 
maternal and 
child health 
through NGOs 
(Canada, EU) 
· Direct 
budgetary 
support to DoH 
to strengthen 
maternal and 
child health 
programs (EU, 
Global Fund 
Round 9 
redirection, 
UK) 
· TB-HIV 
integration 
(Italy) 
· Technical 
assistance to 
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health and social welfare 
services for their most 
vulnerable mothers and 
children. 
DoH to support 
treatment 
expansion, 
integration & 
decentralization 
(CHAI, UN) 
2.3. Mitigate the 
impact of HIV 
& AIDS and TB 
on individuals 
and 
communities 
a) Strengthen community 
mobilization and support 
community-based 
services. 
b) Enhance coordination 
of OVC interventions to 
strengthen the national 
social safety net for 
children infected and 
affected by the epidemics. 
c) Strengthen the 
provision of psychosocial 
support. 
a) Strengthen the 
capacity of SAG and 
civil society to deliver 
OVC services. 
b) Enhance the 
coordination of the 
national and provincial 
OVC programs. 
c) Provide technical 
assistance to strengthen 
SAG’s social welfare 
system. 
d) Strengthen local civil 
society organizations to 
facilitate and support 
community-based 
mitigation efforts. 
e) Build monitoring and 
evaluation capacity to 
respond to the strategic 
priorities of the NSP 
and of the NAPOVC. 
· Programs 
addressing 
gender-based 
violence 
(Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Sweden) 
· Programs 
addressing HIV 
and alcohol 
(Germany, 
Italy) 
· Improving 
access to 
healthcare and 
psychosocial 
support for 
HIV positive 
children, other 
OVCs and their 
families 
(Belgium) 
· Holistic 
support to 
orphaned and 
vulnerable 
children and 
their care 
givers (EU, 
Germany, 
Ireland, 
Netherlands, 
UK) 
· Support 
programs for 
youth at risk 
(Canada, UK) 
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· Poverty 
alleviation, 
food security 
and sustainable 
economic 
growth 
(Belgium, 
Canada, Italy) 
 
Goal 3: Strengthen the effectiveness of the HIV and TB response system 
The achievement of Goals 1 and 2 is dependent on the efficient operation of the 
system that underpins the national HIV and TB response. To strengthen this system, 
Goal 3 aims to improve the implementation, coordination, and management of 
prevention, support, treatment, care, and impact mitigation interventions. Efforts are 
expected concentrate on the coordination of all partners engaged in the response – 
government departments, the private sector, communities, civil society 
organizations, and development partners – across the national, provincial, district, 
and local levels. 
Objectives Expected Contributions 
  SAG USG Other 
3.1. Strengthen 
and improve 
access to 
institutions and 
services, 
especially 
primary 
institutions 
a) Strengthen the 
integration of HIV 
and TB response 
infrastructure. 
b) Strengthen the 
operational 
management of the 
HIV and TB response 
across all levels. 
c) Strengthen the 
primary health care 
(PHC) model of 
delivery to ensure 
equitable access to 
quality services. 
d) Strengthen 
management 
structures at the 
provincial, district and 
sub-district levels. 
e) Strengthen 
community 
participation in the 
a) Strengthen the 
integration of the 
response system 
through support to 
SAG’s management 
structures at the district 
and sub-district levels. 
b) Support SAG efforts 
to enhance operational 
management of health 
facilities across 
government 
departments and 
sectors. 
c) Support SAG’s pilot 
initiatives to test 
innovative ideas and 
concepts with the 
potential for replication 
and scale-up. 
d) Continue to support 
community and civil 
society participation in 
the planning and 
· Early detection 
and linking to 
services (Belgium, 
CHAI) 
· Technical and 
direct budgetary 
support to DoH for 
strengthening and 
expanding the 
delivery of PHC 
and 
HIV/AIDS/STI/TB 
services (CHAI, 
EU, Italy, UK) 
· Addressing 
human rights, 
increasing access 
to justice and civil 
society advocacy 
(Netherlands, UK) 
· Direct support to 
Department of 
Social 
Development 
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planning, monitoring 
and delivery of 
comprehensive health 
and social welfare 
services. 
f) Strengthen supply 
chain management 
and procurement 
systems for 
commodities related 
to the HIV and TB 
response. 
provision of 
comprehensive health 
and social welfare 
services. 
e) Provide technical 
assistance to strengthen 
SAG’s procurement 
and supply chain 
management systems. 
(Germany) 
· Strengthen 
coordination of the 
response at 
national and 
provincial levels 
(Germany, 
Sweden, UK, UN) 
· GIS mapping of 
facilities and 
services 
(Netherlands) 
· Supporting the 
establishment of 
the Parliamentary 
Oversight 
Committee on HIV 
& AIDS (UK) 
· Direct budgetary 
support to DoH for 
strengthening the 
delivery of PHC 
and HIV & AIDS 
services at the 
district level (EU, 
Italy, UK) 
3.2. Strengthen 
the use of quality 
epidemiological 
and program 
information to 
inform planning, 
policy, and 
decision making 
a) Integrate data 
management, 
reporting and 
indicator systems 
across all levels of the 
public and private 
sectors. 
b) Strengthen strategic 
information 
management to 
improve health 
outcomes. 
c) Strengthen national 
capacity to implement 
robust M&E and to 
conduct operational 
a) Support SAG’s 
efforts to integrate data 
management, reporting 
and indicator systems 
at all levels for the HIV 
and TB response. 
b) Align PEPFAR 
reporting with SAG 
indicators and 
reporting systems. 
c) Provide technical 
assistance to SAG to 
improve strategic 
information 
management and use, 
including addressing 
· Technical 
assistance and 
funding to 
strengthen M&E 
and the strategic 
use of information 
within NDOH and 
the SANAC 
Secretariat (CHAI, 
Global Fund 
Round 9, Sweden, 
UK, UN) 
· Technical 
assistance to 
support the DoH, 
key health 
institutions (e.g. 
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and epidemiological 
research. 
the quality of data, its 
collection, analysis and 
dissemination for 
decision-making. 
d) Strengthen SAG’s 
capacity to conduct 
operational and 
epidemiological 
research and basic 
program evaluations. 
e) Support and 
strengthen the 
management of M&E 
and Quality 
Improvement (QI) 
across the HIV and TB 
response. 
NHLS), and 
SANAC (CHAI, 
Sweden) 
· Direct support 
for coordination at 
the provincial level 
and national levels 
(Germany, 
Sweden) 
· Capacity building 
in support of DoH 
services (Belgium) 
· Capacity 
development to 
strengthen partner 
within HIV 
prevention 
(Germany) 
· Financial and 
technical 
assistance to the 
SANAC 
Secretariat 
(Sweden) 
3.3. Improve 
planning and 
management of 
human resources 
to meet the 
changing needs 
of the epidemics 
a) Plan for and 
develop a workforce 
that is able to meet the 
health and social 
welfare needs of the 
country. 
b) Strengthen the 
capacity to plan for, 
recruit, train, retain 
and manage human 
resources to meet the 
needs of the HIV and 
TB response. 
c) Increase the 
number of health and 
social workers 
formally engaged in 
the national HIV and 
a) Assist SAG in 
developing a 
workforce to meet its 
health and social 
welfare priorities 
through policy reforms, 
in-service training, and 
pre-service education. 
b) Provide technical 
assistance to strengthen 
SAG’s capacity for 
planning, recruitment, 
retention and 
management of human 
resources for health 
and social welfare. 
· Direct budgetary 
support to NDoH 
to strengthen the 
response to HIV 
and health (EU, 
UK) 
· Support to DoH 
in all provinces to 
contract 
Community Health 
Workers (CHWs) 
(EU) 
· Strengthen 
coordination of the 
response at 
national and 
provincial levels 
(Germany, 
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TB response. 
d) Strengthen the 
operational capacity 
of the national office 
for standards 
compliance. 
Sweden, UK, UN) 
· Support of 
NDoH M&E and 
SANAC M&E unit 
(Sweden, UK) 
3.4. Improve 
health care and 
prevention 
financing 
a) Strengthen the 
mobilization of 
domestic resources to 
fund the HIV and TB 
response. 
b) Improve the 
coordination and 
management of the 
financial 
commitments from the 
private sector, civil 
society, and 
development partners 
c) Identify and 
implement cost-
effective and high-
impact models of 
service delivery across 
the response for both 
health and social 
welfare. 
d) Improve the 
efficiency of public 
health expenditures 
across all SAG 
departments and 
levels. 
e) Improve the 
management and 
coordination of 
current investments 
across all SAG 
departments and 
levels to improve the 
efficiency and 
effectiveness of the 
response. 
a) Support SAG’s 
efforts to coordinate 
the mobilization of 
necessary resources to 
fund the unmet needs 
of the HIV and TB 
response. 
b) Strengthen SAG 
capacity to identify and 
promote cost-effective 
and high-impact 
models of service 
delivery. 
c) Strengthen South 
Africa’s capacity to use 
costing and health and 
social welfare 
expenditure analyses to 
improve resource 
planning, budgeting, 
allocation and review. 
d) Strengthen SAG’s 
commodity 
procurement, supply-
chain and inventory 
management to 
improve the cost 
effectiveness of service 
delivery systems. 
· Technical 
assistance around 
financing, funding, 
commodity 
procurement and 
drug pricing 
(CHAI) 
· Strengthen the 
management and 
capacity of 
municipalities 
(Netherlands) 
· Strengthen the 
management and 
capacity of NGOs 
(Belgium, 
Netherlands) 
· Strengthen civil 
society advocacy 
(UK) 
· Strengthening 
coordination of the 
response at 
national and 
provincial levels 
(Germany, 
Sweden, UK, UN) 
· Strengthen 
situation analyses, 
country data 
collation and 
international 
reporting (CHAI, 
UN) 
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5. Plans for Developing the Partnership Framework Implementation Plan 
(PFIP) 
The PFIP offers the SAG and the USG the opportunity to operationalize the high-
level goals and objectives expressed in this Partnership Framework document. The 
critical information relevant to the development of a baseline country profile and the 
national HIV & AIDS and TB response as well as relevant policy and financial 
assessments already exist. The development of the PFIP should aim therefore to 
focus chiefly on prioritizing among these goals and objectives, developing strategies 
for the identified priorities and challenges, quantifying the expected inputs and 
outcomes, articulating plans to jointly monitor progress on mutually decided upon 
targets, and communicating progress and challenges. The process should also ensure 
that the PFIP takes into consideration the priorities, programs, and contributions of 
other development partners active in the HIV & AIDS and TB sectors. 
The success of the Partnership Framework is dependent on the development of an 
implementation plan that is collectively and collaboratively executed by the SAG and 
the USG. The PFIP development process should be inclusive and highly consultative, 
guided by the same principles articulated in this document. 
The joint SAG-USG Design Team[9] intends to develop the PFIP with significant 
contributions from relevant technical working groups and stakeholders. 
The proposed timeline for the development of the PFIP is as follows: 
• November/December 2010: Design Team start planning for PFIP 
development; 
• December 2010: SAG and USG sign the Partnership Framework; 
• January/February 2011: Design Team collects and assesses inputs to 
Implementation Plan and develops a detailed, milestone-based timeline; 
• March/April/May 2011: Design Team drafts and circulates PFIP for 
comments; 
• June/July 2011: Design Team submits draft PFIP to PF Steering and 
Management Committees and the U.S. Office of the Global AIDS 
Coordinator for review and feedback; 
• August/September 2011: Design team finalizes and submits final Partnership 
Framework Implementation Plan to PF Steering and Management 
Committees, the SA National Department of Health, and the U.S. Office the 
Global AIDS Coordinator for approval. 
The PFIP should include an annual joint progress review. It is understood that every 
aspect of the PFIP may be renegotiated or updated periodically in writing during the 
life of the Partnership Framework to reflect changing conditions or priorities. 
However, these negotiated changes are not intended to alter the foundation of the 
Partnership Framework itself. 
6. Management, Coordination, and Communication 
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The joint management structure for the Partnership Framework is planned to consist 
of a high level Steering Committee assuming responsibility for the governance and 
strategic direction of the Partnership Framework and a Management Committee 
responsible for the management and coordination of the Partnership. 
The Steering Committee should have high-level representation from both 
governments, each naming its representatives prior to the development of the PFIP. 
The U.S. Ambassador is expected to name the USG representatives. The Director 
General for Health on behalf of the SAG departments is responsible for ensuring the 
participation of the appropriate senior level representatives serving on the Steering 
Committee. 
The Steering Committee is envisioned to assume ultimate responsibility for strategic 
decisions, performance oversight, and conflict resolution relating to the Partnership 
Framework and PFIP. Should the Partnership Framework require modification, this 
should be mutually decided upon in writing by the Steering Committee. 
The Management Committee is envisioned to assume the overall management and 
coordination responsibilities of the Partnership Framework and liaise between the 
Steering Committee and the broader community of stakeholders of the national HIV 
and TB response. It should guide the implementation of the Partnership Framework 
as recommended by the Steering Committee and in accordance with technical inputs 
of relevant stakeholder groups. The Management Committee’s role includes 
implementing the strategic direction of the Partnership Framework, developing and 
monitoring the Partnership Framework Implementation Plan, and ensuring 
communication among all relevant stakeholders. 
The Management Committee is expected to leverage existing stakeholder groups, 
technical working groups, and relevant SAG provincial and district level structures to 
implement its responsibilities. The membership and operational structure of the 
Management Committee, the frequency of its reporting, and other relevant 
operational issues should be detailed in the Partnership Framework Implementation 
Plan and is understood to be subject to Steering Committee approval. 
7. Signatures 
  
8. Guide to Acronyms 
While this document attempts to steer clear as far as is possible from employing 
technical terminology, this guide to acronyms provides a quick reference for some of 
the terminology used. 
• AIDS Acquired-Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
• ART Antiretroviral Therapy 
• ARVs Antiretrovirals 
• CDC United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
• CHAI Clinton Health Access Initiative 
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• EU European Union 
• HCT HIV Counseling and Testing 
• HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
• M&E Monitoring and Evaluation 
• MTSF Medium Term Strategic Framework (2009-2014) 
• NIMART Nurse Initiated and Managed ART 
• NSDAs Negotiated Service Delivery Agreements 
• NSP National Strategic Plan for HIV & AIDS and STIs, 2007-2011 
• OVCs Orphans and Vulnerable Children 
• PACs Provincial AIDS Councils 
• PEPFAR U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
• PF Partnership Framework 
• PFIP Partnership Framework Implementation Plan 
• PHC Primary Health Care 
• PLHIV People living with HIV 
• PM&E Performance Monitoring and Evaluation 
• PMTCT Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission 
• SAG South African Government 
• SANAC South African National AIDS Council 
• STI Sexually Transmitted Infection 
• TB Tuberculosis 
• UN United Nations 
• USAID United States Agency for International Development 
• USG United States Government 
• VMMC Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision 
 
 
 
[1] The United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, was 
launched in 2003. The PEPFAR program in South Africa is elaborated on in greater 
detail in Section 2. 
[2] The official SAG documents referenced in this Partnership Framework include 
the Medium Term Strategic Framework; the Ministerial Negotiated Service Delivery 
Agreements; the current and successive versions of the National Strategic Plan for 
HIV & AIDS and STIs; the TB Strategic Plan; the National HIV & AIDS and TB 
management policy; the Aid Effectiveness Framework for Health; the Department of 
Basic Education HIV & AIDS Integrated Strategy (2011-2015); and the Policy 
Framework for Orphans and Other Children made vulnerable by HIV & AIDS. 
[3] The USG Fiscal Year runs from 1st October to 30th September each year. 
[6] The current HIV & AIDS and STIs NSP covers the period 2007-2011. A new 
HIV & AIDS NSP is planned to be developed in 2011 for the period 2012 – 2016. If 
needed, the Partnership Framework and/or Partnership Framework Implementation 
Plan should be revised to reflect any shifting priorities. 
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[7] The TB NSP covers the same period as the HIV & AIDS NSP. Similarly, changes 
or shifts in priorities should be addressed accordingly. 
[8] Robert Hecht: “The long-term costs and financing of AIDS in Southern Africa: 
Making the right choices” (slide 19). Presentation delivered at the SADC Technical 
Meeting on sustaining HIV & AIDS responses in the context of shrinking 
resources in the SADC region. 24th August 2010. 
[9] The Partnership Framework was developed under the guidance of the joint SAG-
USG Design Team. 
 
Source: PEPFAR (2012) “Partnership Framework in Support of South Africa's 
National HIV & AIDS and TB Response 2012/13 - 2016/17 between the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the United 
States of America (December 2010)” 
http://www.pepfar.gov/frameworks/southafrica/161215.htm [19 March 2012]. 
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